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Abstract 
This study is devoted to politics of nationalism under Bulgarian communism (1944-89). 
The research aims to analyse the actual content of the Bulgarian communist policies on 
three main national questions and the ideas behind them. I-low did Bulgarian 
communism understand nation and nationalism? How did the Bulgarian Communist 
Party policy on issues of nationalism change over time? What was the legacy of 
communist politics of nationalism after the fall of the regime in 1989? 
This thesis focuses on three national questions in Bulgaria: `the Macedonian Question', 
the position of the ethnic Turkish minority, and the politics of Jewish identity. It argues 
that revealing the ideas behind the communist policies in relation to these questions 
explains how communism understood national identity in Bulgaria. 
Chapter 1 provides an overvie of theories of nationalism and communism in relation to 
Bulgarian communism. Chapter 2 analyses the understanding of communist 
internationalism and nationalism of the founders of Bulgarian communism and their 
followers in the contest of Marxism, Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism. Chapter 3 
discusses Bulgarian communist mythology and argues that under communism Bulgarian 
national mythology was at the basis of promoting cultural nationalism which in its own 
turn was used for political mobilisation against ethnic diversity . 
Chapters 4,5 and 6 are 
dedicated to the three national questions mentioned above and their development under 
communism. Chapter 7 examines politics of nationalism after the fall of the communist 
regime in Bulgaria in 1989 and argues that by promoting cultural nationalism based on 
ethnic homogeneity the policies of the BCP in relation to ethnic minorities determined 
2 
the politics of nationalism during post-communism in Bugara . The chapter, are 
linked 
by the argument that Bulgarian communism changed its original idea of building a 
communist ration-State as a political community with class identity at its core to building 
an ethnically homogenous nation-state with ethnic Bulgarian identity as its organising 
principle. 
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Table No. 1: Main Developments, Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) 
1891 Founding, Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) 
1903 BSDP splits into left-wing `narrow' and right-« ing `broad' parties, the 
former raking the name Bulgarian \\ orker's Social Democratic Party 
! 919 BSDP changes its name to Bulgarian Communist Party ! Narrow 
Socialists), or BCP, and is among the founding members of the 
Comintern 
1924 BCP banned 
192T' BCP reorganises as the legal Worker's Party 
1934-1944 BCP operates illegally as the Bulgarian Worker's Party (Communists' 
1944 The party resumes its former name, the Bulgarian Communist Party 
and seizes power in Bulgaria allied with the left-wing . 
\grariars 
and Social Democrats in tke Fatherland Front, which organised 
artisan. resistance to the German forces 
1946 BCP forms government under the leadership of Georgi Dimitroy 
1989 Todor Zhivkov, leader for 35 years, unseated 
1990 BCP changes its name to the Bul rarian Socialist Party (BSP) 
1996 BSP loses power, first -opposition' government formed 
Table No. 2: Communist Party Leaders of Bulgaria: 1944-1996 
944-49 GC<)rg)7 Dirnitrov 
1949--0 Vasil Kolarov 
'9-)()-54 Vulko Chei-c, enko-, - 
: 9; 4-89 Todor Z't1i%-ko%- 
%9-90 Pctur NIladenov 
19c; O-9ý Alezandcr 
: 99ý- Gcorr; Pai-vano" 
Zhivkov was elected Chairman of the State Council (de facto president of the repLblic; 
in '. 9"1 and was succeeded as prime minister by Stanko Todoroy, who in turn was 
succeeded in 1981 by Grisha Filipov. The post of general secretary, abolished in 1934, 
was revived in 1981 for Zhiykoy. 
The parry's name was changed in 1990 to the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Significant 
reforms within the party and its policies were implemented from 199, after its electoral 
defeat the same year. 
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Table No. 3: Prime Ministers of Bulgaria: September 1944-January 1996 
Date of Taking Office Prime Minister 
9 Sep 1944 Icimon Georgiev 
22 Nov 1946 Gcor >i Dimitrov 
21 ul 1949 Vasil Kolarov 
1 Feb 1950 Vulko Chcrvenkov 
17 Apr 1956 Anton Yugov 
19 Nov 1962 Todor Zhivkov 
8 ul 1')-i Stanko Todorov 
16 Jun 1981 Grisha Filipov 
21 Mar 1986 Georgi Atanasov 
20 Sep 1990 Andrei Lukanov 
1 20 Dec 1992 Dimitur Popov 
8 Nov 1991 Dili Dimitrov 
30 Dec 1992 Lubcn Bcrov 
1^ Oct 1994 Rencta lndzova 
25. jan 1995 than Vidcnov 
This table includes Bulgarian prime ministers from the communist seizure of power on 
9 September 1944 until the resignation of the BSP government in January 1997. 
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Table 4: Ethnic Structure of Bulgaria, 1992 ; 
Ethnic/ Religious Group Population 
Ethnic Bulgarians 7,300,000 85.7°4 
Ethnic Turks 800,000 9,4°/, 
Roma (Gypsies) 313,000 3,7%4 
Pomaks ('Bulgarian Muslims') 70,000-250,000 
Ethnic Macedonians 10,800 
cws 3,500 
Armenians 13,700 
Vlahs 5,160 
Hrachans 5,150 
Greeks 4,900 
Russians 17,000 
Total_population 8.5 million 
Table 5: Religious Structure of Bulgaria (percentages), 1992 6 
Christians Muslims Others 
Bulgarians 98.0 2.0 0.1 
Turkish 1.1 98.8 O. 1 
Roma 60.4 39.2 0.3 
Others 71.8 11.4 16.8 
Total 87.1) 12.7 0.2 
1 This data has been drawn according to the official results of the 1992 census, published 
by Committee in Defence of Minorities Rights (Kome/et : -a Zash/eta Praata na 
Jlaltsinstvata), Sofia, 1994. 
According to the 1992 census, 70,000 people declared themselves as Pomaks. Unofficial 
figures estimate the total Pomak population in Bulgaria to be 250,00(). In the census, the 
rest would he assumed to have declared themselves as Bulgarians, Turks or others. 
" [bid., p. 8. 
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Introduction 
The Study of Nationalism and Communism 
This study is devoted to the politics of nationalism under Bulgarian communism. It 
otters a political analysis of ho\y communism and nationalism interacted in Bulgaria. The 
research aims to reveal the actual communist policies on major national questions in 
Bulgaria, and the ideas behind them. As a work of political science, the goal of this thesis 
is to analyse how a number of interconnected issues - communism, nationalism, 
inrernationalism, ethnicity and ethnic conflict - functioned 
in the political system under 
Bulgarian communism. The study also examines the communist legacy in relation to 
ethnic nationalism during the post-communist period. 
This thesis analyses the political nationalism Bulgarian communists aspired to initially 
through the establishment of a communist state within the framework of the historic 
national boundaries - but based on the rational allegiance to a representative state aiming 
to become an equal member of the communist world. However, as they developed their 
ideas of cominunisrn, Bulgaria's communist elites started mobilising ethnic sentiments of 
the Bulgarian majority in order to promote Bulgarian cultural nationalism as an 
inseparable part of the Bulgarian communist tradition. This cultural nationalism was 
based on the idea of the ethnic homogenein" of the Bulgarian people. it became the 
tlagship of the Bulgarian communist leadership, which aimed to acquire mass popularity 
and to legitimise the communist regime. Although the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) 
claimed to have followed the Soviet line unconditionally, analysis of its policies towards 
1 
national questions reveals how they were adapted rather than subordinated 
unconditionally to the requirements of USSR. Here it is important to underline that in 
communist Bulgaria the rise of cultural nationalism based on ethnicity did not arise from 
concerns about demands of ethnic minorities, though this often was the official claim of 
the communist government, but exclusively from the BCP's ideas about maintaining 
power as a national leadership representing and responding to the aspirations of the 
ethnic Bulgarian majority as the party understood them. In Bulgaria the experience of 
oppression did not necessarily result in political mobilisation among ethnic groups. When 
Bulgarian Muslims, Jews or others chose to perform certain religious or cultural rituals, 
they did so mainly because they found them inherently meaningful, not for political 
reasons. The gradual closure of the cultural institutions of ethnic minorities did not lead 
their members to form movements of ethnic nationalism under communism. Nor did 
the overwhelming majority of them see the spread of the Bulgarian language as a threat 
to their cultural identity. While promoting Bulgarian cultural nationalism, the BCP used 
ethnic minorities to stereotype the `other' in the process of identifying who and what was 
`ours' in order to promote Bulgarian cultural nationalism based on ethnic exclusivity. 
This thesis argues that during the de-Stalinisation of Bulgarian communism political 
nationalism as an official ideology of the BCP was subordinated to cultural nationalism. 
As Hutchinson acknowledges many political nationalists begin as `enthusiasts of 
universalist ideologists' but as soon as they discover that the)' still have to achieve their 
political goals within their homelands resort to the instrumental use of mobilising ethnic 
sentiments. Yet they still aspire to securing a state as part of world civilisation. I This 
helps to explain the broader approach of the BCP, which was maintained throughout the 
I John Hutchinson, Nlodcrn Nationalism, (London: Fontana Press, 1994), p. 43. 
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communist rule, namely that the final aim of the Bulgarian communist regime was to 
create a nation-state that he'or. gs to a future larger communist world. 
Bulgarian nationalism under communism has been analysed in western social science 
from two main points of view: first in relationship to Bulgaria being a Soviet satellite and 
second in view of the contradictions between Bulgarian law as reflected in the 
communist constitutions and the treatment of ethnic minorities. In relation to the First 
factor, it has been asserted that Bulgaria's economic interests and desire for political 
protection in order to maintain stability were a major factor in its subservience to the 
Soviets. ' This argument supports the idea that Bulgarian internationalises was directed 
by pragmatic calculation. Others believe that 'Bulgarian-Soviet friendship' under 
communism was based primarily on historic links between Bulgarian communists and 
their Russian/Soviet comrades, as well as the self-confidence tl,: is small nation gained 
from being close to USSR. ' Bulgarian nationalism under communism has also been 
Sec J. Brown, Bulgaria under Communist Rule, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 265, 
and pp. 29--298, John, Bell, The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov, 
, California, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 143, Joseph Rothschild & 
Nancy M. \\ ingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political Histon- of East Central Europe 
Since World War If, third cd., (\ew York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 
212, Karen Davvisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge; 
(Cambridge, New York. New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 40. 
3 See P. Ler. dvai, Fa; les and Cobwebs: -Nationalism and 
Communism in the Balkans, 
(London: Macdonald, 1969;, p. 213 and p. 243, Nissan Oren, Bulgarian Communism: 
The Road Lo Power 1934-1944, (\cwt- York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1971), p. 3, p. 262, Richard J. Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 140. 
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explained as a psychological reaction towards the `nihilistic' attitude of young Bulgarians 
towards communist reality and as a way of counteracting western bourgeois influences. 4 
This research acknowledges the validity of these opinions. But it also seeks to deepen 
their understanding from a different point of view. First, it analyses Bulgarian loyalty to 
Soviet communism in the context of communist internationalism in relation to the 
Macedonian question and the idea of a Balkan Communist Federation (BCF). It argues 
that although the BCP's policy was dictated by the Soviets, it was not always directed 
against `non-communist' Bulgarian national aspirations. Bulgarian communists followed 
the Soviet line in accord with its understanding of internationalism, but it was also 
possible to square this line with ideas of traditional Bulgarian nationalism. Second, this 
thesis analyses the Bulgarian loyalty to Moscow through the concept of cultural 
nationalism disseminated under communism through national mythology as theoretically 
reworked by communist historiography. It agues that the Soviet connection allowed the 
promotion of `old' national myths about Bulgarian-Russian links as opposed to the `new' 
myth about `Bulgarian-Soviet friendship'. This also illuminates the subordinate position 
of the BCP to Moscow and the desire to maintain it even when Moscow was not 
satisfied with the BCP's policy in relation to issues of ethnic nationalism. 
Nationalism in Bulgaria under communism has also been discussed in the West in 
relation to the treatment of the Turkish ethnic minority in communist Bulgaria. The 
reasons for the BCP policy on the Turkish question has been analysed mainly in the 
context of provisions made by the Bulgarian communist definition of `socialist legality', 
4 See Lendvai, l'. agles in (: obwtiwebs, p. 24 and p. 243. 
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and in the context of human rights abuses. ' This study analyses the Turkish minority 
issue in communist Bulgaria from a different point of view. By applying modern theories 
of ethnic conflict regulation to the analysis of the BCP's policy towards the ethnic 
Turkish minority this thesis offers a deeper insight into the actual interaction between 
concepts of ethnicity and change in the context of Bulgarian communism. It argues that 
BCP policies were directed by ethnic nationalism as an official nationalism of the 
Bulgarian communist state which aimed to strengthen the communist regime as the 
leadership of ethnic Bulgarians. This argument counters two main beliefs in post- 
communist scholarship: that the communist policy towards the Bulgarian Turks was a 
result of demographic concerns about the decline of the ethnic Bulgarians compared to 
ethnic Turks6or was caused by the irrational behaviour of communist leaders whose 
`rationale went beyond any historical, legal or humane logic and norm. '' 
The position of the f ews under Bulgarian communism has been exclusively observed by 
western scholars as an emigration issue after the end of the Second World War and as a 
minority rights issue under the Bulgarian communist regime. " This study argues that the 
s Brown, Bulgaria under Communist Rule, pp. 14-15. On discrepancies between 
Bulgarian communist constitutional provisions and the BCP policies towards ethnic 
minorities see also Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, 
(London: Minority Rights Publications, 1994), p. 131. 
Sec Ali Fminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, (London: Hurst & 
Company as Book Series No. 6 of the Institute of Muslim Minorities Affairs, 1997). 
7 See Antonina Zhelyazkova, Introduction., Between Adaptation and Nostalgia: The 
Bulgarian Turks in Turkey by Antonina Zhelyazkova (ed. ), (Sofia: IMIR, 1988), p. 18. 
See Peter Meyer, Bernard D. Wcinrub, Eugene Dushinsky and Nicolas Sylvan, The 
Jews in the Soviet Satellites, (New York, The American Jewish Committee: Syracuse 
University Press, 1953), Frederich B. Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution 
1940-1944, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972). 
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communist leadership promoted the idea of being the `saviour' of the Bulgarian Jews 
during the Second World \X ar in support of Bulgarian cultural nationalism that claimed 
that Bulgarians were not anti-Semitic `by culture'. Bulgarian cultural nationalism also 
required the cultural assimilation of the Bulgarian Jews mistrusted as being connected to 
outside foreign powers. This research also explains the competing trends within Jewish 
politics before the establishment of communist power in relation to their participation in 
the Bulgarian communist movement. It argues that their attitudes towards emigration to 
Israel were determined by the complexities of Bulgarian national and international 
politics as well as by their own ideas of what Bulgarian Jewish identity should mean 
under communism. 
The Macedonian question under Bulgarian communism has been discussed from two 
main points of view: as an issue of dispute among the Balkan communist parties prior 
and during the Second World War around the idea of the creation of Balkan Communist 
Federation and as a question of Bulgarian foreign policy after the establishment of 
communist power in Bulgaria. In relation to the first point of view most western scholars 
claim that the Macedonian question under Bulgarian communism was the main bone of 
contention in relation to the communist internationalist movement. ° The Macedonian 
question has also been analysed as a `minority issue' causing tension between Bulgaria 
" Sec Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development 
1883-1936, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), Walter Roberts, Tito, 
Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 
LS. Stavrianos, Balkan 1 edcration: A Histoiy, of the M"Iovemnt Toward Balkan Unity, in 
Modern Times, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), Crampton, A Short 
Histoi, Hugh Poulton, The Balkans. 
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and Yugoslavia during communism. 1u This research supports the argument made in this 
tradition, namely that before the split between Tito and Stalin Bulgarian communism 
offered a new approach towards the Macedonian question by recognising Macedonia as a 
constituent republic of communist Yugoslavia and declaring that there was a Macedonian 
nation in Bulgaria in accord with the ideas of Soviet communist internationalism. But it 
also argues that the BCP's policy underwent changes and moved beyond the 
international dimension of communist politics. This thesis analyses the Macedonian 
question in communist Bulgaria from a political science point of view and asserts that the 
BCP's policy was based not only on pragmatic considerations dictated by international 
communism but also on the broader approach of the Bulgarian communist leadership 
towards ethniciry and nationalism. It argues that the policy towards the Nlacedonian 
question reveals the understanding of the BCP that ethnic identity is a fixed `blood-and 
soil' phenomenon and could only be changed forcibly. 
This study is new to the Bulgarian scholarship on nations and nationalism under 
Bulgarian communism, which generally claims that nationalism was suppressed by the 
BCP - though this view has not been exclusively Bulgarian and has been applied by 
western scholars to the entire region of Eastern Europe. " This research shows that the 
I" See Robert R. King, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of 
Tension among Balkan Communist States, (Massachusetts, Cambridge: Harvard 
University press, 1973), chapter 1O, 'Historical Debates: Macedonia', pp. 1K7- 219. 
1 See Kiril Neshev, Balkanskiyat Sblusuk na Tsivilizatsii, (Sofia: Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 
1996), Vera Mutafchieva, Introduction., in Mutafchieva (ed. ), Sudut nad Istoritsite: 
Bulgarskata Istoricheska Nauka. Dokumcnti i Diskusii 1944-1950, (Sofia: Marin Drinov, 
1995), vol. 1, Janusz Bugajski, Introduction., in Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern 
Europr A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties, (Armonk, New 
York, London: 1I. 1 Sharp, 1995), Charles A. Kupchan, Introduction: Nationalism 
Resurgent, in Kupchan (cd. ), Nationalism and. Nationalities in the New Europe, p. 1., 
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interaction between internationalism and nationalism in the context of Bulgarian 
communism was more complex than being `on the defensive' as a reaction to the policies 
of Soviet intervention or Yugoslav designs concerning Macedonia, as asserted by 
Pundeff, ' or an iliustration of incompatibility, as asserted by Mutafchie-va, who claims 
that the idea of communist internationalism as Introduced by USSR was a violation of 
Bulgarian national independence which aimed to deny the traditional and `natural' 
national idea of all Bulgarian politicians and intellectuals except the Marxist-Leninists. ° 
This research aso dissents from the view that Bulgarian communism disregarded 
Bulgarian nationalism or transformed it into nihilism or a `perversity' of Zhiykoyism. '4 
Developments in Bulgaria during post-communism in relation to rationalism have not 
been the subject of systematic research. Bulgaria after 1989 has been often omitted or 
mentioned only briefly in scholarly accounts of nationalism in the post-communist 
world. There are two main reasons for this. First, post-communist Bulgaria became 
neither part of post-Soviet studies nor studies dedicated to the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
Also Bulgaria is not generally included in studies dealing with Central European post- 
communist countries nor in those analysing Romania or Albania in depth. Post- 
David S. Mason, Revolution and Transition in Fast-Central Europe, 2nld. cdition, (USA: 
\\. estview Press, 1996), pp. '4-)-144. 
Marin V. Pur. deff `Bul arian Nationalism' in Peter F. Sugar and No J. Lederer, 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, (Seattle and London: University of W ashin; ton Press, 
1969, i, pp. 1 59-1 6D-. 
Sec . \lutatchicva, Sudur nad Istoritsite, 1993). 
4 See Devan Kiuranov, 'Bulgaria: \\'here It Comes From, and Where It Is Trying to Go', 
in Devan Kiuranov, Evgeni Dainov, Vassil Garnizov, Bulgaria in Transition: Three 
Points of View, (Sofia: Centre for Social Practices, 1996), Neshev, Balkanskivat Sblusuk 
na Tsiviliza_sii, 1996 and Alexander 1 ilov, To Overcome the Distortions Among the 
Turkic-Speaking; and Muslim Population in Bulgaria. Report (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1990). 
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communist Bulgaria has been analysed mainly in terms of economic development and as 
a problematic post-communist political democracy. ' In the context of ethnic 
nationalism after 1989 the Bulgarian way been analysed primarily in relation to Turkish 
politics and the recognition of independent Macedonia (FYROM) in 1991. **- 
This study offers an overview of post-communist developments in Bulgaria which 
explains that the rise of ethnic nationalism culminated while the communist regime was 
still in power as a result of a complex interaction between Bulgarian cultural nationalism 
and communist management of ethnic conflict. The rise of Turkish politics on the eve of 
the changes in 1989 was a reaction towards already ethniciscd politics under the 
leadership of the BCP. The research analyses the problems of the ideological 
transformation of the BCP during post-communism in relation to issues of Bulgarian 
nationalism. Although the former communists in Bulgaria claimed to defend the unity of 
the Bulgarian state on the grounds of civic rights, until 1996 their policy continued to be 
marked by the promotion of exclusively Bulgarian cultural nationalism. 
See No Banac, `Nationalism in Southeastern Europe' in Charles A. Kupchan (ed. ), 
Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Eurore, (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1995), p. 118, John D. Bell, `Democratization and political participation 
in `postcommunist' Bulgaria' in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds. ), Politics, Power 
and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East I=urope', (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp. 353-402. 
1o' See Ali I ', ninov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, (London: Hurst & 
Company as Book Series No. 6 of the Institute of Muslim Minorities Affairs, 1997), Luan 
Troxcl, 'Bulgaria' in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgycs (eds. ), The Legacies of 
Communism in Eastern Europe, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), pp. 227-244., Andrei Gcorgiev and Emil Tsenkov, Bulgaria and the 
25 
Terminology 
The main terms which required full research for this thesis arc as follows: 
C. ollllllunism. Communism was the political system based on the particular brand of 
Marxist philosophy - Marxism-Leninism. 
Marxism-Leninism represented Lenin's ideas 
about how Marxist theory should be applied in practice. Marxism-Leninism rested on 
two main premises: a highly organised communist party leading the communist 
revolution, and a strong and centralised communist state controlling the society. 
Marxism-Leninism as the theory of communism came to political power in the 1930s in 
the USSR and spread to the countries of Eastern Europe after the Second World War. 
This thesis asserts that the communist pattern of institutionalisation in Eastern Europe 
and in Bulgaria in particular was essentially a Russian political model. The term 
communism is also used in this thesis in its meaning as a system of beliefs , which 
did 
not derive exclusively from Marxist-Leninist theory, though this was the official claim of 
the communist parties, but also from the complex interaction between implicit meanings 
of various policies and popular perceptions. 
Conrnilrnist Inhrrnrrtiona/i. rn/. Communist internationalism has been associated with the idea 
that a communist revolution would be achieved by the unified struggle of the world 
proletariat. Because of the role of the proletariat as the driving force of the communist 
movement communist internationalism has been also often defined as a proletarian 
internationalism. At the core of the idea of communist internationalism , x-as the nature of 
Recognition of Macedonia (1991-1992), (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy 
(F. thnic Conflicts in [`, astern F, urope: Security and Human Rights Implications, 1993). 
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the relationship between different national communist parties. In defining communist 
internationalism one has to differentiate between the concept of internationalism 
expressed in the -writings of Marx and Engels, in Marxism-Leninism and in Stalinism. For 
the purposes of this study communist internationalism is discussed in the context of 
these models of thought in order to clarify their meaning in relation to the Bulgarian 
Marxist-Leninist tradition. 
Nations and Nationalism. Despite the differences between various types of nationalism, 
Smith argues that it is possible to present a general definition of nationalism: nationalism 
is a social and political movement, which is based on the assumption that individuals 
possess a collective consciousness of belonging to a particular homeland and political 
community. The goals of nationalism usually are to protect the unity, autonomy and the 
identity of the respective nation (or potential nation). 18 It is in this sense that nationalism 
is used throughout this thesis, unless specified otherwise. 
The distinction between political and cultural nationalism is essential for the 
understanding of the development of concepts of nation and nationalism under 
Bulgarian communism. As 1-lutchinson asserts, political nationalism works within the 
framework of a territorial homeland in order to secure a state. Political nationalists view 
that the nation is a `civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws. "' The 
ultimate objective of political nationalism is the national state, which represents those 
ý" This definition draws on Smith's definitions of `nation' and `nationalism' in Anthony 
Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 13-14 and pp. 72-73. 
19 Sec John Hutchinson, 'I'hc Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism, (Allen and Unwind: 
London, 1987), pp. 12-19. 
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members with citizenship rights. Political nationalism also aims to achieve autonomous 
state and institutions. 
Cultural nationalism on the other hand seeks a moral regeneration of the community. 20 
Whereas the objectives of political nationalism are essentially modernist in that it seeks to 
`secure a representative state for their community' so that it might participate as an equal 
in the developing world civilisation, cultural nationalism considers the state as accidental 
and a product of mechanical and rationalist attitude which imposes uniformity on 
society. 21 Both types of nationalism sometimes merge into each other but most 
importantly often political nationalists use cultural nationalism in order to mobilise a 
political constituency. 22 
Political nationalism is state-orientated whereas cultural nationalism is essentially 
communitarian. Political nationalism, argues Hutchinson, espouses essentially rationalist 
approach and seeks to override traditional differences in order to create a homogenous 
society and to win a representative state. Cultural nationalists in general reject the `legal- 
rational concept of integration' and propose to organise society around the concept of 
the uniqueness of the nation. 
Kohn also asserts that there is a distinction between political and cultural nationalism. He 
believes that the former is `rational' whereas the latter is `mystical', but that both depend 
on the level of socio-political development of a community. In the European context 
political nationalism developed first in the West whereas cultural nationalism was to be 
20 John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism, (London: Fontana Press, 1994), p. 41. 
21 Ibid., p. 43-44. 
22 Ibid., p. 43. 
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found in the East, where the vision of the nation-state was based on `mystical organic 
bonds' between people and land. 23 Kohn argues that the people of Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans developed cultural nationalism, which later turned into the aim to establish 
nation-states. 24 The difference between the West and the East underlines that in Central 
and Eastern Europe nationalism grew `in protest against and in conflict with the existing 
state pattern - not primarily to transform it into a people's state, 
but to redraw the 
political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands'. 25 
Ethnicity and Ethnic Nationalism. Ethnicity appears in the form of the idea of ethnie, which 
has been defined as constituting six main features: 1) a common proper name, to identify 
and express the `essence' of the community, 2) a myth of common ancestry, a myth 
rather than a fact, a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place 
and that gives an ethnie a sense of fictive kinship, 3) shared historical memories, or better 
shared memories of common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their 
commemoration, 4) one or more elements of common culture, which need not be 
specified, but normally include religion, customs, or language, 5) a link with homeland, 
not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnie, only its symbolic attachment to the 
ancestral land, as with Diaspora peoples, 6) a sense of solidarity on the part of at least 
some sections of the ethnie's population. 26 Smith also believes that there is a distinct 
model of nationalism in the Eastern European tradition, a model of the nation based on 
23 See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. (Macmillian: New York, 1945), pp. 18-20 
and pp. 329-31. 
24 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background. (USA: 
Collier Books, 1969), p. 4. 
s Ibid., p. 329. 
26 See John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (eds. ), Ethnicity (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 6-7. 
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such an `ethnic' conception of the nation, which defines the nation `first and 
foremost as 
a community of common descent'. The western model of the nation, according to 
him, is 
based on `historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, 
and common civic culture and ideology. ' 27 
Thus ethnicity is understood as a basic ingredient of cultural nationalism. Cultural 
nationalism often uses ethnicity in order to define itself in terms of its own 
distinctiveness. Ethnic nationalism aims to expand into cultural nationalism and from 
there it may aspire to political nationalism, which would require the formation of a state 
unit. Typically such a state would claim legitimacy on the basis of the common ethnic 
origins and culture of the nation. Thus ethnic nationalism is defined mainly as a 
movement which claims that the nation is organised primarily around ethnicity. 
Both political and cultural nationalism are constrained to realise their vision within the 
framework of a historic ethnic community. But political nationalism may use ethnic 
sentiments only instrumentally in order to unite different groups in a national state, 
whereas cultural nationalism may centre around the idea of ethnicity itself. 2 Ethnicity 
becomes a `potential driving force of cultural nationalism claiming exclusivity and fixed 
nature'. 29 
Ethnic Groh Ethnic Alinorily, National Identity. `Ethnic group' is used in this research to 
mean `a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, 
memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic 
27 Ibid., p. 11. 
28 Ibid., p. 56. 
29 Ibid., 13-14. 
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elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. '30 Ethnic groups could be 
`dominant' or `subordinate'. In both cases the definition of etimie given above it is an 
attribute to ethnic groups. 
The term `ethnic minority' is used in this thesis to designate a subordinate ethnic group, 
which forms a `subsystem with limited access to roles and activities central to the 
economic and political institutions of society. '31 The idea of et/inie is also central to 
understanding the relationship between ethnicity and nation in the context of ethnic and 
national minorities. An ethnic minority could be defined as a national minority when it 
has a historic `nation' but at present lives outside its political boundaries. 32 In this sense 
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is a national minority whereas the Pomaks constitute an 
ethnic minority. In some cases the two terms could be applied to one and the same 
minority. Bulgarian Macedonians could be defined as an ethnic minority in the context of 
the Bulgarian nation if it is accepted that there is no Macedonian nation, or as a national 
minority provided that it is recognised that there is a Macedonian nation. 
`National identity' as used in this research is defined by five fundamental features: 1) a 
historic territory or homeland, 2) common myths and historical memories, 3) a common, 
mass public culture, 4) common legal rights and duties for all members, 5) a common 
economy with territorial mobility for members. 33 
30 Richard Schermerhorn , 
`Ethnicity and Minority Groups', in Hutchinson, John, & 
Anthony Smith (eds. ), Ethnici T, (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 
17. 
31 Ibid., p. 18. 
32 `National minority' could also mean that an ethnic minority is in the process of 
establishing a national identity and national state. 
33 Smith, National IdcntinT, p. 14. 
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The Scope of the Topic 
For the purposes of this study, I have constructed my own time periods for looking at 
communism and nationalism in Bulgaria: 
1. Bulgarian communism before coming to power : 1891 - 1944. 
2. Bulgarian communism consolidating as the political power of Bulgaria: 1944-1948. 
3. Bulgarian communism during Stalinism: 1948 - 1956. 
4. Bulgarian communism under the leadership of Todor Zhivkov: 1956-1989. 
5. Bulgarian post-communism: 1989-1996. 
In relation to nationalism and internationalism Bulgarian communism went through two 
main thematically defined periods of development. During the first period, the Bulgarian 
communist movement aspired to the establishment of a centralised state with the 
possibility of being included in a Balkan Communist Federation at a later stage. During 
this period the BCP professed political nationalism requiring loyalty to the Bulgarian 
socialist/communist state. During the second period, the communist leadership in 
34 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1. 
35 Smith, National Identity, p. 14. 
36 George Schöpflin 
, 
`Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West', in Charles 
A. Kupchan (ed. ) Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 39 
37 This list is based on Smith's definition of ethnic community, modified in accord with 
the specific characteristics of ethnic groups in Bulgaria. See Smith, National Identity, p. 
21. 
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Bulgaria subordinated political nationalism to cultural nationalism requiring loyalty first 
to the Bulgarian ethnic community. During this period the final aim stated in the 
doctrine of Bulgarian communism continued to be the building of a communist state as a 
political community based on highly developed means of production and `socialist 
consciousness', hut the instrument to achieve it was exclusive cultural nationalism. 
Bulgarian post-communism, as defined in this research, began in November 1989, when 
dramatic changes in the communist leadership started. Communist ideology was officially 
abandoned, yet political and economic reforms in Bulgaria were held back. This was due 
in part to the legacy of communism. But there was also a lack of substantial reforms in 
the communist party of Bulgaria, which managed to maintain power for most of the time 
until 1996. During this period, Bulgaria was uncertain about its direction. The country's 
insecurities were further compounded by the collapse of the USSR and the eruption of 
the Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s. In the winter of 1996-97, the BCP government 
resigned under pressure from mass protests in the capital Sofia. New elections were held 
and the opposition bloc, the United Democratic Forces (UDF), came to power. Bulgaria 
entered a new stage of political development by declaring a firm intention to seek 
membership in the EU and NATO. For the purposes of this study, this phase is 
Bulgaria's final break from communism. 
The Approach 
This research is a work of political science and as such it offers an analysis of the politics 
of communism and nationalism based on modern theories of communism, nations and 
nationalism, national mythology, ethnicity and ethnic conflict. This study uses history in 
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order to recount what happened, but does not claim to have a historical approach. 
Rather, it aims to analyse the events, accounted for in works of history, in political terms. 
There are a number of excellent histories of Bulgaria, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 
which this study uses as main sources of reference.; " 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis analyses three core national issues in communist Bulgaria: the Macedonian 
question, the Turkish minority and the Bulgarian Jewish community. Each of these 
questions forms a separate chapter of the thesis. I chose these questions as the core 
topics of the research for one major reason: The RlacedonianQuestion, the Turkish minority 
and the Jewish comnisutity are directly linked to the fundamentals of the Bulgarian nation and 
nationalism and its development under communism. There are a number of minorities' issues 
which this study did not focus on. Nevertheless, understanding their development under 
communism contributed to the general overview of Bulgarian nationalism. Among them 
are the Roma (Gypsy), Gagauz, Tatars, Armenians and Vlachs. In my view, these groups 
are more strictly appropriate to the study of minorities' rights rather than the broader 
problem of a politics of nationalism under communism. The Pomaks form a special case, 
closely linked to the Turkish issue but also quite distinct because of being Bulgarian 
language speakers, and therefore are treated in a separate section within the consideration 
of the Turkish minority. 
38 Sec Richard J. Crampton, A Short History,, L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans 1815-1914, 
(Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1958) and Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2 
vols. 
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The rest of the research examines the intellectual background and interactive dynamics 
between communism, internationalism, nationalism, and myth. 
The Chapters 
Chapter 1 presents the overview of the literature on the topic. It conceptualises nations 
and nationalism in general and particularly in relation to communism and modernity. The 
overview of the literature presented here discuses theoretical views on communism and 
nationalism in general and in the context of the communist revolution in Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans. It analyses theories of communism and nationalism which choose as a 
starting point the conceptualisation of nation and nationalism and from there critiques 
the relationship to Marxism and Marxism-Leninism. The main argument here is that, as 
Gellner pointed out, Marxist theory did not offer a satisfactory explanation for 
nationalism as a phenomenon of modernity because it focused on class rather than 
culture in its broad sense. 39 The chapter also offers an overview of literature discussing 
communism and nationalism in a different way - by looking at the meaning of nations 
and nationalism in Marxist and Marxist-Leninist theory as a starting point and from there 
explaining the relationship between the two. From this point of view Marxism and 
Marxism-Leninism did not fail to comprehend nations and nationalism in the world but 
conceptualised them as stages of human development rather than permanent historical 
phenomena. 
39 See Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, (Great Britain: Redwood Press Limited, 
1972). 
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Chapter 2 outlines the basics of Marx and Engels', Lenin's and Stalin's views on issues of 
nationalism and internationalism in order to explain the foundations of Bulgarian 
Marxist-Leninist theory on nations and nationalism. This chapter argues that external 
aspects of national questions in communist Bulgaria were to be dictated in accord with 
the principles of Marxist-Leninist communist internationalism, and analyses the theory of 
the idea of creating a Balkan Communist Federation as a solution to national questions. 
It also points out that in their writings and party documents Bulgarian communist leaders 
claimed adherence to Marxism-Leninism but hardly indicated exactly from which 
concepts of classical Marxism, Marxism-Leninism or Stalinism followed their policies for 
mobilisation of Bulgarian cultural nationalism through linguistic homogenisation during 
the 1960s and forcible assimilation of ethnic minorities during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Chapter 3 analyses the Bulgarian communist mythology. This chapter argues that 
communism designed not only a new but, also, a largely incoherent mythology. Yet 
communism used this mythology to legitimise itself as the `antique' order of Bulgarian 
life. As an ideology with an uncertain future, communism needed the accomplishments 
of the past. For this reason communist mythology had to interact with the national body 
of myths. It also tried to present Bulgarian national myths as communist alongside its 
own system of symbols and rituals. 
Chapters 4,5 and 6 are dedicated to the three national questions in Bulgaria with which 
this study is concerned: the Macedonian question, the position of the Turkish minority 
and Jewish politics under communism, respectively. These are not case studies of 
minorities. Each chapter rather analyses how and why communism politicised ethnic 
identities and what were the consequences of this process. The Macedonian question has 
been a long-standing historical problem in Bulgaria. The politics of Macedonian identity 
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and nationhood are at the core of understanding the Bulgarian nation under 
communism. Chapter 4 argues that the BCP failed to develop a consistent policy on the 
Macedonian question. Communist politics also deepened the anxiety of the Bulgarian 
consciousness in relation to the Macedonian question by raising a fundamental question 
of nationhood: Can national identities change? The politics of the Turkish minority after 
the end of the Second World War reveals how communism handled the complex attitude 
towards the Turkish presence in Bulgaria, which reflected the memory of the Ottoman 
rule. Chapter 5, which is devoted to the Turkish issues, argues that communism was 
driven by the idea that Bulgaria should be an ethnically homogenous nation-state and 
therefore aimed to eliminate Turkishness. Bulgarian communism denied the existence of 
the Turkish identity. This caused the biggest ethnic crisis in the modern history of 
Bulgaria. The politics of the anti-Turkish campaign of 1984-85 invoked the old myth of 
Bulgarian suffering and redemption. This chapter argues that the BCP mobilised 
Bulgarians against Turks through the old belief of Bulgarians as victims of ethnic 
persecution at the hands of the Ottomans. The peculiarity of the Pomak identity and the 
way Bulgarian communism understood it is given special attention in Part II of Chapter 
5. Pomaks' experience under communism is analysed as closely related to the 
development of Turkish issues in communist Bulgaria. Chapter 6 examines communist 
attitudes and policy towards the Bulgarian Jews. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe the 
Jewish question during the Second World War was connected to the Jewish involvement 
in the communist movement. The overwhelming majority of the Jews who remained in 
the country after the mass resettlement to Israel viewed that communist Bulgaria would 
become their true homeland. But they were greatly disappointed by the actual communist 
view and policy towards the Jewish identity. Bulgarian communism offered to the Jewish 
community full assimilation into the ethnic Bulgarian identity, though with some very 
marginal concessions such as individual permission to retain Jewish names. The central 
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argument of this chapter is that under communism the regime patronised the Bulgarian 
Jews and used the community for the purposes of promoting ethnic Bulgarian 
nationalism. 
Chapter 7 analyses the fall of Bulgarian communism in the context of the politics of 
nationalism. It examines the post-communist period of Bulgaria in relation to the 
national questions discussed in the thesis. This chapter argues that the legacy of the 
communist approach to nationalism determined the politicising of ethnic issues after the 
collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Two major themes of post-communist 
development in Bulgaria are discussed in this chapter: the way in which communism in 
Bulgaria was brought down, and the legacy of communism in Bulgarian politics in 
relation to ethnic issues and nationalism. The central argument here is that much of the 
transformation of Bulgaria started in 1989 and was guided by the politics of ethnicity. 
The legacy of the politics of nationalism under communism is analysed by examining 
how ethnic identities created new political parties. Ethnic politics on the scene of 
Bulgarian post-communism became crucial for the further development of Bulgarian 
nationalism. 
I hope not to have overused two of my skills while writing about Bulgaria: my language 
fluency and my own experience with nationalism under communism. Rather I hope that 
an intimate insight into Bulgarian politics has given this research not bias, but passion. 
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Chapter 1: Overview of Literature - 
Theories of Communism and Nationalism 
I. Introduction 
The key to understanding the relationship between communism and nationalism is the 
concept of modernity. Communism as an ideology claimed to bring modernity. Yet 
nationalism had its own objectives of modernity and was in place before communism 
came to power in Eastern Europe. This tension over the modernising role of the two 
great social forces drove the changes which communism brought to the nation-state. 
Understanding this tension helps explain the political culture of communism, and the 
ways in which it developed state traditions in Eastern Europe. The question of 
modernity also provides the key to comprehending the communist idea of the nation and 
nationalism, in Eastern Europe as a whole and Bulgaria in particular. Communism 
represented the `new' world order of the time, whereas nationalism was seen as the `old' 
social organising principle. Communism was supposed to replace nationalism, but 
instead it was nationalism that finally replaced - if not triumphed over - communism. 
For its part, nationalism has been seen as being an especially Eastern European political 
tradition, which communism could not overcome. From this perspective communist 
interaction with nationalism preserved the latter in its original shape. 
This study asserts that the main reason communism competed with nationalism was that 
nationalism was seen as a source of legitimacy, which communism lacked. Unable to 
legitimise its political power communism transformed itself into an ideology of the 
nation. Rather than `overcoming' nationalism, communism in fact drew on and 
in many 
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ways strengthened nationalism. Communism was also incapable of creating an alternative 
to nationalism because it tried to deny nationalism before it actually understood the role 
nationalism plays in Eastern European politics. That role was primarily as a legitimising 
force for political actors. 
Bulgarian communism has been largely analysed through the particularly close 
connection the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) had with the Soviet Communist Party 
and Soviet communism. This close relationship is key to understanding the basics of 
Bulgarian communism. But the crucial factor in determining the course of Bulgarian 
nationalism under communism was that the Bulgarian-Soviet connection did not prevent 
Bulgarian communism from becoming a nationalist ideology. On the contrary, on many 
levels the Soviet connection facilitated the further development of Bulgarian nationalism 
after the Second World War. Indeed, it was Bulgarian nationalism that encouraged the 
close connection to Russia and the Soviet Union - and thus to 
Soviet communism. 
Bulgaria was not more susceptible to obedience than any other communist country. The 
main reason for its subordination to the Soviets as a political satellite was its nationalist 
ties, which in turn encouraged the promotion of communism as nationalism. 
The relationship between Bulgarian communism, nationalism and language is illustrative 
of this political dynamic. The BCP policy on language education was designed after the 
Soviet model. The main communist innovation was the compulsory study of Russian 
language. For most countries, such a reform would be seen as a threat to national culture. 
Yet this was not the case in Bulgaria. The study of Russian did not undermine the 
Bulgarian language as one of the most important features of Bulgarian national identity. 
The close Bulgarian-Russian linguistic connection served to re-enforce the national myth 
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of the civilising mission of the Bulgarian people, which was strongly promoted under 
communism. 
Communism aimed to change the entire social structure of Eastern European society. In 
Bulgaria, communist modernisation affected the countryside and the peasantry in a 
particularly harsh way. Communism tried to integrate the predominant rural culture into 
the urban environment, with ambiguous results. When communism failed to achieve 
social cohesion, it tried to compensate with nationalism. A lack of social integration was 
not solely a problem of communism, but rather a continuation of the long-standing 
problem of the political traditions of the Eastern European countryside. Communism 
inherited these traditions, and although it introduced radical changes, such as 
collectivisation, the peasantry never internalised the new social principles it had to live 
with. Despite massive industrialisation, the Bulgarian countryside remained deeply 
conservative in its political outlook. Communism could only win support there by 
representing itself as the protector of the very same traditional order of life which it 
threatened. 
The complex relationship of Bulgarian nationalism to communism is also illustrated 
through the prism of ethnic conflict. The theory of ethnic conflict under communism 
has been discussed mainly in minority studies or as a question of nationalities policy - the 
implementation of the communist policy towards people of different nationalities living 
under the communist regimes. Communism did not deliver equality for minorities. This 
study argues further, however, that it never intended to. In Bulgaria, ethnic conflict was a 
direct consequence of the BCP's understanding of the nation-state as a homogenous 
ethnic unit, which developed gradually. Bulgarian communism used methods of 
managing ethnic conflict widely practised in ethnically divided societies elsewhere - 
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ranging from assimilation to expulsion. At the same time the specific conditions of ethnic 
conflict under communism derived from the history of Bulgaria, which has aspired to 
national unity since the collapse of the Ottoman empire. 
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II. Claims to Modernity: Nationalism versus Marxism and Communism 
Communism declared that it had brought modernity to Eastern Europe. Modernity was 
achieved through radical social revolution driven by the universal unity of the proletariat. 
Mass industrialisation and education were supposed to give all people equal access to 
political power. This political order was called `people's democracy'. Communism 
claimed that modernity meant a better life for everyone loyal to communist ideals. 
Modernity was to be achieved through elimination of all hostile differences, including 
hostile national differences. Thus modernity also meant homogeneity. Communist 
citizens were defined as people possessing `socialist consciousness' and class identity. 
Class-based social development was an exclusively communist idea based on the Marxist 
theory of capital distribution. It presupposed that modernity was essentially about 
economic advancement. Modernity was a construct to he implemented in the communist 
universe where there would be no antagonistic national units. Modernity was meant to be 
total and applied to everyone in an equal manner. 
Contrary to this concept, other theories of modernity, without rejecting the communist 
approach based totally on Marxism, understood nationalism as being at the core of 
modernity. Many modernists argue that modernity is about homogenising society 
through mass industrialisation and literacy, which in its own turn creates the nation. 
According to Gellner, )Marxism failed to comprehend modernity because it did not 
recognise it as a culturally complex phenomenon. Marxist theory could not sufficiently 
explain either modernity or nationalism, because it concentrated on the economy. It did 
not see education and literacy as the basis of any political unity, but rather as tools of 
class equality. Gellner agrees that modernity was about eliminating inequality. But he sees 
inequality as a result of the uneven diffusion of modernisation, not exclusively in terms 
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the distribution of capital, as Marx did. Gellner understands modernity as a particular 
mode of humanity, which created the nation as the new `structure' and the `changing 
culture' of society. ' He defines pre-modern society as based on the notion of kinship. 
Modern ones, he believes, are united under the flagship of nationality and directed by the 
bureaucracy. Gellner's theory underlines that the minimal requirement for modernity was 
literacy. Mass literacy, he argues, was possible only if there was a `nation-sized' 
educational system. He sees the nation as `the minimal political unit in the modern world 
(i. e., one in which universal literacy is recognised to be the valid norm)'. 
Z Thus according 
to him, language and the mass knowledge of language became the unifying basis of the 
modern society. The modern community had to `speak' a language, and all its members 
should understand it. Modernity, according to this Gellnerian concept, became 
inseparable from the understanding of the political community as a nation. Further on 
Gellner sees the development of the nation as a result of the mobilisation of industrial 
and intellectual resources. He believes that the politicisation of these modernising factors 
created the nation. Ethnicity, according to Gellner, was at the core of the nation, but not 
ethnicity alone. Rather it was ethnicity within a political context, as determined by 
modernity. This formed the foundation principle of the nation: `Nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist - 
but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if as indicated 
these are purely negative. " Gellner distinguishes ethnicity and nationalism as ways of 
justifying the nation as a `genuine', not `natural' phenomenon. He does not believe that 
nations and national identities were `natural' or primordial, but rather `time - and context 
' Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, (Great Britain: Redwood Press Limited, 1972), 
pp. 154-155. 
2 Ibid. p. 159. 
3 Ibid. p. 168. 
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- bound'. 
' Here lies the biggest difference between the Gellnerian concept of the nation 
and Marxist theory. Marxism did not deal with ethnicity. Consequently communism 
denied ethnic diversity as a major ingredient of the societies over which it ruled. 
This framework explains why communism could not create a viable alternative to 
national identity. Communism was a modern model of social development as much as it 
offered a `new' identity based above all on class. But it lacked an understanding of 
identity as a complex phenomenon, sometimes including but also sometimes excluding 
class, and including cultural identifications only. It aimed to eliminate a great deal of the 
context of modernity expressed in culture in its very broad sense and to ingrain people's 
identities in the communist revolution alone. 
Anderson also sees modernity and nationalism as closely linked. As with Gellner, this is 
not in denial of but rather in response to Marxist thought. Anderson thinks that both 
modernity and nationalism were products of capitalism. He believes that Marxism was 
incapable of debating modernity because it did not comprehend that both modernity and 
nationalism were products of capitalism: `nationalism has proved an uncomfortable 
anloma/y for Marxist theory' because Marx spoke of class as being a national unit. s Like 
Gellner, Anderson also thinks that education and language are the major facets of 
modernity. But Gellner argues that nationalism is centred around the cultural roots of the 
collective. Anderson believes it is based on what he calls `the imagination of the nation'. 
Anderson understands language as a way to `imagine' the nation as a unified entity. He 
claims that modernity led to the idea of the nation by allowing people to `imagine' the 
4 Ibid. p. 151. 
'Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Rev. cd., (London & New York: Verso, 1991), p. 3. 
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nation. Print capitalism was the essential element of modernity, making it possible for 
people to imagine themselves in a number of new ways. Print languages, Anderson 
argues, became the basis of national consciousness. 6 The act of reading is the power 
which narrates identity. A nation's biography is constructed through the particular way in 
which people remember or forget this narrative. ' The idea that each nation is `imagined' - 
and thus also always in the process of `imagining' - defines nationalism as an expression 
of the particular way people feel the nation. It touches upon bonds of solidarity, which 
become apparent when the nation is mobilised for political action. This particular 
imagination, according to Anderson, is modernity itself. 
Anderson's theory of the nation as an `imagined community' is not unrelated to the 
communist understanding of modernity. To an extent, communism also operated on the 
level of imagination. It conceptualised nationalism as a false bourgeois reality and a 
decadent fantasy. It claimed that nationalism existed primarily in people's minds, as 
opposed to social and economical reality, which according to communism, was ruled by 
the class struggle. In these terms, the theory of communism classified nationalism as an 
instrument of the bourgeoisie, which aimed to blur social reality in order to achieve 
political domination. People were supposed to leave the irrational world of nationalism 
and enter `material reality'. Yet at the same time, communism presented itself as a 
particular vision - or `imagination' - of an ideal world without nationalism. The nation 
and nationalism by implication were somehow less important compared to the rest of the 
political world. 
These modernists, then, reject the concept of nationalism as a product of a particular set 
' Ibid., 43. 
Ibid. pp. 204-206. 
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of political and historical events. Instead, they understand it as a universal phenomenon 
based on cultural change. Both Gellner and Anderson suggest that the concept of 
nations and nationalism emerged as the dominant concept at the on-set of modernity. 
Their studies of nationalism end with the establishment of the nation-state as the main 
political unit. But this is actually when communism was introduced to Eastern Europe - 
after nationalism. Thus communism and the communist state were not so much part of 
modernisation but rather a strange and confused phenomenon in `the sick heart of 
modern Europe'. " 
8 Quote from the title of Hugh Seton-Watson, The "Sick Heart" of Modern Europe : 
The Problem of the Danubian Lands, (Seattle & London: University of Washington 
Press, 1975). 
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III. A Distinct State Model 
The communist state was a modern and totalitarian state at the same time: modern, 
because it ruled by centralised political power; totalitarian, because it aimed to exercise 
total control over its citizens. Modernity is itself associated with extended state powers. 
By its very nature the modern nation-state gives unique opportunities of control. As 
Giddens states, the development of totalitarianism has been made possible by the 
modern state, which offers excellent opportunities for economical, informational, 
political and military control: `The modern world has been shaped through the 
intersection of capitalism, industrialism, nationalism and the nation-state system.... 
There are four `institutional clusterings' associated with modernity: heightened 
surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the consolidation of 
centralised control of the means of violence. '' Giddens points out that the modern state 
is monitored not only internally, by its citizens, but also externally, by the other states. 
The international aspect of state politics are not simply a stage where the respective 
actors perform but also a political regulator. In the age of modernity, the outside world 
observes the state and has the power to influence internal politics. The modern nation- 
state thus cannot function in isolation. Communism trapped itself in the conundrum of 
theoretically claiming to be aiming to become a universal form of government while at 
the same time practically cutting itself off from the rest of the world. The communist 
state aspired to a model of modernity in which a modernising state aims at total power 
but failed to accept a key component of modernity, being itself controlled. 
'Anthony Giddens, The Nation-state and Violence: Volume Two of Contemporan! 
Critique of Historical Marxism, (University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 
1987), p. 5. 
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Giddens argues that the Gellnerian concept of nationalism is insufficient to explain 
modernity because it does not distinguish between the nation-state and nationalism. He 
insists that the question of why an industrialised society should be a nation-state remains 
unanswered. "' In the case of Bulgaria, the nation-state was adopted before 
industrialisation, but was also maintained after the communist modernisation. In another 
words, industrialisation on its own cannot explain the persistence of the nation-state. 
Giddens seeks to conceptualise nationalism separately from the nation-state. 
Nationalism, he claims, is primarily a psychological phenomenon, `the affiliation of 
individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising communality among the members 
of a political order. "' This statement suggests that nationalism is primarily an emotional 
need of the modern man, whereas the nation-state is a rational construct of modernity. 
Separating the world of politics from the realm of the modern mind seems behind the 
perception that communist ideas may be seen as something separate from the 
communist state. Communism was an emotional response to capitalism, whereas the 
communist state was an attempt to rationalise the capitalist state, and therefore failed. 
Such is the thinking behind the continuing attempts by hard-liners throughout the 
Eastern European countries to sustain communist parties after the fall of communism in 
1989, striving to represent some kind of `communism without communist politics'. 
The main problem with the communist state from the point of view of modernity was 
that it tried to sustain itself without consent from the society it ruled. Communism 
believed that the state sits on top of society and directs it, but does not need to be 
approved by its members. As Schöpflin argues, communism perceived of the state as the 
Ibid. p. 214. 
Ibid. p. 116. 
49 
ýý., " 
.4 : 
, ýý. 
r- ý 
'ýýý 
flagship of advancement, whereas society was thought to be a backsliding unit. In the 
Western tradition, society was perceived as creative and progressive, and the state as 
restricting. As Schöpflin notes, for Eastern Europe, due to its particular historic and 
social development, modernity meant that the opposite became reality. 
i2 From here 
Schöpflin derives two main conclusions about communism and modernity: in Eastern 
Europe, there was `a modernising revolution from above', while communism radically 
transformed this revolution with its own `modernising objectives, myths and utopias'. 
13 
Schöpflin also argues that communism aspired to modernise the world by changing the 
pattern of modernisation itself. It brought radical changes in economic structures and the 
relationship to property, and introduced rapid industrialisation to generally 
underdeveloped regions. 14 
Eastern European modernity was an interrupted and uneven process. The region 
experienced modernisation in its own way, while communism made further changes to 
the norms from the West. Communism therefore rested on the patterns of 
modernisation apparent in the West, and deviated from them. In effect, the communist 
state was constructed as a distinct model, and a deviation from the historical aspiration of 
Eastern Europe to a Western interpretation of modernity. Communism's concept of 
modernity rested on non-consensual political power. It failed to recognise that 
compelling support is much less efficient in building a modern state than consent. The 
communist concept of the state rested on two fundamentals: the `dictatorship of the 
proletariat' and the ideal of internationalism. Both intended to sustain the state's political 
power. But they said very little about the society within which the communist state was 
12 Sec Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, pp. 5-6. 
" Ibid. p. 37. 
14 Ibid. p. 14. 
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supposed to operate - apart from being constituted by class divisions, which 
had to be 
overcome. Communism implied that the dynamics of the state and society were simply a 
reflection of a one-way relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The most important 
state structure to be maintained was the state apparatus for controlling society. In theory 
communism denied the nation on its own as a possible foundation of the state. The 
communist state was a construct of political power only. But because communism 
performed as a changing system of meanings and practices, it used nationalism to try to 
connect to permanence. Because it had to square it with internationalism, nationalism 
under communism was generally perceived as a `false' nationalism, as opposed to the 
`pure' thing. 
This study argues that communism in Eastern Europe was a particular historical period 
of the development of nationalism. It created a specific set of historical circumstances, 
which became of great importance to nationalism. Nationalism under communism 
became a very distinct form of political culture. This did not make it `less' nationalistic 
but rather a particular type of nationalism. This also did not undermine its universal 
meaning. Communism formed a distinct type of nationalism, one which seemed always 
unsatisfied. And in Kampferer's terms, each distinct case of nationalism makes the very 
nature of national identity universal. 
15 By using nationalism as an instrument of political 
power, communism underlined rather than weakened the idea that the modern world is a 
world ruled by nations and nationalism. 
Smith's theory of the origins of the nation offers a reconciliation of the universalistic and 
15 See Bruce Kampferer, Legends of People: Myths of State: Violence. Intolerance and 
Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia, (Washington & London: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1988), p. 4. 
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historical approaches to nationalism. Smith believes that nationalism has many levels of 
development but that both the nation and nationalism are built upon more general and 
older concepts of community. For Smith, the very idea of the nation is based on the 
concept of ethnic community; the nation is constructed around an ethnic core. " Smith 
relates the nation not only to culture but also to the political world, with its inevitable 
historical context. He suggests that understanding nationalism means understanding the 
origins of the nation. This, he insists, is rooted both in the mythical culture of the 
community and also in on-going interpretations throughout history. He examines the 
historical and political dynamism of nationalism within the framework of the 
permanency of the idea of the nation. Smith claims that the nation finds its political 
expression in the state, and that the consequent interaction between the nation and the 
state is very complex. Most importantly, he insists that the state is not simply the physical 
arena of the nation; state territory is not simply a location. The state, according to Smith, 
is a `set of differentiated, autonomous and public institutions, which arc territorially 
centralised and claim jurisdiction over a given territory, including the monopoly over 
coercion and extraction. '" In this sense, the state reflects both the relationship between 
the rulers and the ruled and the deeper cultural traditions of the ethnic community. From 
this perspective, comprehending the communist state and its attitude towards the nation 
means looking simultaneously at historical circumstances and a society's cultural roots. 
Smith argues that in a centralised state the sense of political community is based primarily 
on shared and defended space. By defence he means not simply defence of territory from 
external excursions - physical and cultural - but also control over demographic 
movements, internal dissent, disruptive conflicts between elites or between the 
Anthony Smith, National Identirv, (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 
Anthony Smith, `State-Making and Nation-Building in States in History' in John A. 
Hall (ed. ), Statcs in History, (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1986), p. 235. 
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countryside and the town. " 
Smith also argues that all states are based on and relate to pre-existing national tradition, 
and that communism accepted this in practice, if not in theory: `the Soviet experience 
suggests that even revolutionary "invented traditions" must harness or forge (often both) 
a national cultural and political identity if they are to strike deep popular roots. ' This is 
why, he says, the Soviets tried to retain political control, but gave cultural autonomy to 
the different nationalities, as a way of acknowledging the validity of their national 
feelings. " Thus according to Smith the communist state was a political expression of 
modernity, but constructed on pre-modern concepts. 
'A Ibid. pp. 235-236. 
ýý Smith, National Idcntit r, pp. 147-149. 
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IV. Marxism, Communism and Nationalism 
In discussing communism and nationalism, other modern theories' starting point is 
Marxism rather than nationalism. Davis thinks that Marx and Engels views on 
nationalism were indeed determined by their concept of social class and that they should 
be criticised in the context of their time rather than in terms of the political and cultural 
structure of today's world. He underlines that this is not in order to justify them but 
rather to be fair towards their understanding of the subject. 
"" He suggests that their views 
on problems of nations and nationalism as reflected in the theory of social classes are 
rather disappointing. Davis proposes instead to look at their views in the context of 
proletarian internationalism, because the proletariat `mission in history', as seen by Marx 
and Engels, was to overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish proletarian internationalism. 
This, Davis states, means that Marxism professed that in the long-term the proletariat 
would be not nationalist but internationalist. " He lists four main points, which have to 
be taken into account when analysing Marx and Engels' concept of proletarian 
internationalism: 1) internationalism is not cosmopolitan as it is based on nations, 2) 
`much depends on the timing and sequence of events' as Marx and Engels believed in the 
development of socialism after capitalism, 3) `internationalism did not necessarily imply 
national equality' and Marx and Engels favoured larger states against smaller, and 4) 
internationalism, as conceptualised by Marx and Engels, was an internationalism of 
advanced industrial nations. "Davis concludes that in Marx and Engels' theory 
nationalism was not among the founding principles of their policies and therefore it 
21 Sec I-Iorace B. Davis, Nationalism & Socialism: Marxism and Labor Theories of 
Nationalism to 1917, (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 73. 
21 Ibid., p. 74-75. 
22 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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could be sacrificed in the `interests of the larger policy': `Proletarian internationalism was 
a system in which such words as freedom, equality, democracy, justice and morality 
would have real meaning for the working man. But devoid of socialist content these 
`eternal principles' were a sham and a delusion. 
" 
Similarly Light thinks that Marx and Engels developed far from a full theory of 
nationalism. But she also argues that despite this they had ideas which served as a basis 
for the further development of the Soviet theory of internationalism and particularly of 
Lenin's views on the topic. Light thinks that Marx and Engels were restricted in their 
views on questions of nationalism as far as they were to be found in their treatment of 
life in the colonies, which was `typical for Europeans of the nineteenth century', but 
could not be applied unconditionally to other parts of the world. 
" In the context of the 
colonial questions discussed by Marx and Engels, `nationalism engendered in colonialism 
should be supported not for its own sake but because it would bring about colonial 
revolutions. "' According to Light this was the essential thought which reflected in 
Leninist interpretations of nationalism - that nationalism should be considered only in 
relation to other forces in society. In this way Marxism offered an understanding of 
nationalism as a function of other social forces rather than as a totalising ideology. 
According to Light the focus of Marx and Engels' theory of nations and nationalism was 
on nationalism only in relation to the revolutionary aims of the proletariat. 
Light's argument about nationalism being subordinated to the purposes of the 
u Ibid., p. 14. 
24 See Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, (Great Britain: 
Whcatshcaf Books Ltd., 1988), pp. 75-76. 
25 Ibid., p. 79. 
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communist revolution seems central to understanding why communism resorted to 
usage of nationalism: if nationalism was working in accord with the revolution then it 
should be supported because it `furthers the aims of the revolution'. Thus in Marxist 
terms communism saw nationalism as an `auxiliary force' in bringing about a socialist 
revolution. 2C 
Similarly Stern argues that in understanding `the Marxist base' of the interaction between 
communism and nationalism one has to take into account the time when Marx matured 
as a political philosopher, as well as other thinkers he was influenced by. Stern pays 
particular attention to the social conditions he lived in his native Germany and his 
acquaintance with the history of communist and socialist thought, which Marx himself 
referred to as `utopian'. He emphasises Hegel's influence on Marx and particularly the 
`all-encompassing nature of the Hegelian approach' as well as the idea of progress as the 
bearer of dynamism in history and theory of humankind. " By outlining where Marx 
departed from a Hegelian approach, Stern underlines that central to Marxist theory came 
the idea that the dialectical conflict in history was not one of abstractions, as in Hegel, 
but one of material factors. Yet Stern immediately warns that Marx did more than just 
formulate a `somewhat esoteric "materialist conception" of history', which others have 
dubbed `historical materialism': `Hegel has posited ideas, philosophies, cultures and 
moralities as things-in-themselves; Marx saw them as human creations, subject to change 
as material circumstances change perceptions of interests and needs. "' Stern points out 
that Marx would have had a much smaller impact on the world if he had adhered to a 
26 Ibid., p. 79. 
27 Geoffrey Stern, The Rise and Decline of International Communism, (England: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 1990), p. 10. 
zs Ibid., p. 11. 
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materialist reductionist view of the content of history. 
This insight into Marx's philosophy helps explain that what Marx meant when he talked 
about society was society as a whole rather than national societies. He discussed `any 
national references serving merely to illustrate the general pattern of socio-economic 
organisation in a given historical epoch. ''`' Thus Marx offered an understanding of 
national phenomenon as a stage or a form of development, which was subject to change. 
As much as it was about difference it was also about being a part of the wholeness of 
humanity. In another words it was not that Marx failed to comprehend that there were 
nations and nationalism in the world but he conceptualised them as stages of human 
development rather than fixed entities. 
Nimni also disputes claims that Marx and Engels had no theory on national questions. 
He believes that in fact they had a theory, though it was not to be found in a `single 
corpus of literature that presents their theories in an unequivocal manner'.; " Similarly to 
Stern he asserts that the starting point for understanding Marx's views on nationalism is 
looking at national development within his universal approach, but at the same time 
locating it historically. Further on Nimni emphasises Marx's understanding of national 
communities as stages of development of productive forces. 
" He also sees the term 
`nation' as used by Marx and Engels embodied in its English and French meaning which 
designates a permanent population of a nation-state whereas the word nationality was 
used in its Central and Eastern European denotation, meaning an ethno-cultural 
29 Ibid., p. 12. 
30 Ephraim Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis, 
(London, Concord, Mass: Pluto Press), 1991, p. 17. 
31 Ibid., p. 17. 
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community which does not have full national status because it lacked a state on its own: 
`Consequently, modern nations were for Marx and Engels what we may call today nation 
states; cthno-cultural and linguistic communities with their own states. ''' 
Further on Nimni clarifies that nation in Marxist terms means a `mechanism for 
consolidating and securing the conditions of existing bourgeoisie. ' The Marxist concept 
of nationalism is thus to be found in the dynamic which leads the nation to form its own 
state to further the development of its bourgeoisie. From here, according to Nimni, 
stems Marx's idea that some nations could form national states and other could not. i33 
Nimni asserts that later on Lenin developed his own theory of nationalism which was 
based on Marxist premises but essentially was determined by his own understanding of 
the problem. Marxist-Leninist views in relation to national questions, asserts Nimni, were 
connected to `the debilitating impact of class reductionism. 14 He believes that Lenin, not 
Marx, undermined the role of national culture by locating national identities mostly 
within the field of class determination and describing them as political forces only. This 
was illustrated in Lenin's theory of self-determination, which holds that the awakening of 
national identity was `mere reaction to national oppression'. Nimni believes that Lenin 
underestimated the `cultural and ethnic dimensions of the national question', particularly 
when it came to the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR. Therefore Nimni thinks that 
there was a major failure not in Marx and Engels' views but in what became known as 
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which refused to recognise precisely those aspects of 
classical Marxism which could have provided insight into culture and ethnicity. 35 
32 Ibid., p. 23. 
33 Ibid., p. 42. 
34 Ibid., p. 90. 
35 Ibid., pp. 89-95. Here Nimni has in mind mainly Marxist-Leninist thinking which 
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Cummins also argues that much of what has been labelled as Marxist opinions are 
actually views which Marx himself disagreed with. He asserts that although Marx and 
Engels did not develop a general theory of nations and nationalism they were compelled 
to pay attention to various forms of national questions and deal with the relationship 
they had with class struggles. In another words, Marxism had a theory of national 
questions developed as a flexible strategy, which took into account the peculiarities of the 
world. ' At the same time he acknowledges that it drew from their knowledge and 
experience, which was confined to the western world and believed that in general `the 
development of national states was closely linked with their levels of economic 
development'. '' Marx and Engels, argues Cummins, were interested in nationalism `in the 
hope of harnessing it, however temporarily, to their overall purpose'. In their pursuit for 
recruiting allies for the purposes of the proletarian revolution, Marx and Engels viewed 
nationalism as a development with its own peculiarities in each society. 
However he also accepts that Marx and Engels were Eurocentrics who viewed that some 
European societies had a particular dynamic as opposed to the static and unchanging 
character of some non-European societies. The western societies in Europe, they 
suggested, had a capacity for universalisation, which made them distinct. " In this 
context, asserts Cummins, Marx and Engels' analysis of Russia presented them with a 
peculiar problem, for when it came to Russia, both Marx and Engels deviated from their 
refused to deal with the theory of Otto Bauer proposing a different reading of Marx. 
" Ian Cummins, Marx. Engels and National Movements, (London: Groom Helm Ltd., 
1980), p. 11-12. 
Ibid., p. 19. 
Ibid., p. 50. 
39 Ibid., p. 55. 
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usual way of thinking as historical materialists: `Instead of economic factors, the forces 
which Marx stressed as principally affecting Russia's development lay in the essentially 
superstructural realm of politics. ' The idea that there were two Russia's, one `official' (the 
privileged classes) and one `unofficial' (the common people, or narodj led them to the 
belief that there were virtually two societies within Russia. Marx and Engels were 
generally convinced that Russia was an `inherently expansionist power' and were 
particularly concerned about the extent of Russian influence in Germany. 
"" Cummins 
also points out that in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx argued that Russia was a 
peculiar case and may develop its own `exceptional path of development'. 
" Cummins 
underlines that in the case of Russia Marx gave his support to those who aspired to 
conspiratorial tactics to seize power rather than to those who advocated socio-economic 
change and the achievement of `objective conditions' and the growth of class 
consciousness. He thus concludes that Marx and Engels showed sympathy with those 
groups in Russia who aimed to overthrow the autocracy and by the irony of history, 
when Lenin appeared on the stage as a revolutionary practitioner, `the task of modifying 
theory to facilitate practice had, to some extent, already been forced on Marx and Engels 
in their approach to Russian problems'. 42 
Cummins concludes that despite their general outlook of Eurocentrism, their strategic 
arguments were more flexible. And although Marx emphasised the economic factors in 
producing historical change, he nevertheless gave priority to political factors: `In short, 
Marx remained true to his eleventh thesis of Feurbach: at the cultural level he sought to 
4' Ibid., p. 125 and p. 131. 
41 Ibid., p. 137. 
42 Ibid., pp. 155-163. Cummins believes that in the case of Russia Marx and Engels made 
tactical alliances with national movements with the Narodnaja Vo/ya movement in 
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understand the world; his strategy, however, was shaped by his concern to change it. i43 
Benner also argues that Marx and Engels' views on nations and nationalism were closely 
linked to political factors. She asserts that the most interesting aspect of Marx and 
Engels' analysis of nations and nationalism is that they defined them not in `isolation 
from other aspects of social life, but within specific historical and social contexts. '" She 
argues that Marx and Engels did not understand nations and nationalism in purely 
economic terms and did not suggest the dissolution of nations with the development of 
the world market. 41 Instead she asserts: `Marx and Engels' conception of nations was, to 
be sure, mainly a political one. i4C She thinks that they recognised the pre-political forms 
of ethnicity and linguistic community as well as territorial attachments as `unthreatening' 
to the proletarian revolution as long as these were not mobilised in support of 
authoritarian states. 47 Benner outlines four main tenets of Marx and Engels' 
understanding of nations and nationalism: 1) the political or cultural nation is not to be 
separated from its social bases, 2) nationalism cannot be analysed as `ndgeneris', but in 
relation to movements linked to class issues, 3) the international aspects of nationalism 
are also related to class conflicts, and 4) the appeal of nationalism is not in the primordial 
national identity but rather in the political importance it acquires in class-divided 
4" societies, which Marx and Engels observed. She suggests that Marx and Engels' 
particular) in their search to facilitate the proletarian revolution. 
43 Ibid., p. 180. 
44 Erica Benner, Really hxisting Nationalisms: A Post-Communist View from Marx and 
Engels, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 13. 
45 Ibid., 41. 
46 Ibid., p. 47. 
47 Ibid., p. 44. 
48 Ibid., pp. 96-98. 
61 
understanding of identities and conflict is to be found in the concept of internationalism. 
Accordingly the internationalist strategy they proposed would reconcile desires for 
national freedom with the requirements of a worldwide outlook. Benner concludes that 
Marx and Engel's views offer an alternative to the national-determinist view, which 
assumes that nationalism carries a `trans-national appeal for all members of national 
society'. Instead, she argues, Marx and Engels drew attention to the `specific interests, 
threats, and deprivations that induce people to embrace extremist nationalism. '; 
' 
Discussing nationalism and communism from this perspective proves to be illuminating 
when analysing why and how communists themselves `embraced' nationalism in Eastern 
Europe. 
Kemp focuses on Marx and Engels' views on nationalism as dynamic, moving from the 
abstract to the concrete depending on the political circumstances they were interested in. 
He believes that although nationalism as such was not their primary issue of concern, 
Marx and Engels pointed to the power of nationalism as a part of a social revolution, 
which would overthrow the existing order. Kemp underlines that Marx and Engels 
viewed that nationalism was a tool which should be used to further proletarian 
internationalism. "' He also believes that this understanding of nationalism set up a 
pattern of `using' and `misusing' nationalism followed by many of their disciples. " Kemp 
also thinks that in difference to many of his followers Marx did not believe in `revolution 
in one country' for he did not recognise that there may be `history in one country'. 52 
Marx and Engels had their own political and national prejudices as illustrated by their 
49 Ibid., p. 234. 
5i Walter A. Kemp, Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union: A Basic Contradiction?, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), p. 26. 
51 Ibid., p. 32. 
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views of the future of the `Southern Slavs' as `historyless people' who could achieve 
worth only if they supported a European revolution. But even then they could not form 
a viable economic unit, which was a prerequisite for a political unit. 
S' Kemp points to 
the `gross misreading' of theory of the fathers of communism regarding pan-Slavism as 
`the centre of their offensive force - Russia. ' As a result of this `misreading' Eastern 
European nationalism was viewed with great suspicion in the communist movements' 
sz Ibid., p. 22. 
s3 Ibid., p. 29. 
54 Ibid., p. 30. 
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V. Multilingualism without Nations 
One of the areas where communist interaction with nationalism was most visible was 
language education. Communism declared itself to be a grand project, which would 
deliver mass literacy and education for everyone. These objectives determined the 
particular relationship communism had to have with language. The only condition was 
that the content of the education must reflect communist principles. The complications 
arouse when the theory had to be applied in practice. The language issue was particularly 
difficult to tackle because each communist country of Eastern Europe contained more 
than one linguistic community. Theoretically all nationalities were entitled to education in 
their respective language as long as the education maintained a communist content. 
Communism thus envisioned multilingualism which does not express national 
differences but rather common affiliation to communism. It attempted to disconnect 
language from national identity in Eastern Europe, although language (alongside religion) 
has been traditionally seen as one of the most important features of national identity. 
Most modernists agree that when discussing areas outside Eastern Europe language is an 
important but not the most important feature of the nation. 55 Smith's definition of the 
fundamentals of national identity does not include language as such. Yet it is assumed 
that features which he does consider essential, such as mass culture, common myths and 
historical memories, are in general expressed in a common language. Yet in terms of 
Eastern Europe, Smith asserts that language is one of the most important features of 
national identity. He points out the central role played by philologists and folklorists in 
Eastern European national cultures. In Eastern Europe, he suggests, language is an 
ethnic marker of the nation, which overrides the importance of the civic elements of 
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national identity. 5" Schöpflin also argues that precisely because language is not a self- 
evident marker in south-eastern Europe, with its high level of ethnic mixing, it became 
one of the very individual features of national identity in the region. 
57 Far from being 
simply a linguistic mode of communication, language has been perceived as a powerful 
identifier of nationality. 
Communism tried to break language away from this role. It declared that communist, not 
national, identity, should be rendered by national languages. Marxism-Leninism had to be 
disseminated in as many languages as possible. Thus instead of enforcing national 
differences, language diversity would promote internationalism, and remove national 
barriers. At the same time, the very concept of mass education enhanced the significance 
of language. As Armstrong asserts, it was precisely the idea of mass education which 
transformed language from a symbol of ethnic identity into its primary criterion. 
" Again, 
communism had little understanding of the role language had played in the history of 
Eastern European societies, as well as how mass education could change this. As a result, 
the communist language project failed to create the multilingual yet non-national society 
it promised. Education under communism began as a multilingual project. But as its 
attempt to separate language from national identity failed, it moved towards a policy of 
linguistic homogenisation. 
ss See Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). 
Smith, National Identity, pp. 12-14. 
57 George Schöpflin, `Ethnic Minorities in South-Eastern Europe: Analysis and Solutions 
in Post-Communist Transition and European Integration Process'. Paper. Second 
Summer School, Cervia-Italy, Longo Editore Ravenna, 1996, first unit: vol. 1. 
5" John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 279-281. 
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Bulgaria under communism was a good example. Until the campaign to `re-name' 
Bulgarian Turks in 1984-85, the official language policy of the BCP followed the Soviet 
line of state-controlled education, and language provisions for all minorities. Yet the 
party saw the tendency of language education to maintain ethnic differences as 
undesirable, and it set out to marginalise minority languages. Each ethnic community had 
different experiences under the communist system of language education. Yet in general, 
the practice of any non-Bulgarian language was perceived as a potential threat to national 
security. By the mid-1970s, little remained of the original communist idea of international 
multilingualism. The two main languages of education were Bulgarian and Russian: the 
first was the language of the ethnic majority of the country, the second was the language 
of Soviet dominance. 
It may he wrong to suggest that the communist design for language education was a 
complete failure. Seton-Watson states that, conceptually, the Soviet system, which was 
the main model of language education under communism, represented a kind of success 
if compared to the minority language provisions in Eastern Europe before the Second 
World War. 59 He also insists that in its early years, communism was better equipped for 
multilingual education because internationalism had a stronger appeal after the war. 
Some minority cultures did advance educationally under communism. For instance, the 
1950s marked the high-point for Turkish education in Bulgaria. Although Yugoslavia 
should be viewed as a special case, the Macedonian language was promoted as a national 
language in 1945. 
S9 Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941, (Cambridge 
University Press: 1946), p. 272. 
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Yet real communist achievements in education remain debatable. The problem is not so 
much the degree of success of the communist policy, but its inconsistency. Changes in 
language education were determined by the communist leadership and its varying policy 
on national questions, not by linguistic reality. The unintended result was that instead of 
diminishing people's awareness of language as an ethnic marker in Bulgaria, communism 
emphasised it. Those who call themselves Bulgarians, it was firmly understood, must 
speak Bulgarian. The impression was that nothing had changed from the inter-war years, 
when a big effort was made to homogenise the country linguistically. The difference was 
that Bulgarian communism declared in its documents that it would deliver equal linguistic 
rights for all citizens. In reality, it aspired to linguistic homogeneity. In this way 
communism confirmed language as one of the most persistent features of modern 
Bulgarian identity. Most importantly, the policy was unstated, making it seem as if the 
Bulgarian language had a divine right to be the only national language. This encouraged 
the understanding that Bulgarian was the language of cultural advancement, whereas 
ethnic minorities' languages were to disappear in the process of communist 
modernisation. 
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VI. Communism and Ethnic Conflict 
Understanding ethnic conflict is key to analysing the role of nationalism under 
communism. Communism claimed that in the socialist society there were no antagonistic 
ethnic conflicts. Communist society in general aimed to become a conflict-free society. 
Conflicts were seen as deriving from class, and the communist revolution was supposed 
to resolve them all. Communism professed to eliminate ethnic conflict by committing 
everyone to the overarching concept of social equality. But there was also the idea that all 
conflicts, including ethnic conflicts, were to be eliminated by the communist revolution, 
rather than negotiated. In practice communism preferred to mask, ignore, undermine or 
dismiss ethnic conflict. If communism was free of disagreement, then ethnic conflict 
simply could not be acknowledged. 
One of the ways to avoid discussion of ethnic conflict under communism was to present 
it as a question of the status of minorities. In most communist countries of Eastern 
Europe, minorities officially enjoyed all freedoms: language education, religious practice, 
customs, independent institutions. The only condition attached to all such provisions was 
that people of different nationalities were committed to the communist state. The lack of 
common state loyalty among the different nationalities was not a problem of the 
communist state exclusively, but a persistent source of difficulty throughout the history 
of Eastern Europe. Such difficulties have been explained mainly as `bad government'. No 
human rights were observed and protection for minorities was almost non-existent. " 
Indeed the communist state attempted to break through the `bad' state tradition by 
bringing into life a new singleness of purpose under which all nationalities could unite. 
What communism offered in theory was a utopian world where everyone was promised 
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equal protection by the state. But in practice the priority of communist governments was 
the defence of their own rule of the nation-state, not citizens' rights. 
Ethnic conflict under communism has been largely discussed as a question of communist 
party policy on national questions. This was the primary source of understanding of 
ethnicity under communism. This study looks into the very nature of ethnic conflict and 
argues that ethnic conflict under communism derived from communism promoting 
ethnic exclusivity. Three main works in the area of ethnic conflict provide the theoretical 
background for the study of communism and ethnic conflict in Bulgaria. McGarry and 
O'Leary's taxonomy of ethnic conflict, which uses experience from around the world, 
states that there are two main ways of dealing with ethnic conflict: manage it or eliminate 
it. Methods of elimination include genocide, mass population transfers or 
partition/secession. Management means broadly speaking different types of federalism 
or hegemonic control. " McGarry and O'Leary argue that post-revolutionary communism 
was dedicated to transcending ethnic identities and merging them into a communist 
identity. When this vision was exhausted, communist parties focused on suppressing the 
`politicisation of ethnic differences'. In short, communism failed to sustain its founding 
idea that there could be a communist society with no national antagonisms. Instead it 
focused on controlling ethnic politics. This was done mainly through hegemonic control, 
defined as `coercive and/or co-optive rule which successfully manages to make 
unworkable an ethnic challenge to the state order. 62 
Ibid., pp. 272-275. 
John McGarry & Brandan O'Leary (eds. ), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: 
Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 
4. 
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Research on ethnic conflict in Bulgaria illustrates that both elimination of ethnic conflict 
and managing it through hegemonic control were widely practised under communism. In 
the case of the Turkish minority, for example, the Bulgarian government used three 
methods of eliminating ethnic conflict: a) negotiated emigration, b) forced mass 
population transfer and c) forced assimilation. The Jewish problem in Bulgaria after the 
end of the Second World War was also by and large settled through methods of 
elimination - namely, mass resettlement and assimilation. The Macedonian question 
presented the most confusing case in deciding which method to apply because of the 
historical complexities. Communists saw the best solution as denying its mere existence, 
but in practical terms, both hegemonic control and unofficial Soviet arbitration were 
applied. 
The whole structure of the communist state as a one-party regime made it impossible for 
minorities to participate in political power. Minorities could participate in political life 
only in the role of communists. But they were not only underrepresented in the ranks of 
the ruling communist party, but also normally asked to declare exclusive loyalty to the 
party - denying ethnic identity. Minorities were represented in the leadership only if they 
had no obvious intention of changing the minorities policy prescribed by the party. 
Lustick also conceptualises the idea of hegemonic control. He argues that hegemonic 
control is an effective way of managing ethnic conflict because it is based not only on 
coercion or the threat of coercion, but also on a `wide range of political and economic 
mechanisms, institutional arrangements, legal frameworks and socio-cultural 
circumstances'. G3 Lustick elaborates on the idea of controlling minorities through co- 
ýz Ibid., p. 23. 
Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority, (Austin 
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optation and subordination complemented by strategies for depriving them of the means 
for united political action. 
It is difficult to asses to what extent minorities in Bulgaria were exclusively denied access 
to independent sources of economic support, because the BCP used these policies 
towards the entire population. For instance, police surveillance was applied to all citizens 
regardless of their ethnic background although ethnic groups were subjected to particular 
scrutiny. However the level of co-optation - defined by Lustick as offers of side 
payments or favours to members of ethnic groups in return for information - was quite 
high in the Turkish and Jewish community, particularly in times of crisis. " 
The main question in this study is what made ethnic minorities susceptible to hegemonic 
control under communism? In the case of the Bulgarian Muslims, the lack of an 
established urban elite, economic dependence on the majority and isolation from the kin- 
state made them very vulnerable. The destruction of Jewish cultural institutions, 
politicised relations with Israel and the small size of the community made Bulgarian Jews 
also quite open to communist control. Additionally, segmentation, segregation, isolation 
and economic dependence on the majority left all minorities completely unprotected in 
& London: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 78. 
" This conclusion is based on the evidence provided by 11 interviews conducted in 
Bulgaria during 1996-97 with Ottoman scholars, former students of Turkish Philology, 
Turkish party activists and members of the Sofia and Russe Jewish communities. Some 
of them shared the anxiety about the lustration process, which could expose them as 
collaborators of the communist regime because of the job and career offers as well as 
side payments offered to them during the anti-Turkish campaign of 1984-85 and during 
the very last months of the communism in 1989. 
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Bulgaria under communism. Thus through its controlling policies, the Bulgarian 
communist state emphasised ethnic divisions instead of creating shared loyalty. 
Kymlica regards this lack of common loyalty as communism's biggest failure. He argues 
that the inability to create `integrative citizenship' for all nationalities was the most 
significant consequence of living under communism, resulting in the so-called `ethnic 
revival' during the last years of communism. CS Kymlica's `liberal theory' of minority rights 
asserts that ethnic conflict could be resolved successfully in the long term only through 
consensus. But communist regimes did not rule through consensus. They offered 
communist identity as a mechanism to deal with ethnic issues, but it was very weak and 
could not integrate citizens - not always because they did not want to but because they 
were not allowed to. The multinational communist states could survive only if the 
various national groups felt allegiance to the state they cohabited, yet communism 
offered no consensual means through which to achieve this. " 
The lack of clear communist theory of minorities' rights in the communist nation-state 
isolated minorities' issues as something separate from questions of the communist state. 
This only reinforced ethnic boundaries. The denial of ethnicity encouraged the 
understanding that differences are not negotiable. From this perspective communism 
could be seen as a continuation of the inter-war political tradition in Eastern Europe, 
with very little experience of democratic discussion, and very problematic observance of 
human or minority rights. 
"S Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 67. 
"" Ibid., p. 13. 
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VII. Bulgaria and the Soviet Connection 
Bulgarian communism maintained a unique relationship with the Soviet regime. During 
its entire period in power, from 1944 until the very end in 1989, Bulgarian communists 
registered their untiring loyalty to the Soviets. But what made Bulgaria unusual under 
communism was not simply the existence of this connection. What was really unique was 
that the attachment to Soviet-style communism did not work against Bulgarian national 
aspirations. The satellite position of Bulgaria facilitated not merely the development of 
Bulgarian communism but also the advancement and consolidation of Bulgarian 
nationalism. The Sovietisation of Bulgaria was far less threatening to the Bulgarian nation 
than its own internal ethnic diversity. The main reason was that communism promoted 
the old idea of the Bulgarian nation as an integral part of the Slavic world. This concept 
was centred around Russia, Bulgaria's traditional protector. The Soviet Union was 
perceived as a Russian creation, and communism as the mainly Russian interpretation of 
Marxism. 
Bulgarian communism came to power with the decisive help of the Soviets at the end of 
the Second World War. Throughout the war, Bulgaria sided with Germany, and 
effectively against the USSR. `? Bulgaria was seriously weakened by the war and the short 
term gains of Macedonia and Trace, which Bulgarian troops occupied, were lost. The 
Red Army remained in Bulgaria from 1944 until 1947 -a great advantage to the 
communists, who established themselves as rulers during this period. `" The particular 
history of the coming to power of the Bulgarian communists explains much about how 
See Richard J. Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 124-135. 
" Ibid., p. 145. 
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they ruled, as most analysts agree. Rothschild argues that two main factors determined 
the communist victory throughout Eastern Europe: political structures already weakened 
by the war, and Soviet intervention. Both greatly facilitated the communist take-over 
everywhere. Rothschild suggests that in all countries, except Yugoslavia and Albania, 
communists were able to subvert the existing political coalitions from within, and 
eventually destroy them. Bulgaria seems a perfect example of this model. The BCP was a 
Leninist party and its members, according to Rothschild, `played a role out of all 
proportion to their members in the international Communist movement.... Language, 
sentiment, irredentism, and the tradition, established by Blagoev and his colleagues, of 
peculiarly close relations between the Bulgarian and Russian Marxist movements, explain 
this unique thrust reposed in the Bulgarian Communists by the Russian leaders. Among 
the most backward of European countries, Bulgaria produced international Communist's 
best Bolsheviks. '' Bulgarian communists were installed in power in 1944, Rothschild 
concludes, by the `relentless Grandfather Ivan - Russia. '"' Rothschild disagrees that 
Bulgaria was culturally conditioned to servility or the historical sentimentality of the small 
country to the big one: `Rather, Communist Bulgaria's sustained allegiance to the Soviet 
Union reflected a real complementarity of economic interests and developmental 
strategies. "The post-war situation in the country was desperate, all non-communist 
political parties split on collaborators and opposition and therefore became 
dysfunctional. " The retribution of the Bulgarian communists against their political rivals 
was particularly savage: `thousands of old scores were settled, and the proportion of the 
" Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development. 
1883-1936, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 300-301. 
''" Ibid., 303 
" Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe 
Since World War II, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 212. 
72 Ibid., p. 123. 
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population executed was higher than in any other former Axis state. "The BCP 
legitimated its actions by allegiance to the Soviets, which was also declared to be the only 
guarantee for stability. Rothschild argues that what made Bulgaria unique in relation to 
the Soviet factor was not so much the satellite position assumed by the post-war 
Bulgarian state, but the relatively popular support this position enjoyed. He suggests that 
apart from the special relationship between the Bulgarian and the Soviet communists, 
there was also the traditional attachment of the Bulgarian peasantry to everything 
Russian, which was extended to `a considerable degree of toleration, if not support, 
which the Bulgarian masses extended to the Communists. ' 
Bell also thinks that Bulgaria was distinguished from the rest of Eastern Europe by its 
strong pro-Soviet position. 74 But he underlines that Soviet domination was seen as a 
protector of Bulgarian national interests, not simply as an interventionist power. 
Supporting this view, Lendvai argues that the pro-Soviet policy in Bulgaria was not so 
much directed against Bulgarian nationalism but rather against co-operation with the rest 
of the Eastern European and particularly the Balkan states. He focuses on nationalism in 
Eastern Europe under Soviet rule from the point of view of the inter-bloc relations, 
rather than the individual relationship of each country to the USSR. 75 This seems 
particularly true of Bulgaria, which under communism had problematic relations with all 
of its neighbouring countries in relation to national questions. 
" Ibid., p. 70. 
74 John D. Bell, Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian National 
Union. 1899-1923, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 143. 
75 Sec Paul Lcndvai, Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans 
(London: Macdonald, 1970), p. XII. 
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But the supreme importance of the Soviets to Bulgarian politics was not solely due to 
communism. Because of the particular way in which the USSR was russified, communist 
Bulgaria could relate to the Soviets just as pre-communist Bulgarian bonded to Russia. 76 
This was particularly true of the peasantry and the intelligentsia, which had a long 
tradition of being attached to things Russian. " Bulgaria was connected to Russia in a very 
special way historically and culturally. The linguistic similarity and the common religion 
are the two most important factors in this respect. This is why the Soviet presence was 
seen by and large as a corrector of national sovereignty, not as a real threat to the 
Bulgarian nation. Bulgarian communism had the great advantage of being able to draw 
support from the pre-communist tradition without the risk of being seen as anti-Soviet. 
" See Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1993). 
" See Boian Penev, `Nashata Inteligentsia: Fragmenti' in Zashto sme takiva, Ivan 
Elenkov & Rumen Daskalov (eds. ), (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Prosveta, 1994), pp. 131-143. 
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VIII. The Bulgarian Countryside Misplaced 
Communism proposed a totally new political and social system in Bulgaria. In a country 
where the majority of the population were peasants, it declared that the working class 
was the carer of economic and social progress. The peasantry was supposed to be 
integrated into the working class under the slogan of workers-peasants alliance. The 
countryside was supposed to be merged with the urban areas as much as possible. The 
new identity on offer to the Bulgarians was supposed to have a strong proletarian profile, 
which was to be built upon the existing social fragmentation, which characterised much 
of Bulgarian life after the Second World War. This was the objective of communist 
transformation of the Bulgarian countryside. 
The main difficulty the ruling communist party faced was how to crush the agrarian 
opposition. This required changing the political balance because as Crampton argues the 
most important factor in peasants politics after the war was that the agrarian parties were 
the most serious domestic opponents of the communist regime in Bulgaria. The BCP 
knew that there was a deep suspicion towards the new regime on behalf of the peasant 
population. First of all it had to subvert the existing agrarian parties. Bulgarian 
communists led a fierce battle with them and the main political leader of the agrarians in 
the immediate aftermath of the war, Nikola Petkov, who was sentenced to death after a 
show-trial in 1947. '% Shortly afterwards the agrarians were fused with the Fatherland 
Front, which was the political organisation subsuming all political parties under the 
command of the communists. The new official puppet agrarian party, the Bulgarian 
Agrarian People's Union, was created by the BCP and this was the most effective way of 
subjecting the countryside to the communist leadership. 
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During the 1950s the BCP, under the leadership of Vulko Chervenkov, carried out the 
systematic collectivisation of the land. Private land-holding was virtually destroyed and 
the entire village structure was changed. The Soviet model was applied and the 
industrialisation was the first priority for the Bulgarian regime: `In essence, the general 
line adopted by Chervenkov provided that the Bulgarian countryside become in effect, 
Bulgaria's internal colony, which was to be squeezed and exploited on behalf of 
urbanisation and industrialisation. " The main result of this policy was that the traditional 
suspicion of the countryside towards the urban culture deepened. Peasants perceived of 
the communist regime as an urban feature, which was imposed on their life. Destroying 
the agrarian parties and burdening the peasantry with the demand to generate profit for 
the building up of the industrial sector could hardly win the support of the countryside 
for communism. The communist project intruded into the very heart of the Bulgarian 
countryside. The Bulgarian peasantry, which was one of the most egalitarian societies in 
Eastern Europe, was politically and socially disorientated. Communism not only 
dispossessed the peasants but also destroyed their political identity. On the other hand 
the communist plan for the modernisation of the countryside offered one important 
benefit to village people, upward mobility. Many of the younger generation could leave 
the villages and go to the towns, where employment in the factories was available. It also 
offered cultural interaction with the dynamics of the city. The resettlement to the towns 
and the simultaneous partial urbanisation of the villages gave the peasants access to 
information, which previously had been very minimal. 
" See Crampton, A Short History, pp. 150-157. 
" Nissan Oren, Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria, 
(Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 115. 
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Yet the communist modernisation of the village remained a halfway modernisation. 
While working in the town, peasants maintained their connection to the village. Although 
life in the towns seemed more comfortable, it was felt that peasants were pushed to 
move there rather than having made the choice themselves. Their urbanisation was not 
voluntary. Many of the new town dwellers acquired the mentality of an exile or guest- 
arbiter; they became what Laba calls in the Polish context `peasant-workers'. "" While 
working in the town, peasants glorified the countryside; when back in the village, praised 
the benefits of modernity. Thus Bulgarian peasants became the largest category of 
misplaced citizens under communism. Very importantly, along with the upward mobility 
communism offered among other things the opportunity to join the Bulgarian 
Communist Party. Many of the young generation of Bulgarian communists came from 
the villages or small towns in the countryside. These recent urbanites, holders of the `red- 
diploma', reflected the confusions of the communist countryside. "1 On one hand they 
identified with the newly acquired power of the city and on the other they remained 
strongly attached to their rural past. As communist state servants they glorified the city 
where the party gave them the opportunity to study and make a career. They felt grateful 
to the party for the education and a career it gave them. As a result many of them 
dismissed peasant culture as inferior and others idealised rural life. Rothschild pinpoints 
this particular conflict within the communist generation: `The intelligentsia despised the 
peasantry from which it sprang and scorned any occupation other than state service or 
politics, which became one of Bulgaria's leading industries. 12 
"' Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarit3r :a Political Sociology of Poland's Working-class 
Democratization, (Princeton, N. J : Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 115-116. 
See Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria, p. 224. 
Ibid., p. 225 
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In terms of politics communist modernisation subjected the countryside to the city. All 
decisions about life in the village came from the nearest party district headquarters in the 
town. The Bulgarian peasantry, which before communism had its own political life and 
consciousness, lost all confidence to communicate politics. Peasants' political passivity 
mixed with messianic thinking and communism was accepted more or less as a given. 
Bulgarian peasantry did not gain much from the chaotic changes in communist 
agricultural policy. After the failure in 1959-60 of the so-called `great leap forward' came 
ideas of `planning from bellow', the `perfection of centralised planning', and the building- 
up of the big agrarian-industrial complexes during the 1960s as well as during the New 
Economic Mechanism introduced in the 1980s. 8' Crampton argues that despite all 
attempts to integrate agriculture with industry, the Bulgarian peasant remained devoted 
to the small individual plot of land. Indeed the permission to work on private plot, which 
was part of the parcel called `household self-sufficiency', by the beginning of the 1980s 
proved to be the most efficient way of farming in Bulgaria. 
However the disillusionment with communist modernisation was large. The countryside 
remained deeply conservative and untouched by the voices of dissent which became 
apparent in the last decades of communist rule. The communist era, which failed to 
modernise the peasantry labelled it as naive and laughable. The urbanites used the word 
`peasant' (selianin, seliak) pejoratively and often blamed the countryside for the poor 
economic performance of communist Bulgaria and its cultural conservatism. Yet at the 
same time the very same backwardness of the countryside became a source of its 
romanticisation. The isolation of village life became a symbol of Bulgarian national 
"' For detailed account of the economic reforms in Bulgaria see Crampton, A Short 
History, pp. 192-200, and James F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1970), pp. 83- 95. 
80 
purity, untouched by civilisation. Communist intellectuals endowed the countryside with 
mythical qualities and looked there for inspiration. 14 From the 1960s, folklore studies, 
ethnography and dialectology were greatly encouraged in Bulgarian universities. The 
subjects were united under the titles of narodovedchestvo ('study of the people') or 
narodopsichologia ('people's psychology'). " The Institute of Folklore at the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences promoted the study of micro-regional culture, kraeZnanie, which 
saw Bulgarian culture as consisting of small units, each declared a repository of ancient 
mythology. "' The aim was to emphasise the antiquity of the Bulgarian countryside as the 
heart of the Bulgarian nation. `Imagining' the countryside as a nation, in Anderson's 
sense, did not compensate for the failures of Bulgarian communism in its agricultural 
policy. But it did help the BCP to credit itself as being the party of the Bulgarian people. 
84 See Nikolai Haitov, Divi Razkazi, (Plovdiv: Hristo G. Danov, 1967) and lordan 
Radichkov, Luda Treva, (Varna: Georgi Bakalov, 1980). Both authors enjoyed wide 
recognition and popularity among the Bulgarian intelligentsia. They mythologised the 
Bulgarian village as highly imaginative and spiritual environment. 
"s During the 1980s the works of Ivan Hadziiski were rediscovered as the main 
intellectual achievement in the study of the Bulgarian national character. He became 
known as the best Bulgarian `narodopsicholog' (people's psychologist). 
' See Strashimir Dimitrov, Sustoianie i zadachi na kraeznanieto, (Sofia: Narodna 
Prosvcta, 1978). 
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IX. Conclusion 
The coexistence of Marxism and nationalism has been of primary importance for the 
modern world. According to Szporluk, `Nationality and class are recognised now as 
essential components of individual identity and political legitimacy is a proof of how 
profoundly our modern outlook has been shaped by the ideologies of nationalism and 
Marxism. 'x' The main focus of the theoretical conceptualisations of the relationship, on 
one hand, between Marxist theory and communist ideology and nationalism on the other 
has been on the generalities rather than the specifics of each communist country's 
experience. "' 
V Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, 
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1988), p. 240. 
" Ibid. Szporluk's approach is different in that his account of the origins of the 
interaction between Marxism and nationalism focuses on Russia and from there draws 
conclusions about he general trends of the development of communism, nationalism and 
modernity. According to him classical Marxism was a theoretical achievement, which 
offered a model of society based on historical inevitability and as such it was a particular 
response to nationalism. Szporluk thinks that Marx's inability to recognise nationalism as 
a `changing reality' meant also to ignore the pre-existing traditions in all of Eastern 
Europe. Hence, Szporluk argues, one of the most important factors in the relationship 
between Marxism and nationalism is that the former had a particular Russian 
interpretation, distinct from the rest of Europe and Eastern Europe. Russia, where 
Marxist theory was interpreted and practised, did not have the European development 
and was widely considered to be backward. Szporluk defines the most important features 
of Russian backwardness as the lack of differentiation between the state and society in an 
European fashion, the concept of intelligentsia as a `peculiar category suggesting that its 
members must be separated from the state', and the introduction of the Industrial 
Revolution before the formation of the nation. " All these factors contributed to the 
traditional neglect of political and legal issues in Russia: `Marx taught his Russian 
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But the dynamics between communism and nationalism in Eastern Europe differed from 
country to country. There is little disagreement that communism brought radical and 
overarching change in the entire region. In this classical sense, it constituted a revolution. 
But the nature of that revolution also varied from country to country. Massive action was 
undertaken to overthrow the existing political order. But the change was also forced 
upon on many levels of the society. Was there one or many communist revolutions and 
how national or international their aims were? At first nationalism seemed defeated by 
internationalism. But it was not long before it re-emerged as the strongest competitor for 
political power in Bulgaria and throughout Eastern Europe. 
Eastern Europe before communism was politically backward. The roots of its 
backwardness were to be found in its history, geography and culture. MacNeil argues that 
the origins of the political backwardness of the entire area were in the `political 
geography'. The Danubian and Pontiac Europe, where historically lands where the west 
met the cast. " Armstrong calls Eastern Europe the `shatter zone' encompassing the 
Danube basin of Europe and the Balkans further down to the east. These were the places 
where the big religions of Christianity and Islam clashed. Eastern Europe shaped around 
old ethnic boundaries, rather than modern political entities. As a result, ethnic identities 
became central to the region and civic values were hardly included. "'At the bottom of the 
definition of Eastern Europe as politically backward region is the comparison with the 
disciples that violent social revolution, not piece-meal political reform, offered the 
solution to Russia's problems'. 
" William H. McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500 - 1800, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1964). 
"'John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, (Chapell Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 96-97 and p. 113. 
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West. Eastern Europe was always in contact with the West, but the communication was 
never sufficient. This in its own turn produced a constant desire in Eastern European 
society to imitate the West, but the results were always poor. " Eastern European political 
development was uneven and interrupted; Eastern European westernisation was rather 
superficial. Nationalism has been the primary organising principle of Eastern European 
politics before the arrival of communism. Bibo argues that Eastern European political 
thinking was a `phantasmagoric world' because it was based on distorted notions of 
nationalism. The involvement of the national consciousness in the building up of the 
political institutions in Eastern Europe before the WW II led to the `grotesque 
phenomenon of a feudal, aristocratic, and authority-oriented anti-democratic 
nationalism. '`'` Seton-Watson also described Eastern Europe as traditionally backward. 
Education in citizenship was not part of the history and the political tradition of Eastern 
Europe. Ethnic nationalism was institutionalised and became the main obstacle for the 
development of western type of democracy in the entire region. The missing ingredient 
in the Eastern European society was an integrative political framework for all the 
different nationalities living there. " 
91 Daniel Chirot, `Causes and Consequences of Backwardness' in The Origins of 
Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics & Politics from the Middle Ages until the 
Early Twentieth Century, 
Daniel Chirot (ed. ), (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1989), p. 200. 
92 Istvan Bibo, The Jewish Question in Hungary (1948)' in Democracy. Revolution. Self- 
determination: Selected \Vritings, Nagy Karoly (ed. ), Andras Boros-Kazai (tr. ), (Series: 
East European Monographs, No. 317), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
pp. 235- 236. 
13 Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars: 1918-194. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 265. 
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The backwardness of the political traditions of Eastern Europe become even more 
apparent when looking at the Balkans. The politics of the Balkans have been determined 
by its history as a particular place in Eastern Europe. Here the political backwardness 
seemed mostly to be a result of the legacy of the Ottoman rule, often thought to have 
offered a more undemocratic political model if compared to the Habsburgs. " The 
movements for national independence and the consequent redrawing of the national 
boundaries after the withdrawal of the Ottomans, the disastrous effects of the Balkan 
wars and the First World War left the Balkan region disenchanted. Nationalism seemed 
to be the only force providing coherence in the otherwise deeply fragmented Balkan 
mind. The desire to build up the one-nation-state became the norm of the political 
thinking. 
Communism was supposed to change the very idea of the nation-state radically. Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans were to be transformed by communist modernisation, which 
was to destroy the old order. Communism claimed that political backwardness was a 
capitalist attitude and this was to be eradicated. Eastern Europe was to be reinvented in 
the new communist paradigm of modernity, which was supra-national. Communist 
vision of the future was offered as a cure to all diseases of the past including nationalism. 
In Bulgaria communism promised new historical era. Indeed Bulgarian communism 
designed the most systematic and overarching plan for modernisation known in the 
history of the country. The entire political and economical culture of the country was to 
be changed in the most dramatic manner. From a national and `nationalistic' bourgeoisie 
94 Sec Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 11. See also John R. Lampe, Imperial 
Borderlands or Capitalist Periphery? Redefining Balkan Backwardness, 1520-1914' in The 
Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics & Politics from the Middle 
Ages until the Early Twentieth Century, Daniel Chirot (ed. ), (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
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state Bulgaria was to become a supra-national workers' democracy. The new Bulgaria was 
designed to be a Soviet style state. The `people's republic' had to replace the west 
European model of democracy, which was the main source of inspiration for the pre-war 
Bulgaria. Although the inter-war politics of Bulgaria undoubtedly were ridden by 
authoritarianism, political party pluralism and democratic competition were the model to 
aspire to, regardless of the poor level of their application. 95 With the arrival of 
communism Bulgarian westernisation was banned. Communism stated that 
modernisation was to be carried out in isolation from the west. It severed the Bulgarian 
connections with western Europe and re-orientated the country towards the Soviet 
Euro-Asian communist world. Bulgaria felt this re-orientation as imposed, despite of the 
strong tradition of close relations with the Russian culture. 
Communism understood progress as the institutionalisation of total and permanent 
control over the public and private spheres of life and no accountability of the rulers to 
the ruled. The politics of this formula, with all the intricacies and exceptions, became the 
new twist of the Eastern European backwardness. 
London: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 177-209. 
15 See Oren, Revolution Administered, 1971. 
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Chapter 2: Communist Internationalism and Nationalism - 
The Bulgarian Content 
I. Introduction 
The main features of the BCP before the Second World War were: a) its origins as a 
Marxist party of no compromise, b) its adherence to `pure' Marxism-Leninism as the 
political theory which was going to bring radical change in Bulgarian politics and society, 
and c) its loyalty to the Soviet communist leadership as the focus of its understanding of 
communist internationalism. From the outset Bulgarian communists rejected any debate 
on Marxism or Marxism-Leninism, which was their theoretical creed, and became 
intellectually isolated. By explaining society and history through the prism of working- 
class identity, they became representative for a very small part of Bulgarian society, which 
was predominantly peasant. The BCP's loyalty to the Soviet communists sustained its 
position as a powerful communist party in the Balkans. 
The Bulgarian communist approach to issues of nationalism was new to Bulgarian 
political thinking. It claimed that nationalism as a political movement belonged to the 
bourgeoisie and was a tool for disguising class domination. Nationalism was not central 
to their theory. Theoretically it was analysed according to political events involving issues 
of Bulgarian national unity and in relation to communist internationalism. ' On the other 
hand Bulgarian national questions were central to Bulgarian politics before 1944. 
Bulgarian communists had to respond to their external and internal aspects. According to 
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Bulgarian Marxist-Leninist theory, national questions in Bulgaria and in the Balkans were 
to be dictated in accord with communist internationalism and the Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of nationalism. As a solution to the most important Bulgarian national 
question before the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, the Macedonian 
question, the BCP professed the idea of the Balkan Communist Federation (BCF) under 
the control of Moscow. Most of their efforts went towards defending communist 
internationalism in terms of obedience to the Soviets rather than defining the terms of 
political rule of a future federation in the context of relations with the other Balkan 
communist parties. The BCP's theoretical proposition on the Macedonian question in 
Bulgaria proved futile as the idea of a Balkan federation was not realised. Macedonia's 
autonomy or independence, envisioned as a stage of its development, did not develop 
the way the BCP envisioned. The main reason for this in the context of internationalism 
was the complexities of the Tito-Stalin split which determined the BCP's policy towards 
the Macedonian question. From 1949 onwards the BCP developed a new line of thinking 
- that the Macedonian question in Bulgaria was an internal one. As such it turned into a 
question of the existence of Macedonian national minority in the country. 
' See Todor Pavlov, Izbranie Filosofskie Proizvedenia, (Moscow: Innostrannoi Literaturi, 
1962), vol. 2, p. 105. 
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II. Nationalism and Internationalism: Marx and Engels 
In Marx and Engels' theory class affinity was more important than national differences. 
Questions of nation and nationalism were not ignored but rather discussed on different 
occasions and in different places in their theory. The Communist Manifesto stated: `The 
working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since 
the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to the leading class 
of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in 
the bourgeois sense of the word. 'Z Marx thus observed that the concept of class existed 
within the framework of the nation yet at the same time lacked national characteristics in 
the way the bourgeois concept of nation did. According to Marx this national specificity, 
which was an attribute of the bourgeoisie, was going to be obliterated by the 
advancement of industrialisation. In `The German Ideology' Marx argued: `Generally 
speaking, big industries created everywhere the same relations between the classes of 
society, and thus destroyed the peculiar individuality of the various nationalities. And 
finally, while the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate national interests, big 
industry created a class, which in all nations has the same interest and with which 
nationality is already dead; a class which is really rid of all the old world and at the same 
time stands pitted against it. " Marx also viewed that national differences, which were a 
source of hostility, were bound to disappear in a homogenised industrialised world: 
`National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more 
vanishing owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the 
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London Penguin Books, 
1985), p. 102. 
' Karl Marx, `The German Ideology: Part I' in Robert C. Tucker (cd. ) The Marx-Engels 
Reader, (New York London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978) pp. 185-186. 
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world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life 
corresponding thereto. " 
Marx differentiated between nationality and nation. He did not seem to suggest that the 
elimination of nationalities would create a world not divided into nations. Marx's idea 
was that nations may still exist but they would not be in antagonistic relations to each 
other. Marx envisioned that after the proletariat achieved political power, international 
relations would not be defined by hostile nationalistic perceptions: `In proportion as the 
antagonism between classes within the nations vanishes, the hostility of the nation to 
another will come to an end. 'S Marx assumed that national interests did not drive 
proletarians by nature, as they were the `working men who have no country'. Working 
men have nothing to loose as they are deprived of basic rights, namely, they do not have 
control over the means of production. The deprivation they all suffer from makes them 
equal. However Marx did not mean that proletarians had no homeland since the 
proletarians should rise to the national class, which then would carry out the proletarian 
revolution. Marx also defined the basic difference between communists from other 
working-class parties as follows: 'In the national struggles of the proletarians of the 
different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the 
entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. '" In this way Marx defined the 
communist leadership in a supra-national dimension. 
Marx argued that a high degree of development of productive forces presupposes the 
`world historical instead of local' existence of men. The universal development of 
Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 102. 
Ibid., p. 102. 
Ibid., p. 95. 
90 
productive forces conditions `a universal intercourse between men', `which produces in all 
nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the `propertyless mass. ' This, concluded 
Marx, `makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others'. 7 Marx asserted 
that communism could not be a `local event'. ' In Marxist terms communist movement 
rested on universal interaction between world-historical units (individuals or nations). 
It would be very difficult to project how Marx and Engels would have viewed 
international relations between `really existing' socialist states. Yet as Light points out: `If 
Marx and Engels had thought about socialist foreign policy, they would not have 
expected it to be the functions of traditional state institutions. ''Indeed Marx and Engels 
had a particular view on the nature of the state as well as on its development. In classical 
Marxism the state was seen as a `particular stage of development' of society. "' The state, 
Marx and Engels viewed, arouse as an organ of society, standing above it and `from the 
need to keep class antagonisms in check'. The state was a tool in the hands of the most 
economically powerful class, which were also the ruling class and `an organisation for the 
protection of the possessing class against the nonpossessing class. '" The highest form of 
the state in which the last battle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would take 
place is the democratic republic. In a classless society the state would have no place: `The 
society which organises production anew on the basis of free and equal association of the 
' Marx, `The German Ideology', p. 162. 
" Ibid. 
Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, (Great Britain: \Vheatsheaf 
Books, 1988), p. 147. 
'° Friedrich Engels, `The Basis of the State: From The Origins of the Family, Private 
Property, and the State' in Neil J. Smelser, (ed. ) , 
Karl Marx on Society and Social 
Change, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press), 1973, p. 18. 
" Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
91 
producers will put the whole state machinery where it will then belong - into the museum 
of antiquities, next to the spinning wheel and the bronze axe. ' 12 
In `On the Jewish Question' Marx defined the political character of the state in relation 
to political emancipation and in opposition to civil society. Marx believed that the 
political state was a completely developed political form. Man, according to him, lived in 
the political state as a social being and more precisely as a `communal being' as opposed to 
life in civil society where he acts as `private individual. 13 Marx argued that being a member 
of the political state brings man closer to the universe and divests him from individual 
life. '4 Marx viewed that socialisation of man was a higher form of existence, freed from 
`illusory' individualism. Yet at the same time he did not deny the existence of the 
individual as such. He rather saw the individual in relation to the `world-historically, 
existence'. 's 
But what role would the nation play exactly in Marx's political state where there should 
be no nationality differences and in an international world devoid from national 
antagonism? Could the individual be part of a `world historically existence' and a member of 
a nation at the same time and what exactly it would mean for his/her identity in terms of 
being both `communal being' and `private individual'? Marx and Engels did not give 
direct answers to such questions. When discussing what transformation the state would 
undergo on the way to becoming a communist society, Marx answered the question what 
social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to the present functions 
12 Ibid., p. 21. 
" Karl Marx, `On the Jewish Question' in Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 34. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Marx, `The German Ideology', p. 162. 
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of the state: This question can only be answered scientifically and one does not get a 
flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousand-fold combination of the word people with 
the word state. ''' 
Further on, Marx stated that the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat was the 
political transitional period of the development of the state. But he did not explain what 
was going to happen to the nation in this political transition, though we may assume that 
the status of the proletariat achieved as a `national class', would also be a transitional 
stage on the way towards universal humanity. It was left for future generations to decide 
what was the future of the nation and its particular relationship to the citizen and the 
state in the world where the communist system became reality. 
'6 Karl Marx, `The Transition to Communist Society: From A Critique of the Gotha 
Programme', in Smelser, Karl Marx of Society and Social Change, p. 201. 
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III. Marxism-Leninism: Lenin's Contribution to the Theory of Internationalism 
and Nationalism 
While the relationship between internationalism and the idea of the nation was developed 
as a political model in classical Marxism, Leninism sought to develop a theory of 
internationalism and nationalism which had immediate practical application. Lenin's 
views differed in some ways from those of Marx and Engels' but nevertheless were based 
on his understanding of Marx. The fact that Lenin had to deal with a region which was 
different from Western Europe in geographical and economical terms was also an 
important factor in the way his thinking on nationalism and internationalism developed. 
The specific conditions of the Russian situation on many levels determined Lenin's 
views. Lenin's reworking of Marxist theory was mainly in the emphasis he put on the 
revolutionary aspect of classical Marxism. 
In relation to the questions of internationalism and nationalism Lenin expanded the 
political dimension of the issue. He underlined the need for democratic centralism and 
the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to establish communist 
rule in any country and also in order to co-ordinate the united struggle of the proletarian 
revolution. Lenin firmly believed that the proletarian revolution in Russia should be 
conducted by a well-organised professional communist revolutionary party, as opposed 
to Marx's general vision of communists not having `sectarian principles of their own, by 
which to shape and mould the proletarian movement. '" 
Central to Lenin's ideas on national questions was his theory of the right to self- 
determination. His definition of self-determination of nations was that it was a method 
94 
of political separation of oppressed nations from alien national bodies, and for the 
formation of independent national states: `The right of nations to self-determination 
implies exclusively the right to independence in the political sense, the right to free 
political separation from the oppressor nation. "" Lenin underlined that the right for self- 
determination did not mean simply separation but `only a consistent expression of 
struggle against all national oppression. '" Thus Lenin was not in favour of secession for 
its own sake . He was 
for self-determination as a political arrangement between different 
state units. Further on Lenin saw self-determination as justified when it was progressive, 
namely when it was leading the working class towards freedom from `alien' national 
oppression and when the final goal was international solidarity. Thus similarly to Marx 
and Engels Lenin saw nationalism in the context of a broader strategy, which aimed to 
establish proletarian world unity. 
On the other hand Lenin regarded nationalism as a reaction to oppression, particularly 
when the question was about minorities' nationalism. Lenin believed that national 
movements in Russia should be tamed by offering them the right to self-determination: 
`He [Lenin] was convinced that the only way to combat nationalism was by the use of the 
carrot, not the stick'. 2 He also thought that the proletarian revolution in Eastern Europe 
(Austria, the Balkans and Russia) could not be carried without `championing the right of 
Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto p. 95. 
"'The Significance of the Right to Self - Determination and its Relation to Federation' in 
John Riddell (ed. ), The Communist International in Lenin's Time: Lenin's Struggler a 
Revolutionary International: Documents: 1907-1916. The Preparato[y Years, (New York: 
Monad Press, 1984), p. 356. 
Ibid., p. 356. 
See Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 34. 
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nations to self-determination'. Here, Lenin wrote, the most difficult was to unite the class 
struggle of the oppressor nation with that of the workers from the oppressed nation. ' 21 
Lenin's idea about self-determination was that, as an act of secession it should be 
understood only as a transitional period. Once again his concept of self-determination 
was emphasised as a political one in the sense that secession was permitted only when 
serving the political objectives of a broad communist movement. Essentially self- 
determination was an idea which favoured internationalism though used nationalism on 
the way towards achieving it. Self-determination in Lenin's terms was not determined by 
cultural or ethnic desires, though he did not deny their existence, but by the political 
aspirations of the respective communities. Thus similarly to Marx and Engels, Lenin saw 
nationalism in its political dimension and as a stage of the political development of the 
state. 
On the question of the relationship between self-determination and federation Lenin 
firmly believed that the latter should not be considered as a logical ultimate aim of the 
former. Lenin favoured the establishment of a strong centralist state. Federations, 
according to him, weakened the economic ties of the state and raised the question about 
how agreements were to be achieved between the participants. ' On the other hand 
Lenin specifically emphasised that self-determination was not synonymous with 
recognition of federation, and also that federation was not in contradiction with 
democratic centralism and could be offered as a solution depending on political 
21 `Three Types of Countries with Respect to the Self Determination of Nations', in 
Riddell, The Communist International in Lenin's Time, pp. 358-359. 
L Sec Ephraim Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political 
Crisis, (London Concord, Mass: Pluto Press), 1991, pp. 76-77. 
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circumstances. Federation, asserted Lenin, was even what Marx, as a centralist, preferred 
as a solution to the Irish question. Federation, asserted Lenin, means integration of 
nations against foreign oppression as well as oppression from their own nation. Thus 
federation was both a political concept as much as a practical political solution for 
national questions. 
On the question of autonomy, Lenin again accepted it only as a possible stage on the way 
towards the inevitable `merging' (rlyianie) of the nations. In response to demands for 
cultural-national autonomy, Lenin proposed the project for equal rights - `the division of 
the country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according - among other 
things - to nationality. 'z' Lenin included into his project for equal rights the rights of 
national minorities to participate in the educational and cultural institutions and to 
practice their own languages. Lenin recommended these `equal rights' as a remedy to 
those who may demand autonomy. Similarly to the idea of self-determination, which 
Lenin developed as an interim stage on the way to the establishment of the full power of 
the world proletariat, he also saw nationalities' equality as a temporary stage on the way 
towards internationalism. 
The usage of nationalism in Lenin's thinking for the purposes of the advancement of the 
proletarian revolution, under the strict command of the highly organised communist 
party and within the framework of a highly centralised state, even if it was a federation, 
taught communist leaders that nationalism may be actively used in the name of higher, 
internationalist aims. This was a Leninist innovation, which was reflected in the thinking 
of many of communist ideologists. 
21 See Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and StratcgY, pp. 36-37. 
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IV. Stalin: `What is a nation? ' 
The most celebrated part of Stalin's theory about the nation is his definition of what is a 
nation: `A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the 
basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested in a common culture. '`' This definition was a considerable move away from 
Marxist and Leninist thinking about the nation. Firstly Stalin asserted that the nation was 
not simply a function of class, but is a phenomenon on its own. Secondly despite the 
vagueness of the concept of the nation possessing a `psychological make-up', Stalin 
accepted that the nation was a multidimensional phenomenon and most importantly that 
it had a non-rational element. 
But on the other hand Stalin asserted that no national characteristic could be 
conceptualised outside its social discourse (usloviami ZhiZnz) zs In his critique of Otto 
Bauer's views on the Jewish nation, Stalin underlines that there could be no nation based 
on religion alone, as this was the only common characteristic which Jews possessed, 
according to him because there could be no nation without economic and cultural 
unity. '"Stalin's views on the nature of nations and nationalism were defined in this 
interconnection between the social, historical and economic aspect of the nation on one 
hand and its religious, ethnic and linguistic dimension on the other. Stalin spent 
considerable time trying to come to terms with the contradictions between the two. 
24 Joseph Stalin, `The Nation' in John Hutchinson & Anthony Smith (eds. ), 
Nationalism, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 20. 
z5 I. Stalin, `Nazia' in Marxizm i Nazionalno-Kolonialnii Vopros Sbornik i7branih statei i 
rechei, (Partizdat CK VKP, 1937), pp. 6-7. 
`` Ibid., p. 8. 
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Although he gave priority to the former, he was very aware how difficult it was to deal 
with the latter. 
Stalin emphasised that the nation was a community, not `racial or tribal, but a historically 
constituted community. '27 Therefore, he argued, the nation is `subject to the law of 
change, has its history, its beginning and end. ' The nation, postulated Stalin, can not be 
conceptualised in any spiritual or idealistic framework, but only as determined by socio- 
economic conditions. Z" Stalin distinguished between `national community' and `state 
community'. According to him national community must posses a common original 
language whereas the state only needs an official one. Yet Stalin did not specify whether 
that meant that the nation would `wither away' in the course of the proletarian revolution 
which would change the status of the state itself. 
Stalin viewed that national questions could be solved only according to the political 
expediency of historical circumstances. He believed that national issues are of a changing 
nature and that Marx and his followers themselves showed this in their views of the 
Polish national question. 29 Stalin stressed that national autonomy did not solve national 
questions. On the contrary by `sharpening and confusing it', national autonomy works 
against the unity of the proletariat and creates conditions for further divisions. "' Stalin 
asserted that national autonomy should not be confused with the right to self- 
determination. According to his theory national autonomy presupposes the unity of 
na iona(ity whereas self-determination applies to nations. National autonomy works against 
Z' Ibid., p. 18. 
Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
Ibid., p. 19 and pp. 15-16. 
Ibid., p. 26. 
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the development of the nation, since it aims to organise nations in an artificial way. The 
question of dispersed nations becomes in reality a nationality problem. Stalin's concept of 
nationality was in many ways a concept about national minorities, though he did not say 
it. But when he referred to the rights of nationalities he actually referred to the idea 
developed by the Austrian Marxists, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, who proposed 
constitutional arrangements for national minorities. Stalin did not believe in such rights 
because they implied national autonomy, which could not be a transitional form because 
these nationalities have lost their economic and territorial ties on the first place. " Stalin 
makes it very clear that preserving the `national character of national minorities' in the 
language of Austrian Marxists is a ridiculous demand because they were generally 
'primitive'. " Stalin also saw national autonomy as being in contradiction to Marx's views 
on national questions. Stalin emphasised that if the state was going to `wither away', 
national autonomy is not helpful in the process because it works against the `giant growth 
of capitalist production and the re-grouping of nationalities in order to unite them in 
bigger territories. '" This was the theoretical basis for Stalin's notorious policy of 
resettling nationalities in the Soviet Union. 
Stalin's views on internationalism were defined in opposition to nationalism and Greater 
Russian chauvinism in particular. Stalin asserted that the major role of the October 
revolution was to liberate people `under the banner of mutual trust and brotherly 
rapprochement between workers' and peasants' nationalities in the USSR'. This was in 
opposition to any movement that unites `under the banner of national animosities or 
" Ibid., p. 24. 
Ibid., pp. 24-25. Stalin uses the example of Tatars and Georgians. 
" Ibid., p. 25. 
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international clashes' in the name of nationalism. '' In his speech addressing the Yugoslav 
committee at the Comintern in 1925, Stalin criticised the Yugoslav communist leadership 
for not having understood the true internationalist principles according to which the 
national questions of Yugoslavia should be solved. Stalin stated that after the October 
revolution the main factor in international politics became the new international relations 
and the fight against imperialism. Yugoslav communists, he stated, not only do not take 
into account this factor but also are `connected to certain imperialist groupings'. It was 
the new international situation, which demanded from Yugoslavia to apply the right for 
self-determination and autonomy, if necessary, `after the model of the Soviet system'. 31 
Since the federal Soviet state was established with national units having the status of 
equal republics, Stalin asserted that after the victory of the revolution, the different 
nations should support Russia against imperialism. " Stalin saw the major threat to 
international communism in the international co-operation of imperialist powers. As 
Stalinist practices revealed during the years of his rule of the Soviet Union, Stalin would 
also see disagreements among the communist parties as directly linked to the 
international imperialist enemy. 
Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
ss Ibid., pp. 152-154. 
'G See Robet King, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension 
among Balkan Communist Sates, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1973), p. 22. 
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V. The Foundations of Bulgarian Marxism-Leninism: Blagoev and Dimitrov 
The founder of the Bulgarian socialist movement, Dimitur Blagoev, considered himself 
to be a firm and pure Marxist. While studying in Russia he discovered Russian 
translations of Marx and Engels. In his early interpretations of Marxism Blagocv was 
inspired mainly by Plehanov and Kautsky. Later on he argued against their views, which 
he declared revisionist. He also rejected Eduard Bernstein, the German social democrat, 
as well as the Austro-Marxists for having misinterpreted Marxism by denying the 
supremacy of the class theory and sold out to bourgeois socialism. " Blagoev was also 
against anybody who did not fully adhere to his views within Bulgarian socialist thought. 
His main opponent was Yanko Sakuzov, who became leader of the moderates in the 
early Bulgarian socialist movement and in general professed broader coalition of the left 
forces. In difference to Blagoev, who became a revolutionary thinker of the Russian 
pattern, Sakuzov pursued his studies in the West, in Germany, France and England. 
Blagoev rejected him as being a bourgeois thinker who was trying to expropriate 
Nfarxism. 39 
Blagoev's theoretical views on questions of nations and nationalism were developed in 
relation to two main debates: the theory of class relations and struggle and the idea about 
the Balkan federation, which involved the Macedonian question. He himself defined 
Marxist thinking as based on economics : `The main theoretical foundation, which serves 
as a principle foundation for social democracy, is scientific socialism, namely Marx's 
37 See Dimitur Blagocv, `Nfaraizmut i Bernshtainstvoto? ', in Dimitur Blagoev protiv 
revizionizma: Antologia, (Sofia: Partizdat, 1973) pp. 90-116. 
"' See Dimitur Blagoev, `Pro domo sua', pp. 30-44 and `IN4arxovoto uchenic i Dr. Sakuzov 
(pak pro domo sua)', pp. 45-61, in Protiv revizionizma, (Sofia: Partizdat, 1973). 
102 
philosophical-economical doctrine. The essence of it is in the economical organisation of 
society, which is the basis for its legal and political organisation and in its history as a 
history of class struggle. It follows that any political regime in any country is conditioned 
by the respective dominant economic organisation and that its elimination could be 
carried out by change in the economic basis. " 
Central to Blagoev's views about the nation was the idea that the nation was created as a 
result of class relations. His starting point was Marx's notion that the nation is the 
framework within which the working class expands in order to become a national force. 
Blagoev argued that the nation's significance is in its political meaning as far as it was 
united as a class - the nation as a political unit could have consciousness only as a class 
unit, under the banner of Marxism. 51 Thus Blagoev asserted that there was no nation 
outside class. Also in his view the idea of the nation was closely related to the concept of 
class unity. He asserted that the unity of the nation was firstly determined by its class- 
consciousness. That is why, he argued, the nation has to be united territorially in order to 
become a united class. The proletariat needs to be a territorially united class, wrote 
Blagoev: `If one big part of the national unit is separated from many other national units 
living outside, the question about national unification becomes very important. '" For 
Blagoev claimed that the national unity of the proletariat was a condition for the success 
of the class struggle. In his view the national unity would make it possible for the 
working class to carry out the revolution. This was so, argued Blagoev, because ` national 
unity creates better conditions for social development as well as for the better 
3' Blagoev, `Pro domo sua', p. 30. 
4" Dimitur Blagoev, `Nazionalnoto obedinenie i rabotnicheskata klasa'in Suchinenia, 
(Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata Komunisticheska Partia) (year of publication not 
indicated), vol. 13, p. 284. 
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development of more powerful production forces. ' Thus Blagoev saw the nation as the 
proletarian territory where the class revolution takes place. Yet on the other side Blagoev 
claimed that the proletariat could not be restricted to any particular territory because it 
was a world force: `there is one united proletariat, which includes all different parts of the 
proletariat from various developed capitalist countries'. " Blagoev believed that separate 
national proletarian units were restricted to national territory now but they would achieve 
the unification of the proletarian world in the future. 
Blagoev did believe that economics determined all interests in society and that this was 
according to the `material' concept of Marxism. He argued that contrary to `material' 
Marxism, the bourgeois concepts about nation centred on `national ideals' diverted the 
attention of the proletariat towards the `immaterial' dimension of the nation and this 
aimed to prevent the proletariat from becoming a strong class. At the same time `the so- 
called `national ideals', according to him, were `actually egotistical class interests.. . which 
work against the freedom and the rights of the proletariat. A3 Blagoev saw the solution to 
any national questions in Bulgaria in understanding and transforming the nation into 
class organisation. In this way, he argued, the proletariat would expand and would be 
able to dictate solutions to any national questions in Bulgaria and in the Balkans. 44 He 
asserted that the Bulgarian proletariat would lead the future development of the 
Bulgarian nation. 
" Ibid. 
42 
Ibid. 
" Ibid., p. 285. 
44 Ibid., 287. 
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Blagoev's views on class and nation were further developed in his article `The Proletariat 
and the Homeland' in response to the critique by Plehanov and Kautsky to Marx's idea 
that `the proletariat has no homeland'. There Blagoev argued that the above authors were 
essentially revisionists who by analysing Marx's theory of communism and nationalism 
were trying to present both Marx and Engels as nationalists in order to justify their own 
nationalistic bourgeois views. Blagoev argued that the real meaning of Marx's statement 
about `workers having no homeland' was that `the mere idea of homeland is essentially 
an idea which maintains permanent hostility between people, between nations. It is being 
implanted by the dominant classes in the mind of the exploited and oppressed people. 4s 
According to him this was the Marxist view and to accept any deviation from it would 
mean to `take the slippery road towards . ro7ialßatriotiZvla (social-patriotism), which means 
becoming a counterrevolutionary. 46 Blagoev condemned all social-patriots like Kautsky 
for making a big error by claiming that Marx and Engels were interested in any kind of 
nationalism even if it was connected to the idea of encompassing all nations under the 
umbrella of the world proletariat. 47 He insisted that Marx and Engels had a very clear and 
unambiguous position on the question of nationalism: 'Marx and Engels say simply that 
"workers have no homeland"' Blagoev repeated, `workers with class consciousness give 
priority to the endlessly broader idea about the solidarity between the proletariat of all 
countries, namely to the entire revolutionary mankind. ` 
Blagoev's effort to reject anybody who revised `pure' Marxism led him to contradictions 
in his own concept - on one hand the proletariat had national territory but on the other it 
as Dimitur Blagoev, `Proletariatut i otechestvoto' in Protiv revi7ioni7. ma, p. 482. 
46 
47 
49 
Ibid., pp. 488-489. 
Ibid., p. 485. 
Ibid., p. 486. 
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had no country. Blagoev also claimed that there was national consciousness which was to 
be transformed into a class-consciousness so that the nation would become a proletarian 
unit, but at the same time asserted that national consciousness was formed as a result of 
already activated class interests based on presupposed class consciousness. It may be 
assumed that the national territory where the nation lived prior its transformation as a 
world unit would continue to be inhabited by the national class, but it would not be 
`homeland' anymore, though Blagoev did not say what would it be. 
Blagoev's theoretical views on the state in relation to the nation was expressed in the idea 
of a Balkan federation. Blagoev argued that the idea of a Balkan federation is an 
expression of the Bulgarian social-democrats' `Marxist substantiated position' on the so- 
called Balkan problem (ßroblema). According to him there were in general two solutions: 
`creating a Balkan federation or creating one Balkan state by military force, which would 
require destroying Turkey. Yet the safest choice remains the Balkan federation. 'a' Blagoev 
argued that national unity was the central issue for Bulgaria and it could be achieved only 
by creating a Balkan federation. His main argument was that history showed how the 
bourgeoisie was incapable of finding a solution for the Bulgarian national unity because it 
was led by its own class interests and highly nationalistic spirit. Only the working class 
could develop the right idea about creating a Balkan federation. "' Social democracy, 
wrote Blagoev, offered the only correct solution to Balkan animosities. This was the 
united class struggle led by the Balkan proletariat. 51 This was so because Balkan people 
had very different faith, language, literature, and social development. The Balkan 
bourgeoisie based its nationalism on the basis of these differences and used them to 
;' Dimitur Blagocv, `Balkanskiat vupros', in Suchincnia, pp. 384- 395. 
5' Ibid., 286. 
51 Ibid., p. 393. 
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justify its reactionary views but its sole purpose was to oppress people as working classes 
as belonging to different nationalities. Therefore, Blagoev argued, the first prerequisite 
for creating a Balkan federation was to eliminate the Balkan dynasties. 52 The bourgeoisie 
could not and should not participate in the class-based struggle for a Balkan federation 
because its consciousness could not be changed. The Balkan problema could be solved 
only in the `spirit of an internationally conscious proletariat'. 53 
The primary purpose of the Balkan federation thus was to free the Balkan working 
people from class oppression and to unite them in the world-wide proletariat. This would 
eliminate the nationally different Balkan bourgeoisie and establish the rule of a united 
Balkan proletariat, which had no nationality. Blagoev's view was Marxist as far as he saw 
national differences as an attribute of the bourgeoisie in the respective countries, whereas 
the Balkan proletariats were not marked by them. He viewed that the working class was 
not nationalistic by nature. Although he did not explain in his theoretical works in what 
shape different Balkan countries would appear in a federal structure, it seems that 
Blagoev envisioned a strong federal state ruled by a united proletarian unit still consisting 
of the different Balkan proletariats, not differing in terms of nationality. 
Blagoev's theoretical views on the Macedonian movement were also based on the 
concept of class struggle. Blagoev declared that he was in favour of the Macedonian 
movement as long as it was directed first of all against class enemies of the Bulgarian 
peoples' The disagreements within the Macedonian movement, he argued, were due to 
s` Ibid., p. 386. 
ss Ibid., p. 395. 
" Dimitur Blagoev, `Makcdonskoto dvizhenie', in Prinos kum istoriata na sotsializma v 
Bul >aria, (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata Komunisticheska Partia, 1949), pp. 99-107. 
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the sharpening of class antagonism: `the unity of the "Macedonian movement" collapsed 
clue to the advancement of the class differentiation. The different organisations, which 
emerged after its collapsed, degenerated simply into tools of factious bourgeois politics 
defending the collective interests of the bourgeois class. i55 Blagoev saw the unity of the 
Balkans as a prerequisite of the Bulgarian national unity and the Macedonian movement 
as part of it. Yet it remained unclear what he thought would happen once a Balkan 
federation was established: would there be a Macedonian unit in the Bulgarian state or 
would the merger with Bulgaria in the framework of a Balkan federation mean that there 
would be no Bulgaria either? 
Blagoev's most famous follower was the legendary Bulgarian communist leader Georgi 
Dimitrov. Like him he studied Marx and Engels' writings primarily in the context of 
political developments in Russia. But Dimitrov also made a career in the international 
communist movement and became the first communist leader of Bulgaria. During his 
lifetime Dimitrov had actually to apply the theory of communism in practice in the 
context of an established communist system. Like Blagoev Dimitrov also considered 
himself a `pure' Marxist-Leninist. His main contribution in the field of the communist 
theory of internationalism was the theory of the united fatherland front or the Popular 
Front. It was a breakthrough in the Soviet line on the struggle against fascism. Dimitrov 
was then head of the Western European Bureau, chief defendant in the Reichstag Fire 
Trial in 1933 and Secretary General-elect of the Comintern. In 1934 he stressed the need 
for a review of Comintern tactics according to the specific circumstances. Previously the 
Comintern was against any alliances or collaboration with non-communist political forces 
in the struggle against fascism. In 1935 Dimitrov urged the communist movement to 
declare joint action with the Social-Democratic parties, reformist trade unions and other 
ss Ibid., p. 100. 
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organisations in the name of the proletarian revolution. Dimitrov in effect recommended 
the search for the broadest possible anti-fascist coalition, which was a considerable move 
away from the general anti-war stand of the Comintern. As Stern argues the central 
notion in the idea of the Popular Front was power-orientation in defence of the anti- 
fascist powers in order to deter aggression: `an ideological shift had been grounded in 
considerations of power. '56 
Dimitrov criticised the `narrow sectarian attitude in formulating and solving the 
immediate political tasks of the Party' as opposed to the mass fight against fascism. " 
He called for joint action in order to overcome the national and international split of the 
proletariat as well as for the national and international unity of the trade unions. He also 
introduced the idea of a united front government as an `instrument of the collaboration 
of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat' which he was particularly proud to 
declare a form of the Leninist approach to `transitional forms' on the way to the 
proletarian revolution. Dimitrov explained the united front in the context of the nation- 
state. Nationalism, he declared, was a bourgeois ideology, whereas national pride was part 
of the working class link to Bulgaria's past. Here he supported his opinion with Lenin's 
approach to the national question. Dimitrov underlined that Bulgarian communists 
should be proud of their homeland in the same fashion as Lenin was proud of his own 
`Great-Russian nation' because it created a revolutionary class. Referring to his defence at 
5` Geoffrey Stern, The Rise and Decline of international Communism, (England: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1990), p. 78. 
S' Georgi Dimitrov, `The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist 
International' and `The Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism: Report before the 
Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, delivered on August 2,1935', 
in Georgi Dimitrov, For a United and Popular Front, (Sofia: Sofia Press), (year of 
publication not indicated ), p. 128. 
109 
the Reichstag Fire Trial, Dimitrov declared: `I was proud of being a son of the heroic 
Bulgarian working class'. "" Thus Dimitrov was clear that he had Bulgarian national 
identity as far as it was the identity of the working-class man. 
Dimitrov was quite clear about his views on proletarian internationalism - it ensures the 
unity of the working class in the struggle of each individual country for `national, social 
and cultural freedom'. The leader of communist internationalism was the `great Soviet 
Union' where the highest form of an international and national culture, stated Dimitrov, 
was realised - that is, `national in form and socialist in content'. In difference to Blagoev, 
Dimitrov said more about the nature of the future Bulgarian communist state. He 
defined it as a state based on the class identity of the Bulgarian people, which was to be 
constructed in opposition to the capitalist idea of a state based on private property. 
Dimitrov viewed that the meaning of state independence was freedom from the 
oppression of capitalism. He also viewed that Bulgaria was a small state (capitalist or 
otherwise), that needed the protection of a bigger power, the Soviet Union or the Balkan 
federation, which would facilitate the union of the Bulgarian proletariat on the way to 
becoming part of a communist world union. Dimitrov understood the state as a 
transitional form in Leninist terms. However in his theory he did not envision the merger 
of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union directly: `Bulgaria will not go to be a Soviet republic. It 
will be a people's republic. The leading role will be in the hands of the overwhelming 
majority of the people - workers, peasants, craftsmen and people's intelligentsia. Bulgaria 
will be a free and independent state with its own national and state sovereignty. She will 
not play to the tune of any capitalists, which aim to enslave politically and economically 
small people. '59 
se Ibid., p. 180. 
5J Georgi Dimitrov, Izbrani proizvedenia. (Sofia: Partizdat, 1972), p. 174. 
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Dimitrov understood national independence as a struggle against the `enemy's camp'. As 
far as relationship with USSR and other communist countries was concerned he 
understood Bulgarian political independence as inseparable from communist 
internationalism: `People's democracy and people's democratic state stand for 
internationalism. Nationalism is incompatible with people's democracy, because it is a 
weapon of capitalism and capitalist reactionaries. Nationalism in all its forms is an enemy 
of communism.... While fighting nationalism in all its realisations, we must bring up the 
labour masses in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and dedication to our 
homeland, which means in the spirit of true patriotism. '"' Further on he emphasised that 
both internationalism and patriotism`'' mean above all unity of people's democracies with 
the Soviet Union against imperialism. 
Similarly to Blagoev, Dimitrov also rejected all revisionist views on Marxism and 
Leninism, though he criticised some aspects of the Bulgarian communist movement 
during its `narrow' period (tesniachestvoto) under the leadership of Blagoev. Dimitrov 
asserted that the BCP's (`Narrows') greatest contribution was its participation in the BCF. 
Thus, he concluded, the BCP worked `for the reinforcement of solidarity between the 
Bulgarian labour masses and the labour masses from the other Balkan countries as well 
as with those from the entire world. Dimitrov was a passionate supporter of the idea of 
the Balkan communist federation. His theory was to be tested by communist policy, 
which he himself would direct. 
Ibid., p. 258. 
Dimitrov occasionally used the concept of patriotism as opposed to nationalism but 
did not give it a definition. 
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VI. The Bulgarian Communist Movement and the Balkan Federation 
The Balkan socialists developed the idea of a Balkan federation during the second half of 
the 19`h century. A federation, it seemed, would not only facilitate the further 
development of capitalism but equally importantly would put an end to the Balkan 
rivalries and establish a powerful state between Austria and Russia. Apart from the 
economic and diplomatic problems, a Balkan federation was supposed to solve the main 
bone of contention among the Balkan states - the Macedonian question. The League for 
Balkan Confederation envisioned the future federation as a confederation consisting of 
self-administered states. The federation pact was to be supervised by delegates in 
Constantinople. '' Macedonia was to be granted autonomy as a part of the general 
confederation. 
In 1910 the first general Balkan Socialist Conference met in Belgrade where the Bulgarian 
socialists were represented by their `Narrow' wing, Blagoev and Dimitrov included. 
Two main objectives of the Balkan federation were formulated there: to free the Balkans 
from foreign domination and to emancipate them. Most importantly the federation was 
supposed to remove the artificial state barriers, which separated the Balkan people - 
closely connected by language, culture and economics. " Thus the original idea of the 
BCF was that it would remove small state boundaries in order to facilitate closer relations 
between linguistically and culturally related people in the Balkans. Within the framework 
`2 See L. S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan 
Unity in Modern Times, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), p. 151. 
63 See Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development. 
1883-1936, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 210. 
Ibid., p. 210. 
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of Marxist thinking a Balkan federation would unite Balkan people in a larger state unit 
by removing bourgeois national boundaries under the leadership of the proletariat. 
In Bulgaria the socialist movement had to take a stand on the Macedonian question 
during the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. Yanko Sakuzov, representing the `Broad' wing 
of the Bulgarian socialists declared that although the Bulgarian involvement in the wars 
was wrong, Macedonia was Bulgarian. The `Narrows' led by Blagoev also remained firmly 
for finding a peaceful solution but supported the idea of the Balkan federation as a 
solution to the Macedonian question. 65 In October 1912 the Central Committee of the 
Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) issued a manifesto, drafted by 
Lenin, on the Balkan wars. It was circulated and also published in German, French, and 
Belgian Socialist newspapers. In the manifesto the Balkan problems were explained as 
`chain of events since the turn of the century leading to sharper class and international 
contradictions, to wars and revolutions. '66 The manifesto declared support for Balkan 
socialists who were against the war and clearly set out that they should act in accord with 
Leninist principles: `A federal Balkan republic is the rallying cry that our brother socialists 
in the Balkan countries have issued to the masses in their struggle for self-determination 
and complete freedom of the peoples, to clear the way for a broad class struggle for 
socialism'. `'' Further on the manifesto declared that victory for a Balkan federation could 
be achieved together with victory for a republic in Russia, both being long-term 
objectives of the `international revolutionary Social-Democracy'. "' Lenin supported the 
idea of the BCF mainly on the grounds of the primary importance of political 
`S See Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria. pp. 216-222. 
See Riddell, `To All Citizens of Russia', pp. 84-87. 
Ibid., p. 85. 
Ibid., p. 87. 
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expediency. Also by suggesting that it should go hand in hand with the establishment of 
communist Russia, he must have had in mind that the movement towards the BCF 
should be co-ordinated with the Bolsheviks' struggle. 
Lenin's idea was in accord with the declaration of the inaugural session of the BCF in 
1920 in Sofia, when it was declared that the Balkan countries were in a position of being 
semi-colonised by the Great Powers and that their free development could be achieved 
only by a proletarian revolution, which would unite the Balkan proletariat in a federation. 
At that stage communists envisioned a federation consisting of Soviet-style states. This 
was postulated in the resolution previously issued by the Bulgarian `Narrows' at the 
congress held in Sofia in 1919. The goal was to establish a Balkan Federation of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. ' The resolution emphasised that the different federal units should be 
coordinated with the international communist movement. More precisely each party was 
to be affiliated with the Comintern. But on the level of being a federal unit they should 
create a union of Balkan communist republics. 
Essentially it was suggested that the BCF should be organised as a centralised federal 
state controlled by the Soviets. The resolution of the BCF's conference held in Sofia in 
1920 stated that `the Balkan Communist Federation's founding principle was to unite the 
Balkan nations into `one Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic'. "' This aim was to be achieved 
by: a)`liberation of the Balkan nations from the political, financial and economic rule of 
the imperialist Entente, their national freedom and union, the creation of conditions 
necessary for the development of their productive forces', b) educating the Balkan 
`9 Sec Rothschild, The Communist party of Bulgaria p. 223-224. 
70 `Appendix I: Resolutions of the Balkan Communist Conference, Sofia, January 1920. in 
Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, p. 304. 
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proletariat and propertyless masses in a `revolutionary Socialist (Marxist) spirit in order to 
make them conscious of their historic problems', c) coordinating the actions of the 
Balkan communist and socialist parties in order to support the Russian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. The resolution stated also that the unsolved national problems in the Balkans 
were due to the `reactionary and arbitrary forms of government employed by the 
bourgeoisie in the Balkans' and their `present capitalist relations'. The Balkan bourgeoisie 
was declared not capable of creating a Balkan federation because of its `dynastic, 
autocratic and militaristic' character. 
At the Vienna conference of the Balkan Communist Federation in 1921 the Bulgarian 
communists were represented by Vasil Kolarov, secretary of the BCP, and Dimitrov. The 
major questions at this stage were what exactly should the role of Moscow be in the 
federation and which parties should be affiliated with the federation. Kolarov argued 
against the affiliation of the Austrian and Hungarian parties and reasoned his objections 
by stating that these parties represented countries with too different economic and 
ethnographic structures. " As Rothschild points out it is very doubtful that Kolarov really 
had in mind the ethnic or economic homogeneity as a prerequisite to membership in the 
communist federation, as the Greeks shared neither the economic development of the 
Bulgarians nor were considered to be of Slav origins. It would be more convincing to 
assume that Kolarov was afraid of bringing into the federation new pretenders for the 
leadership. 
However the reassurances of the Comintern representative that the Balkan federation 
would not be turned into a mere function of Soviet Russia did not convince the 
Yugoslav representatives who questioned the centrality of Moscow. Also Yugoslav 
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communists disagreed that the federation should be subordinated to the main purpose of 
fighting the Anglo-French influence in the Balkans as stated by Comintern. Their idea 
was to build up a Balkan federation with more power in the hands of the Balkan 
communists themselves and more focused on Balkan affairs as opposed to Soviet 
strategy. From the point of view of Moscow the Bulgarian communists were adhering 
firmly to the principles of communist internationalism, meaning accepting strict control 
from Moscow, whereas the Yugoslavs were not. Communist internationalism in the 
context of the BCF was understood by the Comintern and supported by the BCP as 
political subordination of the various communist parties to the centre. Cooperation 
among the Balkan communist parties was of secondary importance to the cooperation 
with the Soviets. 
The conference worked out a detailed structure of the federation. It reflected the way the 
different communist parties members of the federation were supposed to be accountable 
to each other and to Moscow. The main principle of the structure was declared to be 
`democratic centralism'. 72 At the core of the structure was the Balkan communists' action 
in conformity with the resolutions of the Comintern. Most importantly there was a clause 
included according to which member parties were to be represented individually at 
Comintern congresses and not by the Federation as an unified body. As Rothschild 
asserts, this prevented any possibility for forming a `Balkan block within the 
Comintern. '" This organisational structure did not work in favour of improving the 
international relations in the Balkans but rather became a source of quarrels among the 
constituent parties, which at the end dissolved the BCF. The founding slogan of the 
" Ibid., p. 229. 
72 Ibid., p. 230. 
" Ibid., p. 231. 
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federation as the Balkan's united revolutionary power soon gave priority to the national 
questions in each of the respective countries. 
In 1922 at the conference in Moscow the Balkan Federation declared its support for 
autonomy for Macedonia, Thrace, and Croatia within the future federation of Soviet style 
republics. " Now the communist parties were declared defenders of national minorities in 
their struggle for independence. Although the idea of autonomy was by no means new to 
the idea of a communist federation, the situation in the Balkans was different. The 
respective communist parties were weakened by the pressure of the respective 
governments on them during the 1920s. The autonomy idea was riven by the 
controversies of Balkan politics, which communists parties had little control over. Most 
importantly autonomy for Macedonia was understood as an independent and united 
Macedonian Soviet-style republic, which was to become a member of the Balkan 
Federation as opposed to autonomy for each Macedonian part in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia 
and Greece. Here the Bulgarian communists' position became of decisive importance for 
the BCF. 
Moscow saw the Bulgarian communists as their most faithful comrades. Concerning the 
decisions of the Berlin Congress of 1878, the most painful national question for Bulgaria 
after the liberation from Ottoman rule, Moscow's Bolsheviks supported the revisionist 
ambitions of Bulgaria by professing that Bulgaria had a legitimate claim over parts of 
Macedonia, Thrace and Dobruja. Such support was hotly opposed by other parties of the 
federation, except for the BCP: `In the case of Macedonia, the BCF decided that the 
proper solution to the problem was the establishment of a united and independent 
Macedonia rather than the granting an autonomy by each of the three Balkan states 
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involved in its slice of Macedonia. This program... suited the interests of neither the 
Greek nor the Yugoslav Communist Parties. '75 
The quarrel between the Bulgarian, Greek and Yugoslav parties over the Macedonian 
question revealed to a great extent the communists views on how the national questions 
were to be solved in the Balkans. Whereas the Greek and Yugoslav parties rejected the 
call for autonomous Macedonia, Bulgarian communists insisted that this was the only 
correct solution according to communist principles. Kolarov accused the Yugoslav 
communists of having committed serious mistakes on the national question by not 
aiming to destroy the then Yugoslav state. ' He proclaimed that the unity of several 
nationalities in the Yugoslav federation was not in the spirit of communist 
internationalism because the national problem of Yugoslavia was essentially a peasant 
problem, which could not be solved by federative arrangements. Kolarov, supported by 
Stalin himself, asserted that the Yugoslav communists should support separatist 
movements within Yugoslavia so as to dismantle the Yugoslav state in the name of 
creating a larger Balkan state unit in which each constituent part was to be controlled by 
Moscow directly. According to this model each of the communist states participating in 
the Balkan federation would be homogenised on the basis of working-class and peasant 
unity. Kolarov underlined that national questions in USSR were `completely solved' and 
there was `full national equality' illustrated in `national in form, socialist in content' 
culture, which was developing. '' 
14 Ibid., p. 232. 
'S Ibid., p. 242. 
76 Ibid., pp. 244-246. 
Vasil Kolarov, `Istochniyat pakt i makedonskoto natsionalno dvizhenic' in S 12cro i 
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When BCP leaders spoke of Bulgarians in Bulgaria, Macedonians in Macedonia or 
Slovenes in Yugoslavia they assumed that these were ethnically homogenous groups, 
which would serve as a basis for national homogeneity merging the working class and the 
peasantry. Also the Balkan communists involved in the communist federation referred to 
the populations of the respective countries both as majorities and minorities at the same 
time: they were considered national minorities when discussed in the context of any 
larger political power - e. g., the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian empires or the Yugoslav 
state - and viewed as national majorities in the independent Balkan states. Macedonians 
were considered a minority within the Yugoslav state and a majority in a future 
Macedonian autonomy. In all cases in the context of a future Balkan federation 
communists did not discuss the issue of other people living among the main nations of 
the Balkans, namely their ethnic minorities. 
At the eighth conference of the BCF in 1929 it was officially accepted that the Executive 
Committee of the Federation had no right to interfere in internal party affairs. At the 
same time the central control of Moscow was reaffirmed. Yet it became apparent that the 
idea of the communist federation could not be revived as each of the member parties 
went in different directions. The Balkan countries entered a new era of the so-called 
rapprochement and the Balkan governments took over Balkan politics. The new spirit of 
negotiation rather than confrontation overwhelmed the official inter-Balkan relations. 
The only legal communist party in the Balkans at the time was the Greek one, and in 
1935 it dropped the federation slogan for autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace. In 1937 
Tito became the leader of the Yugoslav communists and he changed the course of the 
Yugoslav communist politics as he favoured Macedonia as a unit of Yugoslavia. 
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The Macedonian question was central to Bulgarian foreign policy throughout the pre- 
Second World War period. On one hand Bulgarian governments of this period had to 
deal with the other Balkan countries which had a stake in Macedonia, and on the other 
hand they had to deal with the Macedonian movement within Bulgaria. Bulgarian 
relations with the USSR in this matter were of primary importance. The general tasks of 
the mainstream Bulgarian political parties after the Berlin Congress in 1878 were: a) to 
ensure that the Christians of Macedonia considered themselves Bulgarian (which was 
contested by Greeks and Serbs), b) to work for their liberation from Ottoman rule, and 
c) to reunite them with Bulgaria. 78 In Bulgarian mainstream politics the question of 
Macedonian unification became also a question of Macedonian autonomy. But whenever 
Bulgarian political parties, Liberal or Conservative, wanted autonomy for Macedonia it 
was seen as a stage on the way to unification with Macedonia. 
During the rule of Stefan Stambolov, who was a left-wing Liberal (1887-1894), Serbia 
attempted to offer division of Macedonia, which the Bulgarians refused. Stambolov 
believed firmly that the long-term policy of Bulgaria should be unification with 
Macedonia, but he also believed that this should be achieved by well-organised Bulgarian 
foreign policy rather than revolutionary methods. This was the main reason for the 
regime's strict measures against the Macedonian movement in Bulgaria. Also 
Stambolov's regime worked to obtain concessions from Turkey over Macedonia rather 
than to make alliances with other Balkan countries. During his time relations with Russia 
were quite strained mainly around the issue of recognition of Ferdinand as a Bulgarian 
monarch, but also Russia supported Serbia's territorial claims in Macedonia in accord 
'ö See Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: A Histo, (New York: Columbia 
University Press), East European Monographs, Boulder, 1983), p. 81. 
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with its own Balkan policy and effectively entertained the idea of the ultimate division of 
Macedonia. 
Apart from the Bulgarian socialist movement, the Agrarians also envisioned the solution 
of the Macedonian problem through the creation of a Balkan confederation. The most 
prominent Bulgarian Agrarian leader, Alexander Stamboliiski, was devoted to the 
achievement of peace in the Balkans through the creation of a union for the Balkan 
states. ' He professed egalitarian ideas about the power of the peasantry. In his theory 
peasants were defined as small holders and private property owners. He viewed that 
socialists and communists alike perverted the essence of Bulgarian society by denying the 
primacy of the peasants. "" In his foreign policy Stamboliiski remained known for signing 
the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919 which meant severe territorial losses for Bulgaria including 
in Macedonia. Therefore Stamboliiski was seen by the Macedonian movement as 
surrendering the unity of Bulgaria and Macedonia for a Balkan union. 
Yet his support for a Balkan union was different from the BCF's. Stamboliiski adhered to 
the idea of a `Green International', which was a body consisting of peasants parties, 
supposed to be the nucleus of a federation of Eastern European peasant states. " 
Stamboliiski's idea was that a Green International of peasant parties would lead to the 
creation of a Green Entente of peasant states as a counterpoint to both the West and 
Russia. The Green International was about an international peasant solidarity with a 
utopian character. In political terms it did not focus on political organisation nearly as 
much as the supporters of the BCF and never actually declared the creation of a state 
'' See Rothschild, The Communist party of Bulgaria, pp. 85-116. 
Ibid., p. 88. 
Ibid., p. 95. 
121 
(federal or other) as its aim. Instead it spoke of a union in terms of moral solidarity. The 
Green International was supposed to represent the peasantry as such on a political level 
as opposed to the communists who aimed to merge them with the workers. In difference 
to the BCF it never had a strict rule of members being accountable to a centre and was 
more associated with the idea of connecting local identity with the nation. 
Stamboliiski did believe that the best policy for the Central and Eastern European 
peasant states was one of balance between the industrial West and the Bolshevik East, 
both alien to `peasantism'. He considered himself a follower of Lenin only in terms of 
being a social innovator. Although he thought that the communists were immature and 
self-indulgent proletarian-industrialist theorists, who knew nothing about reality, he still 
praised them for being anti-bourgeoisie and favoured their revolutionary attitude. "2 
Concerning the Macedonian question, the prevailing opinion among his supporters was 
in favour of Macedonian autonomy, which would eventually be part of some kind of a 
Balkan confederation. "' But Stamboliiski's views differed from those of the Bulgarian 
Socialists who advocated a Balkan federation under the leading role of the proletariat, 
which Stamboliiski could not accept. 
The role of the peasantry in Bulgarian society was also decisive in the split within the 
Bulgarian socialist movement. In 1890s the newly formed Bulgarian Worker's Social 
Democratic Party (BRSDP) experienced the first separation of the Bulgarian Social 
Democratic Union (BSDU). BSDU was for peaceful improvements in social and 
economical life rather than for immediate preparation for a proletarian revolution. The 
split in the BRSDP in 1903 into `Narrow' and `Broad' socialists was in relation to these 
"' Ibid., p. 112. 
" Sec Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, pp. 335-337. 
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disagreements. The `Broad' socialists led by Sakuzov were for political democracy as a 
necessary stage in the transformation of the society into a socialist one. Therefore, they 
argued that the socialist movement should co-operate with other left-orientated political 
forces. The Narrow socialists led by Blagoev stood for purely working-class policies and 
refused to co-operate with any other political force, including the Agrarians. 
Shortly after the failure of the September uprising in 1923 organised by the communists, 
the BCP was banned by the Bulgarian government. This encouraged those communists 
who aspired to the use of violence. As a result of their activities, which culminated in the 
assassination attempt to kill the king and his aides in 1925, the Bulgarian communist 
movement was repressed severely and until the mid 1930s, when Dimitrov's idea about 
the Popular Front was imposed, remained internally divided. With the cote d'etat of 19 
May 1934 which established the regime of Colonels Damian Velchev and Kimon 
Georgiev the communists were marginalised completely. The ambition of the new 
government was to free Bulgaria's foreign policy from the terror of the Macedonian 
movement, which it achieved successfully. The Macedonian question was firmly in the 
hands of the new regime, with rapprochement with Yugoslavia as the first objective in its 
foreign policy. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was a 
continuation of the general line for promoting a strongly centralised authoritarian 
Bulgaria supported by great powers in international politics. The BCP's underground 
existence strengthened its conspiratorial character and gave priority to tactical 
considerations above theoretical debates. The BCP had to accommodate itself to the new 
conditions which the war brought into Bulgaria and most significantly the occupation of 
Macedonia by the Bulgarians in 1941. Its views on nationalism and internationalism were 
to be tested by relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) and the Soviets 
over the question of who was to control the communist resistance in Macedonia. 
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Although the idea of a Balkan federation was not rejected, it was postponed and priority 
was given to more urgent tasks facing the Balkan communist parties during the war. 
After the end of the Second World War Moscow changed its line in relation to the BCF 
and took a pragmatic stand according to which it supported the Yugoslav communists' 
aspirations as they fought German Hitlerism harder than the Bulgarians. At this point the 
Yugoslavs were in general more interested in the idea of a unified Macedonia as part of 
Yugoslavia on the first place and in their own dominance of any Balkan federation. In 
September 1944 Yugoslav communist leaders negotiated with the Bulgarian communists 
about giving Pirin Macedonia cultural autonomy as a step to the unification of 
Macedonia. However this did not imply that there would be a closer union between 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The main question was to whom should a united Macedonia 
belong to? There were strong disagreements within the BCP about the policy of an 
autonomous Macedonia according to which Macedonia may join Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia 
started negotiations for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation during which Bulgaria insisted 
that the two countries should be equal members whereas the Yugoslavs envisioned 
Bulgaria and Macedonia as being both constituent parts of the Yugoslav federation. The 
idea of the federation continued to be discussed and became a major issue at the Bled 
conference between Tito and Dimitrov in 1947. There Dimitrov insisted that Macedonia 
could be unified only within the broader strategy of creating a federation. But no 
agreement was reached on the immediate transfer of Pirin Macedonia to Yugoslavia , 
though it was agreed that Macedonian culture should be promoted there by Yugoslavs. 
Dimitrov's policy was dictated by his beliefs in communist internationalism as the 
guiding principle of communist inter-state relations. He favoured Macedonian autonomy 
as a temporary stage of its incorporation in a larger federation in accord with Marxist- 
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Leninist principles. On the other hand however Dimitrov stood for Macedonia retaining 
its historical links with Bulgaria. He thought that this could be secured in a Balkan 
federation. Here Dimitrov made a concession to the original ideas of communist 
internationalism - as followed strictly he should not have been concerned which way 
Macedonia was to enter a Balkan federation, through Bulgarian or Yugoslav 
participation, since both were communist countries. But at this stage he saw the idea of a 
Balkan communist federation as a protection of Macedonian - Bulgarian connections 
based on the history of the Macedonian question as part of the Bulgarian historical 
struggle for national unity - not simply as a way of both nations joining the world-wide 
communist revolution. At the same time Dimitrov remained loyal to Moscow's line even 
though it was obviously dictated by the desire to control the communist countries as 
opposed to co-ordinate their united revolutionary action. In this way Dimitrov was 
labelled somewhat unfairly by Bulgarian nationalists as a `betrayer' of the Bulgarian 
national interests in relation to the Macedonian question as he tried to balance 
communist internationalism with Bulgarian nationalism rather than seeing the 
relationship between them as irreconcilable. 
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VII. Bulgarian Stalinist Tradition 
Under Stalin Bulgarian communists devoted their efforts to defining the `politically 
correct' line of the party and ostracising those elements which did not follow it. In their 
writings they relentlessly reasserted loyalty to Marxism-Leninism as demanded by Stalin 
but restrained from expressing their own opinion directly. The fear of being accused of 
being in service to the `enemies' of communism, and the Stalinist show trials, made 
everyone aware that sharing thoughts could be highly dangerous 
During Stalinism the BCP made significant changes in its policy, most notably in relation 
to the Macedonian question. The BCP reversed its policy and denied the existence of a 
Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria. As Crampton argues, during Stalinism the 
major threat to communism was seen to come from external, imperialist forces and this 
was reflected in policies towards Bulgaria's minorities. The Bulgarian Stalinist leader 
Vulko Chervenkov aimed to limit internal diversity in order to eliminate `foreign claims 
upon Bulgarian citizens'. But whereas the Macedonian problem could be saved from 
such claims by asserting that there was no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, other 
minorities' issues could not. " 
Like Blagoev and Dimitrov, Chervenkov was also educated in USSR. He was Secretary 
General of the BCP (1950-1954) and was renounced by the April plenum of the party in 
1956. In his speeches Chervenkov spoke about the `patriotic unity of the Bulgarian 
working people', as deriving from their `rallying ever closer around the Communist Party' 
based on Mars, Engels, Lenin and Stalin's thought. In his understanding of patriotism 
Chervenkov put the emphasis on the Sovietisation of the Bulgarian economy and the 
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collectivisation of land which he promoted. In relation to external factors concerning 
communist Bulgarian foreign policy, which he claimed, was `in the national interests of 
our homeland', he severely criticised Tito and his policies for being `subservient to 
American imperialists' and betraying the ideas of communist internationalism. "s 
Chervenkov focused on the `consolidation' of socialist Bulgaria as unifying the working 
class with the countryside under the banner of a `militant Marxist-Leninist' approach 
with `an iron discipline'. He professed total penetration of Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist 
principles in all spheres of life and total loyalty to the Soviets in order to build up a 
`monolithic socialist state'. H" 
A more developed approach towards nations and nationalism is to be found in Todor 
Pavlov's writings. Pavlov was a major party ideologist during Stalinism and wrote 
"; Sec Crampton, A Short History, p. 174. 
15 See Vulko Chervenkov, Seventh Anniversary of Bulgaria's Liberation from Fascism 
and Imperialist Yoke: Report delivered at the official meeting held on September 8.1951 
at the National Theatre, (Sofia: 1951). 
" Sec Vulko Chervenkov, Report of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party to the Sixth Congress of the Pam, (Sofia, 1954). More about Chervenkov's views 
on nationalism can be derived from the report he assigned in 1948 on behalf of the BCP 
to be written by the historian Tushe Vlahov on Bulgarian historiography, which lie 
judged to be correct. Vlahov asserted that according to Marxism history was determined 
by economics and in these terms `Bulgarian society was essentially a class society from 
medieval times'. On the Macedonian question, Tuhov stated that the idea of an 
independent Macedonia supported by the Bulgarian communists was construed in 
opposition to Bulgarian chauvinism rather than as a solution to the problem as such. See 
Tushe Vlahov, `Sustoianic i zadachi na bulgarskata istoricheska nauka: Stenograma No. 46 
of suveshtanieto na istoritsite, organizirano of Komiteta za Nauka, Izkustvo i Kultura za 
obsuzhdane na sustoianieto na istoricheskata nauka', in Vera Mutafchicva (ed. ), Sudut 
nad Istoritsitc: ßul ; arskatz Istoricheska Nauka Dokumenti i Diskusii 1944 1950, (Sofia: 
Izdatelstvo Marin Drinov, 1995), vol. 1., pp. 203-282. 
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extensively on questions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy trying to apply their approach to 
all fields of life. Pavlov felt no need to clarify his interpretations of Marxism or Leninism 
presumably because he was an authority of the highest order in Bulgarian communist 
theory during the 1950s. He discussed nations and nationalism briefly as part of his 
critique of bourgeois philosophy. According to Pavlov nationalism was an exclusively 
bourgeois theory. He often used the terms nation and class interchangeably as he spoke 
about patriotism, which he stated , was a concept 
deriving straight from Marx and 
Engels' ideas. Marxist scientific theory, Pavlov asserted, gave the only true explanation of 
patriotism as determined by high level of development of the forces of production. He 
claimed that Soviet patriotism was the only model to be followed and it rested on three 
factors: economics, social structure and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Further on 
he asserted that Lenin developed the idea of a homeland as a `social, political and cultural 
environment, where the respective people, the respective class, lives'. " Pavlov argued 
that Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism were two sides of the same coin 
linked by the `dialectical unity' reflecting the most positive intellectual thought as `re- 
worked by Marxism. '"" He drew a sharp line between working-class patriotism and 
bourgeois nationalism and thought that although the bourgeoisie could under certain 
circumstances express patriotic feelings, the working class could under no circumstances 
be nationalistic. " In this line he claimed that the Bulgarian bourgeoisie had a nationalistic 
approach towards Macedonia, whereas the BCP had a patriotic and internationalist 
attitude. Pavlov used the term `national federation' as the solution for the Macedonian 
question as opposed to `anarchy federation'. According to him the former was national 
revolutionary movement whereas the latter aimed towards `individual freedom'. By this 
x' Todor Pavlov, Izbrannic Filosofskie Proizvedenia, p. 147-148. 
xx Ibid., p. 154. 
x' Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
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he meant that Macedonia should be united as a nation within a communist federation, 
not just in any federation (particularly not with Serbia alone). Similarly to Dimitrov he 
insisted that Macedonia may be granted autonomy only if it was to be in one federation 
with Bulgaria. 
129 
VIII. The `Advanced Socialist Society' of Bulgaria 
In 1956 at the so-called April plenum of the BCP, the first secretary of the Central 
Committee, Todor Zhivkov, delivered a report that reflected decisions of the 20th 
congress of the Soviet communist party under the leadership of Khrushchev. " The focus 
of the report was the rejection of the `personality cult' implemented by the BCP under 
the leadership of Vulko Chervenkov. The plenum has been held since as a formal 
recognition of the process of de-Stalinisation in Bulgaria. The main features of the so- 
called April line for the future development of socialism in Bulgaria were outlined: 
resurrection and consolidation of Leninism in the party rule as opposed to Stalinism, 
further development of collective democratic principles, expansion of the material base 
of the socialist socio-economic society as well as more freedoms for intellectuals and 
creativity. The April line was supposed to mark the end of the period of transition from 
capitalism to socialism and the beginning of the advanced socialist society in Bulgaria. " 
Although Khrushchev condemned Stalin for his policies on nationalities in the USSR, no 
issues of nations or nationalism were mentioned in the BCP party documents discussing 
the April line. The emphasis was on the initiative to broaden the proletarian 
internationalism of the BCP, which was the major force in the `growth of the might of 
the world socialist system'. This was to be done under the leadership of Moscow through 
"' At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in his `secret 
speech'(Feb. 24-25,1956) Khrushchev denounced Stalin. The speech was the hallmark of 
a far-reaching dc-Stalinisation campaign intended to destroy the image of the late dictator 
and to revert official policy to a Leninist model. The `cult of personality' that Stalin had 
created to glorify his own rule and leadership was condemned by Khrushchev. 
See Politika potvurdena of zhivota: 20 godini or Aprilskia plenum na BKP, (Sofia: 
Partizdat, 1976). 
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expanding relations with capitalist countries on the basis of `peaceful coexistence' and 
developing friendly relations with her Balkan neighbours Greece, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia. 92 The April line offered a more open-minded approach to culture and 
tolerated intellectual dissent to a limited extent. Yet no theoretical revisions were to be 
made, certainly not in the Bulgarian Marxist-Leninist approach, which continued to be 
quoted as the only source of party policies. However in accord with the revival of `true' 
Leninist principles in the USSR, the emphasis was placed on Lenin as the major 
innovator of Soviet and international socialism. The name of Stalin was removed 
altogether from textbooks on communist history. 
At the 10th congress of the BCP in 1971 the party programme declared that Bulgaria has 
entered `the highest and the last stage of the development of socialism as the first phase 
of the communist formation'. The main features of this stage were defined as follows: 1) 
self-sufficient socialist society developing on its own as state and co-operative forms of 
property merge into each other, 2) `socialist society steps on the threshold of social 
homogeneity', 3) the state under the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes a public state 
(obsbtonarodna dur Nava) and the communist party becomes a party of the entire people 
(partia na tselia narod). " The programme served as the basis for promoting the new 
Bulgarian constitution adopted during the same year, 1971, in Bulgaria. As Zhivkov 
himself said, adopting it meant `approval of the road to the future, for the building of an 
92 See Todor Zhivkov, `Bulgraia's International Status and its Foreign Policy Tasks, 1966' 
and `A Historic Contribution to the Consolidation of the Unity of the International 
Communist Movement, 1969' in Todor Zhivkov, Unity on the Basis of Marxism- 
Leninism: Speeches. reports. articles, (Sofia Press), (no year indicated), pp. 41-65. 
See P. rograma na Bulgarskata Komunisticheska Partia, (Sofia, 1971). 
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advanced socialist society in Bulgaria. "' The main focus of the 1971 constitution was on 
further centralisation of the political power of the BCP. On nationalism or nationalities 
there was very little said though it was mentioned that the Turkish population has been 
successfully acquiring a socialist consciousness. 95 Zhivkov clarified several points of the 
programme and above all he underlined that it was in accord with the ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism and its scientific approach: `Our conceptions of democracy and 
freedom are Marxist-Leninist and to us freedom is a conscious necessity and democracy 
is conditioned by social development. ' `In Bulgaria', he continued, `there are no 
antagonistic class relations and there are `genuine equality and fraternity of all members 
of society' which are the prerequisites of communism. The further extension of the rights 
and freedoms of Bulgarian citizens were to be found in the `enhancement of their 
socialist consciousness'. 96 Zhivkov also used rather vague terms like `the moral unity of 
the Bulgarian people' or `Bulgarian people as a whole' to underline the consensual 
character of the constitution. In his speeches and articles there was never an indication 
that political centralisation implemented in the new constitution may require further 
ethnic homogenisation. He put an emphasis on the concept of the advanced socialism in 
Bulgaria as the `fundamental basis of freedom' for all citizens. " However Zhivkov briefly 
mentioned the topic of nationalism in his remarks about the history of the BCP. He 
underlined the correctness of Blagoev and Dimitrov's views on Marxism as the only 
`correct ideology' He stated that the BCP adhered to them even during the Second World 
" Todor Zhivkov, `Bulgaria has a new Constitution: Speech at the 16th Grand Session of 
the National Assembly, May 18,1971', in Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria Along the Road to an 
Advanced Socialist Societ<T, (Sofia: Sofia press, 1971), p. 497. 
')'See Poulton, Hugh, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, 2" ed., (London: 
Minority Rights Publications, 1993), p. 105. 
" Zhivkov, Bulgaria Along the Road to an Advanced Socialist Society, p. 499. 
97 Ibid., p. 500. 
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War when the situation was `particularly complex' in Bulgaria because there was a 
`speculation with national sentiments' carried by the bourgeoisie under the `illusion of 
national ideals': `In those hard times, our Party manifested its ability to combine the 
struggle for national independence and democracy with the struggle for socialism' led by 
`genuine Marxism-Leninism'. " Zhivkov had in mind the anti-Hitlerist position of the 
BCP led under the slogans of proletarian revolution. 
Further on Zhivkov defined the transformation of the working class as `emancipation' 
on the road to advanced socialist society and stated that Bulgaria has been developing as 
a `socialist nation' whose interests were in harmony with the interests of the world 
working class and in the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism in the 
world. This required `fidelity' to Marxism-Leninism against all forms of opportunism, 
right-wing or left-wing revisionism. ' Thus the advanced socialist society in Bulgaria was 
defined in working-class terms based on developed forms of production and under the 
leadership of the communist party as the `people's party' acting inseparably from the 
Soviet power. It was clearly stated that Bulgaria was a socialist state uniting its citizens by 
their socialist consciousness. "" 
The ideas of the Bulgarian advanced socialist society were further developed by 
Zhivkov's daughter, Liydmilla Zhivkova. She had a more systematic approach towards 
the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and Bulgarian nationalism. It was based on 
aesthetics of culture and arts and the role of the individual rather than the collective in 
Ibid., p. 534. 
Ibid., p. 537. 
'i") This concept of the socialist citizenship served as a platform for demanding respect 
for human rights when the BCP pursued policies of ethnic nationalism during the 1980s. 
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the advanced socialism. She offered an understanding of communist Bulgaria as a 
cultural nation. Bulgaria was defined above all as a unique culture, which by entering the 
stage of advanced socialism was further perfecting its uniqueness. During the period of 
advanced socialism Bulgaria was to find its own place in the world civilisation through 
the resurrection of its glorious past. Zhivkova was a great believer in the cultural capacity 
of the Bulgarians who as citizens of advanced socialism were to become `harmoniously 
developed' people perfecting themselves as future communist citizens mainly through 
learning about culture and art, which were supposed to release new creativity. 
Zhivkova claimed that her approach rested on Marxism-Leninism and believed that the 
aesthetic aspect of this theory were undermined in the socialist world. According to her 
Marx, Engels and Lenin's aspiration to create a better world was based not only on 
economical and political advancement but also on perfecting the spirit of humanity. 
According to her the communist revolution in Bulgaria was a movement of people 
empowered by their great cultural heritage. Aesthetic education was needed to fulfil 
Marx's vision about creating a communist society. In Marx's terms, she argued, 
communism creates a `rich and versatile human being, deep in all his feelings and 
perceptions' as well as `human feeling which would correspond to the whole wealth of 
human and natural essence'. " Zhivkova asserted that to `transform reality in accordance 
with communist aesthetic ideal' was `the most accurate formulation of the question, one 
which completely corresponds to the spirit of Marxism'. Practical activities of people, she 
asserted, should be infused with aesthetics, because `socialist labour' and even more so 
`communist labour' is a `form of manifestation of beauty' according to Marxism. "" 
101 Liydmilla Zhivkova, Perfecting Man and Society, (Sofia: Sofia Prcss, 1980), p. 108. 
102 Ibid., p. 115. 
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By putting emphasis on what she called `the spiritual' content of the Bulgarian culture 
Zhivkova revised the Bulgarian Marxist-Leninist tradition, which underlined the 
materialistic approach to culture. She believed that Lenin developed Marx and Engels' 
ideas further as he led the proletarian revolution in a historic epoch when socialism was 
wining in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Under the banner of Leninism, she asserted, 
Bulgaria was transformed from a backward country into a `developed industrial and 
agrarian socialist state'. "" But what she saw as Lenin's major contribution to the 
proletarian revolution was what she called his idea about `the development of socialist 
material and spiritual culture which presupposes and requires the socialist cultural 
revolution to `absorb within itself' ll values of the `world cultural treasure-house'. "" It is 
a matter of speculation how the BCP would have viewed her approach to Marxism- 
Leninism if she had not been the daughter of the Bulgarian communist leader or how he 
- who viewed intellectual endeavour with scepticism and suspicion - would have treated 
somebody like her otherwise. Yet it is certain that it would have been with less 
admiration. Although it would be an exaggeration to call her a dissident within the BCP, 
Zhivkova certainly was he first communist Bulgarian leader to articulate openly the ideas 
of cultural nationalism as a theory aspiring to mobilise Bulgarian national pride. 
In her speeches Zhivkova always mentioned Bulgarian-Soviet friendship as the focus of 
the BCP's internationalism. She asserted that due to the everlasting co-operation between 
the BCP and the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Bulgaria participated in 
the development of mature socialism on an international level. But her innovation in the 
context of internationalism was not maintaining the supremacy of Bulgarian-Soviet 
friendship but in her involvement in the international peace movement, and women and 
1"' Ibid., p. 443. 
114 Ibid., p. 440. 
135 
children's initiatives. According to Zhivkova the origins of the peace movement were to 
be found in the ancient philosophers who sought the meaning of life in intellectual 
endeavour, which later on were transformed into actual movement by Lenin: `The Peace 
Decree, that first appeal for the peaceful unity of the people on our planet which was 
signed by Lenin, from the building, from the renewal of life, from the creative 
constructive power of the resurgent millions of people raising their voices in the name of 
social justice, of freedom, of development and the future. ""' 
Zhivkova believed in the universality of the peace movement and her own initiative, the 
International Assembly `Banner for Peace', was carried out under spiritual slogans such 
as: `Ours is the Sun! Let all the people follow us, we are the beginning'. She used the very 
same vocabulary when defining the aims of her involvement with the affairs of children: 
`To enjoy the sun, to dream of far-away worlds, to feel creators and builders - this is the 
right of every child and of all children. """ 
Apart from such statements being in sharp contradiction with the dry language used by 
most party officials, Zhivkova was unusual in her activities accompanying her theoretical 
convictions. Her association with the peace movement gave her the opportunity to speak 
often at the United Nations and UNESCO as well as to establish connections with peace 
activists from Western Europe. Her activities involving children's problems created her 
image as a western-type charity orientated public persona. Thus Zhivkova's 
internationalism, though in theory dedicated to Bulgarian-Soviet co-operation, in reality 
placed her in quite a different context. She often spoke about the brotherhood of the 
socialist states, but her activities in the peace movement focused to a great extent on 
1 05 Ibid., p. 369. 
"" Ibid., p. 370. 
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recruiting audiences in the West, though interestingly enough not from the western 
communist parties. Her first official visit abroad (after having studied in England in 
1970) was not to the USSR but to Paris, where she opened the exhibition of Thracian 
Art in 1974 as a First-Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Art and Culture. Between 
1974 and 1981 she paid visits to the USSR only four times, always as a head of a 
Bulgarian cultural delegation. Moreover she never promoted Bulgarian art there but 
rather preferred to exhibit it in the United States. The personalities she chose as symbols 
of her initiative to live according to the `laws of beauty' and called `standard bearers of 
human progress' included Leonardo da Vinci, V. I. Lenin, Cyril the Philosopher1 '17, 
Rabindranath Tagore10", Einstein, Avicenna, Jan Komensky"', Geothe. One could not 
help noticing that Soviet culture was not the first on her list. 
Cyril the Philosopher was one of the two brothers who created the Slavonic alphabet. 
The Bengali poet, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913, and is 
generally regarded as the outstanding creative artist of modern India. 
"'9 Czech educational reformer and religious leader, remembered mainly for his 
innovations in methods of teaching, especially languages. He favoured the learning of 
Latin to facilitate the study of European culture. 
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IX. Conclusion 
Bulgarian communist thinking on nationalism in relation to communist internationalism 
was driven by loyalty to the Soviets, who had the final say over national questions in 
Bulgaria until the mid 1980s. Also the BCP theory was originally conceived as radically 
different from any thought which claimed understanding of society including 
interpretations of Marxism and Leninism not accepted as correct by Bulgarian Marxists. 
Bulgarian communist thinkers refused to engage in any serious debate with `rival 
theories', nationalism among them. The thought of Marxism-Leninism became `the 
Bible' of Bulgarian communism from which quotations were extracted to legitimise all 
subsequent applications of `Marxist-Leninist ' theory. Responsibility for resisting all 
`revisionist' ideas as well as asserting the `politically correct' interpretations was 
centralised in the hands of the communist party and from there disseminated through 
the writings of party ideologists and historians. 
But how important really was the BCP's declared doctrine? Did it lead to actions or 
rather was it used to justify whatever the part), policy it wanted to promote at any given 
time? In general Bulgarian communists either simplified theory by reducing it to a set of 
rules or avoided debate altogether. But of course they did not simply open the works of 
Marx, Engels or Lenin at random in order to decide what to do. Rather they focused on 
coordinating their actions with the basics of theory. And if the theory of Marxism- 
Leninism did not dictate their policies literally, it defined the main directions through 
which decisions were made. At the centre of communist power in Bulgaria was the 
affiliation to Marxism-Leninism as a source of legitimate political power. 
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According to Marxism-Leninism the BCP vieww"ed that the Bulgarian nation, as the 
majority nation, should be the basis of a highly centralised and industrialised state. On 
the question of where there would be a place under communism for national identities 
other than Bulgarian national identity, the fathers of Bulgarian Marxism-Leninism left no 
clear theoretical opinion. The concept of `the socialist citizenry' was supposed to unite all 
members of society in their political identity but it was not clear if this would mean 
forcible cultural assimilation of ethnic minorities. Bulgarian communists used Marx and 
Engels' assumption that communist leadership was by definition internationalist-minded 
and could not profess nationalism in relation to the Macedonian question. They argued 
that as communists their policy was dictated by communist internationalism - though 
this was not entirely so even before Tito's split with Moscow, which allowed the BCP to 
change its course on the Macedonian question. 
During the 1950s Bulgarian communists favoured Stalin's idea that national questions 
could be solved only according to the political expediency of historical circumstances and 
that national minorities which did not make compact entities could not have any special 
rights within the political state, though if they formed an entity they should have 
linguistic rights. 'thus Turkish education flourished during Stalinist times in Bulgaria. 
Also the broad application of the Stalinist idea that ethnic conflict could be solved by 
resettlement provided a theoretical justification for the BCP policy of encouraging 
emigration of ethnic minorities with theory. "" Ethnic minorities' emigration was also 
encouraged according to Stalin's focus on imperialism as the enemy within and without. 
Bulgarian Stalinist ideologists viewed internal diversity as dangerous. 
"° Stalin proposed resettlement as a solution to ethnic problems within USSR. 
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The de-Stalinisation of the BCP culminated in the idea of `the advanced socialist society' 
which continued to favour the high centralisation of the state under the full dictatorship 
of the proletariat according to Marxist-Leninist principles. But centralisation was to be 
achieved by total ethnic homogenisation of the Bulgarian nation, which excluded loyalty 
to the state unless based on loyalty to Bulgarian ethnicity. During the 1970s and 1980s in 
particular the BCP articulated the theory of Bulgarian cultural nationalism evoked to 
inspire the Bulgarian citizens on the road to achieving full freedom and democracy. At 
this stage Marxism-Leninism became little more than a formula attached to the party line. 
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Chapter 3: Communist Myths and Bulgarian Nationhood 
1. Introduction 
Communism sought to offer a new mythological system to the Bulgarian people. 
Communism claimed that it changed history and created new symbols and rituals, which 
were to be remembered as historical. This chapter analyses Bulgarian communist 
mythology and the way it interacted with the concept of the Bulgarian nation. This study 
assumes that each political and social system creates its own mythology and that myth is 
one of the main elements of national identity. ' As such, communist mythology is an 
essential part of the dynamics between communism and nationalism. The myths of 
communism are examined in relation to Bulgarian national mythology. The interaction 
between communism and nationalism on the level of mythology reveals how 
communism understood and used national traditions for its own purposes. The symbols 
and rituals of the communist state constructed the mythological cosmology of 
communism. They are perceived as active expressions of myths. The symbolic 
presentation, as well as the ritual practices of state power, are seen as a bridge between 
the public and the private spheres, which provides people with coherent identity. ' The 
main question to be addressed here is whether communism succeeded in constructing a 
' See Anthony Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 
2 See Mircea Eliadc, The Myth of the Eternal Return: or, Cosmos and History. Williard 
R. Trask (tr. ), (Great Britain: ARKANA, Penguin Group, 1989), John A. Armstrong, 
Nations before Nationalism, (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982) and 
Bogdan Bogdanov, Promianata v zhivota i texta: Retorichni eseta za trudnostite na 
ýreobrazuvancto (Sofia: Otvoreno Obshtestvo, 1998). 
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meaningful mythological system and how did it which relate to people's identity. There 
are two main political figures in the history of Bulgarian communism, which became 
powerful symbols of communist power: Todor Zhivkov, who remained in power for 
most of the 45 years of communist rule in Bulgaria, and his daughter Liydmilla Zhivkova, 
who saw her political mission in reviving the indigenous Bulgarian national mythology. 
These political personas made a specific effort to use national mythology in order to 
construct communist myths, symbols and rituals. 
Bulgarian communist mythology consisted of two main groups of myths: the old 
Bulgarian myths re-invented by communism, and the new communist myths. All myths 
tried to conceptualise the Bulgarian nation and state. The declared intellectual norm of 
Bulgarian communism was the Marxist-Leninist paradigm according to which history, 
not mythology made people's identity. Yet during the 45 years of communist rule, the 
Bulgarian national mythos was actively used in the study of history. But it was modified 
according to the theoretical demands of communism and in order to match the Soviet 
line. This study argues that under communism Bulgarian national mythology was highly 
politicised. Assessing the framework of this politicisation of the national mythology helps 
to understand why and when communist mythology generated political action in relation 
to nationalism. 
In general communist myths were met with scepticism because they lacked cohesiveness 
and were imposed. Communism tried to reinvent Bulgarian history in order to support 
its own mythology. The pre-communist set of Bulgarian national myths was redefined to 
fit into the communist idea of mythology. The myth of the unified Bulgarian ethnic 
nation, the myth of the Russian liberation, the Greater Bulgaria myth, the myth of 
suffering and redemption, the myth of the civilising mission of the Bulgarians, and the 
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myth of the long-standing tradition of ethnic tolerance - all of these were specified in the 
context of the communist idea of modernity. The myth about the antiquity of the 
Bulgarian language, which is closely related to the myth about the civilising mission of 
the Bulgarians, was reinterpreted in the myth of great communist education. The 
interpretation of the Ottoman past remained the most important part of the myth of 
unjust treatment, whereas Russian cultural presence became the symbol of Bulgarian- 
Soviet friendship. Communism also claimed that Bulgarian tolerance towards ethnic 
differences was based on the belief in class equality. Bulgarian people were mythologised 
as saviours of the Jews and protectors of other national minorities. Yet although Turks, 
Muslims, Roma and Jews were all proclaimed as equal citizens of the Bulgarian 
communist state they were at the same time excluded from the communist symbols and 
rituals. Moreover the myth of the Turks and/or Muslims being the traditional enemy of 
the Bulgarian people was used to justify the policy of their assimilation and expulsion. 
Jewish life under communism was turned into a symbol of Bulgaria as a nation of 
saviours. But at the same time the BCP carried out a policy of assimilation towards the 
Jews and aimed to eradicate them as a separate ethnic group. 
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II. The Civilising Mission of the Bulgarian People 
Two major events in Bulgarian history inspired the myth of the civilising mission of the 
Bulgarian people: the mass conversion of the Bulgarian populace to Eastern Orthodoxy 
in 864, which was initiated by Tsar Boris, and the devising of the Cyrillic alphabet by the 
brothers monks Cyril and Methodius around the same time. According to the national 
mythology Bulgaria became a nation when the religion and the language of the Bulgarian 
people were officially institutionalised. Communism as an atheist ideology had to deal 
with the religious aspect of the national mythology. Communism claimed that religion 
was a tool in the hands of the class oppressor to keep the masses ignorant. Religion was 
seen as a sign of backwardness, which the `socialist class consciousness' (socialisticberko 
saniosuZnanie) had to overcome. According to the classical communist view Bulgarian 
involvement with Christianity was a thing of history. Marxism understood the 
development of society as an evolutionary process and associated religion with the 
primitive mind of the early stages of humanity. According to this view religion in 
Bulgaria was a necessary step in the development of the society but at the same time a 
negative historical experience. Further on communism stated that the bourgeoisie used 
religion to obstruct the political development of the people and keep them ignorant. 
Communism was said to have broken away from religion in a revolutionary manner. The 
commitment to political change was supposed to erase religious beliefs. Bulgarian 
communism saw religion along these lines. Religion was said to have deceived the 
Bulgarian peasantry while decadence overwhelmed the educated urbanites. All questions 
of religion were linked to the history of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Communism 
declared that the church was a religious body and by definition implied social regress. 
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church was like any other church in the world and historically 
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supported the politics of authoritarianism. ' 
Such was the theory behind Bulgarian Marxist-Leninist thinking until the 1970s. 
Afterwards Bulgarian communism started to promote a slightly different approach 
towards religion. While religion as such was still considered to be a sign of backwardness, 
the role of religion in Bulgarian history began to be reviewed. The definition of religion 
changed. From being essentially a theological outlook, religion was defined as a historical 
phenomenon. The new official line was that religion in Bulgaria became part of social 
and political life in response to the foreign domination the country was subjected to for 
many centuries. This was a major breakthrough in the communist theory about religion 
in Bulgaria. The approach then became that religion had a very specific historic role and 
was not simply an expression of political conservatism, as asserted previously. The 
significance of this attitude was that it offered space for accepting that religion was part 
of the collective history of the Bulgarian people. The history of Bulgarian Christianity 
became to be seen mainly as a defensive mechanism of the Bulgarian nation against the 
Ottomans who brought the foreign faith of Islam to the country. Bulgarian communist 
historians began to define religion as the `ideology of the Bulgarian people' acting `in 
defence of the nation'. ' In this the very meaning of religion was redefined as a political 
movement rather than a spiritual faith. The shift in the approach towards religion 
showed clearly that communism aspired to connect to the past even when it was 
obviously against its very principals. It seemed that communism permitted a very small 
degree of religiousness but this had a very serious intellectual impact. The concession to 
' Mihail Andreev and Dimitur Angclov, Istoria na bulgarskata feodalna durzhava i pravo, 
(Sofia: Nauka I Izkustvo, 1972), p. 95. 
° Petur Petrov, Sudbonosni vekove za bulgarskata narodnost: kraia na XIV vek - 1912 
go-ding,, (Sofia: Nauka I Izkustvo, 1975), pp. 46-51. 
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religion fractured the shell of Bulgarian communism as an atheist ideology and 
acknowledged that the Bulgarian nation had a religious consciousness. 
On the level of national mythology religion has been inseparable from the Bulgarian 
language. Religion and church were about disseminating the ideas of national awareness 
through language. Moreover the old myth had it that the greatness of the Bulgarian 
language was in its mission to spread culture among the Slavic people. According to the 
myth Bulgarian language was at the very heart of the Slavonic culture, which in its own 
turn was mythologised as universal. Communism strongly promoted the myth of the 
civilising mission of the Bulgarian people. But at the same time the communist myth was 
not simply a continuation of the old belief in the great Bulgarian language culture. 
Communism reorganised the old myth of the civilising mission of the Bulgarian language 
by introducing the Soviet connection to the myth of the civilising mission of the 
Bulgarian people. The starting point was that Soviet greatness was expressed in the 
Russian language. The main reason which made it possible to promote the idea that 
Bulgarian was also a great language was that it was closely related to the Russian 
language. Bulgarian communism suggested that the linguistic relation between the two 
languages was part of the ideological alliance between Bulgaria and the USSR. It was also 
asserted that at the bottom of the language connection was the myth of the Bulgarian 
people being overwhelmingly ethnic Slavs related to the Russians. The Soviets developed 
the theory that the process of the `Slavonising' of the Bulgarian nation was a historical 
development. Accordingly Bulgaria was part of the `Eastern European Slavonic world'. ' 
Soviet scholars made it very clear that the Slav identity was the identity of political 
progress. In contrast any relations to the Oriental world in a very broad sense were held 
S N. S. Derzhavin, Lektsii po Bulgarska istoria, (Izdatelstvo na Bulg. Rabotnicheska Partia 
(Komunisti), 1946. 
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as a sign of political backwardness. This theory was so prominent during Stalinist times 
that it was suggested that the Bulgarian-German alliance during the Second World War 
was because of the Turkic-Tatar element in the origins of the Bulgarians. ` In general 
Bulgarian communist historians accepted this theory. The Slav ingredient of the 
Bulgarian nation was said to be superior to the so called proto-Bulgarian element. It was 
said that the Bulgarian bourgeoisie tried to undermine the Slavic element in the 
foundation of the Bulgarian nation by developing the so-called `hunska teoria' (Hun 
theory). ' The idea behind this claim was to underline the Slavonic character of the 
Bulgarian communist nation. Most importantly presenting the Bulgarian culture as an 
ethnic relative of Soviet Russia legitimised the Bulgarian communist identity both as a 
national and Soviet identity at the same time. This satisfied the national aspirations of 
Bulgarian communism without risking to contradict the Soviets. There was also an 
additional reason for the success of the myth of the greatness of Bulgaria as a Slavonic 
culture. Bulgarian communism preferred to be acknowledged as a Russian-based Soviet 
ideology rather than to be considered a relative of Yugoslavia, which was the other 
Balkan communist country with substantial claim of being a Slavic culture. In view of the 
complicated relations between Moscow and Tito, Bulgaria's place nearer to the Soviets 
seemed much safer. The communist myth of `Slavonic Bulgaria' portrayed the country as 
the antique centre of Slavonic literacy. It described the old Bulgarian language, the so- 
called Church-Slavonic language, as the main language of the Orthodox world. Bulgaria 
was mythologised as the roots of Slavonic culture. The myth held that the Bulgarians' 
special mission was to give language to all Slavs. 
Ibid., pp. 11-20. 
' Mihail Andreev & Dimitur Angelov, Istoria na bulgarskata feodalna dur7hava i pravo, 
(Sofia: Nauka I Izkustvo, 1972), pp. 69-76 and Petur Petrov, Preface. Izbrani 
Proizvedenia. By Alexander Burmov, (Sofia, BAN: Institut za Istoria , 
1968), vol. I., pp. 
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At the centre of the myth was the legend about the creators of the Cyrillic alphabet, Cyril 
and Methodius, who were persecuted by the enemies of Slav culture and received 
protection in Bulgaria. From this point Bulgaria became the protector of the Slavonic 
world, and the dissemination of Slavonic literacy began in Bulgaria. The question of the 
actual ethnic identity of the two brother monks has been disputed by the three main 
countries claiming the cultural heritage of Thessaloniki, where they were born: Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Greece. Under communism Bulgarian scholars asserted that they were 
Slavs by origins. But because Bulgaria offered them asylum she became their mythical 
homeland. The Cyrilic alphabet was upheld as the ethnic heart of the Bulgarian nation: 
`Cyril and Iethodius finalised the Slavonisation of the old-Bulgarian culture and ethnic 
community. 18 According to the myth of the civilising mission of the Bulgarians Cyril and 
Methodius gave written language not only to the Bulgarian people but also to the rest of 
the Slavs: `Bulgaria was called upon to defend the right of all Slavdom, its right to 
national independence, to its own cultural development. ... 
It was the Bulgarian language 
which became for many centuries the common language of Slav scholarship. '`' Essentially 
the myth was about the greatness of the Bulgarian nation. But this greatness was 
presented as an extension of the Slavonic world. Thus Bulgarian communism related to 
Soviet Russia, which was undisputedly the centre of the Slavonic universe, as the 
legitimate perpetuator of the old Bulgarian myth: 
8-9. 
" Alexander Fol, Vasil Guzelev, Nikolai Genchev, Konstantin Kosev, Echo Dimitrov, 
Andrei Pantev, Milcho Lalkov and Kostadin Petrov, Kratka istoria na Bulgaria, (Sofia: 
Izdatelstvo Nauka I Izkustvo, 1981), p. 54. 
Vera Mutafchieva and Nikolai Todorov, Bulgaria's Past, (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1969), pp. 
27-28. 
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We, too, in this world have performed a good deed, 
Given all Slav peoples the books they read10 
"' Ivan Vazov, `Paissy', in Selected Poems, Peter Tempest (tr. ), (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1976), 
p. 40. 
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III. The Long Suffering of the Bulgarian Nation 
Communism had to give its own interpretation of the myth about Bulgaria as the long- 
suffering nation under Ottoman rule. This was the strongest myth of modern Bulgaria. 
The myth was all about Bulgarian nationhood, its survival under the long years of foreign 
domination, heroic struggles against it and the involvement of the outside world in the 
process of achieving national independence. The most remarkable feature of the 
communist version of this myth was how little effort was actually made to interpret 
Ottoman domination as a result of class conflict. According to communist theory, 
foreign rule should have largely been seen as an expression of class conflict. Bulgarian 
communism made a very significant concession to ethnic nationalism by reinforcing the 
myth of the long suffering under the Ottomans. Bulgarian communist history underlined 
that ethnicity was the core of the mythical oppression. Bulgarians were subdued and 
made to suffer because of being Bulgarians. Bulgarian life under the Ottomans was 
described as life under the `Turkish yoke' (turrko robstvo). Consequently having been part 
of the Ottoman empire was equalised to having been enslaved by Turks. The term 
`Turkish yoke' became the most powerful symbol of the communist myth of the long 
suffering of Bulgaria under the Ottoman time. The term itself was coined in 1889 by the 
author of what is considered the first Bulgarian novel, Under Me Yoke, by the Bulgarian 
national writer Vazov. " The significance of the mythologising of the Ottoman times as 
years of `Turkish' rather than `Ottoman' domination presented the confrontation 
between the Christians and the Ottomans as a struggle of the Bulgarian nation against 
the Turkish nation. Thus the distinction between Ottomans and Turks was reduced to a 
" See Ivan Vazov, Under the Yoke: A Novel in Three Parts Taken from the Life of the 
Bulgarians in the Eve of Their Liberation, Margarita Alexieva & Theodora Atanasova 
(trs. ), Marko Minkoff (ed. ), (Sofia, Narodna Kultura, 1955). 
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minimum. 
This process was greatly helped by the political realities of the cold war. Turkey, being a 
member of NATO, was an enemy state to the entire communist bloc, including Bulgaria. 
But at the same time the cold war was not the only reason for the encouragement of the 
anti-Turkish rather than anti-Ottoman attitude under Bulgarian communism. 
Communism used the old perception of Islam as a threat to the Bulgarian nation and 
politicised it as a menace of the Turkish people against the Bulgarian nation. 
Communism focused on the events surrounding the Ottoman invasion of the Bulgarian 
lands and the consequent five centuries years of Ottoman rule (1393-1878). According to 
the myth, the Bulgarian state was destroyed by the Ottomans and Bulgarian national 
development impeded. The communist myth remembered all these years as ages of 
darkness and horror. The myth of the long suffering of the Bulgarian people served to 
emphasise the sacred nature of the Bulgarian national territory. Bulgaria was not only the 
space where the Bulgarian nation was born, but also the place where the Bulgarian 
people suffered under foreign rule. The Ottomans subjected the Bulgarian nation and 
state to endless hardship and Bulgarians sacrificed their lives in the name of the survival 
of the nation during these dark ages. This myth was about the collective national 
martyrdom of the Bulgarians. On the level of national mythology Bulgarian history was 
interpreted both as a passive and an active process. On one hand, the Ottoman period 
was a time of stillness when Bulgarian life stopped and Bulgarian people lost control over 
their development. Bulgarian life under the Ottomans was perceived as being on the 
verge of ethnic extinction. The nation was barely surviving and waiting to be `re-born' at 
a later time. On the other, the myth described Bulgaria under foreign rule as a nation 
united in a heroic struggle against the Ottomans. The Bulgarian warriors (haiduti) 
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organised the national resistance and fought for social justice. The consequent struggle 
for national independence was led by the Bulgarian church and the organised revolt of 
April 1976 (Aprilskoto vustanie) was the culmination of the Bulgarian national movement 
under the Ottomans. The myth glorified the leading role of the national consciousness in 
the Bulgarian survival under Ottoman rule. The myth of the long suffering of the 
Bulgarians was particularly important in communist mythology because it became the 
intellectual basis for the BCP policy towards the Bulgarian Turks during the assimilation 
campaign of 1984-85. 
Turks were declared the historic enemy of the Bulgarian people who had no place in 
communist Bulgaria. The myth was recalled to justify the communist policy towards the 
Bulgarian Turks. Thus the communist mythology was politicised and prepared the 
background for the ethnic violence, which erupted in the country during the forcible 
campaign. In general when myths are recalled to justify political action what actually 
happens is that the past is seen as a part of the present. This is possible, as Kempferer 
argues, because myths communicate between time and space, and mythologised suffering 
in the past starts living in the present. 12 The power of the myth of the long suffering of 
the Bulgarian people was proved by its capacity to make people experience the national 
mythical past in the present, which was officially a non-national communist time. During 
the anti-Turkish campaign the BCP directed the myth of long suffering to mobilise 
public opinion in defence of its policy. The Bulgarian people were `invited' to experience 
their mythological past as a suffering nation and to act according to it in the present. The 
BCP stated that the myth was the historical truth, which had to be resurrected in order to 
12 See Bruce Kempferer, Legends of People. Myths of State: Violence. Intolerance, and 
Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia, (Washington and London: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1988), p. 213. 
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correct the mistakes of the past. The main `mistake' which the Bulgarian people were 
subjected to was the forcible Islamisation of the Bulgarian Christians in the Ottoman 
empire. This was a very central event in the Bulgarian myth of the long suffering. The 
idea behind the mythical event of the forcible Bulgarian Islamisation was that the foreign 
rulers aimed to destroy the Bulgarian nation. Communist history indulged in passionate 
descriptions of the myth. One of the most eloquent history writers under communism 
developed the concept about `enforcing Islam' on the Bulgarian people (nalagane na 
isliama) and asserted that Bulgarians were subjected to `annihilation', `abduction', 
`resettlement', `exile' and `Turkicisation'. " Communism declared that this was wrong and 
the time had come to do justice. Thus Bulgarian communism changed dramatically its 
original aim to liberate Bulgarian people from class oppression and assumed the role of 
being a missionary and a guardian of the Bulgarian national identity. 
13 Petur Petrov, Sudbonosni vekove za bulgarskata narodnost: Kraia na XIV vek - 1912 
odina, (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1975), pp. 87-121. 
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IV. The Bulgarian Revolutionary Nation and National Revival 
The communist myth of the Bulgarian revolutionary nation was built around the old 
myth of the 19`h century movement for the national Bulgarian Revival (Bulgarsko 
VuZraZhdane). Essentially the national myth was focused on the idea of the cultural 
resurrection of the Bulgarian nation, which became the intellectual core of the 
revolutionary struggles for political independence at the end of the 19`h century. 
Communism interpreted this myth from two points of view. First it was declared that the 
driving force of the national revival was the Bulgarian bourgeoisie. This interpretation 
was according to the communist view that all political movements were driven by class 
struggle. Yet at same time the national revival was the single most important political 
movement in the modern history of Bulgaria. The communist idea was to reclaim the 
myth of the Revival as part of communist history. Therefore the Bulgarian Revival was 
mythologised in a new fashion as an internationally minded revolutionary force rather 
than a nationalist movement. The communist intellectuals asserted that the 19`h century 
Bulgarian Revival was a pre-communist revolutionary movement for social justice and 
aimed to eradicate class oppression. 14This approach was obviously ridden by deep 
contradictions. It aimed to satisfy the communist theory of revolution and the national 
history at the same time. 
In historical terms, the Bulgarian Revival was mainly a movement for the independence 
of the Bulgarian church. As Crampton argues, the Bulgarian Revival was primarily a 
14 See Dimitur Blagoev, Prinos kum istoriata na sotsializma v Bulgaria, (Sofia: Izdatelstvo 
na Bulgarskata Komunistichcska Partia, 1949), p. 50 and 
Gcorgi Bakalov, Izhrani istoricheski suchinenia, Zhak Natan & Alexandur Burmov 
(eds. ), (Sofia: Nauka i lzkustvo, 1960), pp. 348-350. 
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cultural comeback and its biggest achievement was the creation of a separate church in 
1870. He also notes that this date may be considered as the date of the birth of the 
Bulgarian nation, although the nation-formation and the state-formation may be different 
processes. 15 Indeed the Bulgarian Revival was focused on the idea of the nation as a 
cultural unit, which should be mobilised for political action. The main difficulty 
communist mythology had was how to square the struggle for church independence 
within the claim that the Bulgarian revival was a class revolution. The communist myth's 
approach was to be highly selective. 
The most significant mythical figure of this national renewal was Paisi Hilendarski. He 
was a monk who wrote the historical text mythologised as the first Bulgarian history 
called Istoria Slavianobulgarckaia (1762). Paissy, as he became known in the Bulgarian 
national mythology, was a romantic nationalist, who called for the Bulgarians to be 
reawakened, to come to terms with their past, and to know who they really were. He saw 
Bulgarian language as the first step towards national awareness and his writing stressed 
the uniqueness of the Bulgarian people. Communist history chose to underline the 
linguistic aspect of Paissy's message, which was in harmony with the myth of the 
civilising mission of the Bulgarian people, discussed above. Paissy was defined as the 
man of the Enlightenment for the Bulgarian people (naroden pro. n'etite! ). The question of 
his religiousness was made to seem irrelevant and somehow diluted in comparison to the 
significance of his role as a teacher of Bulgarian cultural advancement. 
The communist myth of the Bulgarian Revival until the 1970s emphasised the 
revolutionary character of the Bulgarian culture and undermined its religious aspect. But 
15 See Richard J. Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 17. 
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later, communist writers reviewed the myth of the Bulgarian Revival and made some 
significant concessions to nationalism. Two books written during communism on the 
Bulgarian Revival became most significant in this process: The Bulgarian National Revival 
Period by Nikolai Genchev published for the first time in 1977 and Bulgarrkiut Velikdeni i 
Stray ite Bulgarrki by Toncho Zhechev, which appeared in 1980.16 The former is a study of 
the history of the Bulgarian Revival and the latter is a romantic history written in the style 
of literary essay. Both authors are prominent Bulgarian intellectuals. The idea behind 
these two works was to revise the communist version of the Bulgarian Revival from the 
point of view of national history. Both books claimed that the Bulgarian struggles for 
church independence should continue to be seen as part of the reactionary bourgeoisie 
machinery. But they both also sought to reconcile the Bulgarian revolutionary movement 
with the historic role the church played in it. Genchev and Zhechev attempted to 
disconnect the church movement for independence from its religious content and 
present it as a secular movement for national independence. Because religion was such a 
strong part of the traditional understanding of the Bulgarian national identity and so 
obviously against the communist principles the Bulgarian church was acknowledged as a 
leader of the national liberation but only out of the necessity to fight the foreign 
Ottoman rulers. 
The most important concept of the time in relation to nationalism was again introduced 
by Genchev. This was the idea that the Bulgarian revolutionary tradition of the 19`h 
century was indeed a national revolution and developed in harmony with the bourgeois 
revolutions in Europe. Such an understanding of the Bulgarian revolutionary tradition 
was a serious breakthrough in the previous communist interpretation of the Bulgarian 
" Sec Toncho Zhechev, Bulgarskjut Velikden ili strastite Bulgarski, (Sofia: Narodna 
hlladezh, 1980). 
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history, which denied that Bulgarian bourgeoisie may have played any positive role in 
Bulgarian history. Genchev suggested that Bulgaria shared the ideals of the French 
revolution as well as the ideas of the Russian revolution of 1917. "The idea that the pre- 
communist bourgeois Bulgaria, which had not been exclusively orientated towards Russia 
or the Soviet Union, may be seen as inseparable from the Bulgarian history and cultural 
tradition was a considerable step by communism towards nationalism. This interpretation 
of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement gained enormous popularity among the 
Bulgarian intelligentsia in the late 1970s and during the 1980s because it gave priority to 
the role of the nation in Bulgarian history. Genchev's name became a synonym for 
dissent in the younger generation of communist historians because in his writing 
Bulgarian history and mythology appeared uninterrupted and endowed the Bulgarian 
nation-state independence with European values. And this of course was in contradiction 
with the original mythological idea of Bulgarian communism that `real' Bulgarian 
independence began with the establishment of the `dictatorship of the proletariat' in the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria. Genchev also made one more significant contribution to 
the communist myth of the Bulgarian revolutionary myth. He declared Vasil Levsky, the 
main hero of the Bulgarian national liberation, the voice of radical views in the spirit of 
European democracy. Levsky's beliefs were essentially European, argued Genchev. He 
proclaimed that Levsky's vision of the post-Ottoman Bulgaria as a `moral and sacred 
republic' (`chista i sviata republika), where all nationalities in Bulgaria, including Turks, Jews 
and others, would enjoy equal rights in every respect, was the Bulgarian expression of the 
ideals of the French revolution. "It was indeed an extraordinary statement to make under 
Bulgarian communism - that Levsky, as a symbol of the Bulgarian struggle for national 
liberation, the core mythological hero of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, may be 
"See Nikolai Genchcv, The Bulgarian National Revival Period, (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1977). 
IS Ibid., p. 143. 
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viewed as an European type of revolutionary rather than Russian. 
The interpretation of the Bulgarian Revival being in harmony with Europe's traditions 
marked a significant change in the communist mythological paradigm. The communist 
myth moved quite far away from its original construct. The Bulgarian Revival, from 
being a bourgeois movement and driven by class conflict, came to be understood as a 
great achievement of Bulgarian nationalism and driven by nationalism itself Thus 
communism redefined the Bulgarian revolutionary tradition as an European minded 
national bourgeoisie revolution and stated that the final aim of this revolution was not 
the overthrow of capitalism but rather the assertion of the Bulgarian nation The new 
communist myth was that during the 19`h century Bulgaria was re-born as a national state 
in European fashion as opposed to being perceived as a backward `eastern' type of 
country. 
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V. The Bulgarian Liberation 
Bulgarian communism constructed its own liberation mythology. The starting point was 
that communism in general claimed that it was a revolutionary movement aiming to 
liberate the whole world from class oppression. The myth of the communist liberation 
was created around the Russian revolution of 1917 and the role of the Red Army in the 
liberation of the countries of Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria. The myth about the 
Soviet liberation was a new myth, which communism aimed to incorporate into the 
broader Bulgarian national liberation mythology. Self-evidently this myth was new 
because it was constructed around the most recent events of Bulgarian history at the end 
of the Second World War. But most importantly the communist myth of the Bulgarian 
liberation was about the liberation of the Bulgarian people from the oppression of 
capitalism. This myth was built upon the idea that the liberation of Bulgaria was to be 
found in the freedom from class oppression as opposed to the pre-communist liberation 
mythology, which focused on the struggles against foreign rule with the final aim of 
establishing the Bulgarian nation-state. The communist myth of the Soviet liberation held 
that Bulgaria aspired to build Soviet-style communism in the country. Bulgarian 
communist mythology focused on the story of the Soviet liberation in 1944. '9 But the 
new myth also sought continuity in the old pre-communist Bulgarian liberation myth 
about the Russian army liberating Bulgaria from Ottoman rule. Communism connected 
to the old myth in order to reinforce the new one. The complexity of this interaction on 
the level of mythology is an illustration of communist aspirations to incorporate the 
communist myth of liberation into the old Bulgarian national mythology. Generally 
speaking liberation myths relate to the idea of the antiquity of the nation. Liberation 
See Crampton, A Short I-Iistony, pp. 124-134, for an account of the actual events of the 
Soviet troops entering Bulgaria. 
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mythologies concentrate on that particular time when the nation, which has been 
subjected to oppression, has been restored and returned to its original order. But the 
myth of the Soviet liberation could not mean the restoration of the old order because it 
brought the communist revolution, which denied the previous life of the country as far 
as it was not aiming to proletarian revolution. On the contrary it was about radical, 
revolutionary and irreversible change. The Soviet liberation was supposed not only to 
become the main myth of the new Bulgaria but also a symbol of rejection of the old 
bourgeoisie order of the country, which was declared reactionary and bound to die. 
The most problematic questions the myth had to face was who exactly liberated Bulgaria 
and from what? The main difficulty was that the answers were highly ambiguous. The 
key to the success of this myth lay in the degree of its coherence. Communist mythology 
had to describe the actual politics of the Soviet arrival in Bulgaria but they were very 
complicated and very hard to generalise. Kertzer argues that successful myths are usually 
highly coherent and based on clarity. According to his theory ambiguity of myths of 
political power may be quite dangerous, because it `gives way to open conflict about the 
meaning of the rites. In such cases, rather than producing political unity, the rites can 
become just another battleground. "" This condition of uncertainty describe very well the 
myth of the Soviet liberation in Bulgaria. During the entire period of communist rule in 
Bulgaria public opinion was divided on the question of the Soviet liberation. It was 
mostly though not solely the communist establishment which believed in the myth. The 
rest of the Bulgarian people by and large understood the Soviet intervention as a 
manoeuvre of political power. Thus instead of uniting the country the myth of the Soviet 
liberation actually divided it. There was also another level of complexity of the 
20 David I. Kcrtzer, Ritual. Politics and Power, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1988), p. 71. 
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communist liberation myth. It was in the myth's dual structure. On one hand, it was 
about the Soviet renewal of Bulgaria, but on the other it could not escape the association 
with the pre-communist myth about the Russian liberation of Bulgaria from the 
Ottomans. The old myth of the Russian liberation was about national independence 
whereas the new communist myth of the Soviet liberation was about further liberating 
the country from class oppression. The former had the advantag of being clearly 
established as a national myth while the latter was still striving to become one. The 
obvious link between the old and the new myths of liberation in Bulgaria was Russia. 
One way or another the image of Russian intervention in the Bulgarian liberation 
mythology remained its unchanging component. In the pre-communist national 
mythology the Russian-Turkish war of 1878, as a result of which the Ottomans withdrew 
from the Bulgarian lands, was the war of the Bulgarian national liberation. The lack of 
officially established Bulgarian military structures made Russia the leading force of the 
Bulgarian liberation from the Ottomans historically. 21 At the core of the myth of the 
Russian liberation of Bulgaria was the belief that Russia intervened on behalf of the 
oppressed Bulgarians because they were her Slavic brothers. This belief was an old one 
and based on the idea that Bulgarians and Russians speak similar languages and have a 
common religion. The myth conceptualised the view that Bulgaria deserved to be helped 
because of the origins of the Bulgarian nation, which were Slavic and Orthodox. The 
Russian role as the big and powerful protector of the small Bulgarian nation also became 
mythical. Russian protection was said to be primordial and blessed by God himself. 
Bulgarian communism did not make any substantial changes in the mythical Russian role 
in the Bulgarian struggle for national independence against the Ottomans. The only point 
which needed clarification was the claim that at the eve of the withdrawal of the 
21 See Crampton, A Short History, p. 19. 
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Ottomans, Russia was actually in pursuit of power in the Balkans. According to this 
theory there were Russian geopolitical interests behind its intervention. Communism did 
not consider this version seriously, although occasionally it was noted in the history 
books that at the time Russia was a tsarist empire. Communism embraced the myth of 
Russia as a Bulgarian liberator, which was rooted in the cultural, and ethnic ties in 
particular, between the Bulgarian and Russian people. This part of the Bulgarian 
liberation mythology has remained successful after the end of communism. It resonates 
strongly with the Bulgarian ethnic majority of the country and continues to be seen in 
opposition to the Ottoman domination. 
The desire of the communist myth of the Soviet liberation to relate to the old myth of 
the Russian liberation was well illustrated by calling the Russians `dual liberators' (povtorni 
osvoboditeh). But in 1944 when Bulgarian communism came to power the Soviet liberators 
operated on a very different level. What was constructed in this case was the 
juxtaposition of Russia as the liberator of Bulgaria from the foreign enemy, the 
Ottomans, whereas the Soviets were said to have freed the country from the `enemy 
within' - Bulgarian capitalism. The main difference became the issue of the Bulgarian 
nation. The myth of the Russian liberation was about the national independence of 
Bulgaria, whereas the myth of the Soviet liberation was about the national division of 
Bulgaria along the lines of class identity. According to the communist myth the Soviet 
liberation was about freeing the Bulgarian proletariat from the rule of the Bulgarian 
bourgeoisie. Thus communism introduced a new meaning of liberation itself into the 
Bulgarian national mythology. The theory of communism required the reconstruction of 
the concept of freedom as a component of national independence but aiming towards 
the proletarian revolution. The main purpose of the new communist myth of the 
Bulgarian liberation was to legitimise the communists' coming to power in Bulgaria. 
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Accordingly Bulgarians were liberated from the monarchist-fascist Bulgarian government 
and freed to build a national state though this was not declared to be the final aim of the 
communist revolution. At this stage class consciousness was supposed to be the new 
unifying principle of the nation-state, which was also to lead to the transformation of the 
entire world. Communism tried to mythologise itself as the desired political regime in 
Bulgaria, which was to free the Bulgarian proletariat and turn it into a driving force of 
social progress . 
At the same time the myth of the Soviet liberation incorporated an element of Bulgarian 
national participation in the process of the establishment of the communist power in the 
country. It held that the Soviet liberation was supported by a mass native movement, led 
by the local Bulgarian communist antifascist fighters. These were the Bulgarian partisans, 
which in the myth fought side by side with the Soviets in the communist battles. 
According to the new myth, they were underground warriors, ready to sacrifice their lives 
in order to free the country from the burden of class conflict. Partisans and their 
supporters on the ground (iataks) were introduced as the heroes of the new communist 
mythology. The names of the partisans and places where their battles took place were 
included into the Bulgarian communist history and mythology. Many towns, villages, 
streets, schools, military units, kindergartens were named after them in order to turn 
them into everyday symbols of communist power. In general battle myths strengthen the 
identification with the nation and historical battle myths are about `heavenly glory over 
earthy power'. " Communism tried to create its own war mythology, which was to fulfil 
this purpose. The most important myth of the communist battles was declared to be the 
zz George Schöpflin, `The Function of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths' in Geoffrey 
Hosking and George Schöpflin (eds. ), Myths and Nationhood, (London : C. Hurst : in 
association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of 
London, 1997), p. 30. 
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September 1923 antifascist uprising. It was mythologised as a popular mass revolt against 
the Bulgarian capitalist rulers. 2' And here lay the failure of the myth. Communist history 
represented it as a revolutionary action supported by the Bulgarian people. But in fact far 
from being a mass action, the September uprising was initiated by one communist group 
directed from Moscow. It affected parts of north-western Bulgaria and several other 
regions in the country. The uprising ended in failure, being put down within one week, 
with many some prominent left-wing intellectuals killed. But if it did not bring any direct 
political changes it did serve to radicalise the Bulgarian communist movement. 24 
Thus the communist mythology tried to mythologise events with a high degree of 
political ambiguity and too soon after they happened. The September uprising was hardly 
an event which could have solidified the myth about the massive involvement of the 
Bulgarian people in the communist battles, although the scale of the anticommunist 
terror in Bulgaria in its aftermath should not be underestimated. Again the problem with 
this myth was the way it conceptualised the Bulgarian nation as divided between 
communists and anticommunist and at the same time claimed that the native communist 
revolution was a mass Bulgarian movement. The myth of the Bulgarian communist 
battles was built upon this idea of the divided nation. It is worthwhile to compare briefly 
this myth with the older myth of the Bulgarian revolt against the Ottomans during the 
uprising of April 1876. The myth about the April uprising was the main symbol of the 
Bulgarian liberation movement from the Ottomans. It was constructed around the idea 
of the Bulgarian national liberation from the `foreign' oppressor (Bulgaria against the 
Ottoman empire), whereas the myth about the September uprising was about the 
23See D. Kosev, Hr. Hristov, D. Angelov, Kratka istoria na Bulgaria, (Second ed. ), (Sofia: 
Nauka i Izkustvo, 1966). 
24 See Crampton, A Short History, pp. 100-102. 
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`internal' oppressor of Bulgaria (Bulgarian communism against the Bulgarian bourgeoisie 
rulers). The difference between this major communist war myth and the old national 
myth was best illustrated by the degree of resonance with the Bulgarian public. For 
instance the martyrs of the legendary massacre in Batak during the April uprising in 1876 
provoked deep feelings of national suffering in the Bulgarian culture. The national poet 
Ivan Vazov immortalised it in his `Epic of the Forgotten' (`Epopeia na Zabravenite'), which 
remains undoubtedly one of the most popular Bulgarian literary works. 25 The 
`martyrdom' of the September uprising of 1923 was fictionalised by many communist 
writers and also had its success. Geo Milev's epic poem `September' (`Septemvri) has also 
been highly valued as a poetic achievement of Bulgarian symbolism. 2' But its success 
could not mach the influence of Vazov's work in Bulgarian cultural history. This was not 
because it lacked imagination. The reason was that `September' appropriately depicted 
Bulgarian communist battle mythology in fragmented poetic fashion whereas Vazov 
concentrated on the sacrifice of the Bulgarian nation in the name of the national unity 
alone. Moreover after the fall of communism, the glorification of the national liberation 
heroes of the April uprising grew stronger, whereas the communist war mythology was 
shaken by demythologising processes. 
Additionally Bulgarian communism had to maintain the supreme position of the Soviets 
in the war mythology. The BCP's subordination to the Soviets postulated this rule. 
Therefore the communist mythology had the Bulgarian communist battles and heroes as 
an original achievement of the Bulgarian people, but always in balance with Soviet 
25 `Epic of the Forgotten' by Ivan Vazov is a cycle of twelve poems commemorating 
heroes of Bulgaria's renaissance and liberation struggle. For a selection of the poems see 
Vazov, Selected Poems, pp. 28-45. 
26 See Geo Milev, `Septemvri' in Izbrani Proizvedenia, Georgi Tsancv, Lamar and Leda 
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supremacy. According to the myth the Bulgarian partisans were Bulgarian communist 
heroes but the liberation was possible because of the Soviet leadership's help. This was in 
opposition to the old national myth which had it that Bulgarians were martyrs of their 
own revolutionary tradition greatly helped but not subdued to Russian leadership. The 
myth of communist liberation reflected this constant balancing out of the Bulgarian and 
the Soviet elements. Bulgarian communism had its own war mythology but its strength 
was only second to the best. The communist myths of liberation were less nationalistic in 
their content than the myths of the Bulgarian national liberation. But the tension 
between the communist and the national mythical realities was the real reason for the 
weakness of the new myth about the Soviet liberation of Bulgaria. For myths are rarely 
defeated by historical truth. They normally fail because of being unable to compete with 
counter-myths. From this point of view the myth of the Soviet liberation was 
overshadowed by the old myth of the Russian liberation and the myths of the communist 
battlegrounds were weaker than the myths of the wars of national liberation. When the 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the traditional Russian components of the Bulgarian 
liberation mythology were underlined at the expense of the Soviet connection in the 
myth of the communist liberation. Common religion and culture continued to be uphold 
as symbols of the Bulgarian love for Russia, but the Bulgarian communist involvement 
with the Soviets became a symbol of national betrayal. Most of the Soviet liberation 
memorials, which were erected all over the country, did not survive the fall of 
communism in 1989. The great number of stone engraved Soviet soldiers and Bulgarian 
partisans holding guns became silent witnesses of the failure of the communist 
mythology. In contrast the memorials of the Russian liberation remained largely 
untouched and widely celebrated as a triumph of Bulgarian independence. The 
arguments over them were often politicised but almost always the public opinion was 
Mileva (eds. ), (Sofia: Bulgarski Pisatcl, 1955), pp. 63-78. 
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that things Russian have merit beyond communist ideology. 
There was another aspect of the myth of the Soviet liberation which played a role in this 
process. The myth about communism as the most desired political, social and economic 
system for the Bulgarian people competed with the myth about communism being 
imposed by the Soviets in Eastern Europe. This myth was much less important in 
Bulgaria in comparison to other communist countries, Poland in particular. Still the fact 
that the history of the Second World War was strictly censored from this point of view as 
well as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 undermined 
the historical foundations of the myth of the Soviet liberation in Bulgaria. 
The time factor was also crucial for the failure of communist mythology. The communist 
arrival to power was difficult to glorify, because the actual events were too recent. The 
celebrated events and legendary heroes were less of a history than a living memory. As 
Eliade asserts, recollections of historical events survive in popular memory for some 
time, generation or two, before they are turned into myths: `Myth is the last, not the first 
stage of the development of the hero'. 27 The communist mythology lacked the distance 
of time which was required to turn the memory into mythology. 
Communism stated that it was the totally new ideology of the future but at the same time 
it claimed a mythical past. In this way communist myths had not only to compete with 
the old national myths but also to rework the very recent memories of events, which 
undermined the credibility of the communist mythology. For the arrival of communism 
divided Bulgarian society rather than uniting it as was claimed. Communism tried to build 
a mythology about the communist revolution as a popular and desired revolutionary act. 
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But the communist violence, the elimination of the monarchy and the disputed electoral 
success of the communists in the early years of its power in Bulgaria, as well as the 
perpetual use of intimidation and coercion to extract support, undermined its success. 28 
Nevertheless the myth of the Soviet liberation of Bulgaria was not seriously challenged, 
and lasted until the last days of Bulgarian communism. This myth was common for the 
Eastern European countries, except for Yugoslavia, which had a different liberation 
myth. What made the Bulgarian case distinct was that regardless of the undermining 
factors, the myth of the Soviet liberation was less objected to than in the rest of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The events of 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in 
Czechoslovakia, which ultimately destroyed the myth of the Soviet liberation, showed 
that the Bulgarian connection to Soviet power was very strong. 
But why was the Soviet liberation myth so successful in Bulgaria? The answer to this 
question is to be found in the overlaps of the communist and national mythology, which 
made the myth more coherent than in the rest of the countries of the Soviet bloc. First 
of all on the level of myth, the Soviet Union saw Bulgarian communism as an important 
asset because of the strategic position the country had in the Balkan region. The myth 
had it that the Soviet interests in Bulgaria were largely based on the geo-political 
importance of Bulgaria as a bridge between the East and the West. This idea was actually 
an update of the old perception of the Russian engagement in Bulgarian affairs, which 
was dictated by strategic interests and brotherly feelings. From this point of view the Red 
Army liberated Bulgaria because the country had an important role to play in the Soviet 
Union's foreign affairs. This concept was a continuation of the old myth of the Bulgarian 
27 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 43. 
ze Sec Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, pp. 152-158. 
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importance in the life of Russia. Bulgarian communism mythologised this importance 
which was built upon the national myth of Russia `the big brother'. Another factor for 
the relative success of the communist liberation myth was the achievements of the 
Bulgarian Sovietisation. Bulgarian membership in the economic union of the socialist 
bloc, Comecon, the annual fairs of technological innovations promoting Bulgaria as an 
advanced and technologically sophisticated society second only to the Soviets, as well as 
its status as an ally of the Soviet military might, supported the myth about Bulgarian 
communism's success on an international level. Being part of the Soviet bloc acquired 
the meaning of being able to compete on a world level. This gave a serious boost to the 
Bulgarian national confidence. The myth was created that communist Bulgaria equalled 
famous Bulgaria. Second the Sovietisation of Bulgarian education was declared as a great 
communist achievement. The myth was built that the introduction of the Soviet 
educational system gave Bulgaria the chance to make an enormous intellectual progress. 
This communist myth was largely successful because it actually remodelled the old 
national myth about the cultural advancement of the Bulgarian people discussed as the 
myth of Bulgaria's civilising mission. The cultural expansion of Bulgaria was an old and 
central value of Bulgarian nationalism. Thus the myth about the greatness of Bulgarian 
communist education corresponded with the national mythology and this seriously 
facilitated its success. 
The Sovietisation of Bulgarian education under communism included the idea that 
Russian culture was an inseparable part of the Bulgarian tradition. During the 1950s, the 
Bulgarian alphabet was changed to make it as similar to the Russian as possible. The 
reform was supposed to be a symbol of the expansion of the cultural closeness of the 
two cultures under communism. The Sovietisation of the Bulgarian language was drastic. 
But most importantly it provoked very little resentment on behalf of the Bulgarians. This 
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was so because the reform was made to look as a continuation of the ancient Bulgarian- 
Russian linguistic closeness. It was well established that Russian culture had historic 
bonds to the Bulgarian national development. The myth about the great Bulgarian 
communist education relied on this bonding. Additionally the myth asserted that Russia 
as well the USSR were no doubt great cultures and Bulgaria could only develop through 
its Russification or Sovietisation. The Sovietisation of Bulgarian culture was also 
mythologised as an achievement of modernisation and total secularisation. Soviet 
Marxism-Leninism penetrated all aspects of Bulgarian education. It was the undisputed 
norm of intellectual endeavour. All ideological and non-ideological subjects, from 
Marxism-Leninism, Historical Materialism and Dialectical Materialism to Agriculture, 
Theatre and Sport were studied in the Soviet tradition. 
Apart from the connection communism made between things Russian and Soviet, the 
success of the myth about the great communist education was in the promotion of 
Bulgarian culture as exclusively Bulgarian language culture. This was despite the full 
Sovietisation of Bulgarian education and the multicultural model which it advertised in its 
official documents. The new myth was about Bulgaria being a linguistically homogenous 
country. During the 1940s and 1950s communism promoted the studies of minority 
languages and cultures as long as their content was in line with the state ideology. But 
gradually minority languages were eliminated from the educational system. By the late 
1970s communist Bulgaria established a one-language educational system. Cultural 
diversity was seen as a threat to the communist education, Turkish language education 
remaining the biggest problem. The myth about multilingual communist education was 
failed by the communist reforms Education meant education in Bulgarian and about 
things Bulgarian, which was after all a purely linguistic nationalist ambition. 
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The myth of the great communist education had one very important function - to hide 
the failure of Bulgarian communist economics. Communist education was propagandised 
as a part of the anti-imperialist struggle. It glorified the workers and the peasants who 
were building the perfect world with simple tools and educated in the spirit of socialism. 
The myth about the educational advancement was supplemented by the idea that 
Bulgaria, alongside the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern European countries, was 
advancing industrially and otherwise as opposed to the decline of the capitalist West. But 
this myth could succeed only in the conditions of communist isolation. During the 1950s 
Stalinism encouraged Bulgarian isolation from the outside world; the only measure of 
success was Soviet appreciation. 2' But during the 1960s the failure to reform the 
economy, the increasing information about western wealth, and the fading of the myth 
about Soviet prosperity, undermined the myth of Bulgaria as an ever-advancing country. 
The economic failure became more and more obvious and communism sought to 
compensate with non-material performance. The regime sought to replace the myth of 
the economic prosperity of Bulgaria with the myth of the great Bulgarian intellectual 
endeavour. A great deal of resources and intellectual efforts concentrated on 
humanitarian subjects. From there came the belief that the West may be rich materially 
but Bulgarian communism's wealth was in its intellectual development. 
29 John D. Bell, The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Tzivkov, (Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1986), pp. 108-109. 
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VI. Communist Symbolism 
Communist symbols were supposed to derive from the meanings of production and 
political power in accord with the theory of the supremacy of class identity. 
Communism faced the task of creating a whole new system of custom and ritual 
symbolising the new values of state and society. Most importantly communism could not 
rely on the past because it was rejected as wrong as far as it was not orientated towards 
the communist revolution. Communism claimed that fundamentally it was a self- 
sufficient reality, which was future-orientated. This was in full contrast with nationalism, 
which claimed to encompass all aspects of community life and put a special emphasis on 
the past as the main source of national identity. In terms of symbols, nationalism claimed 
that they were rooted deep in the past and spoke exclusively through old meanings and 
traditional beliefs. However in reality communism also needed the past to substantiate its 
symbolic presentation. Whenever communist symbolism was based exclusively on the 
idea that communism offered a totally new life to Bulgarian people, it lacked coherence 
and was short-lived. Communist symbols of this type did not survive the fall of 
communism and gradually were removed from the symbolic tradition of Bulgaria. 
Communism produced its own customs and rituals, which were maintained through 
party directions alone and were gradually emptied from meaningful content. The BCP 
policy was to design symbols which matched the ideas of the communist regime. But in 
fact the symbols of Bulgarian communism which were designed to mythologise 
communist ideas failed unless supported by the Bulgarian cultural national tradition. The 
symbols of the Bulgarian communist state survived only as much as they recalled the pre- 
communist time. The main reason for this was that the symbols deriving from class 
identity and the Bulgarian-Soviet alliance were imposed and non-consensual symbols. 
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By the 1980s communist Bulgaria celebrated nationalism as the main content of its 
symbols. All symbols of the Bulgarian state - the flag, the coat of arms, the anniversaries, 
the maps and the main documents asserting the legitimacy of the Bulgarian socialist state 
such as the communist constitutions, the names of places and memorials - were 
specifically designed to express communist ideology. But in the end none of them 
succeeded in replacing the symbols of the Bulgarian nation. 
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VII. Symbols of Class Equality 
Communism had to create symbols of class identity and class equality because these were 
fundamental to communist society. All socialist citizens were supposed to identify with 
class first. By the 1970s the idea of the `advanced socialism' was promoted in Bulgaria 
and class equality was declared to be on the way of being achieved. Again communism 
had problem with the concept of time. For equality was an essentially utopian idea, which 
communism promised to build in the future. The full realisation of communism was 
always promised still to come. And of course class equality was a very vulnerable theme 
of communism because it was never achieved. On the contrary in the course of time 
communism created new classes. "' As Kertzer argues, in general the notion that people 
are or could be fully equal is a mystification and a product of a social construction of 
reality. He suggests that in fact the more inequality there is in a society, the bigger the 
opportunity there is for creating a mystification about the lack of it. 31 This was certainly 
the case of Bulgarian communism. Most rituals of class equality were an obvious 
mystification. In theory everyone had both the right and the duty to be part of the 
communist life. All Bulgarian citizens were supposed to be engaged in the building of 
communism. The everyday code of communication, which symbolised such participation 
consisted of customs and rituals which were introduced by Bulgarian communism in 
Soviet fashion. The greeting `comrade', which substituted the gender based pro- 
communist `gospodin', `gospoZ/Ja'or `gospozhitZa', the compulsory participation in communist 
children and youth organisations, which created new communist identities (`c1)ar'darcGeta' 
and `pioneri), the obligatory public appearance at the celebrations of communist holidays 
}" See Mfilovan Djilas, The New Class An Analysis of the Communist System, (London: 
Themes & Hudson, 1957). 
" See Kertzer, Ritual. Politics and Power, p. 48. 
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and participation in elections, were all symbols of class equality. The actual involvement 
in these customised activities was a symbol of support which Bulgarian citizens gave to 
the communist regime. But because they were based on the concept that the citizens 
must obey the state in a disciplined manner, their symbolic presentation said much more 
about the communist regime itself than about how much it was desired. Instead of 
demonstrating the class equality communism ritualised its inequalities. 
The Bulgarian coat of arms, dating back as early as the 14`h century, underwent several 
changes after Bulgarian independence, but the main elements required by the 
constitution remained the same. The central figure was a crowned lion. The communist 
regime changed the Bulgarian coat of arms twice. In 1946, when the monarchy was 
abolished, the communist-dominated government removed the crown. In 1947 a five- 
pointed star, a cog-wheel, and two ears of corn were included. Most importantly the date 
of the communist revolution, 9 September 1944, was inscribed on a band. 32 This symbol 
aimed to incorporate the communist state into Bulgarian national history as firmly as 
possible. But it also claimed to be the `beginning' of Bulgarian statehood. The coat of 
arms was one of the first symbols of communism, which was changed after 1989. The 
debate was highly politicised but the date of the foundation of the Bulgarian state was 
recovered with little disagreement. The idea that the creation of the Bulgarian state could 
be symbolised by the arrival of communism in 1944 was unsustainable. 
The more powerful symbols of communism were the mass manifestations marking the 
national communist holidays, such as the celebration of the October revolution and the 
coming to power of Bulgarian communism: 7 November and 9 September, respectively. 
'Z Veselin Metodiev and Luchezar Stoinaov (eds. ), Bulgarski konstitutsii i konstitutsioni 
12rockti, (Sofia: D-r Petur Beron, 1990), pp. 52-53. 
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They required everyone's involvement and were supposed to impress the entire world 
with their grandness. The structure of the manifestations itself had highly symbolic 
meanings. Although the entire country was celebrating with mass events, the focus of 
attention was the parades in the capital, Sofia. Usually the communist leadership lined up 
on the platform of the mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov, in the centre of the city. The 
selected high-ranking members of the BCP greeted the passing masses gathered to 
participate in the manifestation. The leaders were strictly ordered according to their 
position in the party hierarchy. This power structure defined symbolically the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled. The manifestations became a ritual of the party rule 
rather than of `people's power'. Additionally engaging in symbolic practices members of 
any organisation mark themselves off from non-members. But because of the 
compulsory character of the public manifestations of support under communism, there 
was nobody left to be distinguished from (any non-participants would be in such small 
numbers that it wouldn't matter). In this way the symbolic dividing line was mainly, if not 
only, about those who ruled and those who were ruled. Although the symbol aimed to 
manifest the societal unity, it actually ritualised the divisions within. Moreover communist 
organisations were strictly closed societies. Their symbolic code, from party membership 
to holiday places, manners and dress style distinguished them from the rest of the people. 
Thus communist belief in class equality did not find appropriate symbolic expressions. 
But the BCP did not find this completely intolerable. One of the ways of countering the 
general weakness of the communist symbols was to underline the ethnic Bulgarian 
character of Bulgarian communism. In relation to the ethnic diversity of Bulgaria, the 
discrepancy in the communist symbols of equality was very clear: the more official 
ideology emphasised that all Bulgarian citizens were equal, the more ethnic inequality 
became apparent. For example Article 45, paragraph 7 of the 1971 Constitution stated 
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that `Citizens of non-Bulgarian origin, in addition to the compulsory study of the 
Bulgarian language, shall have the right to study also in their own language'. " But by the 
1970s most of the minorities' language education was practically non-existent. Thus the 
communist `rule of law' on ethnic issues was not substantiated. Therefore instead of 
providing the regime with symbolic power, it actually exposed its failure. 
Another similarly unintended side effect of the communist myth of citizens' equality was 
the mystification of the ethnic minorities as the `privileged minorities'. The myth was 
about the demographic decline of the Bulgarian nation as opposed to the demographic 
growth of the ethnic minorities, which was seen as a direct consequence of the 
communist policy to develop a multicultural Bulgaria. The belief behind the myth came 
from the BCP policy from the 1960s to encourage the demographic growth of the nation 
by various child benefits and maternity allowances: the more children there were in the 
family, the more benefits were received from the state. Additionally although the right to 
abortion was never banned, married women were entitled to it only after having two 
children. At the same time, the demographic growth which Bulgarian communism 
promoted could not escape the association with the extended family structure of the 
Turkish and Roma people in the country. Consequently most people viewed that these 
minorities benefited from such policies far more than Bulgarians. This was seen as an 
unfair arrangement provided by the communist state. A good example in this respect was 
the special policy towards the Roma introduced during the 1950s. It lasted until 1965 and 
was perceived largely by the Bulgarian majority as a set of privileges. In fact the 
communist regime carried out a policy for the sedementarisation and assimilation of the 
Roma population, which required the creation of a living space and employment for 
" Williams B. Simons, Communist Constitutions of the World, (Walters Noordhoff: 
1984), p. 47. 
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them. But most Bulgarians felt that this was not necessary and that the policy was wrong 
because it encouraged the growth of the minority populations in Bulgaria. 
Despite the uneven results of this policy one thing was clear - that Bulgarian communism 
was concerned about the demographic pattern of the development of the ethnic 
Bulgarian nation. The population growth was not seen as a problem of expanding the 
overall communist world but rather as a question of the growth of the Bulgarian people 
under communism. 
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VIII. Symbolic Meanings of the Bulgarian Constitution 
The most important symbols of communist `organisational identity' were the communist 
constitutions. In 1947, shortly after communism took over, Bulgaria adopted the new 
`Dimitrov constitution'. It defined Bulgaria as a people's democracy created by the 
revolution of 1944 and promised all citizens equal civil, religious and employment rights. 
But very importantly it also stated that all these rights were conditional on not being 
subversive to the communist revolution. " It included religious freedom and gave the 
right to the national minorities to study in their own language alongside with Bulgarian. 35 
This concept was further developed by the 1971 constitution, which changed the 
definition of citizenship. Now Bulgaria was `a socialist state of the working people in 
town and countryside headed by the working class'. Accordingly everyone was supposed 
to assimilate into the working class. The idea was that the new constitution should 
symbolise the Bulgarian state of the working class. Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, 
specifically stated that the BCP was the leading force of the society and the state, which 
was a further move towards centralising political power. 36 
Thus the meaning of the Bulgarian constitution changed. The new constitution came to 
symbolise the Bulgarian communist leadership, which saw Bulgaria as a homogenous 
society and a centralised nation-state, but also allowed no restrictions or privileges based 
on national, religious or racial differences, as stated in Article 34, paragraph 2,3 and 4.37 
But the communist constitution as a major symbol of political power had to compete 
" See Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, p. 165. 
35 Veselin Metodiev and Luchezar Stoianov (eds. ), Bulgarski konstitutsii i konstitutsionni 
prockti, (Sofia: D-r Petur Bcron, 1990), p. 51. 
3"See Simons, Communist Constitutions, p. 39. 
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with Bulgaria's pre-communist constitutional tradition. The Turnovo constitution of 
1879 was the first constitution of independent Bulgaria and as such was a very powerful 
national symbol. It marked not only Bulgarian independence after the withdrawal of the 
Ottomans, but also it was at the core of the myth about the great democracy of the so- 
called third Bulgarian state. 3"Originally the Turnovo constitution declared Eastern 
Orthodoxy as the official religion of Bulgaria. But it also gave rights to the other spiritual 
faiths. The adopting of the document served as a political ritual and as such it had 
enormous significance for the legitimacy of Bulgarian national independence. The 
Turnovo constitution was modelled on western constitutions and showed the desire of 
the Bulgarian political elite to become part of the democratic European tradition. The 
Turnovo constitution was a symbol of the new Bulgaria aspiring to democratic European 
values. Communist constitutions had a different symbolic meaning as they were 
designed to legitimise party policy. They declared rights and duties which the party itself 
persecuted in practice. As documents of political legitimacy communist constitutions 
failed to become part of the myth of Bulgarian democracy. After 1989 the Turnovo 
constitution was resurrected as a symbol of the Bulgarian democratic tradition, whereas 
the communist constitutions were rejected as an imposed interruption of this tradition. 
37 Sec Metodiev and Stoianov, Bulgarski konstitutsii i konstitutsioni prockti, 1990. 
According to Bulgarian historiography there were three Bulgarian states: the first, from 
681-803; the second, from 1185-1197; and the third from 1878. 
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IX. Communist Leaders as Symbols 
Communist leaders everywhere in the Soviet bloc served as symbols of the communist 
regimes. As discussed previously Bulgarian communist leaders were unique in one way - 
they all had a particularly strong relationship with the Soviets. Their subservience to the 
Soviet regime distinguished them among the communist leaders of the rest of the 
communist bloc. 39 But Bulgarian communism had its own mythology of the great 
communist Bulgarian leaders who not only adhered to communist ideals but also had to 
apply them in practice. The strongest among them were the mythologised personalities 
of Georgi Dimitrov, the first communist Bulgarian leader, and the last one, Todor 
Tzivkov. Dimitrov was distinguished from all other communist leaders of Bulgaria by 
being exposed in a mausoleum in Sofia, which was a Soviet-style memorial symbolising 
the immortality of communism. The mummified body of the most internationally known 
Bulgarian communist was supposed to give the impression of communist Bulgaria as a 
sacred country. But what undermined Dimitrov's mythical credibility was the fact that he 
was seen as `the Soviet man' in Bulgaria because of promoting the idea of Macedonian 
national identity in Bulgaria in accord with Soviet instructions. He remained strictly a 
symbol of Soviet communism in Bulgaria and after 1989 his name became a symbol of 
the Soviet influence in Bulgaria rather than one of Bulgarian communism. 
The most successful symbol of the Bulgarian communist leadership was the myth about 
the `father' of the communist Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov. The success of this myth was in 
that Zhivkov tackled the main contradiction of the communist leadership as a symbol of 
the Bulgarian state - namely, whether communist leaders could really be national leaders 
39 Georgi Dimtrov, Vasil Kolarov and Vulko Chervenkov were perceived as the most 
prominent pro-Soviet political leaders of communist Bulgaria. 
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of Bulgaria The very clear identity of all Bulgarian communist leaders as Russian and 
Soviet disciples did not suffice to turn them into successful myths. But the myth about 
Zhivkov, the longest-serving head of the Bulgarian communist state, was that he was not 
only a communist leader but also a national leader. From here derived his image as `the 
people's leader' in communist Bulgaria. 
Zhivkov was a `charismatic leader' in the Wcberian sense of the word. His political 
instincts were one of a populist. The main reason for his success as a Bulgarian 
communist leader was that he associated himself with the Bulgarian people, which he 
understood mainly as the Bulgarian peasants. Consequently Zhivkov advertised his policy 
openly as an anti-intellectual one and voiced his suspicions of the Bulgarian intelligentsia. 
In this way he responded to the traditional hostility of the countryside to the city, which 
characterised much of the Bulgarian society traditionally. Although formally Zhivkov 
promoted himself as a working class leader of the underground communist movement, 
he emphasised his image as a hunter and admirer of rural beauty and folk culture. He 
detested the city life and mentality because it represented the idea of potential change. 
Zhivkov feared change, and this helped him to bond with the Bulgarian peasantry, which 
was shattered by the communist revolution and aspired for stability. Notably there was 
no religious element in his populism, which made him less vulnerable to possible 
accusations of anti-Marxism-Leninism. 
Zhivkov stayed in power much longer than any other Bulgarian communist leader. He 
acquired much more power than Anton Ugov, by becoming general secretary of the BCP 
, prime-minister and head of the State Council. In contrast to Georgi Dimitrov he had no 
international reputation as a communist. And his name was associated with the relaxation 
of political life in Bulgaria after the Stalinist rule of Vulko Chervenkov. 
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The most important moment in Zhivkov's biography as a Bulgarian communist was his 
participation in the partisan movement. His legendary image as a head of the partisan 
brigade Chavdar, which entered Sofia on 9 September 1944. The myth about Zhivkov 
being the leader of the Bulgarian partisans aimed to legitimise him as one of the founders 
of the native Bulgarian communist movement. And this in its own terms was supposed 
to legitimise his power during communism. The dramatic presentation of his 
involvement in the historic events of communism taking over Bulgaria made him a 
symbol of a political `bastion of morality and tireless servant of the public good', to use 
Kertzer terminology. " Zhivkov also drew upon being a `Soviet man', but in a different 
way from Dimirov. He never challenged the Soviet line and even offered Bulgaria to be 
part of the USSR but this was hardly seen as a contribution to communist 
internationalism He saw the Soviet factor as the most stabilising and protective force for 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian satellite position matched perfectly his idea of maintaining power 
without ever changing anything. This unquestionable respect for Soviet supremacy gave 
Zhivkov's public perception the `coronation' rituals such as visits, meetings and praises 
of the Soviet might. The Soviet support he enjoyed, particularly under the Brezhnev's 
rule, played the role of a divine, outside power delivering political immortality to the 
Bulgarian leader. 
Zhivkov's political inability was illustrated during the time of Gorbachov's perestroika in 
the 1980s. This time the changes in the Soviet line divested the Bulgarian communist 
leader's authority and after the rituals of Soviet support stopped being performed, 
Zhivkov's ability to exercise power decreased substantially. Zhivkov was quite popular 
among the Bulgarian people because he presented himself as a protector of the nation, 
not as a reorganiser or reformer of any kind. He came to symbolise national leadership as 
ý'ý Kertzer, Ritual. Politics and Power, p. 108. 
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much as the communist regime because he aspired to be the Bulgarian `people's leader', 
(`c%ovek of naroda'). Zhivkov's political image was based on two main features of the 
Bulgarian national tradition: being a hero from a peasant background and transformed by 
history into a protector of the ethnic Bulgarian nation. He was entirely orientated 
towards being a leader of a united Bulgarian people and detested the ethnic diversity of 
the country. His personal responsibility for the anti-Turkish campaign in the 1980s 
remains unclear, but his total support for the forcible expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks in 
1989 has been widely acknowledged. 
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X. The Myth of the Origins of Class Conflict 
According to communist theory, historical conflicts were all based on class. Therefore 
Bulgarian communism attempted to reinterpret the medieval past as the time of the big 
Bulgarian class battles. The idea was to create a myth about very early Bulgarian class 
consciousness. Again communism desired to be seen as an ideology which originated in 
the legendary past of the nation. This project was ridden by contradictions and 
constructed a deeply confused and incoherent mythology. On one hand, communism 
glorified medieval Bulgaria for its military successes and cultural achievements. It 
acknowledged that the old Bulgarian khans and the tsars were great men and `founding 
fathers' of Bulgaria. They were upheld as symbols of Bulgarian military might, state 
leadership and cultural progress. ' 
On the other hand communism tried to use medieval history in order to generate the 
idea of Bulgaria being historically involved in class conflict. Communist scholars selected 
one particular event which seemed to match the idea, the Peasant Uprising. The original 
story was that during the 13°i century Bulgaria suffered severe internal struggles and 
outside threats, which led to serious mass distress. The population rebelled and was led 
by a man called Ivailo, who was a swineherd and became Bulgarian tsar for three years. 42 
Communist history chose to mythologise Ivailo as the leader of the first `anti-feudal 
peasant revolt' in the world which resulted in the leader taking power. 43 Ivailo was 
supposed to symbolise the capacity of the Bulgarian peasantry to organise for action and 
41 See Mihail Andreev and Dimitur Angclov, Istoria na bulgarskata fcodalna durzhava i 
12ravo, (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1972), p. 73. 
42 See Crampton, A Short History, p. 6. 
43 See Alexander Fol, Vasil Guzclev, Nikolai Genchev, Konstantin Kosev, Ilcho 
Dimitrov, Andrei Pantev, Milcho Lalkov and Kostadin Petrov, Kratka istoria na Bulgaria, 
(Sofia: Izdatelstvo Nauka i Izkustvo, 1981), p. 113. 
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to actually make political change. Communism depicted the Bulgarian peasants as 
possessed by ideas of class struggle from early times. Essentially the myth of the very old 
class-minded Bulgaria ascribed political radicalism to the peasantry. But it resonated 
neither with the rural nor the urban Bulgarians living under communism.; ' The myth 
about the medieval class awareness of the Bulgarian people was alien to the Bulgarian 
community. As Schöpflin argues, `A myth that fails to elicit a response is either alien to 
the community, or inappropriate at the time when it is used, or, conceivably, evokes a 
response only in small numbers or those addressed'. 45 Indeed social rebellion was alien to 
the Bulgarian countryside and the myth was a total failure. One could only speculate 
about how successful the myth could have been if constructed around the idea that Ivailo 
was actually a messiah. 
4' The idea that Ivailo was a Bulgarian people's hero was pursued not only by historians. 
In 1959 at the request of the party, the opera `Ivailo' was composed by Marin Goleminov 
and performed regularly since. It was undoubtedly one of the most absurd endeavors of 
the Bulgarian classical music under communism. 
45 Schöpflin, `The Function of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths', p. 27. 
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XI. Myths of Territory 
Most modernists think that territorial nationalism is a modern phenomenon. The idea 
that the boundaries of the nation have to be congruent with the territorial borders of the 
state is considered the essence of nationalism. 46 Yet the very idea of boundaries - 
territorial, linguistic, religious or demographic - seems to be a pre-modern concept. As 
Grosby argues, the constitutive prerequisite of the existence of a territory is the existence 
of boundaries understood in a broad sense; the extent of the `jurisdiction of the lex 
terrae', or the articulated law of the land, is the most important boundary of the territory. 
Perceptions of territory seem not `negotiated' but most often accepted as 47 
Changes of territorial boundaries are always hard for people to accept because the places 
where the nation lives is mythologised. Schöpflin argues that the idea of the nation is 
linked to the perceptions of territory through myth. Myth creates the idea that territorial 
borders mark not simply territory but a sacred territory. " 
The idea of the Bulgarian nation is based on the myth of the liberation of the Bulgarian 
territories and the struggle to unite them in one nation-state. The slogan of the Bulgarian 
independence movement at the end of 19`x' century was to liberate the Bulgarian lands. At 
the time when communism came to power after the end of the Second World War 
Bulgaria had just undergone territorial changes. The most important one was the loss of 
Macedonia, which Bulgaria occupied during the war. Communism responded to the 
Bulgarian territorial changes through the myth of the communist liberation. Communism 
'' See Ernest Gellncr, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1. 
" Steven Grosby, `Territoriality: the transcendental, primordial feature of modern 
societies' in `Nations and Nationalism', 1995, vol. 1 (part 2), pp. 143-148. 
41 See Schöpflin, `The Function of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths', p. 29. 
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claimed that it liberated the Bulgarian people and country from the oppression of the 
class conflict, which was seen as the primary source of all misfortunes of Bulgaria. But 
the communist claim extended to the territorial changes throughout the entire Bulgarian 
history. Communism declared that Bulgaria suffered from foreign domination, but also 
of class conflict: the medieval Bulgarian empires underwent disintegration in the hands of 
feudal rulers; the Ottoman empire collapsed in a traumatic way because it was based on 
inequality; the First World War as well as the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) were called 
`national catastrophes' -a direct result of the monarchy-bourgeois politics. The party 
historians postulated that communist historiography offers a different view of the 
Bulgarian territorial disputes; they were driven by class conflict, not by ideas of 
nationalism. For instance the `politically correct' approach to the Macedonian question 
was to see it first as a matter of class conflict. The Bulgarian bourgeoisie, not the workers 
and peasants, had claims over Macedonia. " 
However gradually communism changed its attitude to the Bulgarian national territories. 
Although the official line continued to be that history was driven by class conflict, 
communism accepted that the Bulgarian territorial losses were losses of national 
character first. By the 1980s the official claim established that although the Bulgarian 
bourgeoisie was to be blamed for the `national catastrophes', the Macedonian territorial 
question was a humiliating national loss for the country which the bourgeoisie failed to 
prevent, not because it acted according to its own class interests, but because it did not 
have the appropriate foreign policy. The leading communist historian Ilcho Dimitrov 
stated that the main mistake of the pre-communist Bulgarian governments was that they 
were too cautious and never really had the courage to stand in defence of the Bulgarian 
4' Georgi Bakalov, Izbrani istoricheski suchinenia, Zhak Natan & Alexandur Burmov 
(eds. ), (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1960), p. 359. 
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national interests. 5 
The communist party accepted that the territorial boundaries established at the end of 
the Second World War were to be maintained. Communist Bulgaria was not to be altered 
territorially. It was to be honoured as `small but beautiful'. Communism offered 
territorial stability under Soviet protection. The myth of the Bulgarian national territory 
was limited to the glorification of the country's medieval greatness and the partition of 
Bulgaria at the Berlin Congress in 1878. Under communism the territorial partition of 
Bulgaria continued to be understood as a result of Great Power intervention in Balkan 
politics. In general their ambitions were explained in terms of imperialist and capitalist 
aggression. But gradually the idea was promoted that the territorial stability under 
communism was not sufficient to compensate for the territorial losses in the past. 
S" Ilcho Dimitrov, Bulgaria na Balkanite iv Evrot2a, (Sofia: Narodna Prosveta, 1980), pp. 
16-20. 
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XII. The Leader's Daughter and `1300 Years Bulgaria' 
The 1980s marked the renewal of the myth of the great national Bulgarian culture. The 
daughter of Zhivkov played a special role in constructing and promoting this myth. 
which had tremendous impact on the dynamics of Bulgarian communism and 
nationalism during the 1980s. 
Zhivkova prompted a cultural policy which became the first systematic attempt to create 
a new Bulgarian communist theory of cultural nationalism and apply it in practice. She 
also aimed to establish a new Bulgarian national cultural communist elite as openly 
promoting the need for strong national values in the country. Through her activities and 
writings Zhivkova introduced Bulgarian cultural nationalism as a mainstream political 
movement under communism. She created new national institutions and changed the 
architectural landscape of the capital by building the biggest cultural institution in the 
country, the Palace of People's Culture. The underlying idea was to mythologise Bulgaria 
as a self-sufficient and unique cultural nation. Bulgaria no longer needed to be part of the 
Slavic world in order to be part of the universe. This was a major innovation in the 
Bulgarian communist mythology. 
Zhivkova's policy was in the spirit of the Bulgarian Revival movement from the 19`' 
century. Similarly to the call for the re-awakening of the nation, Zhivkova demanded that 
the Bulgarian people re-discover their mythological past and use it in order to achieve 
national glory in the future. Upholding Bulgarian national cultural supremacy Zhivkova 
asserted that culture was a superior and to a great extent a separate phenomenon from 
the world of politics, ideology or economics. The inspiration of Bulgarian national life 
was to be found in the national artefacts. Zhivkova declared the supremacy of the 
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Bulgarian human spirit as the driving force of social advancement, including the socialist 
one. 
As a daughter of the Bulgarian communist leader, Zhivkova enjoyed almost unlimited 
powers in Bulgarian political life and was solely responsible for the cultural, educational 
and scientific development in the country from 1979 until her early death in 1981. Her 
most ambitious project was called `1300 Years Bulgaria' commemorating the longevity of 
the Bulgarian state. The early 1980s saw the enormous Palace of People's Culture erected 
in central Sofia and the international programme Children's Peace Assembly as well as 
the establishment of the memorial Peace Bells in the outskirts of the capital. Alongside 
the Foundation for Foreign Art in Sofia and the Centre for Medieval Studies Ivan 
Duichev, they all became symbols of the new Bulgarian communist policy. At the same 
time, her entire project signalled the deep crisis of the communist regime in Bulgaria. The 
attempt was to reinvent the communist state as a continuation of the Bulgarian Golden 
age: 'We are proud of the Bulgarian State in the Balkans, which through the union of 
Slavs and Proto-Bulgarians laid the foundations of continuity of the social and cultural 
development, in the course of which the Bulgarian nationality and later the Bulgarian 
nation were formed. ... 
The socialist state is the highest rung of the ladder in the ages-long 
development of the state organisation of the Bulgarian people until the present days; it is 
the legitimate heir of the continuous development of all things progressive and 
democratic in the thirteenth centuries' history of Bulgaria. 51Zhivkova's approach to 
restore and re-invent the Bulgarian tradition by using messianic and superstitious folk 
beliefs as evidence of unparalleled capacity was supposed to create a specifically 
Bulgarian cultural model of national development. It resembled the New Age movement, 
si Liydmilla Zhivkova, Her Many Worlds: New Culture & Beauty Concepts & Action. 
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 50-51. 
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which developed in the West in the late 1960s as a mixture of Eastern mysticism and 
western liberalism. In fact Zhivkova had the unique privilege to travel everywhere in the 
world and she had a particular taste for Indian arts. Spending some time in Britain while 
studying in Oxford may have acquainted her more intimately with fashionable 
subcultures, which she probably used as a model for some of her programmes. 
Zhivkova's politics were limited to the cultural sphere and in her role as a minister of 
culture she did little else. Her understanding of communism was diffused within ideas of 
culture. She formulated it as socialism which involves the `need for renovating changes 
imperatively imposed by the epoch we are living in... the rich historical, cultural and 
spiritual experience that has been accumulated by the Bulgarian nation over the ages, 
revealing the militant vitality and impetuosity of the socially renovated society and 
people'. 52 
Zhivkova was fascinated by remote and exotic cultures such as India but never looked 
for inspiration in the different ethnic cultures within her own country. She offered 
Bulgaria a cultural model which was exclusively ethnically Bulgarian. Although writers, 
artists, politicians, mostly members of the younger generation of intelligentsia and 
communist party elite, admired Zhivkova's ideas, her time also signalled the decline of 
Bulgarian communism seeking to re-invent itself as a cultural nationalist movement 
inspired by myths of the past. The official promotion of Bulgaria as a unique national 
culture showed how profound was the crisis of legitimacy in Bulgarian communism. 
Mythologising Bulgaria as a unique and universal culture was supposed to provide the 
missing link between the `new' communist mythology and the `old' national myths. 
52 Liydmilla Zhivkova, Perfecting Man and Socicty, (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1980), p. 362. 
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XIII. Conclusion 
Bulgarian communist mythology was incoherent and most of its symbols were weak. 
Communism's initial claim about being the new history of Bulgaria was gradually 
transformed into the claim that it was also deeply rooted into the antique Bulgarian 
cultural tradition. Communist myths were supposed to assert the historical importance of 
Bulgarian class identity and undermine the bourgeoisie `nationalistic' mythology. At the 
same time communism could not escape the national tradition and made constant 
references to it in order to support its own myths. The main difficulty it had in 
constructing its cosmos was the problem of time. Communism was the system of the 
present, which claimed to be disconnected from the past if it was not associated with the 
historical struggles of the working class. In its aims communism was totally orientated to 
the future. But it had to create symbols out of the Bulgarian pre-communist past. And it 
was precisely because it was an ideology of the future that it needed the past more than 
any other concept. Because the future was so uncertain and utopian in its nature, 
communism had to find support in the past. In theory it denied a great deal of it, but in 
practice it tried to use it for its own purposes. 
The communist mythology rested on the question of how `old' was communism in 
Bulgaria. Similarly to nationalism, communist ideology sought to legitimate itself as an 
`antique' social order. But in difference to nationalism, communism had to select only 
those events and heroes of the Bulgarian history which could be interpreted from a 
revolutionary point of view. This was a serious restriction, which made communist 
mythology an exclusive rather than inclusive system. Bulgarian communism was weakest 
when it tried to incorporate the class conflict in the national mythology, as in the case of 
Ivailo, who it held as a hero of the Bulgarian peasants' radicalism. The communist myth 
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was successful when it made the communist perspective of modernity compatible with 
the Bulgarian national mythology aiming to underline the uniqueness of Bulgarian 
people, as was the case with the myth of the civilising mission of the Bulgarian people. 
After 1989, the process of rejecting communist celebrations was matched by one of 
recovering pre-communist national symbols. The communist celebrations of 9 
September, the day commemorating the communists' coming to power in 1944, as well 
as 7 November, the day of the October revolution of 1917 in Russia and 9 May, the day 
of the Soviet victory in the Second World War in 1945, were abandoned. Instead the day 
commemorating the signing of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano of 3 March 1878, 
which established the borders of Greater Bulgaria, was declared the biggest national 
holiday in 1990. 
Bulgarian communism promoted the idea that the country was united under the banner 
of working class and peasantry alliance. It sought ways of unifying the town and the 
countryside. The same party structure was established in each town and village and all 
were connected to the centre through the administrative network. Indeed the effort 
resembled the use of rituals to connect periphery communities to the centre of state 
power when new nations arc established. The political integration of the countryside was 
secured through popular participation in `rites of allegiance', to use Kertzer terms, which 
featured regularly in community life. " 
The countryside celebrated the `socialist revolution' and party leaders visited farming 
festivities and communism achieved the homogenisation of this style of life to a great 
extent. But it was all about the structure of political power, not about beliefs. The 
division between the Bulgarian city and countryside remained on the level of tradition 
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versus modernity. The communist idea about the modern Bulgarian being a working 
class citizen could not be substantiated enough to become a convincing myth and could 
not compete successfully with the myth of the Bulgarian national identity as unchanged 
by politics. 
Bulgarian communist myths were designed to link radical revolutionary views with 
national history in order to prove that the Bulgarian mind was communist by nature. This 
was the idea behind the search for the pre-modern Bulgarian roots of communism. 
Communism claimed that the nation had been engaged in movements for social justice 
since medieval times. The interpretation of the feudal peasant uprising led by Ivailo was 
the most obvious example in this respect. But there were also other communist myths 
which were supposed to symbolise communist antiquity. For instance the medieval 
heresy of Bogomilism was declared an early sign of communist thinking in Bulgaria. sa In 
this way communism, rather than trying to escape the past, chose to use it actively. 
Communist mythology tried to reconcile its own myths with the myths of Bulgarian 
nationhood. Bulgarian communism created a mythology by selecting and reinterpreting 
traditional national myths. It sought support in the national mythology for the 
construction of its cosmos. It tried to balance previously existing myths of nationhood 
with newly introduced myths of class-based Bulgarian national identity. As a result, 
Bulgarian communism succeeded in linking to the national mythology about the 
See Kertzer, Ritual. Politics and Power, pp. 22 -23. 
sa Bogomilism was a religious heresy thought to have originated in the lands of 
Macedonia and Thrace in the 10"' century. Bogomils believed in dualism and criticised 
the Christian church for being corrupt. During communism Bogomilism was taught to 
have been a Bulgarian anti-religious movement, which preached equality. For a scholarly 
account of the origins and spread of the Bogomil heresy see Yuri Stoyanov, The Hidden 
Tradition in Europe, (London : Arkana, Penguin, 1994). 
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exclusivity of the Bulgarian ethnie, but failed to achieve coherence in its symbols and 
rituals. The main reason for this was that communism designed and imposed new myths, 
but they proved to be short-lived and were overshadowed by the old ones. Gradually 
what was defined as communist tradition in Bulgarian history was emptied of content 
and substituted with rituals and symbols of cultural nationalism. 
Soon after the changes in 1989 Cyril and Methodius were officially granted the status of 
saints and the celebration of the `Day of the Bulgarian Enlightenment' (Dell na Bu/garskata 
Prosreta) recovered its religious dimension. In this way the myth of the civilising mission 
regained its full content and came to symbolise two of the main features of Bulgarian 
ethnicity, language and religion. 
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Chapter 4: The Macedonian Question in Communist Bulgaria 
I. Introduction 
Several years ago while in Bulgaria I read in the press that Sofia University may be opening a 
Alacedonian language and literature course. When I called the administrative office to enquire about such 
a course, there was a pause at the other end of the line followed a sharp response: `What nationality are 
you, madam? '. The voice had a familiar tone of irony, reproach and anger. I said automatically, I am 
Bulgarian. ' Then ; P/ g don'tyougetyourselfa Bulgarian history text book and educate yourself! Shame 
on you! ' The outraged woman put the phone down. 
Not long after that I was speaking with ayoung Bulgarian historian who was writing a new textbook. I 
was telling him about nq, recent trip to the Turkish regions of the country and asked whether he would 
include the history of the Bugarian Muslims in his book. We can't afford to write histories of Turks, 
Macedonians, Pomaks, etc. because there will be nothing left from Bulgarian history itself. Ve bare to 
have a national history; like everyone in the West. ' Behind us on a shabby wall there was afresh 
ascription 'V1YIRD , the initials of the resurrected Internal A'Iacedonian Revolutionary Organisation in 
the new Bugaria. He pointed at it and said They are weak as they have always been... Isn't it sad? ' 
When the bus from Sofia to Skopje stopped at a town in Pirin Macedonia before the border, a local 
young man approached me: `Excuse me, are 
-you 
Macedonian? ' Before I managed to digest the question, 
a passing woman gave an answer smiling y: We are all Macedonian 
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The first story is one of the malty, which shore the emotional texture of the word Macedonian' and the 
demand for `correct' historical awareness of the national question in Bulgaria on a daily, basis. The second 
one illustrates the prevailing fear of loosing Bulgarian national identity and the insecurity of not having 
enough of it because of `other' identities in the same country. The last one reveals in simple words the 
essence of the Macedonian question in Bulgaria. It is about overlapping identities: some say all 
Macedonians are Bulgarians; others that all Bulgarians are Macedonians. 
The most impressive feature of Macedonian question in Bulgaria remains the emotional 
intensity of its past - it has by now a history of more than one hundred years - and its 
capacity to inspire the present. The issue has been central for understanding the 
Bulgarian nationalism in general and under communism in particular. Fundamentally it 
constitutes a two-sided debate. It disputes the existence of a distinct Macedonian ethnic 
identity based on history, culture and language and questions the legitimacy of the 
Macedonian nationhood. It has been discussed mainly as a historical question involving 
the geopolitics of the Balkans after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Later it is seen 
as a result of the communist idea to create a separate Macedonian state, nation, language 
and history. It is also generally assumed that the Bulgarian communist policy on the 
Macedonian question was internationalist and lacked the nationalist passion of the pre- 
war government. 
This chapter focuses on the effects of the Macedonian question on the formation, 
development and changes in the communist concept of Bulgarian national identity. The 
Bulgarian communist party policy on the Macedonian problem after the Second World 
War kept changing until the great changes of 1989. Although the BCP claimed that it 
stood for internationalism in relation to the Macedonian question, after 1948 the 
Bulgarian communists' project was to homogenise the country and to deny the existence 
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of Macedonian identity in Bulgaria. The party also sought to compose a consolidated 
national history of Bulgaria, which required certain twists in the policy of communism. 
Most importantly the Bulgarian communist leadership, was exceptionally loyal to 
Moscow and tried to balance Soviet demands for internationalist policy and Bulgarian 
nationalism. Yet at the end the BCP reintroduced the traditional view about the 
Macedonian question according to which Macedonian and Bulgarian people were 
ethnically the same. Initially the BCP's ideas about developing Macedonia as an 
independent state in order to be included in a communist federation represented a break 
from the mainstream Bulgarian politics, which envisioned Bulgarian and Macedonian 
state and national unity as the final aim of the Macedonian movement in Bulgaria. 
Although throughout its rule the BCP accepted that there may be a political Macedonian 
nation in Yugoslavia, the party viewed that in their own socialist country Bulgarians and 
Macedonians had to be united in ethnic terms. 
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II. Historical Background: The Religious Factor 
Historically the Macedonian question in Bulgaria was a struggle for the territorial unity of 
the geographical lands of Macedonia with the Bulgarian state. Conceptually it was born 
out of the Ottoman decline that led to the national liberation movements in the Balkans. 
The struggle to liberate Macedonia from Ottoman rule was perceived as a part of 
Bulgarian national unification. On one side it was a direct expression of the rise of the 
Balkan nationalism and on the other it was a reflection of the Great Powers interests in 
the region. 
The Bulgarian struggle for Macedonia began with the establishment of an independent 
Bulgarian church in 1870 known as the Exarchate. Its ambition before and after the 
national liberation in 1878 was to dominate the region of Macedonia. The Exarchate 
demanded the legitimate creation of one state for the Christians of Bulgaria and 
Macedonia. The Exarchate sought to gain the loyalty of the Slavic-speaking population 
of Macedonia and persuade them to accept one distinct identity through religious 
communion with the Bulgarians. Further, it aimed to stimulate the development of 
national consciousness towards achieving political power. It stood for the integration of 
Macedonia into the Bulgarian independent state and claimed that the national, state and 
religious boundaries should be congruent. Thus the Bulgarian movement for unification 
with Macedonia started as a church organisation and envisioned the unity of the 
Bulgarian and Macedonian communities in one nation-state. This ideal was never to be 
achieved. 
The Bulgarian Exarchate was established in 1870 by firman (decree) issued by the Sultan. 
It was an autonomous Orthodox Church under the Greek patriarch's jurisdiction. Thus 
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the national church was created eight years before the state. It was largely seen as the first 
national institution using the Bulgarian language. This was not an unusual development 
in the process of nation-formation, for religious unity is very often perceived as the basis 
of creating states. However, in the case of the Bulgarian Exarchatc the main question was 
not the establishment of religious status or unity of the Christians, since they already 
enjoyed this under the Ottoman law. Balkan Christianity had the status of a millet under 
the control of the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul. 1The millet was essentially a recognition 
of religious identity. But the movement for an independent Bulgarian church demanded 
its independent institution. It was also fused with national ideas so that the struggle for a 
national church served as the commencement of national awareness. The movement for 
Bulgarian national independence was based on the movement for religious Christian 
unity. 
The importance of religion in the nation formation of the Balkan states has been viewed 
as one of the specific features of Balkan nationalism. King argues that religious 
identification is the key element of the Balkan national consciousness. He illustrates the 
close connection between nationality and religion on the Balkans with the case of 
Bulgaria: `The establishment in 1870 of the Bulgarian Exarchate, whose territory included 
all of Macedonia, Dobruja, and western Thrace, as well as present-day Bulgaria, advanced 
the Bulgarian claim, particularly in light of the close connection between nationality and 
religion in the Balkans'. '-The political dimension of the `church-liberating struggles of the 
Bulgarians', as they are known in the Bulgarian historiography, crystallised in its content 
1 The millet was an administrative entity which defined the status of any religious 
community living under Ottoman rule: Christians, Armenians, Jews etc. 
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when the Exarchate started educational activities and church-building in the Macedonian 
lands. Whether the population of Macedonia was to be enticed by the Bulgarian 
Exarchate was actually a political question about its ethnic and national identity. The new 
generations were to study in Bulgarian schools and pray in Bulgarian churches, and as a 
way to consolidate a Bulgarian national identity. The biggest achievement of the 
Exarchate was to boost Bulgarian-language education. In general language and religion 
were seen as the most effective uniting factors in the creation of the nation: `Through 
religion and education the Christians of Macedonia were to acquire a national identity - 
Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian - depending upon one's religious affiliation and the school a 
child attended'.; 
The Macedonian question was further complicated because of the contesting claims of 
Bulgaria's neighbours. The Bulgarian Exarchate competed with the Greek Patriarchate 
and the Serbian church over Macedonia. The Bulgarian activities were quite effective and 
there was a significant redirection of pupils to the Bulgarian Exarchate, particularly from 
the Greeks, who had the most powerful church in the Balkans. The success of the 
Bulgarian idea in Macedonia was due to combination of factors: principally, Greeks 
treated the Slavic parishioners namely as inferior, and the weakening of Ottoman rule, 
which made significant concessions to the Bulgarian church struggle by granting it 
independence. These factors enhanced the Bulgarian national liberation movement and 
attracted many Slav people in Macedonia, pulling them away from the Greek influence. 
Bulgarians ultimately succeeded in the competition with the Greek and the Serbian 
2 Robert R. King, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension 
among Balkan Communist Sates, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1973), p. 187. 
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churches in Macedonia. At the turn of the century, out of total 1,854 churches in the 15 
dioceses of Macedonia, 1,232 were Bulgarian. The Macedonian regions of Veles and Nis 
as well as the Serbian region of Pirot were included in the Bulgarian Exarchate while the 
districts of Skopje, Monastir, Stip, and Ohrid were not. 4 
In general Bulgarian Exarchate supported non-violent changes towards the gradual 
integration of Bulgaria and Macedonia in one nation. Bulgarian priests advocated co- 
existence with the Ottomans and by building up good relations with the rulers gained 
permission to increase the number of churches and schools in Macedonia. Yet at the 
same time the Bulgarian church movement had strong political ambitions, which were 
much more difficult to achieve. The aim of gaining political power was central to the 
Bulgarian Exarchate. Political power was seen as the next stage of the Bulgarian national 
development, after the achievement of the religious unity of all Bulgarian Christians. 
Thus the movement for an independent and united Bulgarian church extended to a 
movement for national Bulgarian recognition. In this way the religious aspect blended 
fully with the nationalist Bulgarian movement. All pretenders for Macedonian 
nationhood went through the same development. Each of the competing churches 
aspired not only to achieve the spiritual unity of its people but also to become a leader of 
the respective community on the path towards national unity. Macedonia was caught in 
the middle of these competing claims. The Macedonian question - namely with whom 
should Macedonians unite - was on the rise. 
3 Duncan M. Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation 'Movements 
1893-1903, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 28. 
4 Sec Perry, The Politics of Terror, 1988. 
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III. Bulgarian Independence and the Macedonian Question 
The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 changed the entire political context of the 
Macedonian question. The whole political map of the Balkans was redrawn. Bulgaria 
took part in the war with its partisan forces, the so-called `Bulgarrko opulclienie', which 
fought on the side of the Russian army. Turkey was defeated by Russia, which was 
supported also by Serbia, Romania and Montenegro. The preliminary peace treaty was 
negotiated and concluded on 3 March 1878. It became known as the San Stefano treaty. 3 
As a result of the war Bulgaria extended from the Danube to the Aegean and from the 
Vardar and Morava valleys to the Black Sea. Bulgaria included the whole of Macedonia 
without Thessaloniki and without Halkididki peninsula. The Great Powers were seriously 
alarmed by this arrangement. Bulgaria was seen as a future big state, and a potential tool 
of Russian influence in the Balkans. 
The Great Powers decided then to revise the San Stefano treaty, and on 13 June 1878 
called the Berlin Congress. The Berlin Congress concluded with the signing of a new 
treaty on 13 July 1878. Accordingly the Bulgarian territory was split into three parts. 
Bulgaria proper was defined in the area between the Danube and the Balkan mountains. 
The area south of these mountains was to be an autonomous Ottoman province called 
Lastern Rumelia. Macedonia was returned to the Sultan, though rather vague promises 
were made that it would be granted an independent administration in the future. (, 
S See Traite Preliminaire De St. Stefano, Du 3 Mars/19 Fevrier 1878. 
6 See Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: A Histoy, (East European Monographs, 
No. CXXXVIII), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 23-24. 
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The revision of the preliminary peace settlement, which drew new boundaries in the 
entire region was strongly felt as very unfair by the new Balkan states. The decisions of 
the Great powers were interpreted as politically expedient for their own interests, rather 
then reflecting the ambitions of the emerging nation-states. The ambitions of Bulgarian 
nationalism were badly damaged. Hence the initial `inclusion' of Macedonia into the 
Bulgarian state was accepted as `right and just', whereas the following `exclusion' 
acquired the meaning of `wrong and unjust'. This notion of injustice towards Macedonia 
caused by outside politics became a permanent feature of the Bulgarian national mind. 
The revision of the San Stefano treaty marked the early stages of the Bulgarian national 
legitimacy. The loss of Macedonia became symbol of Bulgarian nationalism impaired. 
The Macedonian question became a national Bulgarian myth, born out of the territorial 
division of the country. The myth about the unjust treatment of Bulgaria held that 
Bulgaria fall victim of foreign powers and the homeland of the Bulgarian people was 
dismembered. I 
7 See Hristo Hristov, Stoiko Gruncharov and Elena Statelova (eds. ), Istoria na Bulgaria: 
Vuzstanoviavane i utvur7hdavane na bulgarskata durzhava. Natsionalno-osvoboditelni 
borbi (1878-1903), (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata Akademia na Naukite, 1991), 
chapter 2, pp. 38-59. For the most recent view on the emotional perception of the 
decisions of the Berlin Congress see Andrei Pantev, Godini na democratsia: Edna 
hulgarska istoria. (Sofia; `Edem 21', 1992). 
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IV. The Macedonian Revolutionary Organisations 
After the Berlin Congress of 1878 Bulgarian nationalism aspired to reverse historical 
events and restore justice for Bulgaria. This meant above all the Bulgarian unification 
with Macedonia. Macedonian organisations, created after the Berlin Congress of 1878 
became an inseparable part of the Bulgarian revolutionary tradition. Their leaders created 
a new image of Bulgarian freedom fighters: national liberation revolutionaries, the 
vanguard for ideas of Bulgarian nationalism. Although Macedonia was not re-united with 
Bulgaria, the Macedonian revolutionaries were romanticised as heroes in the struggle for 
Bulgarian national unity. The fight for Macedonia was mythologised as a glorious period 
of Bulgarian national development. In Anderson's terms, the Macedonian revolutionary 
organisations became part of the Bulgarian national `imagination', which facilitated the 
nation-state building process. The new Bulgarian state and the Exarchate held that the 
solution to the Macedonian question was to be sought in the gradual merger of people 
and territories, and generally preached submission to the Ottomans in the meantime. But 
in fact Bulgarian schools in Macedonia became `hotbeds' of national agendas. As Perry 
observes: `Bulgarian Exarchate schools were the training grounds for troublemakers'. 8 
The Ottomans preferred to ignore the fact that there was a new generation growing up in 
Macedonia, which had revolutionary ideas and was also quite unhappy with their life 
under the Ottoman administration. This generation acquired new intellectual skills and 
was eager to practice them. Moreover the Ottoman administration had very little control 
over the educational programme in the Christian schools in Macedonia. The long-lasting 
religious, social and language barriers between Muslims and Christians under the millet 
system helped the young intelligentsia to flourish as a separate social group with its own 
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national consciousness. This new generation shifted the view about the non-violent 
advancement of Macedonian liberation as preached by the church, to more radical 
agenda for change. The new idea was to organise revolutionary activities. This re- 
orientation was one of the most significant results of the decline of Ottoman empire. 
While the Bulgarian church was calling for reforms with respect to the order in the 
empire, the Christian subjects wanted immediate changes. 
The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO or VMRO9) was founded 
in 1893 in Thessaloniki. The Supreme Macedonian Committee of VMRO was 
established in Bulgaria 1895. Its members were also known as the Supremacists. The 
purpose of the organisation was to lead the Macedonian liberation movement. But from 
the outset VMRO was divided into two factions: those who were in favour of the 
establishment of a separate Macedonia and those who aspired for Macedonian 
unification with Bulgaria. 
VMRO was a secret organisation. VMRO's structure was neither open nor democratic. 
The organisation recruited supporters from the Bulgarian-language gymnasiums and high 
schools and almost all of them were supporters of the Bulgarian Exarchate. VIN1RO was 
not a popular organisation. By 1894 it had 50 members only. Rather it was an 
organisation, which in many ways extracted its support from the population. The VMRO 
activist (`komita') was an outlaw who lived off the land and depended upon the peasantry 
for information, food and other material aid. But the Bulgarian peasantry did not get 
involved in a militant actions, unless directly provoked, and in general did not share the 
k Perry, Politics of Terror, p. 30. 
9 Viv1RO is the acronym in Bulgarian (Vutreshna Makedonska Revolutsiona 
Organizatsia). 
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revolutionary ideas of the more educated revolutionaries. This does not mean that 
VMRO did not get any support from the countryside, but rather that it came from 
composed bands of uprooted people living in poor conditions. Town people, students 
and teachers also helped the organisation. VMRO's main source of funding was through 
donors, kidnappings or extortion. '() Perry defines VMRO as a `prototypical liberation - 
terrorist movement found also in other agrarian pre-industrialised societies where a small 
collection of educated people seek reform in the face of a stronger and more powerful 
state apparatus. 11 VMRO's slogan was `Freedom or Death' and the foundation principles 
were. VMRO operated through secret committees and had an idealistic vision about 
rebellion as a largely emotional and spontaneous revolutionary action. 
Although VMVIRO and the Supremacists were rival organisations, the lines distinguishing 
them were often blurred, especially at grass root support and membership. Until around 
1900 they shared the same goal: the establishment of an independent Macedonia. Later, 
the Supremacists shifted entirely towards union with Bulgaria, whereas VMRO consisted 
of different factions and changed policy several times from independent Macedonia to 
integration with Bulgaria. Many Bulgarian historians interpret the hesitations in VMRO's 
agenda as a proof of the power of the integrationist element within the organisation and 
prefer to ignore the fact that VMRO was seriously considering the idea of independent 
Macedonia. On the contrary Macedonian scholars give prominence to VMRO as 
supporters of Macedonian independence only and deny any inclinations towards union 
with Bulgaria. 12 
10 Ibid., pp. 76-79. 
1 Ibid., p. 212. 
12 For detailed account of the differences between VMRO and the Supremacists see 
Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, pp. 236-237. For the prevailing Macedonian opinion on 
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The main contradiction between VNIRO and the Supremacists was the question of how 
to organise the revolution. Unlike VMRO the Supremacists believed in organised military 
action led by experienced Bulgarian army officers. VMRO was a clandestine organisation 
whereas the Supremacists were a recognised organisation supported by the Bulgarian 
government. The latter had more members. The fact that they aspired to be led by 
professional military men gave the Supremacists a particular power. Despite these 
differences, there were two main similarities between the two Macedonian revolutionary 
organisations. First of all both used guerrilla tactics as well as terrorism. The 
Supremacists' violent tactics went as far as to involve Bulgarian governmental 
representatives. The disagreements between the two factions led to assassinations on the 
streets of Sofia and violent extraction of support in the villages of border regions 
between Bulgaria and Macedonia. 13 
Second, VMRO in its all incarnations and the Supremacists aimed to gain the support of 
the Christian Slav populations of Macedonia and Bulgaria. Vlachs were the only other 
ethnic community involved in VMRO activities and they were the only non-Slav 
members involved in Macedonian affairs. 14 The Supremacists focused on the liberated 
the same topic see Kscntc Bogocv, Manol Pandevski, Ivan Kantardjicv and Krstc 
Bitovski (eds. ), Sto godini od osnovavaneto na VMRO i 90 godini of Ilindenskoto 
vostanie: prilozi od nauchen sobir odrzhan na 21-23 Oktomvri. 1993, (Skopje: 
Makedonska Akademia na Naukite, 1994). 
13 For analysis of the assassination of the Bulgarian prime-minister Stefan Stambolov and 
the Macedonian question see Crampton, `The Decline and Fall of Stambolov, 1891- 
94'. Bulgaria 1878-1918, pp. 143-158 and Duncan M. Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the 
Emergence of Modern Bulgaria. 1870-1895, (USA: Duke University Press, 1993). 
14 See Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 
pp. 52-57. 
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Bulgarian lands and their membership was entirely Slav Christian. Albanians, Turks, Jews, 
Gypsies or other Muslims did not participate in Macedonian revolutionary organisations. 
This marked the Macedonian question as being an exclusively ethnic Bulgarian issue. The 
highest point of VMRO's revolutionary activities was the Ilinden uprising of 1903, which 
became a central myth of the new Macedonian history, the premise of which is that it 
was about independent Macedonia. At the same time according to modern Bulgarian 
history, the Ilinden uprising and its leaders are the culmination of the revolutionary 
struggle for Macedonian and Bulgarian unity. The dispute over the events as well as the 
heroes of the Ilinden uprising continue to the present day. ts 
Modern Bulgarian historians underline the failure of the VMRO as a result of the weak 
policy of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia and the `fragility of Bulgarian 
nationalism', which acted defensively. 16 The main argument is that Macedonian 
revolutionary organisations were essentially a Bulgarian national phenomenon. '? 
Macedonian historians underline the differences between the two organisations and claim 
that VMRO was exclusively a Macedonian national organisation, whereas the 
Supremacists represented the Bulgarian ambitions in Macedonia and used terrorist tactics 
15 For the official Macedonian opinion about who do the leaders of the Ilinden uprising 
belong to see Ljuben Lape, Mihalo Apostolski, Dimitur Mitrev and Petur Stojanov (eds. ), 
Kniga za Ilinden. Zbornik na trudovi - po oo vod 65-godishninata od Ilindenskoto 
Vostanie', (Skopje: Institut za Nacionalna Istoria, 1969). 
" Zina Markova, Bulgarskata Exarchia 1870-1879, (Sofia: Bulgarska Akademia na 
Naukite, 1989). 
17 See Diameter Gotsev, Mladezhkite Natsionalno-Osvoboditelni organizatsii na 
makedonskite bulgari 1919 - 1941, (Sofia: BAN, 1988). 
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all of the time to achieve their aims. 18 Attempts to portray this period as a shared 
experience of two overlapping national agendas have been rejected. The activities of the 
Macedonian revolutionary organisations did not satisfy Bulgarian national aspirations. 
But at the same time they created a number of markers of national identity both for the 
Bulgarians and the Macedonians. The history of Macedonian organisations became a 
major feature of both Bulgarian and Macedonian nationhood. The most prominent 
leaders of the Macedonian uprisings, Gotse Delchev and lane Sandanski are declared 
national heroes in Bulgaria as well as in Macedonia. Both sides claim their mythologised 
personalities as symbols of their own nation-building movements. Yet in reality they are 
shared designators of nationhood and a common historical heritage for both countries. 
But as shown by Bulgaria and Macedonia, sharing history and nationhood has not been 
appreciated by Balkan nationalism. 
At the same time the poor results of VMRO and the Supremacists sealed the Bulgarian 
national consciousness not only with notions of national revolutionary tradition but also 
with a sense of insecurity and dissatisfaction. Bulgarian nationalism was deeply 
disappointed by the failure of the Macedonian revolutionary organisations to achieve the 
unification of Bulgaria and Macedonia. Thus the notion was created that nation building 
in modern Bulgaria was interrupted, darkened and remained unfinished. 
" Sec Ivan Kantardjiev, `VNIRO i lýfakedonskoto osloboditelno dvizhenic od krajot na 
prvata svetska voina do raspatanjeto na monizmot (1919-1990)' in Sto godini od 
osnovavancto na VN1RO i 90 godini of Ilindcnskoto vostanie, pp. 44-73. 
211 
V. Independent Bulgaria and Macedonian Organisations 
The Macedonian question was a priority for independent Bulgaria. In the 1890s between 
100,000 and 200,000 Macedonians emigrated to Bulgaria. Many of these newcomers were 
educated in the revolutionary spirit of the Macedonian liberation movement. In the 
Bulgarian capital, Sofia, Macedonian emigres made up about 18,000-20,000 (26-29%) of 
the total population of 70,000. They had a substantial presence in the army (33%) and of 
the Bulgarian government officials (43%). 19The emigres kept the Macedonian question 
high on the political agenda. The Macedonian involvement in Bulgarian politics also 
divided the political establishment of the country between those who supported the 
`return' of Macedonia within Bulgaria and those who did not. 
At the same time, the idea of a separate and independent Macedonia was gaining ground. 
This possibility was considered most dangerous for the Bulgarian-minded Macedonians, 
who thought that once Bulgarian, Macedonians should remain Bulgarian forever. Yet 
after the collapse of the Ottoman power, it was obvious that while there was a strong 
desire among people living in Macedonia to join in one state with Bulgaria, Macedonian 
nationalism was also on the rise. Macedonian revolutionary organisations expressed the 
aspirations and divisions of Bulgarian nationalism in relation to Macedonia. No other 
movement in the history of independent Bulgaria was as important for Bulgarian 
nationhood as the struggles for Macedonia. Even now, the Macedonian revolutionary 
organisations continue to symbolise devotion to Bulgarian national unity. The 
conspiratorial character of the Macedonian revolutionary organisations favoured the idea 
that political change was about secret contracts, terrorist attacks, and forcible extraction 
I`) See Perry, Politics of Terror, p. 35. See also Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, pp. 150- 
151. 
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of support. The Macedonian liberation movement saw outside forces and `other' people 
as enemies of the national battle. It was exclusively a Christian movement and underlined 
the importance of religion for Bulgarian nationalism. 
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VI. The Macedonian Question and the Balkan Wars (1911-13) 
Bulgaria fought in the Balkan Wars to gain the Macedonian lands and people. Bulgaria's 
attachment to Macedonia was highly emotional and drove the Bulgarian policy during the 
period. For the Balkan Wars were not only over territorial disputes but also disputed 
national identities. Macedonia was an inseparable part of Bulgarian nationhood. For 
most Bulgarians to fight for Macedonia meant to fight for Bulgaria itself. Yet despite the 
Bulgarian victory over Turkey in the First Balkan War, the Bulgarian involvement in the 
wars became known as the country's `national catastrophe'. 2()Bulgaria suffered heavy 
losses in the Second Balkan War and the way the wars were conducted raised many 
controversial points about Bulgarian politics. But the perception that Bulgaria had to 
fight for Macedonia was never questioned. 
Communist Bulgarian history tried to separate the two issues: the Bulgarian involvement 
in the Balkan wars in general and Bulgarian conduct over the Macedonian question 
during the wars. Communist historians claimed that although Macedonia was a big loss 
to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian involvement in the Balkan wars was conducted wrongly by 
`Greater Bulgarian chauvinism' (`velikobulgarski shoviniZum'), as the Bulgarian nationalist 
aspirations to Macedonia were labelled. This formula aimed to reconcile Bulgarian 
communism with nationalism in relation to the Bulgarian involvement in the Balkan 
wars: to reject completely the Bulgarian right to fight for Macedonia was to go too far, 
but to assert that it was all done in the name of Bulgarian national unity was not 
2() Bulgaria won in the First Balkan War which saw the Ottomans lose all mainland 
European Turkey, except Istanbul. By the end of May 1913 the Balkan allies and Turkey 
signed the Treaty of London, according to which Bulgaria acquired the whole of the 
southern part of Dobrudja, but only one-ninth of Macedonia. 
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acceptable either according to communist doctrine. To blame the Bulgarian bourgeoisie 
alone for the Bulgarian defeat seemed like an acceptable compromise. Yet the idea that 
any struggle for Macedonia could be viewed as excessive never gained popularity among 
the Bulgarian public. The prevailing feeling was that nobody did enough for the 
Macedonian question in Bulgaria. 
In March 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria, which were allies in the First Balkan War, signed a 
treaty of `friendship and union'. Actually the treaty was about partitioning Macedonian 
territory between the two countries. There were to be two zones: the so called 
`undisputed' and `disputed' areas. The `undisputed' territory of Macedonia was to be 
assigned to Bulgaria. 2' 
Greece disagreed with this arrangement, and Serbia was not satisfied either. Both 
countries started secret negotiations with Romania, Montenegro and even the Ottoman 
empire, about how to partition Macedonia in a new way. The division of Macedonia, 
combined with the internal political disagreements within the Bulgarian government, as 
well as the personal views of the Bulgarian monarch, Ferdinand, led to the decision to 
fight again. Bulgaria started the Second Balkan War in 1913, only a month after the end 
of the first one. This time Bulgaria was defeated and in August 1913 the treaty of 
Bucharest was signed. As a result Macedonia was partitioned again, this time between 
Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. But Bulgaria was hoping for much more than it received, 
retaining only a small part of Macedonia. 
21 It included the lands south of the line stretching from Kriva Palanka to Ohrid. The 
latter included the lands north of the same line including the towns of Skopje, Struga and 
Tetovo. These were planned to remain subject to arbitration by the Russian tsar. 
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Yet Bulgarians insisted that the decision to fight another war was correct in view of the 
`unjust' partition of Macedonia and the rivalry over the Macedonian territories, which 
riddled relations with Serbia and Greece. Bulgarian diplomacy was blamed for the failure. 
Yet the reason behind the Bulgarian `national catastrophe' during the Balkan Wars - 
namely the desire to re-gain Macedonia - overrode other considerations and remained 
unchallenged. 
After the Balkan Wars the entire region was hugely damaged and unsettled. Refugees 
and displaced people were dispersed everywhere. The report of the Carnegie 
Commission, published first in 1914, registered the consequences of the wars and the 
policies each of the governments involved carried out on the population. "The rival 
claims to Macedonia were summed up by the Commission, which concluded that the 
Macedonian question during the Balkan wars concerned three main issues: Bulgaria 
believed firmly in its `historic right' to possess Macedonia; Serbia also held claim over the 
I Iacedonians, which was that Macedonians belonged to Serbian people because they had 
similar customs; and Greeks claimed that Macedonia was part of their country alone. 
According to the Carnegie report, out of the total of 2,258,224 people living in 
Macedonia 1,181,336 were identified as Bulgarians. However it underlined that the 
official registers were from the time of the Ottoman administration, which counted 
The special Commission of Inquiry was set up by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in Washington. Because the information coming from the region was 
fragmentary, insufficient and unreliable, the Commission' aim was to established the facts 
and present to the West a trustworthy picture of the situation on the Balkans. Six 
countries became members of the Commission: US, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, France. The representatives travelled together to Belgrade, Thessaloniki, Athens, 
Constantinopole and Sofia. The Commission registered what it saw in the immediate 
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people only according to their religious affiliation. Consequently the Christian population 
of the `exarchist group' were considered of Bulgarian nationality, whereas the 
`patriarchists' were calculated as Greeks. Thus Macedonians were defined as Bulgarian by 
religion rather than nationality. 23The Commission also reported on the `extermination, 
emigration and assimilation' of the civil populations. It concluded that `the war is waged 
not only by the armies but by the nations themselves', that `veritable migration' was 
characteristic of the wars, and that there was forced conversion and assimilation of entire 
groups of people. Essentially the Commission concluded that the Balkan wars were 
ethnic wars. The driving idea behind the policies of each of the countries involved was to 
redraw the ethnic boundaries of the Balkans. 
Yet despite the defeat the Bulgarian national ambition about unity with Macedonia 
remained a dream. Bulgarian national history had to deal with the concept of national 
loss. The complex development, which involved the creation of new states out of the 
Ottoman empire and the redrawing of borders - after the Russian-Turkish war of 1878 as 
well as the Balkan Wars - shaped the Macedonian question in Bulgaria through four main 
issues of hot debate: the territory of Macedonia, the nationality of the people of 
Macedonia, the state allegiance of Macedonia (i. e., independent or linked to another 
country), and the language of the Macedonians (i. e., Serbian, Bulgarian or Macedonian). 
The Bulgarian movement for independence at the end of the 191h century gave rise to the 
Bulgarian nationalist desire for unification: the incorporation of the Macedonian lands 
and people within the new Bulgarian state. The concept of the common historical land 
aftermath of the Balkan wars and collected many memories of survivors, both military 
and civilian. 
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was used to legitimise the unification of Macedonia and Bulgaria. Bulgarian unification 
nationalism demanded above all the territorial unity of the Bulgarian nation-state. The 
settlement of the Macedonian question after the end of the Balkan Wars was the biggest 
disappointment of modern Bulgarian nationalism. 
''-; See The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with 
a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kerman, 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 28. 
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VII. The Interwar Period 
During the interwar period Bulgaria retained its aspirations for uniting with Macedonia. 
It continued to hope that the national borders would be revised, while Serbia and 
Greece supported the status quo. Bulgaria saw the First World War, which started in 
1914, as a new chance for possible reconsideration of the Macedonian question. Bulgaria 
sided with the Central powers (Germany, Italy, Austria) in the war and they in turn 
promised Bulgaria the whole of Macedonia. This of course proved an irresistible 
temptation for Bulgaria. In September 1915 the Bulgarian army entered Vardar 
Macedonia and advanced towards Serbia proper and Aegian Macedonia. But the course 
of the war turned against the Central powers and in the autumn of 1918 the Entante 
(Britain, Russia, France) defeated the Bulgarian army near Thessaloniki. As a result the 
peace treaty of Neuilly was signed in November 1919. This marked the end of yet 
another stage of the development of the Bulgarian aspirations for national unification 
with Macedonia. 
The persistence of the Macedonian question in Bulgarian life was not merely an irrational 
romantic ideal. The Macedonian question became a very serious anxiety for Bulgarian 
national consciousness. It raised difficult questions of national identity and ethnicity. If 
Macedonia was to develop further outside Bulgaria, the general question was whether a 
nation develops differently, if separated from its original core? Is it possible for a nation 
to diversify and transform into other nations? If the Bulgarian national identity was not 
firmly fixed, how could anyone be sure that Macedonia was not going to go its own way? 
The Macedonian question became the most serious question about the future of 
Bulgarian national integrity. Until the Second World War the core of the Macedonian 
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question in Bulgaria was their common religion, education, historic land and common 
historic enemy, the Ottomans. But this was soon to change. 
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VIII. The Bulgarian Communist Movement 
With the end of the First World War the disintegration of the Ottoman empire was 
finalised. A new Balkan order was in place, and the Bulgarian position was not enviable, 
as Stavrianos points out: `Bulgaria was left as the sole revisionist power in the Balkans, 
having fallen from second to last place in the Balkan hierarchy. The influx of refugees 
from Macedonia and the activities of their IMRO organisation made irredentism a prime 
issue in the interwar years. '24 Macedonia constituted the so-called `Southern Serbia', part 
of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, founded in 1918, which in 1929 was 
renamed to Yugoslavia. 
The Macedonian question also became central to the emerging communist movement in 
the Balkans at the beginning of the 20th century. Similar to official Balkan governmental 
politics in Macedonia, it was locked in a triangle between the conflicting interests of the 
young communist parties in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The main factor, 
which the Balkan communist movements had to take into account in relation to the 
Macedonian question, was the position of the Soviet communist leadership. This was far 
from easy to do so. On one hand, Balkan communists had to design a concept which 
was not based on the nationalist claims in each respective country but could still appeal 
to the respective communities. On the other hand, any local idea had to be approved by 
Moscow. 
The Macedonian question was central to the Balkan communists but totally dependant 
on the Comintern's policy. The Macedonian question became even more complicated 
dispute over who should be in control of the issue within the communist movement. 
The most effective way of conducting Macedonian affairs seemed to be to make 
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Macedonia part of some kind of a federal Balkan structure. On a general level this idea 
derived from traditional communist thinking, which favoured the creation of large state 
units. As Connor argues, at this time, the idea of establishing one larger unit, out of the 
fragmented South-East Europe, was a `throwback to Karl Marx's bias for large units over 
small, regardless of ethnic distributional patterns'. 25 
Creating large federal units was the experience of the Soviet communists with the 
foundation of the USSR. The idea of a Balkan federation looked like a good solution to 
the Macedonian question. It envisioned separation of the Macedonian regions from 
Greece and Yugoslavia and uniting them as independent political units under the 
umbrella of a Balkan Communist Federation. 2C' The Bulgarian communists favoured the 
idea of a Balkan federation and the traditional minimum-programme of BCP was the 
creation of an independent Macedonia. Bulgarian communists would rather see 
Macedonia non-aligned, if not included within Bulgaria, but by no means in one state 
with Serbia. Independent or some kind of autonomous Macedonia was traditionally seen 
as an acceptable stage on the way to the integration of all Bulgarian people in one state. 
Both of these projects, Macedonia being a part of a Balkan federation or an independent 
country, were theoretically compatible with the Leninist theory of the right of self- 
determination. Therefore the idea of a Balkan federation seemed appropriate from the 
Comintern's point of view. It was supposed to end oppression of small nations, and also 
to blur ethnic sentiments into a communist identity, eliminating irredentism. But an 
agreement over Macedonia was never achieved. For Bulgarian communists, the main 
24 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans 1815-1914, (Hinsdale, Ilinois: Dryden Press, 1958), p. 592. 
25 Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 
(Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 130-132. 
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problem was how to negotiate relations with the Yugoslav communists over the 
Macedonian question. At that time the Bulgarians enjoyed Moscow's patronage and used 
it to promote their domination over other communist parties in the Balkans. In contrast, 
Yugoslav communists opposed the idea of Macedonia being part of a Balkan federation. 
In general Yugoslav communists saw the entire plan for a communist federative structure 
as turning the Balkans simply into an administrative organ of Moscow. Therefore Soviet 
command of the Macedonian question further deepened their disagreements with the 
Bulgarian communists over Macedonia. The Balkan federation did not make the 
communist cause in the Balkans more popular. Apart from the fact that the communists 
parties had to work underground for most of the interwar period, the requirement to 
obey the Comintern was seen as a great disadvantage when it came to national questions 
in the Balkans. For the Yugoslavs, Greeks and Romanians, receiving orders from the 
Soviets was often an embarrassment. But for the Bulgarian communists, because of their 
particular involvement with the Soviet communist tradition, this was not so. Moreover 
the Macedonian project, as envisioned by the Balkan communist federation, was not the 
worst option from the point of view of Bulgarian national interests. At this time the main 
attraction was clearly the possibility to dictate the Macedonian question through the 
Comintern, where the Bulgarian communists were represented strongly. 
Yet at the same time the total dependence of the BCP on Moscow made it impossible to 
articulate its own policy, which could have attracted more support for the Bulgarian 
communists. Although `Macedonia for the Macedonians' was the general concept of the 
BCP, the Comintern's position shifted according to Soviet interests, not Bulgarian 
interests. As Rothschild argued: The Soviet leaders demonstrated that far from having 
had a definite Macedonian policy based on principle, they simply considered the area as a 
26 See Stavrianos, The Balkans, p. 614. 
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prize to be awarded to their most promising and obedient pupil among the Balkan 
communist parties'. 27 However the Bulgarian communists were not awarded as 
expected. The way the Second World War ended in Yugoslavia as well as the new role of 
the Soviets in Eastern Europe dramatically changed the course of the Macedonian 
question and the whole Balkan history in general. 
27 Joseph, Rothchild. The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development. 
1883-1936, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 256. 
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IX. Communist Politics during the Bulgarian Occupation (1941-44) 
With the outbreak of the Second World War Bulgaria joined the Axis Powers 28 and in 
December 1941 declared war on the Western Allies. In April the same year the Bulgarian 
government broke diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and on April19, only two days 
after Yugoslavia's capitulation, Bulgarian forces entered the country and occupied 
Macedonia. 
Bulgarian language was introduced into schools and churches in Macedonia and new 
Bulgarian speaking cultural institutions were built. In June 1942 new citizenship 
legislation was passed. According to the law Bulgarian citizenship was offered to all 
people of Bulgarian descent living in Vardar or Aegean Macedonia. The Bulgarian 
occupation of Macedonia was the biggest challenge faced by the Bulgarian communists 
in relation to the Macedonian question in the pre-communist period. They had to deal 
with two complicated questions: how was the resistance in Macedonia to be organised 
and what should their relationship with the Yugoslav resistance movement (`partisans) be 
in Macedonia? 
Formally Bulgaria was in the role of an occupier of Macedonia, controlled by Germany. 
Yet the meaning of the occupation ran very deep in the Bulgarian mind. The 
21 The Axis Powers was the coalition headed by Germany, Italy, and Japan that opposed 
the Allied Powers in World War II. The alliance originated in a series of agreements 
between Germany and Italy, followed by the proclamation of an `axis' binding Rome and 
Berlin (Oct. 25,1936) and then by the German Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact against 
the Soviet Union (Nov. 25,1936). The connection was strengthened by a full military 
and political alliance between Germany and Italy (the Pact of Steel, May 22,1939), and 
the Tripartite Pact signed by all three powers on Sept. 27,1940. 
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Macedonian occupation was seen as a great step forward towards the fulfilment of the 
Bulgarian national dream, unification with Macedonia. Here lay the communists' anxiety 
about opposing the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia. Any communist anti-Bulgarian 
activities in Macedonia could alienate them from the ground support they needed. No 
section of the Bulgarian population which would support such activities. The people of 
Macedonian origin who were refugees in Bulgaria from the Balkan wars and the First 
World War were also encouraged to settle in the occupied lands and their biggest hope 
was that Macedonia would remain Bulgarian. Yet Bulgarian communists had to co- 
operate with the Yugoslav communists, who saw them as supporters of Bulgarian 
nationalism in Macedonia. The BCP tried to portray the communist resistance in 
Macedonia as an anti-fascist movement, opposing the tsarist Bulgarian regime but not 
everything Bulgarian. In contrast the Yugoslav communist party, the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), thought that the resistance in Macedonia was an 
armed struggle against the entire Bulgarian presence, which dominated Macedonia since 
the occupation. Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Yugoslav partisans, advocated 
resistance to the Germans as well as to the Bulgarian administration in Macedonia. 29 
Thus BCP and the LCY had conflicting views on the very essence of the communist 
resistance in Macedonia. The disagreements became the major source of contention 
between the two communist parties. The BCP called for `one territory - one party'. This 
practically meant that control had to be in their own hands. Todor Pavlov, the prominent 
ideologist of the Bulgarian communists, who was from Macedonia himself, issued a letter 
denying that Macedonians were separate people. 30 
29 See Walter R. Roberts, Tito. Mihailovic and the Allies. 1941-1945, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1987). 
;" See Pero Korovar and Orde Ivanovski (eds. ), Filip Korzenski (tr. ), The Historical 
Truth: The Progressive Social Circles in Bulgaria and Pirin Macedonia on the 
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Thus the Bulgarian communists found it impossible to distance themselves from the 
issues of nationalism in relation to Macedonia. They tried to balance the call for a united 
`anti-fascist' struggle against the Bulgarian state with the overwhelming Bulgarian desire 
to see Macedonia included into Bulgaria. But the result was a major confusion within the 
communist movement. The BCP was caught in the conundrum of the general difficulty 
in reconciling national aspirations and internationalist communist ideals. 
The Yugoslav communists tackled the problem in a different manner. They were clear 
that the Macedonian communist movement must remain loyal to the Yugoslav 
leadership and refuse to obey the BCP. They were also clear that any help to the 
Bulgarian comrades could play in the hands of the Bulgarian nationalist aspirations 
towards Macedonia. The Bulgarian-Yugoslav controversies were highlighted when it had 
to be decided who was to lead the communist movement in Macedonia. The head of the 
Macedonian Communist Party from 1940 until 1941 was Metodi Shatarov-Sharlo, who 
was close to the Bulgarians and spoke about `free Soviet Macedonia'. The Yugoslav 
communists, aware of the close ties between the Bulgarian and Soviet communists, were 
not happy with this idea. Indeed Shatariv-Sharlo's orientation suited the pro-Soviet policy 
of the Bulgarian communists, who read `Soviet Macedonia' as `Soviet Bulgaria'. But the 
Soviet concern was not how to please the Bulgarian communists, but rather how to 
retain control over both the Bulgarian and the Yugoslav communist parties. Moscow 
acted as an arbiter in the dispute between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists over 
Shatarov-Sharlo and decided that he was not suitable to lead the Macedonian 
communists. They approved of his expulsion from Macedonia on the grounds of 
Macedonian National Question. Documents. Studies. Resolutions. Appeals and 
Published Articles, (Skopje: Kultura, 1983). 
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mishandling the political situation there. Consequently the Bulgarian and Yugoslav 
communists jointly condemned him. Moscow and Bulgaria accepted the Yugoslav 
approach, subjecting him to severe party criticism, but sparing his life as well as his name 
- he was not labelled a class enemy. 31The leadership of Tito was a decisive in the dispute. 
During the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia Moscow favoured Tito because he 
organised an armed struggle against the Germans, whereas Bulgarian communists hardly 
participated in armed resistance. Tito was in charge of the Macedonian leadership and 
gradually reduced the Bulgarian influence over the Macedonian communists to a 
minimum. At the end of 1942 Tito decided to send one of his best aide to take over the 
military and political activities in the Macedonian communist movement. Svetozar 
Vukmanovic-Tcmpo, a Montenegrin, shared Tito's beliefs that Macedonia should 
engage in active resistance. Tito was a different type of communist leader compared to 
the Bulgarians. Unlike Dimitrov and Kolarov, Tito did not rely on the Soviets to solve 
the Yugoslav national questions. He had his own ideas. This gave him the opportunity to 
act much more independently when it came to the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over 
Macedonia. 
Meanwhile the Soviets continued to envision Macedonia as united republic and part of 
some kind of a Balkan federative structure, designed after the model of the Soviet 
republics. Effectively this meant that according to the Soviets any future Macedonian 
republic should be placed under Soviet auspices. But the Comintern by and large also 
thought that the part of Macedonia which was in Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) would have 
to be united with the future Macedonian republic. As Clissold concluded, the thinking 
behind Moscow's policy on Macedonia was as follows: `Bulgarian people were staunchly 
pro-Russian. They would let themselves be guided by what Moscow thought good for 
31 See Tsola Dragoicheva, Takava e istinata, (Sofia: Partizdat, 1981). 
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them. And if there was any opposition ... 
from the Macedonian emigrant residents in 
Bulgaria who were a large and influential body bitterly opposed to any abandonment by 
Bulgaria of her Macedonian provinces... Bulgaria could always be reminded that she was 
in the position of an ex-Axis satellite and must bear the consequences. ' 32 
The Soviet position on the Macedonian question was ambivalent and totally politicised. 
When the Soviet policy was to distance itself from the Yugoslav state in the interwar 
years, the Comintern encouraged Macedonian separatism. After the invasion of the Axis 
in Yugoslavia in 1941, it appeared that the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia may be 
accepted as definite. It also looked as if the Soviets approved of the Bulgarian 
communists' control of the Macedonian communists as long as it complied with their 
orders. In less than a year though, when the Yugoslav partisan movement gained 
momentum, the Comintern decided that the Macedonian communists should be 
controlled by the Yugoslav communist leadership alone. Without the support of the 
Soviets, Bulgarian communists seemed lost and incapable of making any decisions. 
At the same time the Comintern's directive was for both parties to support the idea of 
self-determination of the Macedonian people: `Macedonia should remain with Yugoslavia 
on the grounds of practicality and expediency... the Bulgarian communist party members 
who find themselves on Yugoslav territory should co-operate and give all possible help 
to Yugoslavia, and both parties should adopt an attitude in favour of self-determination 
for the Macedonian people'. 33 Supporting Macedonian self-determination must have 
32 Stephen Clissold, Whirlwind: An account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power. (London: 
The Cresset Press, 1969), p. 146. 
;; Stephen Clissold (cd. ), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973: A Documentary 
urve ,( 
London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 153. 
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seemed the last option left for the Bulgarian communists, who so much counted on the 
Soviets to help them solve their most important national question. But Moscow used the 
disagreements between the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians whenever it was necessary to 
confront disobedience from its Bulgarian protege. The friction between them over the 
partisan tactics in Macedonia and the future status of Pirin Macedonia remained 
explosive. Although the Comintern acted hesitantly, trying to keep both sides under 
control, Tito was favoured in relation to Macedonia. In theory the Comintern's position 
was `the Balkans for the Balkan peoples' and `Macedonia for the Macedonians', but in 
reality they wanted to satisfy Yugoslav demands as an award for their strong opposition 
to the Germans. 
By 1943 the success of Tito's resistance cost the Bulgarian communists their initiative in 
the Macedonian affairs. The Bulgarian communists' confidence was badly undermined. 
As Oren wrote: `Prom that point on, the Bulgarian Communists, who had hitherto 
thought themselves as unequalled by their Balkan counterparts found themselves in a 
secondary position'. 34 This was a big blow to the Bulgarian communists, who had hoped 
to acquire the image of national savours. 
3; Nissan Oren, Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power 1934-1944, (East European 
Studies and of Columbia University and Research Institute of Communist Affairs, 
Columbia University), (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 199. 
230 
X. The Failure of Bulgaria's Macedonian Policy 
At the beginning of the occupation many people in Macedonia met the Bulgarians 
enthusiastically as liberators. But because of their assimilative policy this image was soon 
transformed and they were seen as conquerors. As a result, the occupation of Macedonia, 
for which the Bulgarians so long dreamed, succeeded mainly in creating hostility towards 
them. The Bulgarian administration forced Bulgarian identity on the Macedonians and 
tried to eliminate any different perceptions of ethnicity or culture among the population. 
All public affairs were supposed to be conducted in Bulgarian language and everyone was 
supposed to assert his or her Bulgarian nationality. All educational, cultural and social 
institutions were transformed according to Bulgarian instructions. Yet Macedonians were 
not united in their response to the Bulgarian policy. Some people welcomed the 
Bulgarians, but others saw the Bulgarians as new rulers of Macedonia who would merely 
substitute Serbian dominance for Bulgarian. The disappointment with the Bulgarian 
policy fed into the rise of Macedonian nationalism with its claim that Macedonia is 
Macedonian only. It became increasingly apparent that from this point onwards that 
Macedonian nationalism was to be the main contestant of the idea that Macedonia was 
Bulgarian. 
The Bulgarian administration did not have any particular policy towards the numerous 
minorities living in Macedonia, including Albanians, Serbs, Vlachs, Turks, Jews, Gypsies 
and others. The Bulgarian idea of Macedonia seemed blind to the ethnic diversity of the 
country. This was so partly because the biggest minority in Macedonia, the Albanians, 
were concentrated in the Italian-occupied territories of Macedonia during the war. But 
the Bulgarian administration did not provide any arrangements for those members of 
ethnic minorities living under Bulgarian occupation. The Jews paid the price of the 
231 
highest order for this policy, when the Bulgarian administration, under the Nazi orders, 
deported them to death camps, stripped of their previous Yugoslav or other 
citizenship. 35 
The Bulgarian communist strategy during the occupation of Macedonia was to rely on 
the Soviet policy and hope that it could be squared with Bulgarian national ambitions. 
But the lack of a strong Bulgarian-led partisan movement in Macedonia, as well as in 
Bulgaria proper, undermined the position of the BCP in the eyes of the Soviets, 
particularly when compared to their Yugoslav comrades. In the end, the Bulgarian 
communists lost their influence in Macedonia and the Macedonian communist 
movement became closely associated with the Yugoslav partisans. This development 
during the course of the war led Macedonia to become a part of the new Yugoslav 
federation established in 1945 under the leadership of Tito. The People's Republic of 
Macedonia was legitimated as a constituent part of the new Yugoslav communist state. 
Did Bulgarian communists gave up completely on the Macedonian question? Did 
communist Bulgaria accept that as painful as it was the loss of Macedonia was simply a 
fact of Bulgarian national history? How was the BCP going to promote Soviet-style 
internationalism under the new circumstances? The answer to all these questions was 
complex as under communism Bulgaria was bound to re-experience the Macedonian 
question. 
35 A full account of the Jewish deportations from the Bulgarian occupied territories 
during the Second World War is presented in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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XI. The Macedonian Question during Communism (1944-89) 
After the end of the Second World War, the BCP became the new political ruler of 
Bulgaria. During 45 years of government the BCP could not develop a consistent policy 
on the Macedonian question. It revised its views several times and accordingly Bulgarian 
communist policy also changed. The two main factors which dictated the BCP approach 
to Macedonian issues were the consequences of the split between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union in 1948 and the change in the development of nationalism under 
communism in Bulgaria as dictated by the BCP. Bulgarian relations with the USSR 
remained central to the way the BCP conducted all affairs, including the Macedonian 
question. If Moscow could not tolerate Tito, Bulgaria had to also reconsider its relations 
with Yugoslavia. And the Macedonian question was at the core of the Bulgarian- 
Yugoslav relations. Equally important was the fluctuation of the BCP's views on 
Bulgarian nationalism in relation to the Macedonian question Although initially the BCP 
supported the idea that the Macedonian nation existed as a separate entity, from 1948 
onwards this was denied. Instead the BCP declared that there was no Macedonian 
identity in Bulgaria, though there may be one in Yugoslav Macedonia. This was an 
obvious change in the communist approach, but the BCP decided that such an attitude 
was useful for two purposes. First, by asserting that Bulgaria has no claims over 
Macedonian identity in Yugoslavia, communist Bulgaria distanced itself from Yugoslavia. 
In this way the BCP reassured Moscow that its instructions were being taken seriously. 
Second, declaring that there was no Macedonian population in Bulgaria was in accord 
with the growing communist idea of Bulgaria as an ethnically homogenous country. 
During the same time the BCP encouraged Jewish emigration from Bulgaria (1947-49) 
and an agreement about Turkish resettlement was under way. However it would be 
wrong to suggest that the BCP planned the parallel development of these issues 
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concerning nationalities in Bulgaria. Each national problem was dealt with according to 
the political circumstances of the moment. 
In this sense the BCP followed the direction given by Moscow on the Macedonian 
question. But the policy also seemed like a good option for Bulgaria at the time. The 
denial of Macedonian identity in communist Bulgaria was well squared with the project 
of establishing communist Bulgaria as an ethnic nation-state. 
The most crucial development of the Macedonian question in the Balkans since the 
collapse of the Ottoman empire was the establishment of the People's Republic of 
Macedonia in Tito's Yugoslavia. The status of the republic was the first step towards a 
legitimate Macedonian nation and state. A Macedonian identity with its own officially 
recognised language, culture and institutions was established a separate national identity. 
Consequently the whole Bulgarian debate about who Macedonia belonged to was 
transformed into a different question: if there was a Macedonian nation in Yugoslavia, 
was there a Macedonian national minority in Pirin Macedonia, the Bulgarian part of 
Macedonia? 
In 1946, Georgi Dimitrov, the first communist leader of Bulgaria stated: `The fact has 
often been disregarded that the majority of the Macedonian people have already been 
organised in a state and a nation within the framework of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia as the People's republic of Macedonia. Using this republic as a basis, the 
other sections of the Macedonian people will be united to it in the near future, especially 
Macedonia of the present Pirin region. There are no three Macedonians. There is only 
one Macedonia and its major part is represented by the established Macedonian People's 
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republic'. 36 Thus Dimitrov agreed with the USSR opinion that Macedonia should 
ultimately aim towards independence. Further on the old idea of a Balkan communist 
federation was discussed by Dimitrov, Stalin and Tito. 37 But there were many 
disagreements about the possible structure of such a federation. The main issue was 
again that Yugoslavia refused to accept the unconditional Soviet control, which the BCP 
did not even question. The split between Yugoslavia and the Soviets put an end to this 
debate. Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists also differed over the status of Pirin 
Macedonia. After the capitulation of Bulgaria at the end of the Second World War, in 
September 1944, there was a campaign to separate Pirin Macedonia from Bulgaria. The 
Bulgarian communists blocked it successfully with the support of the Soviets, who 
opposed any separation of Pirin Macedonia from Bulgaria. But the compromise was their 
co-operation in building the Macedonian People's Republic within the Yugoslav 
federation. In December 1946 the Bulgarian Institute for the Scientific Study of 
Macedonia, based in Sofia, which disseminated Bulgarian ideas in Macedonia, was closed 
and its archives transferred to Skopje. This marked formally and highly symbolically the 
end of the promotion of the Bulgarian identity in post-war Macedonia. 
Later, the BCP decided that Macedonian culture should be developed in Pirin 
Macedonia. In 1948 the Bulgarian government introduced the study of Macedonian 
language and history in the schools of Pirin Macedonia and many teachers arrived there 
from Yugoslavia to re-educate the population. This policy was exactly the reverse of the 
36 Korovar and Ivanovski, The Historical Truth. p. 171. 
37 In 1947 Bulgarian and Yugoslavian communists negotiated an agreement in Bled for 
abolishing the border in Pirin Macedonia. Teachers in history and language were sent 
from Yugoslav Macedonia to Pirin Macedonia. Macedonian National Theatre was 
opened in Gorna Djumaja. The newspapers Nora Macedonia and Piruuki Vestnik were 
published in the Macedonian language. 
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one during the occupation of Macedonia, when Bulgarians tried to educate Macedonians 
into being Bulgarian. Naturally there was confusion among the people of Pirin 
Macedonia. 
Despite the Bulgarian co-operation in the promotion of Macedonian identity, relations 
between Yugoslav Macedonia and the Bulgarian authorities were tense. Bulgarians often 
found the presence of Yugoslav Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia arrogant and offensive. 
Pirin Macedonia became a place for confrontation between the two communist 
countries. Then Bulgarian communists' attitude was changed again. By the end of the 
same year of 1948, Bulgarian authorities introduced the opposite policy, now seeking the 
de-Macedonianisation of the Pirin region. The reasons for this shift in Bulgarian 
communist policy were rather complex. Shoup suggests the split between Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union at that time was a major incentive behind the new Bulgarian policy. 38 
Crampton however believes that `the dispute between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was more 
complicated than a case of Sofia following Moscow's example'. Crampton argues that 
Bulgarian communists were not really prepared to alienate Pirin Macedonia, and once 
Tito and the Yugoslavs were ostracised from the Soviets, `nationalist interest could again 
be squared with proletarian internationalism'. 39 
At the core of the change in Bulgarian policy seems to have been national sentiment 
about Macedonia, which remained strong among the Bulgarian public as well as among 
the Bulgarian communists. Although the BCP accepted the existence of Yugoslav 
3" Paul S. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, East Central 
European Studies of Columbia University, (New York & London: Columbia University 
Press, 1968), p. 155. 
39 Crampton, A Short History, pp. 171-172. 
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Macedonia, the mere thought of recognising Macedonian identity in Bulgaria was not 
seriously entertained. Indeed the change in the Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia suited 
the Bulgarian communists only too well. Freed from the responsibility of taking the 
decision themselves they could enjoy its result, which was to be seen as defenders of the 
Bulgarian nation. Communists needed to popularise themselves when they were still the 
new masters of Bulgaria. During these years there was still a segment of Bulgarian 
political life, which was about opposition and public opinion mattered. In 1946 the 
remaining active opposition in Bulgaria expressed sharp criticism over ideas of unifying 
Pirin Macedonia and Yugoslav Macedonia. The Macedonian community in Bulgaria was 
also still active, particularly in the capital Sofia. It attacked the communist government by 
saying that the BCP mishandled the whole idea of Macedonian nationality. Besides the 
Yugoslavs themselves thought that it was too risky to go so far as to claim Pirin 
Macedonia from Bulgaria, which made it easier for the BCP to oppose them. The Soviet 
split with Yugoslavia gave the BCP the chance to restrict their views over Macedonian 
issues to Pirin M'lacedonia. And this seemed better than nothing. 
From 1948 onwards any ideas of open co-operation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
were punishable in Bulgaria. The communist world was living under Stalin and any 
national questions were subject to persecution. The BCP under Dimitrov organised the 
show trial of Traicho Kostov, a pro-Soviet communist accused of having the wrong 
policy on the Macedonian question. He was tried and executed in 1948.40 His case 
40See Protsesut sreshtu Traicho Kostov i negovata a, (Sofia: 1949). Traicho Kostov 
was executed after a staged trial on 17 December 1949. The fifth article of the accusation 
stated that together with the Yugoslav party leaders, Tito, Kardel, Djilas and Rankovich, 
he was negotiating: `common action against the Bulgarian national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence by attaching it to Yugoslavia and, above all by separating 
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showed that the Macedonian question was very volatile and had a great potential for 
misuse. Those communists who believed that they could easily combine a nationalist 
policy over Macedonia with Soviet principles were badly mistaken, for Moscow could 
change it any time according to its own agenda. In 1948 at its 51h congress, the BCP stated 
that Pirin Macedonia was Bulgarian. This assertion aimed to reinforce the Bulgarian- 
Soviet alliance and cut off any possibilities of being accused of Titoism. In 1963 a party 
plenum decided that the population in Pirin Macedonia does not constitute Macedonian 
minority. 
Pirin region on behalf of Yugoslav Macedonia. ' He was rehabilitated after the April 
plenum of the BCP in 1956. 
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XII. Macedonian Censuses in Communist Bulgaria 
Bulgarian communist regime considered census statistics important. The number of the 
Macedonian population in Pirin Macedonia as reflected in the censuses of 1956 and 1965 
caused controversies between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian data kept changing 
correspondingly to the position of the BCP on the existence of Macedonian nationality 
within Bulgaria. In 1946 there was a census in Bulgaria and it is generally believed that 
Bulgarian communist authorities pressurised the population of Pirin Macedonia to 
register as Macedonians. The results were not published by the Bulgarian authorities but 
Yugoslav sources claim that 252,908 people declared themselves as Macedonians. 4' 
Although this figure has been disputed since, it has also been established that the census 
of 1946 registered that more than 70% of the population of Pirin Macedonia declared 
themselves as Macedonians. 42 The results of the census were in accord with the 
recognition of separate Macedonian identity by Bulgarian communists. 
The next census was in 1956 and it recorded the figure of 187,789, which was less than 
the result of the previous census. This was after BCP started a process of reconsidering 
its position on the 1\-facedonian question in Bulgaria and moving away from the 
recognition of a separate Macedonian national identity. The census was taken only 
months after the April Plenum of 1956 which marked the beginning of the process of 
de-Stalinization in Bulgaria. The smaller number of Macedonians which was recorded 
was opposed by Belgrade. 
41 See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, (London: Minority 
Rights Publications, 1993), pp. 106-107. 
42 See Miliana Kaimakova (ed. ), Istoria na Bulgaria, (Sofia: Standart, 1999-2000), p. 321. 
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In assessing the results of the census of 1956 the international relations within the Soviet 
block should be taken into account. The census was taken just after the first 
reapproachment between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1955. Until the autumn of 
1957 the official course was one of improving the relations between USSR and 
Yugoslavia. It is highly unlikely that BCP would decide to go against it, which would 
have been the case if decided to encourage recording of dramatically lower number of 
Macedonians in Bulgaria. It seems more probable that the 1956 census was conducted 
without pressure, at least not on the same scale as during the 1946 census to register as 
Macedonian. 
Things have changed though by 1965 when the next census was taken. This time it 
resulted in a dramatically lower figure compared to the previous two censuses and 
dropped to 8,750. With this census the BCP asserted its new policy of non-recognition 
of a separate Macedonian identity in Bulgaria and defended it as a correction of the 
previous policy for encouraging the population of Pirin Macedonia to register as 
`Macedonians'. a} The Yugoslavs denounced the results of 1965 census as they appeared 
threatening to the afirmation of the Macedonian nationalily in Yugoslav Macedonia. 
Most importantly relations between USSR and Yugoslavia once again changed. The 
reapproachement of 1955 lasted shortly and with the Soviet invasion in Hungary in 1956 
and the consequent violation of Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement on the protection of 
Imre Nagy relations between Belgrade and Moscow were strained, and by the time he 
was executed in the summer of 1958 Soviet-Yugoslav relations were in serious crisis. 
Bulgaria must have felt free to exercise its own policy concerning the existence of 
Macedonian identity as it was unlikely to be categoriaclly sanctioned by Moscow in 
favour of Belgrade. Until 1965 when the census was taken Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
240 
engaged in exchanging conflicting claims about Macedonian nationality in Bulgaria as 
well as Bulgarian nationality in Yugoslav Macedonia, but they were limited to `historical 
debates'.; { 
It has been a point of dispute who was right in the debate between Yugoslav and 
Bulgarian communists regarding the reliability of the statistics of 1965. The BCP claimed 
that the pressure on the population to register as `Macedonian' was lifted and therefore 
the data was correct. In support of this claim is the fact that in the last census of the 
Bulgarian population of 1992 (after the fall of communism) the number 10,800 was close 
to the one of 1965. Also as King suggests, if in 1965 the BCP wanted to declare that 
there were no Macedonians in Bulgaria there would have not been any number of 
Macedonians registered. 
It seems certain that pressure for identifying as Macedonian was exerted in 1946 when 
Macedonian culture was promoted in Pirin Macedonia in accord with the idea of the 
existence of a separate IMfacedonain nation promoted by the BCP. But it seems equally 
probable that in 1965 there was no need to put the same pressure in order to register the 
majority of the population as Bulgarian. The BCP did not have to exersice pressure on 
the population in Bulgaria in order to popularise the idea that Macedonians were 
Bulgarians. It was rather a question of promoting this position inside the BCP in order to 
gain popularity in the country. For traditionally the majority of the Bulgarian 
Macedonians considered themselves as being a legitimate part of the Bulgarian nation - 
as opposed to a minority claiming separate Macedonian identity. This is not to say that 
the censuses were not politicised. But the BCP policy of recognition of Macedonian 
43 See King, Minorities under Communism, 1973, p. 96. 
44 Ibid., p. 201. 
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nationality in Bulgaria until 1948 was exceptional in the history of the Macedonian 
politics in Bulgaria. It lasted shortly and was denied by the BCP itself. 
The result of the first Macedonian census was supposed to implement the instruction 
given from above, which was to confirm the idea of Macedonian identity in Bulgaria. 
The following two censuses had the opposite aim. They were supposed to demonstrate 
that there was no Macedonian identity in Bulgaria in such numbers as to constitute a 
viable national identity. Thus the censuses also demonstrated graphically the changes in 
communist policy: people were first made to define themselves as Macedonians, and in a 
less than a couple of decades, the orders have changed and they were allowed to identify 
as Bulgarians. This policy intensified people's insecurity about their national identity. 
Many people of the Pirin Macedonia feared to identify themselves in terms of nationality. 
They secretly hated the idea that somebody else not only had a definition for them but 
also kept changing it according to some abstract and invisible regulations. 
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XIII. The Consolidation of Bulgarian Nationalism under Communism 
From the 1960s the communist government in Bulgaria developed a more coherent idea 
about the national questions and called for a united position among Bulgarian scholars. 
The aim was to assert that Bulgaria was an ethnically homogenous nation. A number of 
publications were produced in support of this idea. Some of them were designed to be 
used as official party documents, but the new party position was disseminated also 
through history books, new research on the Bulgarian literature and folklore. The most 
precise description of the BCP policy on the Macedonian question during the 1970s was 
summarised in the Ministry for Foreign Affair's declaration, published under the tide 
`About the Comprehensive development of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations'. 45 The 
declaration focused on claims about the existence of Macedonian minority in Bulgaria as 
well as the establishment of the Yugoslav Macedonian republic. Three basic principles on 
the Macedonian question were outlined in view of the BCP decisions. First it asserted 
that the Macedonian question was an internal problem of Bulgarian politics and therefore 
no one else should interfere in it. This statement was directed towards the LYC as it 
never missed the chance to publicise its own views on the way Bulgaria was handling the 
Macedonian question. Second, it claimed that the population in Pirin Macedonia centred 
around the town of Blagoevgrad, was both historically and at present Bulgarian. Third it 
declared that the process of the creation of Macedonian nation in Yugoslavia was anti- 
Bulgarian. 
The declaration underlined that the national question had been solved in Bulgaria on the 
basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and accused the LYC's leadership, as well as the 
Yugoslav media, of mounting an anti-Bulgarian campaign and undermining the 
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internationalist thinking of communism. Yugoslavia was also accused of giving 
prominence to national questions above social issues, which were much more important 
because they concerned class identity. It asserted that Yugoslav policy was in breach of 
Leninist principles on the national question. The intense campaign led by the BCP in the 
Pirin district was declared a result of a long lasting pressure in this period (since the end 
of the Second World War) for a forced introduction of non-Bulgarian consciousness in 
the Macedonian region of Bulgaria. 46 Essentially the document defended the BCP policy, 
denied any past co-operation between the communist movements in Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia over Macedonia, and made it plain, that there was no Macedonian national 
minority in Bulgaria. These points were also made by a document published by the 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences called `The Wholeness of the Bulgarian Language Nov 
and in the Past'. 47 It explained that there was no Macedonian language because 
Bulgarian was the original language spoken in the Macedonian lands from times 
immemorial. The argument was based on the assumption that language affiliation is a 
given, not a subject to choice and that Bulgaria had one language only in its entire 
history. Still, the biggest problem remained how to justify the change in BCP policy on 
Macedonia? The Bulgarian communists fiercely defended themselves and blamed 
everyone else for Bulgarian failures in Macedonia. During the 1950s many Bulgarian 
history books asserted that by occupying Macedonia, Bulgaria had no chance to have an 
independent policy. Being a satellite of Hitler's Germany Bulgaria made mistakes, which 
otherwise would not have been committed. 48 Later the communist historiography 
blamed the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, which could not resist the temptations of 
457. a vsestranoto razvitic na Bulgaro-Yugoslavskite otnoshenia, (Sofia, 1978). 
4 Ibid., p. 17. 
47 Quoted from Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, p. 116. 
48 See Kratka Istoria na Bulgaria, (Sofia: `Nauka I Izkustvo', 1958), pp. 312-317. 
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Bulgarian nationalism and nurtured certain illusions about it during the occupation of 
Macedonia. 49 Bulgarian communism claimed to have been led by the principles of 
internationalism by emphasising that all mistakes in the past were committed by the 
Bulgarian bourgeoisie, which suffered from the excesses of nationalism. 50 The 
publication of the memoirs of Tsola Dragoicheva in 1979 was a culmination of the 
controversies over the BCP's past and present policy over Macedonia. Dragoicheva 
described the Bulgarian communists as innocent victims in the hands of their Yugoslav 
brothers, who plotted for dominance in Macedonia. She underlined that the population 
in Pirin Macedonia was Bulgarian by character. 51 
At the same time Bulgarian folklorists and ethnographers sought to prove the ethnic 
Bulgarian character of Macedonian culture past and present. Most of the research was 
carried out by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The emphasis was on the scientific 
evidence collected in Pirin Macedonia. Todor Iv. Zhivkov, the head of the Institute of 
Folklore Studies, asserted that each nation had its own ethnic history and culture which 
was inherited, not created. He claimed that the oral, written and musical tradition in Pirin 
Macedonia was wholesome Bulgarian culture, though he did not say explicitly that 
49 See D. Koscv, Hr. Hristov and D. Angelov, Kratka Istoria na Bulgaria, 2nd cd., (Sofia, 
Nauka i Izkustvo, 1966), p. 276. 
50 See Alexander Fol, Vasil Guzclev, Nikolai Genchev, Konstantin Kosev, Ilcho 
Dimitrov, Andrei Pantev, Milcho Lalkov and Kostadin Petrov, Kratka istoria na Bulgaria, 
(Sofia: Izdatclstvo Nauka i Izkustvo, 1981), pp. 380-381. 
51 See Tsola Dragoicheva, Iz moite spomeni: Na klasovi internatsionalisticheski pozitsii, 
(Sofia: Partizdat, 1979). Dragoicheva was a member of the central Committee of the 
BCP since 1966. In her book she explained that the BCP made mistakes over the 
Macedonian policy under the pressure of the YCP and blamed Serbian chauvinism. 
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Macedonia was Bulgarian. 52 Denying the Yugoslav account of events in Macedonia was 
also a central task of Bulgarian history, which was mobilised to defend the Bulgarian 
nation. Bulgarian scholars argued passionately that Macedonia could not claim separate 
ethnicity and that prior the Second World War there was no Macedonian nation. 53 
By the end of the 1970s BCP made it clear that the Macedonian question in Bulgaria was 
solved by the proclamation that communist Bulgaria was a one nation-state with no 
ethnic diversity. The national questions in communist Eastern Europe were on the raise 
and Bulgaria was no exception. During this time most countries of the Soviet bloc had 
already exposed dissatisfaction with Moscow. The Hungarian events of 1956 and the 
Prague Spring of 1968, the rejection of the Sovietisation by the Romanians after 1968, 
the break-up between Albania and the Soviet Union in 1961 - these were all acts of 
disagreement with Soviet policy. Yugoslavia kept its distance from the Soviet Union but 
experienced the first serious nationalist dissent during the `Croatian spring' movement in 
1972. Bulgaria was the communist state most loyal to the Soviets and because of the 
hostility between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the feeling was that it could afford to take a 
firmer stand on the Bulgarian aspect of the Macedonian question with no particularly 
unfavourable consequences. There would be no `Bulgarian spring. 'Moreover no one 
knew what the Soviet leadership really thought about the Macedonian question. The 
definitions of national culture under communism repeated the Stalinist slogan `national in 
form, socialist in content'. But Breznev's doctrine from 1968 for `socialist self- 
52 See Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Introduction. Rdinstvo na bulgarskata folklorna traditsia. By 
Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Dimtrina Nfitscva, Evgenia Stoikova, Stcfana Iancva (eds. ), (Sofia: 
Izdatclstvo na Bulgarskata Academia na Naukite, 1981), p. 17. 
53 See M. Voinov, L. Panaiotov, D. Kosev and D. Hristov (eds. ), Dokumenti i 'Matcriali 
?a Istoriata na Bulgarskia Narod, (Sofia: Bulgarska Academia na Naukite: Institut za 
Istoria, 1969). 
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determination' showed clearly that the Soviet authorities were not going to tolerate 
independent national modifications of communism as attempted by Hungary or 
Czechoslovakia. Therefore with no risk of going against the `big brother', Bulgarian 
communism succeeded in promoting ethnic Bulgarian nationalism, which relentlessly 
revised the Macedonian question. 
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XIV. The Macedonian-Bulgarian Language Dispute 
The question of a Macedonian language was a major issue to which communist Bulgaria 
had to respond since the establishment of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Again 
the BCP had an ambiguous policy. The main line of communist Bulgaria was never to 
deny openly the existence of the Macedonian language. At the same time the emphasis 
was on the idea that there was only one Bulgarian language. The underlying message was 
that even if Macedonian was a separate language, this had nothing to do with Bulgaria 
itself. The position towards the Macedonian language was based on the same premise as 
the position towards the Macedonian nation in Yugoslavia: it may be that there was 
Macedonian language in Yugoslav Macedonia, but this had nothing to do with the 
Macedonian question in Bulgaria. The BCP did not deny that people in Yugoslav 
Macedonia spoke Macedonian language. But it also insisted that Bulgarian was the 
historic language of Macedonia. The biggest concern of communist Bulgaria was that if 
there was a Macedonian language there, it would open the question of the language in 
Pirin Macedonia. On this issue the BCP was firm that there was only one Bulgarian 
language spoken in communist Bulgaria: Bulgarian. Thus the language issue remained a 
mute point in Bulgarian-Macedonian communist politics. The dispute consisted of 
several aspects. The starting point was that Bulgarian nationhood has been traditionally 
connected to language. Language has been an inseparable part of the Bulgarian national 
identity. From the language point of view the Macedonian question in Bulgaria was not 
only about the territorial unity of Bulgaria but also about the linguistic integrity of the 
Bulgarian nation. 
The Bulgarian-Macedonian language dispute therefore ran deeper than the purely 
linguistic debate, which was more or less freely discussed in communist Bulgaria. The 
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Macedonian language question in Bulgaria was also about: (a) defining language as an 
exclusive national identification, which led to the denial of the existence of the 
Macedonian language in Bulgaria, (b) understanding the establishment of the official 
Macedonian language as an attempt to steal from the national Bulgarian history, and (c) 
insisting that Bulgarian linguistic unity was untouchable. 
The theory about the origins of the Bulgarian language was supposed to be the best 
evidence of Bulgarian linguistic unity. This theory was closely linked to the myth of the 
civilising mission of the Bulgarian people. Bulgarian language was upheld as the language 
of Slav civilisation. Inquiring into the ethnic background of the creators of the Cyrillic 
alphabet, the brothers St. Cyril and St. Methodius, as well as underlying the antique 
character of the historic, religious, folk and secular Bulgarian language literature in the 
Middle Ages and during the Bulgarian Revival, were used as arguments in support of this 
theory. Communist Bulgaria claimed that the creators of Bulgarian literacy may have 
been of a Slav background, but nevertheless they were major heroes of Bulgarian 
nationhood. 
On the contrary in Yugoslav Macedonia the same personalities were considered heroes 
of Macedonian culture, understood as a separate entity. In Yugoslav Macedonia, the 
Macedonian language was legitimised as a separate one by the formal Macedonian 
alphabet which was officially accepted in 1945. It was based on the spoken dialects of 
Bitola and Veles, which were close to the Bulgarian language but as the Bulgarian was 
based on eastern dialects of the country, there was enough differentiation for the 
Macedonians to claim that it was a language distinct from Bulgarian. 
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Yet there were inconsistencies in the Bulgarian communist policy on the Macedonian 
language question. Under Dimitrov (1944-48) communist Bulgaria officially recognised 
the Macedonian nation with its own language. The recognition was in accord with the 
Soviet policy of `Macedonia for the Macedonians', which lasted until the split between 
Tito and Stalin in 1948. Once the Soviet policy changed, Bulgarian communists altered 
their position and bitterly disputed the existence of the Macedonian language. The 
communist policy towards the Macedonian language had the support of the Bulgarian 
intellectual elite. Also the majority of the people in Bulgaria believed that there was no 
separate Macedonian language. The linguistic differences were explained mainly as a 
Serbian influence imposed on Macedonia. 
The argument that the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages were the same encouraged 
the belief that the people were also the same and of the same nationality. The 
understanding was that members of a particular ethnic group dress and eat in similar 
ways and speak the same language. This argument over Bulgarian language unity ignored 
the fact that Bulgarians and Macedonians were living in different states and under quite 
different political systems, though within the general framework of the communist 
ideology. Although in theory Bulgarian communism underlined political consciousness 
as the essence of socialist Bulgarian identity, in practice identity was defined in cultural 
terms of history and memory. In Bulgaria the process of building a Macedonian literary 
language was most often referred to as something negative, dangerous, wrong, unjust and 
most importantly illegitimate. In contrast, in Macedonia, the language was seen as an 
inseparable part of Macedonian nationhood. Bulgaria thought of the Macedonian 
language as an invention, whereas in Macedonia it was perceived as a reconstruction of 
the Macedonian ethnic core and a national integrative force. Thus the two views 
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constructed conflicting national histories in both countries, which refused to accept that 
a common past can be transformed into a separate future. 
251 
XV. Conclusion 
After 1948 Bulgarian communism offered ethnic Bulgarian identity to everyone in the 
country, including the people of Pirin Macedonia. This seemed permitted by Soviets and 
in agreement with the views of the ethnic Bulgarian majority in the country. In relation 
to the Macedonian question, Bulgarian identity under communism was defined in ethnic 
terms. Yet at the same time Bulgarian communist identity had to declare loyalty first to 
the Soviet Union. Some people accepted this formula, but for the majority of Bulgarians 
it was simply an ideological construct, which had very little to do with real life. The 
communists' flirtation with the idea of accepting the existence of a separate Macedonian 
identity in Bulgaria lasted briefly, but officially Yugoslav Macedonia was not denied by 
the Bulgarian communist state. The conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR helped 
Bulgaria find a temporary solution to the Macedonian question. The Macedonian 
question was restricted to issues of Bulgarian nationalism, in an effort to ignore 
developments in Macedonia. It was somehow frozen, not forgotten but rather forbidden. 
There were hardly any newspapers and almost no other printed sources of information 
from Yugoslav Macedonia available in Bulgaria. Travelling from Bulgaria to Macedonia 
was highly restricted and heavily controlled by the Bulgarian authorities. 
One of the side effects of the communist policy on the Macedonian question was that 
many people in Pirin Macedonia felt they were being compensated for the lack free 
choice of their national identity with second hand `Macedonian' things. For instance the 
annual folk festival `Singing Pirin' (`Pirin pee) as well as the numerous government 
initiatives to improve life in the region were felt as a deliberate policy for satisfying the 
population. Yet no material benefits succeeded in keeping some people away from the 
idea that beyond the border there was `another' Macedonian life. Thus Macedonian 
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identity was loaded with mythical attraction - over there, the `real' Macedonian life as 
opposed to the one here in Bulgaria. The fear of being punished for identifying as 
Macedonian in Bulgaria also had an ambivalent impact. Some people felt silenced. But 
many others became very attached to their own ethnic definition. As Connor argues on 
the effects of similar policies towards national identity : `In some cases they threatened 
people but in others they nurtured the weed they intended to root out. '54 However there 
was no organised Macedonian movement in Bulgaria under communism based on 
demand for Macedonian identity to be recognised as different from the Bulgarian one 
There were individuals only who desired to live in Yugoslav Macedonia as Macedonians. 
Some Macedonians from Bulgaria could resettle in Yugoslav Macedonia on the basis of 
family relations. There are no statistics available about them, but it is known that the 
Bulgarian state issued individual permissions. Another option was to apply for political 
asylum in Yugoslavia as a member of persecuted ethnic minority in Bulgaria. 
The BCP's conduct of the Macedonian question also affected Bulgarian relations with its 
neighbours. The Soviet anxiety over Yugoslavia was so serious that Bulgaria was 
permitted to develop some relations with Greece and Turkey, but not with Yugoslavia. 
In the early 1960s some openings were allowed. In 1962, the Bulgarian communist leader 
Todor Zhivkov made an official visit in Belgrade and in 1965 Tito was welcomed in 
Sofia. But these occasions did not amount to a full normalisation of Bulgarian-Yugoslav 
relations. Communist Bulgaria lived in isolation, dictated by the Soviets and confused by 
its national problems. The Macedonian question was put on hold. 
54 Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory, p. 551. 
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Chapter 5: Muslims Under Bulgarian Communism 
Part 1: The Turkish Minority - The Politics of Ethnicity and Power 
I. Introduction 
On 21 May 1993 deputies of the Bulgarian Parliament tried to shout down Prof. Ibrahim Taturli, MP 
from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms MRF), the country's Turkish party. They accused him of 
being lypocritical because he was a former member of the special commission for the Revival process' 
which directed the anti-Turkish renaming campaign in 1989. Now Mg criticised him for being too 
emotional in defence of Turkish rights and accused him of attempting to f rel ethnic tensions. 
Mr. Taturli provoked the uproar by quoting in "Turkish from an old grave inscription found in Bulgaria. 
The parliamentary audience took this as a provocation because the only official language in the country 
was Bulgarian. 
The MP responded that the Bulgarian deputies could not appreciate his words or position because he had 
a Turkish experience, which did not resonate with the Bulgarian public. 
This encounter was one of the may illustrating how was the political debate in Bulgaria was coloured by 
ethnic issues as a result of communist policy towards the Turkish minority'. The core of this was the 
Revival process, the campaign for the forcible changing of the Turkish names in 1984-85 carried out by 
the communist authorities and the consequent turmoil in the Bulgarian-Turkish interethnic relations in 
1989. Afterwards Turkish people identified unanimously with the ethnic persecution directed against 
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them by the Bulgarian authorities. Their unique Turkish experience' during theseyearsgave them a 
special insight into the nature of the Bulgarian communism. 
The biggest effect of the communist policy on the Turkish question in Bulgaria was 
unintended - the `Revival process' focused the dissident movement in Bulgaria on human 
rights issues and the Turkish issue became the most active internal factor during the 
changes in 1989. It has also led to the emergence for the first time in its history of a new 
political contestant representing the interests of the largest ethnic minority in the 
country. This chapter argues that the BCP tried to exercise total control over Christian- 
Muslim relations in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian communist regime resorted to the use of 
violence in its attempt to destroy the Turkish community. This policy sharpened the 
ethnic boundaries of the Turkish community and deepened the Bulgarians' negative 
stereotyping of Turkishness. Communism widened the gap between the two 
communities. In his defence the MP Taturli made this point stressing that `our' hardships 
- those endured by the Turkish minority - mean very little to `you', - that is the ethnic 
Bulgarian majority. Under communist power Bulgarian-Turkish relations existed in a 
state of ethnic conflict. The Turkish minority, as the single biggest ethnic minority in the 
country, was defined in opposition to the ethnic Bulgarian majority population. The 
Turkish population was depicted as the representative of the traditional Bulgarian enemy 
- the Ottoman empire. Bulgarian Turks were associated strongly with Ottoman 
dominance in the Balkans in general and in Bulgaria in particular. 
This perception was greatly strengthened by the fact that Bulgarian Turks had ethnic kin 
in neighbouring Turkey, which retained its meaning as their mother country. But modern 
Turkey was not part of the Soviet bloc -a strong argument in the hands of Bulgarian 
communist against Turkish minority rights. The perception that part of the population in 
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communist Bulgaria was related to `the enemy' of the Bulgarian people was reinforced by 
the concept that Turkey was also an enemy of communism. During the 1940s and the 
1950s communist Bulgaria managed interethnic Bulgarian-Turkish relations according to 
Leninist ideas about language education for national minorities. The BCP's policy held in 
Stalinist fashion that the ethnic culture of the Turkish minority was a sign of 
backwardness, and that although language differences were perfectly acceptable and 
facilitated by the Bulgarian educational system, religion was not -it was supposed to be 
erased and substituted by `socialist consciousness'. But as the idea of ethnically 
homogenous Bulgarian nation gained ground in the 1960s, the Turkish issue became a 
heavy burden for the state. If immigration could not solve it, the BCP designed an 
assimilation programme. Its implementation led to the most destructive experience 
related to national questions in Bulgaria under communism. 
This chapter analyses the ideas behind the Bulgarian communist policy towards the 
Turkish minority. This policy is of crucial importance for understanding nationalism, 
ethnicity and power in Bulgarian society under communism. The research discusses the 
position of the Turkish minority in the context of the development of ideas of the ethnic 
Bulgarian communist nation-state, and looks at the importance of its specific 
characteristic as `formerly dominant minority'. It considers the conduct of ethnic conflict 
management during communism in relation to the Bulgarian-Turkish interaction. 
Generally Bulgarian communism considered ethnic heterogeneity as destabilising. The 
elimination of ethnic difference was seen as giving stability to the communist regime in 
Bulgaria. Bulgarian communists understood integration as the elimination of differences 
and erasing the `foreign' elements of the Turkish Muslim identity, which was viewed as 
backward, reactionary and potentially subversive. Gradually the promotion of the idea 
that Bulgaria was an ethnically homogenous nation led to the denial of the very existence 
256 
of the Turkish ethnic minority. This policy culminated in the `Revival process', the anti- 
Turkish campaign for the forcible changing of names of 1984-85, leading to the mass 
exodus of the Bulgarian Turks in 1989. 
BCP policy towards the Turkish minority developed from `benign neglect', and relatively 
regulated immigration to Turkey before and after the Second World War to a 
combination of `hegemonic control' and `forcible assimilation'. ' On one hand communist 
policy led to the biggest ethnic crisis in the new history of Bulgaria. On the other, it 
presided over the most radical change in the political position of the Turkish minority in 
the country. The ideas of ethnic nationalism were the main motivation of the Bulgarian 
communist policy. Ethnic homogeneity was seen not only as a stabilising factor of the 
political power but also as an unifying force of the Bulgarian nation under communism. 
The Bulgarian communist regime sought legitimacy in achieving the ethnic homogeneity 
of the country. Yet the unintended consequence was that the Turkish issue compelled 
the establishment of the Bulgarian dissident movement in the 1980s by attracting 
international attention to the human rights issues in the country. Bulgarian opposition 
focused on the issue of ethnic persecution and organised itself as a human rights pressure 
group. The support it received from international human rights organisations was 
invaluable and greatly encouraged the movement for change. At the same time the BCP 
tried to reform itself fully on ethnic nationalist grounds and succeeded in mobilising the 
intellectual elite of the country against the Turkish people. This chapter looks at the role 
of the intellectuals in the communist politics in relation to the Turkish minority issue. It 
argues that the support of the intellectuals was crucial to the `Revival process'. 
' Sec John McGarry and Brandan O'Leary (eds. ), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
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II. Historical Background of the Turkish Minority 
It is largely accepted that ethnic Turks began to settle in Bulgaria towards the end of the 
fourteenth century. ' The biggest influx of Turks took place under the rule of the 
Ottoman empire. Nowadays Turkish people live mostly in compact communities in 
southern Bulgaria (in the Arda river basin), in the north-east in the region of Dobruja 
and the Deli Orman area (Ludogorie). They also live in scattered communities in the 
Rhodope mountains and in central and eastern Stara Planina (the Balkan mountains). 
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims. Turks are not the only 
Muslims in Bulgaria. Crampton divides Bulgarian Muslims into four ethnic or linguistic 
groups. The largest group, which is the main subject of this chapter, is Turks who 
resettled in Bulgaria after the Ottoman conquest. ' They retained their language and 
cultural traditions. The second group, also covered by this research, are the Pomaks. 
They are converts to Islam and in general have retained their native Bulgarian customs 
and language. The third group are Tatars who came to Bulgarian lands in the mid- 
nineteenth century from the Caucasus and settled along the Black sea. The fourth group 
consists of Muslim Roma (Gypsies) who spread all over the country. I 
2 See Anthonina Zheliazkova, Razprostranenie na isliama v zapadnobulgarskite zemi pod 
osmanska vlast XV - XVIII vek, (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata Akademia na Naukite, 
1990) and Bilal N. Simsir, (ed. ), The Turks of Bulgaria in International Fora: Documents, 
(Ankara: Publications of Turkish Historical Society, 1990), serial VII, No 100, vol. 2. 
' For a scholarly speculation about the origins of the Turkish people living in the north- 
eastern region of Deli Orman in Bulgaria being actually descendants of the ancient 
Proto-Bulgar Turks who did not assimilated into the Slavic population, see H. T. Norris, 
Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World, 
(London: Hurst & Company, 1993), p. 147. 
4 See R. J. Crampton `The Turks in Bulgaria, 1878-1944' in K. H. Karpat, The Turks of 
Bulgaria: The History. Culture and Political Fate of a Minority, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 
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Muslim settlement in the Balkans was linked to a special category of land ownership in 
the Ottoman empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: the mulks and vakufr. The 
central government was making gifts of land to revive economic life there. This caused 
an influx of migrating groups of mixed origin, some of them nomadic. Most of them 
were poor or landless peasants from Anatolia. s'The Ottoman lands were administered by 
the millet system, which did not differentiate between ethnic groups. It recognised the 
cultural autonomy of all Orthodox religious groups living under its rule and their 
members were all subjects of the Sultan. The Sultan was the absolute ruler, the protector 
of the political power and the religious leader of the country obliged to promote the holly 
prescriptions of the Koran. The political-religious community of the Muslims and the 
other people under the empire's domination was the caliphate, which united the church 
and the state. This form of government merged civil and political powers and regulated 
life by religious law. Gcllner defined this society as `trans-ethnic'. By this he meant that 
Islam as a philosophy fundamentally gave the opportunity for ethnicity to fuse with 
national identity, `so that one can hardly tell which one of the two is of most benefit to 
the other. '(According to Islam, the social order is a given: `It holds that a set of rules 
exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men'. 71n essence, before 
the rise of nationalism in the Balkan parts of the Ottoman empire, national identity 
meant primarily religious affiliation. But the collapse of the empire, and the 
transformation of the Islamic millets into societies based on national independence, was a 
dramatic change for all communities. 
1990), pp. 43-44. 
s See Zheliazkova, Razprostranenie na isliama. 1990. 
" See Ernest Gellner, `The Muslim Society', Cambridge Studies in SocialAnthropology, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, vol. 32, p. 5. 
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The new rulers were Christians and this was reflecting in their ideas about social order. In 
general Christianity was more open to the division of political and religious powers, `to 
give into Caesar that which is Caesar's'. In another words, the new national states, which 
emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman empire, were supposed to bring civil liberties 
in the spirit of the French Revolution. Yet at the same time, they retained their Oriental 
character, particularly from western European point of view. This was detectable in the 
desire to build up a monolithic social order, which could encompass the political and the 
spiritual. The new national states still had to compete with the old millet thinking. In this 
sense both Muslims and Bulgarians entered the new era of the Bulgarian national 
independence with similar experience. 
The Bulgarian Turks belonged to the community of Balkan Muslims, which is neither 
homogenous, nor has clear geographical boundaries. What united them was that they 
formed a minority, which lived in the middle of essentially Christian environment. They 
were also strongly associated with the former imperial power, the Ottoman empire and 
Turkey, also a young national state, which became their new mother-country. Thus they 
reminded Bulgarians of their `foreign' oppression. Islam was viewed as a hostile to the 
Eastern Orthodoxy. But in fact what made Bulgarian Muslims quite a specific 
community was their unconventional Islamic background. They were an overwhelmingly 
rural population with very little contact with the city. They professed a kind of folk Islam, 
which was viewed as a rather conservative but also unregulated faith whereas urban Islam 
was thought to be pure and pious. 
' Ibid., p. 1. 
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Balkan Muslims, including the Bulgarian Turks, have been known for their unorthodox 
beliefs, called heretical or mystic Islam. Scholars of Islam have shown interest in the 
Balkan sects and in the intermixing of the elements of Christianity and Islam in the 
rituals of the `Dervish', `Bektashia' or `Aliani' in Bulgaria e Their syncretism is thought to 
be rooted in the active interaction between the folk-Christianity and the folk-Islam which 
shaped a curious variety of Balkan Islam and adopted many non-Muslim features such as 
icons and baptism. Such influences could also be observed in the Balkan Muslims local 
cults, which were interpreted mostly as a reaction to the monotonous scholastic Islam. In 
this sense Bulgarian Islam communicated with the Christian beliefs, although not in a 
systematic manner. At the same time, the roots of Bulgarian Christianity are also quite 
ambiguous. Various medieval heresies played rather important roles in the shaping of the 
Balkan Christians' faith. The Christian Balkans were riddled by Manichean and non- 
Manichean (Paulicians) dualist heresies. Most notably Bogomilism, with its dualistic 
beliefs, is thought to have provided the whole region with the tendency towards 
heterodoxy that is often blamed for the conversion of Christians to Islam. 9 
There are many controversies surrounding Christian and Muslim heresies. But the main 
point in relation to Christian-Muslim relations in the Bulgarian lands is that the religious 
boundaries in the Balkans were quite fuzzy. Indeed from this point of view Bulgaria was 
on the crossroad between Christianity and Islam. Unconventional faiths on both sides 
offered bridges for coexistence and possibilities for identities to shift according to 
historical circumstances. Yet for the Bulgarians, the Greeks, the Serbs, the Macedonians, 
8 See Machiel Kiel, Studies on the Ottoman architecture on the Balkans: A legacy in 
Stone, Collected Studies Series CS326; 1. Balkan Countries. Ottoman Architecture, 
History (Great Britain: Variorum, 1990). 
See Norris, Islam in the Balkans. 1993.. 
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and the Romanians, Muslim minorities remained above all associated with Islam as a 
colonising force, which came from the alien Arab East. The conversions under foreign 
rule retained the meaning of being forcible and undesired. Later on religion was reflected 
in the political views of both Christians and Muslims. The Eastern Orthodoxy underlines 
the importance of the community above the individual. This is also the case with 
traditional Islam. Eastern Orthodoxy downplays the education of the church 
establishment and highlights the power of belief; Islam sees hierarchical order as 
designed by itself and does not have real clergy. 
These peculiarities of both religions are connected to the understanding of change, which 
both communities see as undesired. The still and inwardly orientated perspective Balkan 
Christians and Muslims share derives from their understanding of the finality of the 
absolute. When translated in political terms, this means to a great extent that people live 
in a community ruled by divine powers and individuals have little responsibility as to how 
the community life should be organised. This world view is often referred to as Balkan or 
Eastern European `Orientalism' as opposed to the Western Christian world associated 
with individualism and social dynamics. In Islam, religious and the civic powers merge. 
But there is also a corresponding Christian concept, namely the idea of Caesaropapirm, a 
political system in which the head of the state also has the power of the church, which is 
mostly associated with the Byzantine understanding of Christianity. Although this 
concept is not explicitly stated in Eastern Orthodoxy, historically it has been very close 
to the political powers. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, founded in 1870, marked the 
beginning of the Bulgarian national liberation movement, which resulted in state 
independence. Orthodoxy became the symbol of the Bulgarian nation and has been 
considered an inseparable part of Bulgarian national consciousness. 
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Thus the main similarity between Islam and Orthodoxy is the lack of division of powers 
and the blurring of the political and the spiritual. From the religious point of view the 
two communities were different of course, but also similar. What divided them was the 
political interpretations of the difference, the politics of nationalism, not their religious 
affiliation as such. 
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III. Turks and Bulgarian National Independence 
Bulgarian independence in 1878 dramatically changed the country's political elite. The 
position of Christians and Muslims was reversed. The Christians, previously governed by 
the Ottoman millet, became a majority in the new Bulgarian state, and the formerly 
dominant Muslims evolved into a minority within it. The new Bulgarian state institutions 
were created reflecting these new roles. Accordingly the Bulgarians became the legitimate 
holders of military power, previously forbidden to them by the Ottomans. Turkish 
people had to rely not only on the new state to make space for them, but also to organise 
themselves in a different way. The community was shattered by the dismantling of the 
old order and was not ready for the new one. 
The new Bulgarian law addressed the issue of Turkish minority rights. The 1878 Treaty 
of Berlin included provisions for freedom of worship. The Turkey-Bulgarian Convention 
of 1909 and the Turnovo Constitution of 1879 gave some guarantees for the rights of the 
Muslims. "' The Regional Assembly of Eastern Rumelia envisioned representation of the 
non-Bulgarian religious communities, although the Turks did not succeed in winning 
seats. Officially language provisions stated that any of the three major languages of the 
province could be used to in the Regional Assembly - Bulgarian, Greek or Turkish - but 
in reality Bulgarian was established as the official language. Underlining these new 
realities the new rulers also made some symbolic changes by converting some mosques 
into churches. Certain place names were changed from Turkish into Bulgarian. Yet the 
Turkish issue was not on the immediate agenda of the new Bulgarian rulers. The division 
of the country, at the Berlin Congress of 1878, the consequent Balkan wars and the First 
"' See Articles 40 and 41 from Turnovskata Konstitutsia, (Sofia: FTP, Seriya Documenti i 
Facti), P. M. 
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World \Var put forward the Macedonian question, which enormously troubled the 
Bulgarian political life. During this time Turkish people came in contact with the 
Bulgarian government mostly when they needed assistance to emigrate to Turkey. 
Bulgarian Turks did not struggle for their rights. They preferred to live undisturbed by 
the modernising processes, which were transforming the entire structure of social life. 
They also showed neither a desire to integrate into Bulgarian society, nor to oppose it. 
This social and political passivity was the beginning of their marginalisation in 
independent Bulgaria. Turkish presence was most visibly affected by Bulgarian rule when 
the names of the villages were massively changed in 1934 by the Damian Velchev-Kimon 
Georgiev government, which came to power after a coup d'etat. The administrative 
reforms it carried Bulgarised the names of two-thirds of all Turkish place names. " 
t' See Petur Kolcdarov and Nikolai NLIichcv, Promeni v imenata i statuta na selistata v 
Bulgaria: 1872-1972, (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1973). 
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IV. Bulgarian Turks and Turkey 
After Bulgarian independence the Bulgarian Turks continued to communicate with their 
kin in Turkey. In fact by having very minimal contact with Bulgarian society, the Turkish 
community preserved its unity and strong association with their mother-country. Turkey 
made numerous gestures by accepting the Bulgarian Turks through a number of 
immigration agreements with Bulgaria. Several distinct periods of Muslim emigration 
could be discerned according to the historical and structural changes of the independent 
Bulgarian state. The first one is the period of 1877-78 and its immediate aftermath. The 
immigration was a direct consequence of the success of the Bulgarian national liberation. 
The second period was from the mid 1880s until the arrival of the communists in power 
in 1944, when Turks were barely involved in political and the social institutions. Despite 
Turkish support in the Bulgarian war against Serbia of 1885, Bulgarians remained 
suspicious of the Turks loyalty to the Bulgarian state. The third was the regulated 
emigration waves according to different agreements between communist Bulgaria and 
Turkey. The fourth started with the mass exodus in 1989 and continues in smaller 
numbers to this day. During these periods, Turkey's position towards Bulgarian Turks 
kept changing. In general it was dictated by Turkey's defence of the rights of the Turkish 
minorities abroad. 
But what kind of a mother-country could Turkey be for the Bulgarian Turks? The 
modern Turkish state became a successor of the former imperial power in the Balkans, 
the Ottoman empire, which ruled the country for nearly five centuries. Understandably 
this complicated the relations between the two countries and reflected strongly on the 
attitudes towards the Turks in Bulgaria. They were often perceived both as a members of 
the `formerly dominant' class and as a potentially destabilising factor in the internal 
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politics of Bulgaria. Thus modern Turkey, which the Bulgarian Turks had as their mother 
country, was seen in Bulgaria as a threatening neighbour. The main complication for the 
identity of the Bulgarian Turks in relation to their mother country was that the mere idea 
of Turkish nationality was a very new one. It was born out of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman empire. Similarly to Bulgaria, Turkey also emerged as a modern state after the 
collapse of the empire. Both countries saw nationalism as a consolidating force of the 
political movement for the construction of national identities. Turkish nationalism, 
similarly to the Bulgarian and other Balkan nationalisms, brought major changes in the 
region. 
Strictly speaking the Bulgarian Turks were Ottoman subjects of Muslim faith, who after 
the collapse of the empire were supposed to identify with both the Bulgarian and the 
Turkish nation. After Bulgarian independence, the Turkish people who stayed had to 
transform their Ottoman, supra-national identity, into a national one. But they could not 
really develop as Bulgarian nationals because the idea was to build a Bulgarian one- 
nation-state. Neither could they keep up with the construction of the new Turkish 
national ideas in Turkey. As a result Bulgarian Turks fell largely outside the nation- 
formation processes in both Bulgaria and Turkey. They remained connected but also 
disconnected and somehow `in-between' these two countries. The new nation-states, 
Bulgaria and Turkey, offered them very little choice in this respect. In Bulgaria they were 
repeatedly encouraged to leave whereas once in Turkey the pressure was to assimilate 
into a very new Turkish style of life. As Crampton argues, `the Kemalist revolution 
meant that Turkey itself was now employing the modernising, secularising policies, which 
had so offended many Bulgarian Turks in the post-liberation years; this did not however 
deter many Turks from leaving Bulgaria for a new life in their neighbouring nation- 
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state'. lrThe notion that Turkey had an agenda towards the Turkish minorities living 
outside its borders added to the Bulgarian Turks' anxieties. " Bulgarian Turks were aware 
of the uncertainties of their future but did almost nothing to protect themselves. The 
future was to bring many more challenges than they ever expected. 
12 See Crampton, `The Turks in Bulgaria' in Karpat, The Turks of Bulgaria, p. 71. 
"The Bulgarian communist and post-communist politicians and intellectuals make 
particular reference to the Cyprus problem, which became acute in the 1970s and 
remains unsolved to this day. 
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V. Bulgarian Turks under Communism 
The Turkish community was not part of the political debate in Bulgaria during the 
Second World War. Rather Bulgarian Turks rather continued their life on the margins of 
the Bulgarian society. The arrival of communism in Bulgaria after the end of the war 
dramatically changed this state of affairs. Most importantly communism demanded 
response and accountability from all citizens of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. 
Although one could be an insignificant member of the new communist society, it was 
hardly possible to remain outside it. This meant that Bulgarian Turks could hardly sustain 
their political passivity. Under communism everyone had a duty to participate in the 
building of a perfect society. Minorities issues were openly part of the immediate 
communist agenda in Bulgaria after the end of the Second World War. But what made 
the Turkish community very different from the rest of the ethnic Bulgarian minorities 
was its size. Turks were the largest minority in the country. Even if the results of the 
censuses carried out in communist Bulgaria in 1965 and 1975 adjusted the numbers in 
order to undermine it, it was largely acknowledged that Turks always made up about 10 
percent of the Bulgarian population after 1944.14 
Until 1984 when the forcible assimilation campaign took place, the ethnic Turks were 
recognised officially as a `national minority' in communist Bulgaria, along with other 
14 According to the data in the report submitted to the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of BCP defining the approximate size of the main minorities in 1989, there 
were 844,000 Turks living in Bulgaria. The results of the last census conducted in 1992 
estimated 800,000 Turks in the country. 
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minorities including Roma, Jews, Armenians but excluding Macedonians and Pomaks. 15 
However this recognition was not without reservations about the very idea of the 
existence of national minorities in Bulgaria. The first Constitution of the People's 
Republic of Bulgaria of 4 December 1947 stated: `National minorities have a right to be 
educated in their vernacular, and to develop their vernacular, and to develop their 
national culture. ' The 1971 Constitution marked a shift towards the marginalisation of 
the minorities' status. It made no specific reference to ethnic minorities in Bulgaria and 
spoke about `citizens of non-Bulgarian origins'. " In 1975 the section recording 
nationality was removed form the personal identity cards of all Bulgarian citizens. In 
1984 the passports of the renamed Turks were changed and issued with their Bulgarian 
names and in 1990 the new law allowed the change to be reversed according the new 
politics towards the Turkish minority. 
Similarly to its approach to the Macedonian question, the BCP could not design a 
consistent policy towards the Turkish issue and its approach kept changing. But whereas 
the policy towards the Macedonian question was conducted mainly according to the 
changes of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations, in the case of the Bulgarian Turks, it was 
directed mostly from within the BCP. The Turkish issue was considered an internal 
matter, whereas the Macedonian question involved sensitivities concerning the relations 
between the socialist states. Of course the fact that the mother-country Turkey was in the 
`enemy's bloc', a member of NATO and a state with long history of hostile relations with 
Russia and the Soviet Union, continued to shape the policy towards the Turkish 
'S The Pomaks or the Bulgarian Mohameds are from Slav origins. They speak Bulgarian 
as their mother tongue but arc of Islamic faith and are largely believed to have converted 
to Islam during Ottoman times. 
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minority. It was much easier to sever dialogue with Turkey on the grounds of leading an 
ideological battle against the capitalist world then to explain a disruption of Bulgarian- 
Yugoslav relations. Yet the BCP policy towards the Turkish minority was not dependent 
on international affairs and relations between Sofia and Ankara. The driving force behind 
the communist approach was the way the Bulgarian communist establishment saw the 
Turkish presence within the country. This in turn revealed the nature of communist 
power in relation to ethnicity in Bulgaria. 
Initially, on the level of rhetoric ethnic-conflict management under Bulgarian 
communism sought full integration of the national minorities into the Bulgarian 
communist nation. The theory was that socialist citizens could be of any nationality. In 
practice those who were not Bulgarian were encouraged to leave the country. In 1949, 
the head of the communist party, Vulko Chervenkov, introduced severe Sovietisation 
into Bulgarian economic and social life. He was a determined Stalinist, who saw 
minorities' issues as a problem to be solved as soon as possible. Under his rule, the 
Bulgarian government tried to settle the Turkish question by negotiating their mass 
resettlement. Bulgaria and Turkey reached agreement over their emigration and by 1950 
the authorities received about 250,000 applications for emigration. As a result, between 
1949 and 1951, the largest number of those who applied were able to leave. The Turkish 
government complained that it could not accept such a huge mass of people at once and 
that among those crossing the border there were Gypsies. Consequently it introduced a 
strict entry-visa regime and closed the border. It also claimed that Bulgarian officials 
forged documents for the Turks to enable them to leave. '? Turks also left because of 
'6 See Veselin Mctodiev and Luchezar Stoinaov (eds. ), Bulgarski Konstitutsii i 
Konstitutsionni Prockti, (Sofia: D-r Petur Beron, 1990). 
" See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, (London: Minority 
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pressure exerted on them to collectivise the land. As most of them were engaged in the 
agricultural production, this had an enormous effect on their life. Collectivisation 
programs put them in a particularly unfavourable position and they chose to leave the 
country. 
During the 1950s communist propaganda described the Turkish minority as an equal 
participant in the building of a glorious socialist state. Turkish achievements were 
underlined in contrast to the discrimination they experienced under the monarch-fascist 
regime of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie. '" Most importantly, during this period, Bulgarian 
Turks were still recognised as a an ethnic group living in Bulgaria. Although the idea 
clearly was to let as many as possible to move to Turkey, those who chose to stay were 
acknowledged as a presence in the Bulgarian Iife. During the 1960s reforms in Bulgaria 
failed and the country entered a new period of stagnation. This reflected directly on the 
position of the Turkish minority. The negotiated mass resettlement of Turks under 
Bulgarian communism soon came to an end. In 1968 there was another agreement, 
which allowed the departure of relatives, who had left previously. This was the last 
Rights Publications, 1991), p. 119. 
" Official publications described the participation of the Turks and other minorities in 
the partisan struggle as a starting point in their socialist integration. See The Turkish 
Minority in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1951. This pamphlet was essentially an 
essay on the emigration of the Bulgarian Turks. It asserted that Turkish emigration was 
not involuntary as suggested by the Turkish government. Additionally it claimed that the 
Bulgarian Turks were not at all encouraged to leave Bulgaria. In the typical Stalinist style 
of the time Turkish accusations of the Bulgarian mistreatment of the Turkish minority 
were described as an expression of the British-American imperialist's designs against the 
Soviet system and Bulgaria itself. It reversed the accusations by asserting that it was the 
Turkish government who manipulated national and religious feelings of the Turks and 
then created obstacles on their way to Turkey. 
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resettlement agreement; it expired in 1978. During the 1970s information about the 
Turkish immigration became scarce and gradually the issue stopped being discussed. In 
1973 the Turkish foreign minister visited Bulgaria and discussed the issue of repatriation 
again. Turkey was concerned that too many people wanted to leave and the government 
slowed down the issuing of visas, arguing that they were still better off in Bulgaria. '" 
Yet this policy was not clearly articulated. The Bulgarian approach was either to move 
the Muslim population, or to cover up the problem, hoping that it would fade away. At 
the same time the communist authorities paraded the ideological aspects of the Turkish 
issue. They proclaimed that it was about the confrontation between capitalist imperialism 
and just communism. Turks who stayed should be grateful to Bulgaria; those who left 
ought to be forgotten. 
See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans, 1991, and Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim 
Minorities of Bulgaria, (London: Hurst & Company as Book Series No. 6 of the Institute 
of Muslim Minorities Affairs, 1997). 
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VI. Turkish Education Under Bulgarian Communism 
During the 1950s Turks in Bulgaria had a separate education in Turkish language. The 
main condition attached to it was that it had to have socialist content. During this 
Stalinist period, which was the most constraining period of the Bulgarian intellectual 
development, Turkish education reached its highest point. The Sovietisation of the 
educational system promoted education in minorities' languages. The Soviet ideas were 
based on their experience with the Muslim and Turkic speaking people in Central Asia. 
They were copied in Bulgaria with little idea of long-term development. But gradually the 
idea of a separate Turkish education was transformed into a merging with Bulgarian 
schooling. At the end of the 1960s Turkish language schools were combined with 
Bulgarian schools and by the early 1970s teaching Turkish ceased to exist altogether. 
The main consequence of this uneven policy was that the Turkish minority was 
prevented of creating its own educated class. Initially Turkish education was about 
educating Turks in communism in Turkish language. Later on it was about assimilating 
them into the Bulgarian culture through education in Bulgarian language. The 
Department of Turkish Philology at the University of Sofia was admitting a considerable 
number of ethnic Turks from a politically sound background. This seeming educational 
integration meant actually recruiting the more educated members of the community into 
the security services, which observed them strictly once they were in the university 
system. In effect the party controlled the Turkish elite and the professional development 
of its community members. Moreover the Faculty of Turkish Philology admitted 
exclusively `reliable' Bulgarians, who were also placed under the stringent control of the 
security services. In this way the state controlled fully the Turkish elite, which was 
anyway quite small. Thus education under Bulgarian communism facilitated the `co- 
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optation' of the Turkish intelligentsia in Lustick's terms. 2 There was an additional 
pressure on those who were trusted to be party members to register regularly their loyalty 
to the Bulgarian state, which meant devotion to the communist party. Turks were 
constantly criticised for lacking sufficient `socialist consciousness'. In fact the BCP 
expressed general concern about the `political correctness' of the whole community; it 
was very often disparaged as backward. Ethnic Bulgarians were still considered regular 
members of the socialist society, even if they were not communist party members, 
whereas a Turk, even when a party member, remained a reactionary element. On average 
the highest post that a Turkish communist could obtain was District Party Committee 
chairman. In the 1970s there was one Turkish member of the higher structures of the 
BCP, the Central Committee, and he had a Bulgarian name, Kalin Kalinov 2' 
Despite the great efforts to re-educate the Turks, Turkish language remained a major 
problem for the communist authorities. Although it was used exclusively inside the 
community, it continued to be the native language of the Bulgarian Turks. It defined the 
ethnic boundaries, and most importantly, as Kymlicka asserts, when maintaining the 
minority language implies disloyalty, the society becomes ethnically divided "22 
The Faculty 
of Turkish philology was closed in 1974 and replaced by a department of Eastern 
(Arabic) Languages. After that the Turkish department reopened irregularly. The majority 
of the students in these departments were children of the Bulgarian diplomatic staff 
working in the Arabic countries. In general those who studied Turkish were officially or 
unofficially either serving as `informers' or expected to do so after graduation. This 
20 See Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority, 
(Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1980). 
21 See RFC, Bulgarian SR/5,27 May 1986. 
22 See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minori y Rights, 
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situation continued until the late 1980s and reached its highest point through the close 
collaboration between the security services and the experts in Turkish language and 
Ottoman culture during the assimilation campaign of 1984-85. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 97. 
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VII. Demographic Concerns and the `Revival Process' 
Bulgarian Turks traditionally maintained more closed family structures compared to 
ethnic Bulgarians. Living in social isolation generally strengthens familial allegiances. 
Kymlica observes that when a minority is not integrated into the mainstream life, the 
family becomes the social refuge from a hostile and alien `other' society. 23 Communism 
encouraged Turkish marginalisation without realising that it may strengthen the ethnic 
consciousness of the community. The only organised form of Turkish life was the 
community with its ethnic ties: common language, religion and family bonds. This 
exposed the Bulgarian Turks as different from the majority and made them a vulnerable 
community. But they lived dispersed in the cultural and geographical margins of the 
communist state. Somehow Turkish ethnic identity was accepted as a matter of fact by 
the Bulgarian population. Yet the BCP decided that there was something wrong about 
having Turks in Bulgaria. It was very concerned about the demographic development of 
the nation. The message was that Bulgarian people had to expand as a socialist nation 
and a high birth rate was to be one of the many achievements of communism. 24 But the 
demographic growth of the Turkish population was regarded as a major threat to the 
future of the Bulgarian nation. The problem was how to deal with the ethnic minorities' 
demographic development. In theory they were also part of the socialist nation, as long 
as they were being loyal to the Bulgarian political state. Accordingly they should have 
been also encouraged to increase their number. During the late 1960s, a special state 
policy was introduced in order to encourage the growth of the birth rates. The state 
23 Ibid., p. 103. 
24 The BCP's demographic policy never acquired the dimensions which communist 
Romania did under Nicolae Ceausescu. Nevertheless in both countries the idea that 
successful nations must expand demographically as much as possible was fundamental to 
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provided various child and family benefits and imposed some restrictions on abortion for 
married women. It was applied indiscriminately towards everyone, including the Turkish 
community. At the same time the Turks lived predominantly in the countryside and 
couldn't get extra flats on the basis of having an extended family, which was the most 
desired award; the cash benefits were not that generous. But many ordinary Bulgarians 
viewed that it was wrong for the ethnic minorities to enjoy the same benefits. It was 
generally felt that these were too many, Turks and in particular Roma and their numbers 
needed not to be expanded . 
25 The BCP designed this policy deliberately to encourage the 
enlargement of the ethnic Bulgarians. But it could not direct it towards the ethnic 
Bulgarians only because there was no way to make the distinction without bridging the 
law in a very obvious manner. Yet the policy was inspired by the fear that Bulgarians 
would be outnumbered by Turks. This contradiction created a strong insecurity about 
Bulgarian demography. 
Bulgarian communism could not escape the traditional `fear of extinction' characteristic 
of many Eastern European people. Z` This worked in combination with communists' 
search for new legitimacy in nationalism and led to the eruption of ethnic violence during 
the 1980s. The demographic policy increased the general concern and was seen as one of 
the reasons to carry out the `Revival process'. Eminov suggests that at that time the 
demographic issue was particularly sensitive because of the then forthcoming census, 
communist politics of nationalism. 
25 See Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, 1997. 
ZG For full definition of the term in the context of the political traditions of Eastern 
Europe see George Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe: 1945-1992, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), pp. 5-38. In the Bulgarian case the `fear of extinction' is reflected in the 
myth of the long suffering of the Bulgarian nation according to which the Ottomans 
aimed to destroy the Bulgarian people. 
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which might have registered a higher number of ethnic Turks then the BCP thought was 
acceptable? 7 
27 Sec Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities, p. 95. 
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VIII. The Background of the `Revival process' (1984-85) 
The failure to reform the BCP during the 1960s, the consequent political stagnation, 
which in the 1970s embraced all aspects of life in Bulgaria, as well as the economic 
decline, exposed Bulgarian communism as an incapable regime. Soviet style 
internationalism continued to be the official ideology of Bulgarian socialism, but after the 
events in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981, it was widely 
discredited. Communism everywhere in Eastern Europe was in question. Although 
communism in Bulgaria was not damaged in the same obvious manner as in Poland or 
Hungary, by the 1980s it was in a deep crisis. The legitimacy of the communist regime 
was hard to maintain and it was strongly felt that the future would hardly bring the full 
implementation of the communist promise. Moreover Bulgarian communism had very 
little to offer as an alternative. National sensitivities were sharpened. With the Bulgarian 
cultural nationalism unsatisfied and the ethnic groups facing discrimination. It seemed 
that Bulgaria lost everything under communism, including its national pride. Yet whereas 
to blame the Soviet Union seemed inappropriate for the Bulgarian public and absolutely 
inconceivable for the BCP, activating the internal national questions still seemed in the 
hands of the Bulgarian communist rulers. How did exactly the BCP came to the decision 
to organise the `Revival process' and what triggered it remains unclear. No party 
statement or any other written document has been uncovered until today, which can 
adequately explain the way party's decision was taken. However the facts about the 
manner in which the campaign was carried have been established quite clearly. 
Interpreting them in the context of the communist party policy, the intellectual 
environment and the general state of mind in Bulgaria during the 1980s, tells the story of 
the `Revival process'. 
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Essentially the `Revival process' mobilised public opinion and polarised Bulgarian politics 
on the ethnic issues. The old and powerful myth of the long suffering of the Bulgarian 
nation under the Ottoman rule, which communism enhanced systematically, was brought 
into political life and charged with new energy. It was used to legitimise the use of 
violence against the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. Later the `Revival process' was facilitated 
by the marginalised position of the Turkish minority. Turks were badly informed in 
general about political developments in Bulgaria and abroad and were not politically 
organised. The majority of them relied mainly on the goodwill of the Bulgarian 
communist masters and did not understand their real importance for the ideas of 
Bulgarian ethnic nationalism. The lack of independent media in communist Bulgaria was 
a major factor for the success of the campaign. So were the realities of the Cold War, 
when the international community outside the Soviet block could do very little to stop 
the ethnic violence in Bulgaria. Also essential for the campaign was the support of the 
Bulgarian communist military leadership and the Bulgarian intellectuals. 
In late 1984 Bulgarian authorities initiated a massive campaign to forcibly change the 
names of all ethnic Turks. The Bulgarian authorities stated officially that ethnic Turks 
were descendants of Slav Bulgarians who were forcibly converted to Islam under 
Ottoman rule. It was declared that they voluntarily and spontaneously wanted their 
Bulgarian names back as a symbolic `rebirth' of their Bulgarian nationality. The whole 
process was named `The Revival process' (VuZroditelen proces), which was an allusion to 
the Bulgarian Renaissance during the late 18`x' century (VuZraZhdane). The BCP 
orchestrated and controlled the campaign. The message was very clear - the national 
questions were going to be dealt with actively and the party rhetoric was to be turned 
into `deeds'. In effect the BCP officially declared that Bulgaria was to be transformed 
into a homogenous ethnic nation-state. It also signalled that in this respect the BCP 
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could handle matters alone, which was supposed to compensate for the lack of 
independence from Moscow. At a time when the communist regime in Bulgaria was 
facing maximum insecurity, it would play the nationalist card to win maximum support. 
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IX. Changing the Names 
The main purpose of the campaign was to replace the names of ethnic Turks with 
Bulgarian ones. But the `Revival process' was also about eliminating all signs of 
Turkishness in the country. Apart from involving the change of personal names, the 
names of the dead forefathers, on gravestones, in public office records, reference books, 
literature were to be erased. Bulgarian communism had decided to eradicate the ethnic, 
the cultural and the historic evidence of Turkish life in Bulgaria. In practice using Turkish 
names was forbidden and fines were introduced for speaking Turkish language in public 
places or on the phone. There was also a new burial ritual imposed by the state on 
Muslims and there was a complete ban on the circumcision of infants. Circumcision was 
made punishable by law and there were checks on the new- born baby boys. With the 
new regulations an official from the local government or a militiaman had to accompany 
any Turkish burial to ensure that it was carried out in a `civilian' manner. Turkish 
cemeteries were closed down and many were desecrated. 2' 
During the campaign the policy of the Bulgarian government to co-opt the Turkish elite 
intensified. The Muslim clergy was targeted. All Turkish officials were summoned for 
instruction on how to help the campaign as well as to report back on the results. The 
security services put pressure on many ethnic Bulgarians who were in touch with Turkish 
people to report on them. `'' Mosques were divided into two categories: official, ones 
Z" See Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks: Human Rights Abuses During the 
Forced Assimilation of the Ethnic Turkish Minority, (London: Amnesty International, 
1986). 
27 Bulgarian students, who studied at the Faculty of Oriental Studies at the University of 
Sofia at that time, recalled in conversations with me how they were approached by the 
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which had a government- appointed leader and non-official ones, which did not. The 
latter were closed and some were destroyed. Many mosques were damaged by abusive 
inscriptions. Some of the closed mosques were turned into museums and had the sign 
'Museum of Bulgarian Muslims' on the locked doors. The half-crescent which is 
normally on the top of the minaret was removed because it was associated with Turkish 
national symbols. In March 1985 `The Muslim Leaders' Letter on Religious Freedom' vas 
officially released. It declared that opposite to the Western sources of information and 
the Ankara summoning of the ambassadors of the Islamic countries the Bulgarian 
government gives all the freedom for religious expression and cares about the Islamic 
monuments. It argues that Islam is a world religion and `each Muslim is entitled to his or 
her nation's name. ' It was signed by the Chief Mufti and the regional imiftier of seven big 
towns who all had Bulgarian names. The main purpose of the declaration was to object 
the Turkish foreign ministry that no foreign institution has the right to be the 
`spokesman for Islam'. 3i 
But how was the `Revival process' met by the Turkish people? The campaign seems to 
have come as a surprise for the majority of the Turkish people in Bulgaria. Some of them 
hoped that the campaign would bypass them; others tried to escape or hide. There were 
some attempts to organise peaceful protests but most were crushed at the beginning. 
Very importantly the Bulgarian police managed to crush perhaps the most important 
form of Turkish political resistance at the very start. Ahmed Dogan, a Turkish Marxist 
security services and asked to submit any information they had about Turkish people 
they knew. 
30 RFE, SWB EE/7894/B/1,8 March 1985. 
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intellectual based in Sofia, was imprisoned in 1986 for anti-government activity. 31 
Another form of Turkish protest was organised terrorist activities. Although they were 
rather sporadic and relatively harmless, the occurrence of any actions of this type was 
extremely worrisome for the Bulgarian communist authorities. In 1986 there was a series 
of bombings at the station in Plovdiv, the airport in Varna, Sliven and Kazanluk. The 
Turkish embassy in Sofia was guarded tightly to prevent any gathering of demonstrations 
or Turks entering with complaints or asking for political asylum. The private mail of the 
majority of Turkish people was strictly checked and in some cases the security services 
asked for private letters written in Turkish to be translated into Bulgarian. 32 Most of the 
ethnic Turks detained during the campaign were imprisoned in Belene, the notorious 
prison camp on an island in the Danube where during the 1950s a large number of 
political prisoners were held. 33 The use of the labour camp and the internal banishment, 
as well as the official language used during the campaign, showed that the communist 
government policy was reverting to the methods and the rhetoric of the 1950s. 
" After the changes in 1989 Ahmed Dogan claimed publicly that he run an illegal 
organisation of 220 members who gathered information for Amnesty International, 
BBC, Radio Free Europe (RFE), the US Congress. However the organisation's activities 
were sporadic and information about them began to appear in the foreign media only in 
1985. 
32 Stefan Andrecv. Interview. Sofia: 1996. Andreev is a reputable Ottoman scholar and a 
deputy director of the Bulgarian National Library `Cyril and Methodius', Sofia. He told 
me that the translation of private Turkish correspondence became a profitable business 
for Bulgarians who knew Turkish during the campaign and afterwards. 
" See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans, 1991. He estimated that in the early 1985 there were 
detained between 500 and 1000 Turkish prisoners in connection with the campaign. 
There were no trials and many of them were released after several months; afterwards 
some of them were exiled internally. Many times they were charged with `hooliganism', a 
term popular during Stalinism. Yet others were tried for `anti-state agitation' or `anti-state 
espionage'. 
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After 1985 the publication of the Turkish language paper `Nova Stetlina' (`I eniAsik) 
became available in Bulgarian language only. Its editor in chief was invited to speak about 
the Turkish issue at the party congress in 1986. The idea was to show that the `Revival 
process' was a voluntary action of the Turkish people, who themselves wanted to `revert' 
to their Bulgarian identity. The national media reported that many Turks, of the so called 
`new Bulgarians', spoke about their approval of the re-naming campaign. But in a 
number of cases the identity of these allegedly Turkish representatives could not be 
established. 34 Even if the co-optation of the Turkish elite had been quite successful 
during the previous years, at that moment, very few Turks were prepared to co-operate 
with the BCP on anti-Turkish grounds. On the contrary the campaign sharpened ethnic 
awareness as it became increasingly clear that Turks were treated differently from any 
Bulgarian. 
At the same time several public figures, ethnic Turks, escaped to Turkey and gave 
evidence about the campaign in Bulgaria. The former member of the Bulgarian National 
Assembly Halil Ibishev, among other things, said that Grisha Filipov, a high ranking 
Bulgarian party official, warned him in advance that there was going to be a renaming 
campaign, but that it was aimed at changing the names of Turkish women married to 
Bulgarian men. He also claimed that the same official told him, that the orders came 
from the leader of the country, Todor Zhivkov himself. Ibishev did not speculate about 
possible Soviet complicity in the campaign and suggested that it had been launched 
34 See RFE, SR/5,27 May 1986. There was the case of Stoyan Mctodiev allegedly from 
Haskovo who was also named Bonev on the national radio. Also the previous name of 
Angel Nikolov, a Pomak awarded as `Hero of the Socialist Labour' could not be traced. 
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because of fear of the rapid growth of the Turkish population. 35 Another well known 
Bulgarian Turk who escaped was the Turkish weight-lifting champion Naim 
Suleimanoglu. He also made his way to Turkey and at a press conference spoke openly 
about the maltreatment of the Turkish minority in the country. These reports were 
complemented by Amnesty International reports about the abuse of human rights in 
Bulgaria, which were officially denied by the head of the Bulgarian radio. " The Bulgarian 
authorities had little space to manoeuvre. They chose to deny all accusations concerning 
the abuse of human rights in the country led by the belief that the problem with the 
`Revival process' would somehow fade away. 
Meanwhile the eyes of the Bulgarian Turks as well as of the international community 
were turned to Turkey. In January 1985 the Turkish President, Kenan Evren, delivered 
the first of four protest notes, calling for the Bulgarian authorities to end the campaign 
and to reach a new emigration agreement. Bulgarian officials replied that there were no 
Turks in Bulgaria and that there would be no negotiations with Turkey and no 
emigration. " The rest of the Islamic world also expressed serious concern about the 
Bulgarian Turks. In 1987 the Organisation of Islamic Countries sent delegation to visit 
Bulgaria and as a result, the UN special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance for the 
Human Rights Committee named Bulgaria as one of seven countries systematically 
preventing the peaceful practice of religion. 
He spoke about the `Bulgarian national socialist consciousness' and said that the Turks 
were profoundly convinced of their `ancestral Bulgarian roots'. 
See RFE, SR/8,9 September 1986. 
Ibid., p. 2. 
RFE, SR /5,28 March 1985. 
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The combination of economic and administrative sanctions, the threats and the control 
of the media was effective as far as the majority of the Turkish people assumed their new 
names and the Bulgarian community remained largely passive. But the changing of the 
names strengthened the ethnic consciousness of the Turkish community and by no 
means helped their assimilation as were the communist intentions. Despite the seeming 
lack of action and feeling that no one from the outside world could do anything, the 
international awareness of the violation of the rights of the Bulgarian Turks increased. 
Turkey was very cautious, but also quite persistent. 
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X. Bulgarian and Turkish Dissent in the Aftermath of the `Revival process' 
The `Revival process' relied heavily on the intellectual background of the campaign to 
legitimise it. The regime was confident that the Bulgarian national media would support 
it. Most of the people who worked in the national media were of strictly `politically 
correct' background and many of them were members of the party themselves. The 
vetting procedures for recruiting staff for television, radio and national newspapers were 
very strict. This assured the smooth running of the party propaganda machine in general 
and in times of crisis in particular. As a result Bulgarian media were severely censored 
and controlled and the intelligentsia was mobilised to defend the nation against foreign 
subversive elements. After the campaign was over in 1985 the recruitment of informers 
for the security services among the Bulgarian intelligentsia intensified. The secret services 
were particularly interested in people with education in humanities, who were involved in 
research, held public posts and were connected in any way to questions of nationality in 
Bulgaria. " 
The campaign aimed to legitimise the ethnic violence by implementing it within the 
existing legal framework. The authorities did not issue any written orders for changing 
names; the resistance to the campaign was not reported; the use of violence was not 
admitted. Since the army's activities were considered state secrets, its involvement in the 
violence that accompanied the campaign was legally unquestionable. There was no 
" Members of intellectual institutions such as the Institute of Balkan Studies and the 
Institute of the History of the Bulgarian literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 
shared with me how they were approached by the security services with offers to work 
for them on the Turkish issue and promised to be rewarded. Interviews. Sofia, 1996. 
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official legal ban on religious practice either. The regime tried to say that what was going 
on with the Turks was lawful. 
In order to deal with the concerns expressed inside and outside Bulgaria about the 
treatment of the Turks the BCP made an attempt to build up its own human rights 
profile. Thus when in 1988 six Bulgarian dissidents set up the Independent Association 
for the Defence of Human Rights in Bulgaria, the authorities responded by registering 
officially an organisation named the Human Rights Committee, chaired by Konstantin 
Telalov, a former ambassador to the UN and a high-ranking party figure. The BCP 
resorted to creating a parallel structure to the dissident one. This signalled that the 
emergence of alternative political life in Bulgaria so worried the regime that it was not 
enough simply to repress it. It was more important to delegitimisc it by setting up a 
government organisation with the same function. This also ensured that regarding 
human rights issues, foreign officials and journalists had to contact the official sources 
first. 
During the period of 1988-89, within a matter of six months Turks outnumbered 
Bulgarians in the Independent Association. This was the first dissident organisation in 
Bulgaria under communism. It was genuinely interested in the Turkish issue. It also 
understood that Bulgaria's violation of international agreements was a way to attract 
outside attention to communist Bulgaria. In late 1988 a specifically Turkish civil rights 
group within Bulgaria was formed. The Democratic League for the Defence of the 
Human Rights aimed to oppose the assimilation campaign and the repression of Islam. It 
applied for official registration and was refused. 
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At the same time the authorities tried to counter these activities organising campaigns of 
visits and speeches. The prime minister and Politburo member Grisha Filipov visited 
Kurdjali and other towns where Turks lived compactly. He called for the transformation 
of the region into `a fortress of the Bulgarian spirit' and prosperity. The newspaper 
published in Blagoevgrad, Pirnuko Delo, reported that Dimitur Stanishev, a member of 
the Central Committee, visited the city and announced that `there is not a single section 
of the Bulgarian people that belongs to another nation'. " Dimitar Stoianov, the Interior 
minister and Politburo member, spoke about the change of names as an action 
objectively serving the cause of peace and good neighbourliness in the region and in 
Europe, because it created better conditions for building and developing Bulgarian 
relations with Turkey on a `consequently sound and clear basis. ", 
The BCP continued to insist that the rule of law was in place and that communism was 
the only desired regime in Bulgaria. But the widespread belief was that the politics of the 
country were highly ethnicised, that the old order was shaking, and that the regime was 
loosing ground. Nobody quite knew what would the future bring, but in the spring of 
1989 the smell of change was in the air. 
39 See RFE, SR /5,12 May 1985. 
"' Ibid. 
291 
XI. `The Exodus' of the Bulgarian Turks 
At the beginning of May 1989 hunger strikes accompanied by demonstrations started in 
the Turkish regions. By mid June more followed and the authorities responded with 
violence. The situation became explosive and the BCP policy changed dramatically. All 
those Turks who disagreed with the Bulgarian policy of assimilation were officially 
permitted to emigrate. In May 1989, Todor Zhivkov himself addressed the nation on 
television and appealed to the Turkish government to open the border and let go those 
who want to go to Turkey to remain there. On the 2 June his speech was published in 
Narodna Kultura, the newspaper largely read by the Bulgarian intelligentsia. In his speech 
the Bulgarian leader underlined the achievements of the socialist revolution, which pulled 
the Muslim population out of the dark ages of backwardness, that Bulgaria is a society in 
the period of restructuring (`perestroika) in all spheres of life, and that in respect of all 
international conventions every citizen has the right to travel. He called Turkey's policy 
anti-Bulgarian and finally and most importantly stated that Turkey should open her 
border for the Bulgarian Turks. Zhivkov relied on appealing to the traditional Bulgarian 
national sentiment of being the long suffering nation, which never lost its pride: `The 
Bulgarian people will not fall on its knees ... every citizen will support the oneness of the 
Bulgarian people. ' ;' 
Thousands of the Bulgarian Turks started the journey to Turkey, which became known 
as `the big excursion'. By August 1989 about 300,000 left the country. The authorities 
declared that they were leaving voluntary because they were disloyal and ungrateful for 
what Bulgaria had done for them. Yet the truth was that the authorities put pressure on 
many Turks to leave. Some were given notices of 24 hours, others were invited 
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unofficially to leave. 42 This was accompanied by organised anti-Turkish demonstrations 
in major towns in the Turkish regions and other centres, including the capital, Sofia. At 
the same time many institutions were asked to send telegrams in support of Zhivkov's 
speech; schools and colleges were summoned to demonstrate. The idea was to counter 
the Turkish demonstrations. It was supposed to be a spontaneous manifestation of 
national unity. In fact it was an organised ethnic confrontation orchestrated by the state 
leadership. These mass rallies became the most effective tool of extracting popular 
support. It had been a long time since Bulgarians had had the chance to demonstrate 
`against' and not `in support of', as it always was under communism. For the first time 
they were given the chance to march on the streets with nationalist slogans, such as 
`Bulgaria for the Bulgarians' and `Death to the Enemy'. To use Kertzer's term, `the 
politics of carnival' expressed the feelings of national solidarity: `The rites with which 
people cope with crises and conflict are not just products of a political elite, whether 
conservative or revolutionary. On the contrary, one of the most important aspects of 
such rites is that they provide a means for the powerless to take power, for the people 
lacking any formal means of political control to have a political influence. Through rites 
the powerless can overcome their politically debilitating isolation, their lack of 
bureaucratic organisation, and be united to challenge the position of the elite. '43 The 
marches symbolised the readiness for mobilisation based on national unity, which the 
communists used for their own purposes. 
41 Sec Todor Zhivkov, `Speech', ATarodua Kul/nra, 2 June, 1989. 
4' In 1996 I interviewed members of Turkish family in Sofia and Novi Pazar, who 
returned from Turkey. According to them the Bulgarian authorities gave them a very 
short notice to leave although they were not willing to go. 
43 David I. Kertzer, Ritual. Politics and Power, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1988), p. 144. 
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The demonstrations against the Turks were supplemented with sponsored cultural events 
such as the release of the film `Vrenre Razdelno' (Time to Divide) based on the popular 
novel by Anton Donchev. It was a popular melodrama about the forcible Islamisation of 
the Bulgarians under Ottoman rule. 44 Many Bulgarians identified with the symbolic 
images of the oppression of the Bulgarian nation and responded very emotionally. It is 
with a background of such ritualised and publicised Bulgarian national sentiments that 
the Turkish exodus took place. 
44 See Anton Donchev, Vreme razdelno: istoricheski roman, (Sofia: Bulgarski Pisatel, 
1964). 
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XII. The Intellectuals' Response to the `Revival Process' 
The idea behind the communist policy towards the Turkish question was to eliminate 
ethnic difference in Bulgaria. As suggested earlier, the anti-Turkish campaign could not 
be legitimised without the intellectual support of the Bulgarian elite. The regime had to 
justify the policy of forcible assimilation, and the only way to do this was to design a 
concept on the Bulgarian national question which could convince public opinion and 
satisfy the ideological requirements of the communist party. The theory had to match the 
practice, not the other way around. The call was to re-work Bulgarian national history in 
order to justify the communist policy. The Bulgarian communist historiography had to 
answer the question - why do the Turks have to change their names now? The answer 
was given by the communist party, and the historians had to conceptualise it. What made 
the task possible was the fact that there were many intellectuals who believed that the 
communist policy was in principle correct. The Turks were actually ethnic Bulgarians 
who were forced to convert to Islam under the Ottoman rule. They were misled and now 
was the time to correct the mistakes of the past. But the leading factor in this process 
was the idea of communist Bulgaria as a homogenous nation-state. Intellectuals were 
employed in the main institutions engaged in the `Revival process': the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences (BAN), the universities and the media. Among the most important 
contributors to the construction of the theory of the Bulgarian ethnic background of the 
Turks were Angel Balevski (chairman of BAN), Professor Hristo I-Iristov (historian), 
Strashimir Dimitrov (historian), Orlin Zagorov (historian, previously named Shukri 
Tahirov), Professor Petar Petrov (historian), Professor Ilcho Dimitrov (historian). 
Leading Bulgarian experts in the field of Ottoman Studies were also mobilised to support 
the theory with historical evidence the theory, including more open minded historians of 
the Ottoman period, such as Elena Grozdanova, Tzvetana Georgieva, Evgeni Radushev, 
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Stefan Andreev. 35 Historians' involvement was of primary importance because it was 
history itself which had to be presented as the reason for the campaign. `Correcting' the 
ethnic identity of the Turks had to be explained as a question of historical truth, which 
had to be uncovered. For example Hristov wrote: `A Bulgarian may be an Eastern 
Orthodox, a Catholic, a Muslim or a Protestant but he is nonetheless Bulgarian... It is 
precisely the Ottoman oppressors' desire to couple religious with ethnic assimilation 
from the very outset that provides the basis for the present day Turkish fabrications 
about some large Turkish population in the Bulgarian lands. '' The head of the Centre 
for Eastern Languages and Cultures at the University of Sofia, Emil Boev wrote that 
Islam was a religion only, whereas Bulgaria was a nation. He argued that there was one 
Bulgarian identity and that the `Revival process' was about a question of `the 
ethnocultural unity of the Bulgarian people'. " 
Balevski placed the emphasis on the Bulgarian people being a victim of ethnic 
persecution: 'No other people has gone through such an annihilation with the exception 
of the American Indians and the Armenians perhaps. '; " 
This kind of intellectualising of the `Revival process' had two main aims: to legitimise the 
campaign itself and to legitimise the shift of the BCP policy from political nationalism 
towards ethnic nationalism. This move was not entirely new but was promoted gradually 
from the 1960s onwards. But it was the first time in the history of the BCP when its 
position on the identity of the Bulgarian people had to be defined and declared against 
other people living in Bulgaria. Yet again it continued to try to square ethnic nationalism 
4S See Stranitsi of Bulgarskata Istoria: Ocherk 7a Islami7iranite Bulgari, (Sofia: Nauka i 
Izkustvo, 1989). 
«G Zemedelsko Zname, 19 April, 1989. 
47 Studentska Dibiata (Special Edition), 6 July, 1989. 
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within Marxist-Leninist theory by claiming that all Bulgarian citizens have socialist 
identity and there were no ethnic differences within the country. The Bulgarian 
opposition used the claim that Bulgaria was a lawful communist country to ask why it 
was then promoting a policy which was against its constitution. In 1989 few intellectuals 
expressed public objections to the campaign. They were mainly university lecturers (in 
humanities), writers or members of the technological intelligentsia and were not formally 
organised. Among them were Mihail Nedelchev, Alexander lordanov, Blaga Dimitrova, 
Petar Manolov, Elka Konstantinova, Andrei Sheludko, Solomon Passy. 49Some of them 
were among the founding members of the Club in Support of the Perestroika and 
Glasnost. They were neither united or very articulate in their opposition to the `Revival 
process'. Mostly they claimed that the campaign was being carried out in an 
undemocratic manner because it breached the law on freedom of speech and religious 
expression. Others were not really sure that the policy was altogether wrong. They 
implied that in principal the campaign was not fully unjustified. For instance Petko 
Simeonov, a prominent political scientist, whose name was associated with somewhat 
alternative Marxist thinking in Bulgaria, criticised the lack of freedom of speech in the 
country, but also said Bulgarians are threatened by the Turkish presence in the country. 
He commented: ' I think that the Levsky republic can be build by patriots, regardless of 
ax Rabotniclhesko Delo, 7 September, 1989. 
4' These people did not acted in an organised manner but rather shared similar views on 
the topic and engaged in conversations about what could be done. The most 
extraordinary act of protest at the time was the exhibition organised by Solomon Passy in 
1986. Passy was a mathematician at the Institute of Mathematics at the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, who started writing on mathematical topics under the Turkish 
pen-name Suleiman Osmanoglu. He exhibited his own amateur etchings under the same 
name in a private Sofia flat and the event was attended by more than 100 people, most of 
whom belonged to intelligentsia circles. This was meant to be a sign of protest against 
the re-naming campaign. 
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their background, it can not be done with foreigners... In all Balkan countries there are 
now as there were in the near past identical processes with the restoration of the 
names ... One ought to have been born in Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Armenia, Cyprus 
to comprehend the meaning of slogans about dealing with the `giaur'... 'S" 
The debate about the Turkish question was blurred by politicised definitions of ethnicity 
and nationalism under communism. Even those most determined to oppose communist 
policy found it very hard to make a clear and convincing argument. As far as ordinary 
people's views, they were shaped to a great extent by the economic consequences of the 
Turkish exodus, as the Bulgarian economy declined. `Peacetime mobilisation' was 
announced in July 1989 for extra working hours and voluntary brigades in agriculture. 
This Filled working-class people with resentment, because they had to work `instead and 
because of the Turks'. The declared mobilisation also created certain enthusiasm in the 
party nomenklatura in the countryside. Lower level district party officials had the chance to 
be active in mobilising the population for the fulfilment of the economic plans with the 
special mission of `saving the Bulgarian country and nation'. The local press restored the 
1940s and 1950s rhetoric of the glamorous socialist achievements: `An outburst of 
determination has taken over the agricultural sector... The cattlemen are showing their 
exemplary patriotism... The mobilisation is full! "' For the first time since the sharp 
disillusionment with the socialist economy in the 1960s, the countryside was called to 
unite in the name of defending the nation, but not as before the name of the future and 
51 Petko Simeonov. Interview. BBC World Service, Bulgarian Section, 26 May 
1989. 'Giau? is the word used by the Ottomans to name Christian non-believers. It has 
derogatory connotation. 
51 Si/istrenska Tribuna, 13 May 1989. 
298 
complete triumph of communism. Now the imperative was to unite against a `foreign 
enemy'. 
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XIII. The Party, the `Revival process' and the Soviet Position 
Bulgarian communist policy towards the Turkish minority appears not to have been 
directed or approved by the Soviets. Did the BCP consult at all with the Soviets over it? 
Similarly to the Macedonian question, which was considered part of the complicated 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and to the Jewish issue, which remained connected to Soviet 
politics in the Middle East, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was connected to Turkey's 
relations to the Soviet Union. From the Soviet point of view, the Bulgarian policy could 
have disturbed Turkey- related issues in Central Asia, but it was a rather vague and 
distant connection at that moment. More immediately `perestroika andglasnost' was 
preparing the ground for a big change in the Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. The 
BCP failed to recognise this and launched the anti-Turkish campaign without realising 
that this time `the big brother' might not get involved in Bulgarian politics, neither in the 
role of governor, or as defender. In fact the Soviet leadership avoided any direct 
comment on the exodus. The foreign minister, Edward Shevarnadze, cancelled his visit 
to Turkey due in June 1989, most probably because he wanted to avoid the issue. In 
general it was also thought that Todor Zhivkov's relationship with Mikhail Gorbachov 
was far less friendly than with the previous Soviet leaders, Nikita Hrushchov and Leonid 
Breznev in particular. Gorbachov visited Bulgaria only once in 1985 and commented 
afterwards that there were few sharp disagreements between them. In June 1989 Zhivkov 
met with Gorbachev in Moscow, in the midst of the Turkish crisis, it seemed that the 
two leaders agreed to support the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other 
states. Yet it is hard to imagine that Gorbachov would have supported a re-naming 
campaign of ethnic minorities, since the Soviet leader was openly speaking at the time 
about minority rights as part of human rights issues in the new communism he though 
the Soviet communist party could build. Moreover the Islamic communities in Central 
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Asia had a different history under communism, and despite of the Russification policy of 
the Soviets, Muslims there lived within a federal structure, enjoyed much more 
independence, and the relationship with `the centre' was contracted rather than dictated. 
"The Soviet press publicised the Turkish issue in a limited manner, when the exodus 
was in motion, but it restrained from criticism, and to some extent justified the Bulgarian 
policy, in the face of what it saw as possible Turkish intervention and taking into account 
the Cyprus scenarios' There was no longer a single opinion in Moscow - `glasnost was 
well on its way and what Soviet newspapers wrote did not have to be solely what 
Gorbachov believed in. It would have been hard not to discuss the Turkish crisis in 
Bulgaria. But perhaps in view of what happened later on in Eastern Europe, Gorbachov 
may have considered Zhivkov as a retiring politician. Gorbachov was a new type of 
western orientated leader, whereas Zhivkov always maintained the image of the 
unsophisticated communist, leader of the common people. Although Bulgaria was the 
most loyal Soviet satellite, it was also in the backyard of the imperial provinces. 
The situation in the rest of the socialist countries was similar. On the whole the Eastern 
block distanced itself from Bulgaria but avoided open criticism. In fact none of the 
communist world opposed the campaign, but none approved either. Hungary and 
Poland kept quiet on the issue, although during a visit to Turkey in June 1989 the 
Hungarian president Bruno Straub said, that it was `an inescapable clement of European 
cooperation to realise minority rights and respect for human rights. '54 Romania was 
totally isolated under Ceausescu's rule and had its own national problems to deal with; 
sz See Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1993). 
53 See `Shest vekov i dva mesetsa, Literalurnaia GaZeta, No 31.2 August, 1989. 
S° RFE, SR, 7 August 1989. 
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Albania was completely cut off and at the time seemed irrelevant to Eastern Europe. In 
general Yugoslavia was always eager to point to Bulgaria's bad record on minority rights, 
due to the complicated relations with Bulgaria over Macedonia. But on the other hand 
since 1980 it was facing serious problems with the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia 
and had no interest in commenting on the Turkish issues in Bulgaria. In fact since the 
troubles in Kosovo erupted in 1981, the Macedonian authorities started revising their 
policy towards the Albanians in a similar fashion. Cuts were made in the educational 
system in terms of teaching in Albanian language, textbooks were re-examined on 
suspicions of nationalist content, frequent arrests were made on the grounds of 
nationalism and irredentism. It was reported that in Skopje the editor-in-chief of the 
Albanian language service broadcast listened to the entire record library of the Albanian 
popular folk songs only to find out that about one third of them had nationalistic or 
national-romantic content. Also in the 1980s certain names were forbidden to be given to 
the newly born children of the `nationalist inspired Albanian parents' in Macedonia. ss 
After the renaming campaign in Bulgaria a team of musicologists was given the task of 
extracting the parts of a traditional Turkish instrument (Zurla) from Bulgarian folk songs. 
This was only one of many changes that had to be made in the national heritage as a 
result of the anti-Turkish campaign. 5C' 
ss Sec Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995). 
Evgeni Radushev. Personal conversation. London, 1994. 
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XIV. Turkey's Reaction 
The only active relationship between Bulgaria and the outside world in relation to the 
Turkish exodus remained with Turkey. Bulgarian Turks had no significant links with 
Muslim organisations in the rest of the Balkans or Eastern Europe. The size of the 
exodus made Turkey's involvement inevitable. The Turkish government recognised the 
huge refugee problem by mid June 1989. Ankara first posed the question: if there were 
no Turks in Bulgaria, who were the Bulgarian authorities deporting now? The Turkish 
leader Turgut Opal went personally to meet the first Turks, who were expelled and were 
arriving in Turkey via Belgrade. Later on he visited refugee camps around the Bulgarian- 
Turkish border. The Turkish president, Kenan Evren, said that a great human tragedy 
was taking place in Bulgaria and called on all civilised countries to oppose what he called 
the oppression of the Turkish minority there. " At the same time Turkey seemed 
incapable of dealing with the crisis. The border was closed in August 1989 and Turkey 
admitted that it could not take any more of the refugees. Ozal stated publicly that Turkey 
treated the matter as a humanitarian crisis and that it would not affect commercial or 
economic affairs or diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. There were additional 
complications, which seemed to have affected Turkey's attitude. Ankara's efforts to 
present a joint European community response to Bulgaria's action were delayed by 
Greece, Turkish old rival with Turkish minority of its own; the Cyprus issue was quite 
sensitive and relevant. Additionally Turkey's record on human rights issues made her 
motivation for intervention in Bulgarian politics questionable. In fact some observers 
criticised Ozal and suggested that the Bulgarian crisis gave him an opportunity to 
improve his diminishing popularity and divert attention from domestic problems. Others 
thought that the Bulgarian-Turkish issue served to strengthen Turkish nationalism. Ozal 
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himself said: `the West gets excited over human rights in Turkey when Europeans are 
involved, but doesn't give a damn when Turks are the victims. i5" These factors could not 
prevent Turkey from expressing compassion for the plight of the Turkish people in 
Bulgaria. But it did make it difficult to make a strong argument against the Bulgarian 
policy. As a result Turkey's policy remained contradictory. 't'urkey preferred to shift the 
issue from a purely ethnic minority question to a violation of individual human rights. 
The idea was to maintain that the issue was not a bilateral matter between Turkey and 
Bulgaria, but a question of Bulgarian democracy and the stand the international 
community should take in relation to the state of Bulgarian communist institutions and 
the lack of respect for human rights in the country. Public opinion in Turkey supported 
of the government's position that the persecuted may have to be accepted in Turkey, but 
that there should be a new emigration treaty to regulate such a big resettlement. 
For a long time after the `Revival process' began the countries in the Islamic world 
showed no signs of any diplomatic activities regarding the issue. One month after the 
exodus started the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) issued a joint statement and 
totally condemned Bulgaria for the treatment of ethnic Turks. The organisation urged all 
its members to impose economic, political and moral pressure on Bulgaria. Iran, Iraq, 
Algeria and Libya were seen as very important partners of communist Bulgaria, but their 
criticism was not viewed as damaging by the Bulgarian authorities at this time. The main 
reason was because a great deal of the Bulgarian arms trade directed to Iran and Iraq had 
already diminished due to the end of fighting between the two countries. 
57 See BBC Monitoring Service. Report. 14 May 1989. 
58 The Economist, 17 June, 1989. 
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The key countries were Turkey and the Soviet Union, and for different reasons both 
were not as active so as to prevent the biggest forced resettlement of Turks in Bulgarian 
history. 
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XV. The CSCE and International Responses 
The most important attention given to the issue in the West was at the Conference on 
Human Rights of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held 
in Paris 30 May 1989.59 This was a unique opportunity both for the first big international 
breakthrough on the Turkish question and for the Bulgarian opposition to voice its 
concerns. Before that, in January 1989 the Association for the Support of Vienna 1989 
was founded by Bulgarian Turks, who had been expelled. Its name was intended to 
attract the international attention to the plight of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria exactly at 
the time of the CSCE conference in late May 1989. The conference was attended by an 
official Bulgarian delegation, which included several independent intellectuals from the 
Club for the Support of Glasnost and perestroika, most notably the widely respected and 
politically active writer Blaga Dimitrova. Representatives of two emigre groups, the US- 
based Free Bulgarian Center and the French-based Dialogue Foundation to Support the 
Democratic Process in Bulgaria also attended the Conference. One high point of the 
conference was a press-conference addressed by seven Turkish representatives of the 
Association, including the human rights activist Ismet Emrullahoglu, who showed scars 
on his legs from maltreatment before being expelled. The Turkish delegates also asked to 
speak in Turkish. This put the Bulgarian delegation in an embarrassing position, making 
it impossible to continue to insist that there were no Turks in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian 
governmental officials walked out of the press-conference, turning the incident into a 
media event. 
59 The CSCE culminated in the signing on Aug. 1,1975, of the Helsinki Accords, in 
which the American- and Soviet-led alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively) 
recognised the inviolability of the post Second World War frontiers in Europe and 
committed themselves to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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At the same time the independent Bulgarian delegates distanced themselves from the 
Bulgarian government position. This was a huge step towards recognising internationally 
that there was dissent in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian emigre's appeared to be acting in co- 
operation with Bulgarian dissident and Turkish organisations in Bulgaria. This unique 
alliance showed that the ethnic issue deeply shook the entire political life in Bulgaria and 
was getting out of control. At the Paris conference the core of the emerging Bulgarian 
opposition crystallised, consisting of democratically minded supporters of Soviet 
perestroika, Bulgarian emigres and politically organised ethnic Turks. After the conference 
the US-state department refused to receive the Bulgarian deputy minister of foreign 
economic relations and the US Senate condemned the treatment of ethnic Turks. Many 
European governments condemned Bulgaria's assimilation policy and the Council of 
Europe issued a joint statement on 15 June 1989. Towards the end of June, the Secretary 
General of the UN Javier Perez de Cuellar, summoned the Bulgarian ambassador in the 
UN for discussion after expressing concern over the matter. 
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XVI. Conclusion 
The `Revival process' organised by the BCP produced unintended results. Its original aim 
was to make Bulgaria an ethnically homogenous nation by eliminating Turkish ethnicity. 
This was to be achieved by forcible assimilation. But the nature of Turkish resistance was 
unexpected. The communist authorities were quite efficient in using violence in 
persecuting those individuals who resisted changing their names. Sending them to labour 
camps or to internment made the campaign look successful, because all Turks acquired 
Bulgarian names. The BCP hoped to be able to manage the whole affair by fear. It also 
relied on Turkish passivity, which by and large had characterised Turkish political 
behaviour until the campaign and during its immediate aftermath. \Vhat the Bulgarian 
communists did not understand was that other people's ethnicity could be as powerful as 
their own. Blinded by their pursuit of power, the Bulgarian communist regime was 
determined to legitimise its rule through the ideology of ethnic nationalism. But because 
of their inability actually to inquire into what does ethnicity mean they had little 
understanding how ethnic identity actually works in politics. The `Revival process' was 
the clearest example of how the Bulgarian communist elite used ethnic nationalism for 
political purposes. The most damaging evidence to which violent nationalism could go, 
the `Revival process' scarred the Bulgarian-Turkish interethnic relations for a very long 
time. The main unintended consequence of the re-naming campaign was to sharpen the 
ethnic boundaries of the Turkish community. Even though it was hardly possible to be 
simply a socialist citizen, after the campaign being Turkish meant being persecuted by 
Bulgarian communism on ethnic grounds. Consequently this raised the political 
awareness of the Turkish minority, which came to realise that steps had to be taken to 
defend itself. Living in the margins was no longer a viable survival strategy. 
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The `Revival process' also unexpectedly facilitated the Bulgarian opposition by focussing 
its protests on human rights issues. Although human rights violations were already at the 
core of Bulgarian dissent, they were understood mainly as environmental issues and the 
right to free speech. The abuse of human rights during the re-naming campaign was very 
clear and much more focussed on the core nature of the communist regime in Bulgaria. 
Amnesty International publicised information which seemed more credible than the 
conflicting reports about the pollution in Russe, which was the focus of the Bulgarian 
dissident movement in 1987-88. Bulgarian communism was condemned for the first time 
according to international law as a political system. 
At the beginning of the Turkish exodus Bulgarian authorities seemed to be achieving 
their aim, which was to rid of the country of Turks, having failed to assimilate them. But 
with the rapid and dramatic developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe in the autumn of 
1989 and the fall of Todor Zhivkov, it became clear that this was not to be the end of the 
Turks in Bulgaria. On the contrary, not only did Turks returned in substantial numbers, 
but they were also now determined to participate in the new political life in Bulgaria. A 
new Turkish political organisation, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was 
founded and became a major power player in the country. It is very doubtful that its 
influence could have been achieved if the history of the late 1980s in Bulgaria had been 
different. Ethnic persecution consolidated the Bulgarian Turks and gave them a clear 
political profile, and a new goal, which was to hold power themselves. This task took 
them far from the image of a helpless ethnic minority, which lived at the mercy of 
Bulgarian communism. At the same time, the exodus of 1898 created a Bulgarian Turkish 
community in Turkey, with its own identity and ambitions. In effect, opposite to what 
the BCP had intended, Turkey's presence in Bulgaria increased. Bulgaria's Turks 
invigorated the communication between the two countries, which despite of being 
309 
problematic has since been accepted as unavoidable. `a' The `Revival process' mobilised a 
major part of the Bulgarian intellectual life by reviving the old myth of Bulgarian 
suffering and redemption. It seemed that Bulgaria was once again at the doorstep of a 
major process of rethinking its own past in relation to the history of the entire region. 
The dynamics of this mobilisation proved that the traditional perceptions of Bulgaria 
have not changed that much despite the years of communism. Bulgarian intellectuals 
continued to feel strongly about the faith of the Bulgarian ethnic nation and saw ethnic 
difference as unfavourable to the country's future development. The `Revival process' 
underlined the importance of religion and language in understanding ethnic identity in 
Bulgaria. The fact that Bulgarian attitudes towards the Turkish minority could be 
manipulated and politicised to such an extend, as proved by the anti-Turkish 
demonstrations in 1989, was indicative of the strength of national sensitivities. Yet in 
some ways discussing them seemed better than trying to pretend they were not there. For 
the debate on nationalism opened new ways of looking at the past. In the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s, a new generation of historians and social scientists emerged offering new 
readings of the national questions. The `Revival process' presented them with the 
dilemma of either serving the security services by reporting on their colleagues and 
distorting their own research, or being marginalised if not directly persecuted. After the 
fall of communism in 1989 academics entered the discussion on the Christian-Muslim 
relations in Bulgaria and pleaded for the de-politicising of the issue. They represented 
democratically minded expertise and insisted that the cultural differences between 
Bulgarian and Turks were reconcilable by focusing on their common features. For 
example the Bulgarian expert in Ottoman history Georgieva stated: `The system of 
"' For a detailed account of the life of the Bulgarian Turks living in Turkey see Antonina 
Tzeliazkova (ed. ), Between Adaptation and Nostalgia: The Bulgarian Turks in Turkey, 
(Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 1998). 
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coexistence between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria ... 
is a covipatibi/ity model of 
opposites, in which people of different faith and different ethnic origin participate... '. 6I 
Such an attitude was a breakthrough in the interethnic relations and it changed the 
intellectual debate in the country. 
The entire policy towards the Turkish minority and the `Revival process' as its 
culmination revealed how Bulgarian communism viewed Turkish identity in Bulgaria. 
Similarly to its views on Macedonian and Jewish identities, the BCP thought that Turkish 
identity should be changed, whereas Bulgarian ethnic identity should remain fixed. It 
aspired to prove that the only ethnic identity worth maintaining was Bulgarian. The BCP 
asked the intelligentsia to submit evidence in support of the authentic Bulgarianness of 
the Turkish population and to verify that the Turkish presence was a result of unjust and 
forcible Islamisation conducted by the Ottomans. 
During the entire period of communism in Bulgaria, being Turkish retained the meaning 
of being part of the oppressive past, backward, reactionary and incompatible with the 
strivings of Bulgarian political nationalism. Its anticommunist colouring was 
supplemented by Turkey's belonging to the capitalist bloc. In another words being 
Turkish meant disloyalty to everything Bulgarian. At the same time the specific cultural 
and historical background of the Bulgarian Turks determined their marginal significance 
in the eyes of their `kin' in Turkey. Turkey did not sec them as a repository of `pure' or 
"' Tzvetana Georgicva, `Compatibility and Incompatibility in the Everyday Life Between 
Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria' in Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility 
between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria: Draft report, (Sofia: International Center 
for Minority studies and Intercultural Relations' Foundation, 1994), p. 128. 
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`unpolluted' Turkish culture, as often is the case with outside minorities, but rather as an 
obsolete and obscure reminder of the bygone days of the Ottoman empire. 
In general Turks in Bulgaria could not accommodate themselves to Bulgarian modernity 
as the Bulgarian Jews did. They were badly affected by the collectivisation of the land and 
had a very small urban elite. Their professional options were minimal and controlled by 
the state. They were excluded from decision-making and party politics as well as from the 
military structure and the police force. The Bulgarian attitude towards the Turkish people 
had its own complexity. It reflected the memory of the unfavourable Ottoman times and 
shared the prevailing `fear of extinction' of Eastern European societies. The demographic 
growth of the Muslim population in Bulgaria was seen as threatening to the survival of 
the ethnic Bulgarians. The very weak tradition of inclusive civil society structures and the 
highly politicised history contributed to the Bulgarian national anxiety. The feeling of 
uniqueness mingled with the notion of being victimised by the history itself and divided 
by the Great Powers' geopolitical interests. As Kiel comments on communist Bulgaria's 
treatment of the Turkish people, the reasons behind the totally `black' depiction of the 
Ottoman period were understandable but based on rather incorrect claims: `It serves the 
political justification for the position of the country as it is today, and the moral 
justification of the present policy towards the Turkish minority'. 6Zrhe last census 
conducted after the collapse of the communist system in December 1992 caused 
considerable controversy. The Bulgarian nationalists objected to the ethnic Turks 
demand - supported by the then government - to include questions on ethnicity, native 
`Z Machiel Kiel, Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: A Sketch of the 
Economic, juridical and Artistic Preconditions of Bulgarian Post-Byzantine Art and its 
Place in the Development of the art of the Christian Balkans. 1360/70-1700. A New 
Interpretation, (The Netherlands, Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1985), p. 53. 
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language and religion. The census's polemics reflected the importance of the issue both 
for the majority and the minority because of the political implications of the size of the 
population. As Anderson observes, a census is a powerful tool that enables the state to 
classify its citizens into national categories and then use the classification to determine 
the strength of the national minority according to its size. 63 The smaller the minority is in 
official numbers, the less visible it will be in state and society institutions. 
The Turkish presence in Bulgaria is a record of an ethnic minority's effort to achieve 
political visibility in order to defend its culture and participate in the society. The 
difficulties of its acceptance by the Bulgarian side reflect mainly the fear of legitimising 
the multi-ethnicity of the country which may lead to demands for Turkish cultural 
autonomy and to a major political and cultural change, though such aspirations were 
never a living part of Turkish life in Bulgaria. In the transitional period after the end of 
communism, the leadership of the Bulgarian Turkish community developed political 
sophistication and an expertise in international human rights conventions and demanded 
Turkish language education and media. Like their Bulgarian fellow-countrymen the Turks 
realised that society will be undergoing fundamental changes and they engaged in 
political struggle for control of this fundamental change. This political empowerment of 
the Turkish community in Bulgaria was exactly the opposite of what the BCP and its 
policy towards the minority, had intended. 
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (Rev. ed. ), (London & New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 164-70. 
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Chapter 5 Muslims Under Bulgarian Communism 
Part 2: The `Betrayal' of the Bulgarian Pomaks 
I. Introduction 
In 1979 Rlalina Tornova, a poet and literary editor wrote the script proposal for the filar entitled 
Flame, Flame, Little Spark (Gori, Gori, Malko Ogunche). ' The Bulgarian Arts Council 
r jetted the proposal, although in private many intellectuals praised it highly. In 1982 the council 
reviewed its assessment and this time granted its approval. But production was blocked again because of 
the high politicisation of the national question in 1984-85, when the communist regime pursued the 
renaming campaign against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
Flame, Flame, Little Spark' treats the renaming campaign carried by the communist govennnent 
against the Pomaks (Bulgarian Muslims) in the 1960s. The main character is ayo ung Bulgarian 
woman who teaches in a remote village in the Rhodopi mountains and witnesses the violent disruption of 
Pomak community life under pressure of thegoveniment's police for the homogenisation of Bulgarian 
socigy. The film tries to negotiate the understanding of `otherness' and to explore the implications of 
religious intolerance under totalitarian rule. It also rethinks citizens' responsibilities under communism by 
sketching out the Bulgarian participation in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
After the collapse of communism in 1989 the Arts Council authorised the script. In 1993 it received a 
grant from the National Film Centre and supplementary fiatding from the Open . 
Society Fund (Soros 
Cori, Cori, Malko Ogmic%e, Bulgarian film, 1994, Rumiana Pctkova, director; IMlalina 
Tomova, script; Svetla Ganeva, camera; Atonina Zheliazkova, consultant. 
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Foundation, Sofia. In September 1994 the film was shown for the first time at the annual International 
Cinema Festival in Varna, Bulgaria, and received the an important award. Then it was adapted for 
television, in four parts, and a broadcast schedule was set. However the National Television postponed 
the screening because it coincided with pre-election time in post-communist Bulgaria. 
Channel 1 of the National Television showed the first part of the film in 1995. But the press criticised 
the film for presenting a false reality , accusing the authors of `national betrayal' and denying that the 
renaming campaign against the Bulgarian Muslims was forcible, as the film suggested. 
After the second part aired, the National Television announced that the third instalment would be shown 
one if the filmmakers could defend themselves in the face of the increasingly sharp polemic. Yet script 
writer Tomova was prevented from taking part in the programme specifically designed to discuss the file. 
She was also not permitted to attend a press conference about the film although her journalist 
accreditation was valid The members of the flm team received threatening calls and letters, and the door 
of Tomova apartment in Sofia was 
daubed with swastikas, crosses and red stars. 
Meanwhile the Bulgarian president, Zhelr Zhelev, attended a special meeting with the intelligentsia on 
censorship and sharply criticised the government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (former communists) for 
imposing political control on the national media, including in case of Flame, Flame, Little Spark. At 
the same time the press reported that the Commission for National Security had appealed to the 
Constitutional Court to site the frlmmakers for national betrayal: Apparently. the charge was dropped, 
on thegrounds that the film is fiction, not a documentary. 
The national media continued to vilib, the flm by rpecial reports aiming to deuy the existence of a distinct 
Pomak ident j and affirming the Bulgarian nationality of the villagers depicted in the film. The Arts 
Council remained silent and the editor-in-chief of the First Program of the National Radio was ordered 
not to cover the debate. A high-ranking military representative used aggressive sexist language on the 
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radio against the female team, but the women's o, ganisations did not interfere in the debate. Unofcially 
the headmasters of the secondary schools received an order from the Alinister for Education to criticise the 
movie during lessons in Bulgarian history. 
Fame, Flame, Little Spark had entered the controversial debate about Bulgarian communism and 
prime nationalism and the role of the ruling elite and the nationalist organisations. Zhan Videnov, then - 
minister of post communist Bulgaria, commented on the radio that the film was harm f rl to the county. 
Having failed to censor the film itself, the national media distorted the context and pr judiced viewers 
against its message. The one-sided debate turned into a politicised argument about national identities and 
sharpened ethnic sensitivities. Later Tomova recalled that Bulgarian intellectuals did not want to be 
associated with her or `her Pomaks, who seemed to be a rynrbol of `national apostay' 
(rodootsta pnichestvo). 2 
As a community of Muslims, the fate of the Bulgarian Pomaks under communism was 
closely linked to developments concerning the Turkish minority. Numbering around 
250,000, they represent a small but politically extremely awkward group for Bulgaria. In 
Bulgaria it is largely believed that the Bulgarian Pomaks are people of Bulgarian ethnic 
background, who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. The main evidence used in 
support of this belief - that essentially Pomaks are ethnic Bulgarians - is linguistic. 
Bulgarian Pomaks speak Bulgarian language, though with dialectical characteristics. Most 
Bulgarian scholars define the specific characteristics of Pomak speech as archaic 
2 Malina Tomova. Interview, Sofia, 1997. 
316 
Bulgarian constructions. ; This claim has been contested by Greek and Turkish scholars 
who claim that Pomak speech contains many Greek and Turkish words and therefore its 
origins should be traced to the respective cultures. From here derives the belief that 
Pomaks may be of Greek or Turkish ethnic origins. 4 
The name Pomak has a negative connotation, as it is thought to derive from the Bulgarian 
meaning of the verb `help' (`pomagam ), which has been interpreted also as meaning 
`collaborating', which indicates the Pomaks position in the Ottoman empire. Pomaks are 
also called `Bulgarian Mohameds' (`bulgaronrohamedani ), meant to describe their identity as 
ethnic Bulgarians first and as Muslims second. 5 However both terms, `Pomak' and 
`Bulgarian-Mohameds' have been viewed as derogatory by many Pomaks themselves. 
They call themselves Bulgarians, Turks, Ottomans, Muslims, Uruks, Pomaks, or Ahrians, 
depending on the political circumstances. 6 Pomaks tend to dislike the hyphenated name, 
arguing that if it is to be used, Bulgarians should be called Bulgarian-Christians.? 
3 Sec Rodopski Sbornik, vol. 1-4,1976. In the late 1950s a special commission was 
established to study the history, culture and customs of the Pomaks living in the Rodhopi 
mountains. The results were published in this publication. 
4 See Ali Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, (London: Hurst & 
Company as Book Series No. 6 of the Institute of Muslim Minorities Affairs, 1997), 
pp. 102- 103. 
5 See Boriana Panaiotova and Kalina Bozeva, `Religioznata Obshnost na Bulgaritc 
Musulmani (`Pomatsite'): Obshta harakteristika' in Maltsinstvata v Bulgaria v Konteksta 
na Choveshkite Prava, (Sofia: Komitet za Zashtita Pravata na 
Maltsinstvata, 1994), p. 57. These Bulgarian scholars assert that the word `pomak' has 
been used since the Bulgarian independence until the 1960s. They claim that the word 
Bulgarian-Mohammeds/Mohameans was introduced in Bulgaria during the anti-Turkish 
campaign in 1984-1985 and has been used since in Bulgarian public and scholarly life. 
6 Ibid., 57. 
7 Marin Marinov. Interview. BBC World Service, Bulgarian Section. 12 May 1997. 
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Nevertheless, the most recent term, which seem to be preferred by the new generation of 
Bulgarian scholars for Pomak people, is Bulgarian Muslims. 
Before the end of the Second World War Pomaks were forced to replace their Turkish or 
Arabic names twice: in 1912 and 1942. These campaigns were also accompanied by 
missionary activities, which aimed to convert the Pomaks to Eastern Orthodoxy, the 
official Bulgarian religion. It is thought that during these two campaigns thousands of 
Pomaks were converted to Christianity. At the same time the campaigns encouraged the 
Pomak to emigrate to Turkey. 8 The main organisation of the Bulgarian Pomaks before 
1944 was Rodina ('homeland'). It was created in 1937 in the town of Smolian, in the 
Rhodopi area, and aimed to educate the Pomaks in the traditions of Bulgarian culture. 
The organisation had its own monthly publication, Sbonrik Rodina ('anthology Rodina), 
which was issued until 1944. Before the arrival of communism two main factors affected 
the life of the Bulgarian Pomaks: the Bulgarian policy of conversion and the option to 
emigrate to Turkey or Greece. The Bulgarian attitude towards the Pomaks was highly 
politicised and determined by the idea that Pomaks should `return' to their ethnic origins 
and become Bulgarians only. In general this policy was met with hostility by the Pomaks, 
who showed firm loyalty to their Muslim religion. The option of emigrating to Turkey or 
Greece was dictated by the idea of a better life rather than religious freedom, though 
Pomaks who left for Turkey did hope to find accommodation for their identity among 
other Muslims. 
8 See Ylian Konstantinov, `Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity: The Case of 
the Bulgarian Pomaks' in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State. Hugh Poulton and Suha 
Taji-Farouki (eds. ), (London: Hurst &Company in association with the Islamic Council), 
pp. 50-51. See also Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, p. 101. 
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The main factor which determined Pomak life in Bulgaria after the collapse of the 
Ottoman empire was the establishment of the Bulgarian independent state. In the new 
national Bulgarian state, Pomaks were an uncomfortable remainder of the Bulgarian 
Ottoman past, which had much longer lasting consequences than independent Bulgaria 
wished to acknowledge. The attempt to define Pomak identity in the context of the 
Bulgarian nation-state was not possible unless Pomaks changed their religion. This 
proved a more difficult problem than Bulgarian rulers anticipated. Although Pomaks' 
linguistic ties related them clearly to the Bulgarian people, they also identified with the 
faith of the Turkish people living in Bulgaria. Bulgarians saw this affiliation as an 
extension of the Turkish presence in the country and as such an undesirable expansion 
of the Turkish culture in Bulgaria. Thus it became central for Bulgarian politics in 
relation to the Pomaks to prevent the development of close ties between Pomaks and 
Turks. On the other hand Bulgarian Turks in general did not consider Pomaks part of 
their community as they were not `Turkish' people. Yet the pressure to assimilate into the 
Bulgarian one-nation-state, as well as the attraction of Turkey for both Pomaks and 
Turks, made them share the mentality of being persecuted - and a shared desire for an 
escape to fresh opportunities and a new life. 
The Bulgarian attitude towards Pomaks consists of two conflicting views: on one hand 
Pomaks are stereotyped as Bulgarians who were forced to become Muslims and 
therefore became a symbol of a shameful betrayal of Bulgarian Christianity. On the other 
hand they are declared innocent victims of the Islamic expansion in Bulgaria, who 
heroically retained their language. According to Bulgarian history, by hiding their 
Bulgarian background behind the mask of Islam, Pomaks became the repository of the 
most pure and antique Bulgarian customs. 9 The Pomak way of life has been 
See Rodopski Sbornik, 1976, vol. 4. 
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mythologised and romanticised as the most genuine and authentic feature of Bulgarian 
ethnicity. Bulgarian scholars have worked hard to convince the Bulgarian public that 
Pomaks were forcibly converted to Islam during the dark times of Ottoman despotism. 
Yet the troublesome question remained: Why did Pomaks not convert back to Orthodox 
Christianity once the Ottoman menace was gone from the Bulgarian lands? Although 
much has been said about Pomaks' ignorance as the sole reason for their cultural inertia 
and political backwardness, their attachment to the Muslim faith has been a disturbing 
issue for the Bulgarian nationalism. 
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H. Pomaks under Bulgarian Communism 
The issues of Pomak identity in Bulgaria have been subject to debate among Bulgarian 
policy-makers and scholars long before the arrival of communism. At that time, the 
policy was to `re-convert' Pomaks `back' to Orthodox Christianity. "Communism did not 
resort to the same method because it was an atheist ideology. The contradiction seemed 
far too obvious to place the question of religion as the main problem. The BCP had to 
answer the most difficult question about why and what were Pomaks supposed to 
convert back to? If Pomaks were ethnic Bulgarians, what were the main features of their 
identity which needed correction? The answer of Bulgarian communism was that 
Pomaks should become true socialist citizens of Bulgaria by: a) denouncing their religion, 
and b) changing their Muslim names to Bulgarian. Self-evidently Bulgarian communism 
decided to demand eradication of any sign of cultural otherness among the Pomak 
population. 
Communist policy towards Pomaks in Bulgaria went through different stages and used 
different methods. Until 1951 resettlement to Turkey seemed one way of solving the 
Pomak problem. During the 1960s dislocation accompanied the campaign for the re- 
naming of the Pomaks. By the mid 1970s all Pomaks were renamed and the special 
communist policy for their acculturation resulted in serious isolation from Bulgarian 
society. Communism rejected the Bulgarian policy towards the Pomaks before 1944 as 
totally wrong. It was said that the Bulgarian bourgeois governments, capitalist and fascist 
by nature, intentionally abused the Pomak population and left them to live in misery. 
Moreover the pre-communist Bulgarian legislation and policy on emigration was said to 
10 See Georgi Genov, `Pravnoto Polozhenic na Maltsinstvata', Godu! >ulk ! la Sofri. rýyat 
Uridic{>eski Fakar/tet, (Sofia: 1929), vol. XXIV (1928/1929), pp. 1-272. 
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have been influenced by the Muslim leaders of the Pomak and Turkish community as 
well as by Turkish agents in Bulgaria. "Further on the pre-communist Bulgarian policy of 
converting Pomaks to Orthodox Christianity was condemned as the high point of 
humiliation and abuse, a result of the bourgeoisie's unrestrained chauvinism. '2 
After declaring that Pomaks were Bulgarian socialist citizens, the BCP embarked on the 
implementation of a special program designed for the acculturation (`priobshtavaae') of the 
Pomaks. The idea was to re-educate the Pomak population in the spirit of Bulgarian 
communism by developing a wide cultural and educational infrastructure. "But behind 
the scene of the official declarations of the cultural and economic advancement of the 
Bulgarian Pomaks, the communist party conducted a very different policy. After 1948 
there were several attempts to force the Pomaks to change their names and renounce 
their faith. Poulton observes that during the initial campaign (1948-52) Bulgarian 
authorities subjected the Pomaks to pressure to adopt Bulgarian names and resettled 
some of them in order to dismantle their tight communities. 14 The main result of the first 
campaign conducted by the BCP was that the Pomak population became increasingly 
aware of its insecure position in Bulgarian society. Consequently many members of the 
community began to identify themselves as Turks as a protective mechanism for their 
Muslim identity. Also, if identified as Turks, Pomaks could apply to emigrate to Turkey. 
The Bulgarian communist government viewed this process as very undesirable and in 
11 See Iz minaloto na bulgarite mohamedani v Rodopite, (Sofia: Izdatclstvo na 
Bulgarskata Akadcmia na Naukite, Institut za Bulgarska Istoria, 1958), pp. 100-137. 
12 Ibid., p. 133. 
13 See Tsviatko Monov, 'Razvitic i deinost na narodnite chitalishta, kinata, muzcite i 
drugitc kulturni instituti v rodopskiya krai (1944-1973)' in Hr. Hristov, P. Petrov, Str. 
Dimitrov (eds. ), Rodopski Sbornik, (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata Akademia na 
Naukite, 1976), vol. IV, pp. 7-40. 
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1962 declared that special measures would be taken to reverse the `Turl: ification' of the 
Bulgarian Pomaks. The main aims of the BCP program were to intensify the party 
propaganda in the Pomak regions, to prevent Pomaks from moving to Turkish villages 
and learning the Turkish language. Also the party emphasised the importance of the 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in further uncovering of the `historical truth' about the 
Pomaks as victims of Turkish assimilation carried out in Ottoman times. ''Soon 
afterwards the BCP undertook another campaign to change the Muslim names of the 
Pomaks and to persuade them to give up their faith. This time the campaign was met 
with resistance and the Muslim names of the Pomaks were partially restored. Yet only 
several years later yet another campaign was carried out and between 1971-73 all Pomaks 
were forced to change their names and adopt Bulgarian ones. This time the resistance 
was stronger and the Bulgarian authorities put it down violently. 16 
Similarly to the communist policy to the Bulgarian Turks, the policy towards the Pomaks 
was dictated by Bulgarian cultural nationalism which considered Muslim personal names 
as a marker of alien culture. Konstantinov argues that during the 1940s and the very 
early 1950s the BCP' s policy towards the Bulgarian national minorities was to `let people 
go'. 17 Indeed during this time the majority of the Bulgarian Jews left for Israel (1947-49) 
14 Sec Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, pp. 101-102. 
15 Ibid., Apendix H `Measures Against the Turkish Self-Identification of Gypsies, 
Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) and Tatars Approved by the Politburo, April, 1962, pp. 
191-194. 
1G Ibid., 106. 
17 Konstantinov, `Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity', pp. 47-48. 
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and many Bulgarian Turks also emigrated to Turkey. 18 The Pomaks were in a more 
difficult position because they had no other nation-state to go to. 
However during the 1960s and 1970s, the BCP made it clear that the Pomak identity 
should be changed and that the Bulgarian Pomaks should become Bulgarians only. This 
policy was in accord with the general orientation of Bulgarian communism towards 
cultural nationalism during those years. The BCP demanded the ethnic homogenisation 
of the Bulgarian nation: the Pomaks fell victims of this attitude. 19 Essentially the 
repeated re-naming campaigns against the Bulgarian Pomaks were motivated by the same 
idea, which in 1984-85 motivated the anti-Turkish campaign, the `Revival process'. All 
people living in communist Bulgaria were supposed to be of Bulgarian ethnic identity 
and any cultural differences deriving from ethnicity were to be eliminated. 
The re-naming campaigns towards the Pomaks under communism remained largely 
unknown to the Bulgarian public. This was so partly because they were carried out in 
stages and because the Pomaks were a smaller community of people, who lived in 
isolation. They were barely represented in the political structures of communist Bulgaria 
and had no educated class of their own. Yet the crucial reason for the silence which 
accompanied the re-naming campaigns against the Pomaks was that they had no other 
mother-country apart from Bulgaria - unlike the Bulgarian Turks, who had Turkey. 
Despite the desire to become Turkish on behalf of one part of the community, Pomaks 
18 Ibid., p. 48. Konstantinov thinks that between 1950-1951 about 15,000 Turks were 
allowed to leave to Turkey. Among them there were Pomaks, but the Bulgarian 
authorities did not object. 
19 See Chapter 3 of this thesis for the changes in the BCP policy towards the Macedonian 
question in 1968 and the gradual closing down of the Turkish schooling in communist 
Bulgaria. 
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were never accepted by the community of Bulgarian Turks or by Turkey as Turks. 20 They 
received no support from the outside and belonged to no other nation or state. Pomaks 
had nowhere to look for protection. Therefore their protest and resistance to the 
Bulgarian communist policy remained largely unheard inside and outside communist 
Bulgaria. 21 
Yet Pomak's identity has been a painful issue for Bulgarian cultural nationalism. On one 
hand, the idea that Pomaks were ethnic Bulgarians who were converted forcibly to Islam 
during Ottoman rule feeds the powerful national myth of the long suffering of the 
Bulgarian people. Pomaks have been the living proof that Bulgarians were subjected to 
forcible assimilation by their traditional enemy - the Ottomans. On the other hand, the 
Pomak community has also served as strong evidence that the Bulgarian identity could 
be changed. Previously Bulgarians, Pomaks became different people. The idea that 
people could change national identity has been rejected and is viewed as a terrifying 
thought by modern Bulgaria. 
The question about the Pomak identity has been further complicated by the fact that 
they have not claimed any national identity unless forced to do so. The communist policy 
20 See Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria, p. 106. Turkey appears 
to have objected to emigration of the Pomaks alongside the Bulgarian Turks. 
21 After the establishment of the Bulgarian-Greek border after the Second World War, 
contact between the Bulgarian Pomaks and their Greek kin was severed. From then 
onwards the two states engaged in a conflict over the Pomak community. Bulgaria and 
Greece claimed that Pomaks were misguided parts of the respective majority population 
in each country. Konstantinov argues that during the Cold War the Bulgarian communist 
authorities used male Pomaks to guard the Greek and Turkish borders. The Pomaks 
were expected to assist border control and to report on people trying to cross the border 
with Greece. See Konstantinov, `Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity', p. 47. 
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put pressure on the Bulgarian Pomaks to declare themselves Bulgarian. The idea that 
Pomaks were actually Turks took ground before communism came to Bulgaria. But it 
accelerated in response to the communist pressure and was one of the unintended results 
of the communist policy, which gave it a special significance. Bulgarian Pomaks 
responded to the communist definition of who they were with their own version. 22 
Pomaks reject the core idea that they were converted forcibly to Islam during Ottoman 
rule. Instead an alternative history of Pomak conversion to Islam has been offered in 
their oral culture. According to this version of history, Pomaks shared a common Slavo- 
Tracian past with the Bulgarians and converted to Islam between the 91h and 12th 
centuries, i. e., before the Ottoman arrival in the Balkans. This version has it that the 
Pomaks' conversion to Islam was an act of free and moral will. Bulgarian Pomaks started 
claiming that they accepted the Muslim faith directly from Arab missionaries, not from 
the Ottomans. Lozanova argues that Pomaks developed this `quasi-academic theory' 
about the parallel historical development of Christians and Muslims in the Bulgarian 
lands. According to her, this theory acts as an alternative version to the Bulgarian history, 
which constructed a negative stereotype about the Pomaks as being traitors of the 
Bulgarian Christianity. 23 Konstantinov also argues that as a reaction to the Bulgarian 
communist state `monopoly' over the Pomak identity, the Pomaks created their own 
theory about their origins. According to him `the indeterminate state of the Pomaks' 
identity' led the community to seek for "`proofs" which establish an original Pomak 
identity - one which is more acceptable than the Turkish.. 24 Nevertheless, the Bulgarian 
" See Galina Lozanova, `Sakralna Sreshtu Realna Istoria na Bulgarite Musulmani v 
Rodopite' in Rositsa Gradeva and Svetlana Ivanova (eds. ), Musulmanskata Kutura Do 
Bulgarskite Zemi, (Sofia: Mezhdunaroden Center po Problemite na l-laltsinstvata i 
Kulturnite Vzaimodeistvia, 1998), pp. 451-463. 
23 Ibid., p. 455. 
24 Konstantinov, `Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity', pp. 35-37. 
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communist policy intensified the Pomaks' desire to keep the reality of their cultural 
identity private. Pomak communities in Bulgaria have been living in isolation since the 
19th century. Under communism the intervention of the state in their life was more than 
ever associated with danger and destruction. Therefore under communism Bulgarian 
Pomaks became accustomed to living in the niche of their `clandestine identity', which 
was to be exposed to new threats after the changes in 1989.2' 
25 Ibid., p. 52. 
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III. Conclusion 
Despite the theoretical confusions and obvious incoherence of the Bulgarian communist 
attitude towards Pomaks, one major feature of their life remained unchanged under 
communism- unlike the Turkish presence, the Pomak community was never perceived 
as a big threat to the preservation of Bulgarian national culture. This was mainly because 
Pomaks spoke Bulgarian language - an important tool in the communist argument that 
they were ethnic Bulgarians - and the Pomak community was much smaller than the 
Bulgarian Turks'. More generally, Pomaks have been part of the continuing debate about 
the Bulgarian connection to Islam and the broader issue of the importance of religion for 
ethnic identities, including during the communist period. Bulgarian communism largely 
exploited the belief that language is the most decisive feature of ethnic identity and 
therefore claimed that Pomaks are ethnic Bulgarians. But the Pomaks' resistance to this 
claim showed that questions of ethnicity, nationalism and identity were more complex 
and required a different understanding. The Bulgarian communist policy towards the 
Pomaks also had unintended effects. When communism arrived in Bulgaria, 90 per cent 
of the Pomaks lived in the Rhodopi mountains, both in small dispersed towns and in 
secluded villages almost completely inaccessible. Their economic position was weak and 
the communities survived by seasonal work. They were deeply isolated and marginalised. 
Communism promised to change Pomaks' life dramatically. They were to become 
Bulgarian socialist citizens equal to everyone else regardless of their religious affiliation. 
But in fact the special policy of economic and cultural development of the Pomaks, 
introduced by the BCP, only reinforced their segregation. As Konstantinov argues, 
during communism isolation and lack of mobility among the Bulgarian Pomaks created a 
new `occupational' boundary, which strengthened the dividing line between Pomaks and 
the rest of the Bulgarian people. Pomaks became `Islamic peasant-workers' who 
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developed their own economy -a combination of agricultural and manufacturing work, 
which generally nobody else in Bulgaria practised. '-' Another unintended effect of the 
communist policy was that Pomaks' experience of forcible assimilation under 
communism encouraged their identification with the community of the Bulgarian Turks 
instead of moving them further apart. This affiliation became particularly strong during 
the anti-Turkish campaign, the `Revival process', carried out in the mid-1980s. The tics 
between the Pomaks and the Bulgarian Turks concerned the communist authorities 
greatly. During the forcible expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks in 1989, Bulgarian 
authorities made it clear that Pomaks would not be allowed to leave the country, unlike 
the Turks who were invited to go. 27 Communist Bulgaria believed that there was no 
separate Pomak identity and demanded their forcible inclusion into a homogenous ethnic 
Bulgarian nation. Bulgarian Pomaks' dual identity was rejected by communism because it 
was not Bulgarian only. 
26 Ibid., p. 43. 
27 See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, (London: Minority 
Rights Publications, 1991, p. 113. 
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Chapter 6: The Limits of Bulgarian Jewish Identity under 
Communism 
I. Introduction 
IY/hen Elias Canetti was awarded the Nobel PriZe in Literature in 1981, the Bulgarian authorities 
kept the announcement short. Canetti was born in the town of Russe, in Bulgaria, in 1905, raised in 
Vienna, Manchester and Zurich, and wrote in German. His knotty life was a confusion for socialist 
Bulgaria where Canetti was not popular. The communists did not want to know about Crowds and 
Power (1960), with its insights into the catastrophic direction mass action and anonymous equality could 
take. Yet the National Heritage paid respect by listing Canettis family house as a memorial. 
In 1996 1 ! vent to Russe to see for nyse f what was left of the Jewish commnniy there, which Canetti 
described in his memoirs as the intellectual inspiration of his early creative development. Russe was one a 
bustling trading port on the Danube, an old Ottoman gateway to Europe. In 1915 Canetti returned to 
visit his native Ruschuk as it was then called His mother, all ambitious and educated woman, identified 
two reasons for the mannerless border controk" the incurable Balkan harshness and the famiy's Turkish 
passports. In his memoirs, The Tongue Set Free (1977), he remembers his early, awareness of the 
national passions which divided the old Ottoman lands. Canetti talks about Bulgarian Jews preferring 
the imperial world with its cosmopolitan travel and trade. Many of them were scared of the empire's 
dismantling. Thy feared the divisions and partitions of people and territories, and found refuge in 
Ottoman society,. 
In Canettis Ruscbuk, people spoke many languages: Greek, Romanian, Russian, "Turkish, Armenian, 
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Roma. Faire tales and family celebrations translated mysteriously and unconsciously from Bulgarian and 
Ladino, the language of the Sephardic household, into German, the language of the emancipated Central 
European Jewry. Canetti'cgrandfather liked to walk around Vienna and shame/ess/y shock the 
cognoscenti, that he, who lived in Russe, could converse in 17 languages. 
The dissolution of the Ottoman empire and the scattering of Canetti's family were painful, the unity of 
communism and, of course, National Socialism were far worse. 
The first ynagogue in Russe was a gift from the Ottoman ruler Mustafa Bairaktar Pasha, and was 
built at the end of the 18th century. Today's Jewish community centre Shalom was constructed on the site 
of another ynagogue, which was a storehouse during commsnsism. 
Soaked in summer tranquillity, Russe's elegance is disordered. With sickly post-coiiimiinist 
merchandising, jumbled coffee shops and many change bureau, it is a apical Bulgarian protnncial city. 
The Austrian styles seem to outline the dusty city boundaries of this southern Danubian corner. 
Jewish traces are evident. "Take a picture of me, too, " an elderly, man requests, after showing me the 
unmistakable Jewish ornaments of his terrace. A round the corner, a s'nagogrre is being reconstructed as 
an Evangelical church, but the new occupiers promise to keep its beautiful wooden ceiling. "Don't take 
these things too seriously, " advises ny companion. In the 1970s the regime erected a huge memorial of to 
Bulgarian liberation where the old Jewish cemetery used to be. There have been so mart' changes, and he 
is worried I might overinterpret the faint traces that do remain. 
Canetti's home is not a famous tourist place. On a Suinday afternoon, the neighbourhood is napping. The 
narrow street leading there bides its introvert residents. People are neither surprised nor intrigued by the 
occasional visitors: there is nothing more they can tellyou. Some actually think that his house was 
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demolished and the modest sign is wrong. 
There is another intriguing store about Russe, communism and the Jews. The structure and the interior of 
the big house in the sidewalk of the town's centre is still elegant, though unmistakably shattered by may 
years of neglect. It belonged to Ventura, a wealthy pre-war Bulgarian Jewish merchant. His daughter 
Ani died in the resistance, aged 18. For some time, Bulgarian history held her as a hero of the 
underground movement. Her portrait could be found in the communist history books. But then the name 
faded away, as the communist party `cleansed' and unified its memory. 
It turns out that Anis slob'' was muddled with politics of ethnicity. According to some of the inhabitants 
of Russe, Ventura expelled his daughterfrom home because she loved Isidor, ayoung and poorJeivish 
communist, so she died, forsaken. Others believe she eloped with Isidor and was killed instead of hies-by 
mistake. But everyone agrees that it was wrong to forget her regardless of whether she believed in 
communism or love alone. Nowadays the Ventura house hosts a Roma organisation, a restaurant and a 
library. 
Both stories shoe the dynamic role Jews played in Bulgarian cultural and political life and the quiet way 
in which the fact has been swept away - either by neglect, repression or some combination of the two. 
Jewishness is the national question Bulgaria would simply prefer to forget. 
This chapter focuses on perceptions of Jewish identity under communism in Bulgaria. It 
examines three main themes to understand the communist approach and policy towards 
the Bulgarian Jews. First 'who saved the Bulgarian Jews' during the Second World War? 
The common answer - that the Bulgarian communist movement was responsible 
for the 
survival of the Jewish community - reveals the communist concepts of the 
identity of the 
Bulgaria Jews as well as the role of the Bulgarian government and society in the course of 
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the war. This research pays special attention to the Jewish deportations from Macedonia 
and Thrace and the communist view of these events, which took place under the 
Bulgarian administration of these territories. Second why and how did Bulgarian Jews 
resettle en mass to Israel after the war? This question is analysed in the context of the 
BCP approach towards national questions in the immediate aftermath of the war and in 
relation to the Soviet control of domestic politics in Bulgaria. Between 1947 and 1949 
over 45,000 Jews left Bulgaria. The research seeks to analyse the implications of the mass 
Jewish exodus from Bulgaria for the communist attitudes towards ethnic diversity. Third, 
how and why was Jewish education eradicated and Jewish cultural and community 
institutions gradually closed? This question reveals the communist policy of Jewish 
assimilation in Bulgaria. Although officially assimilation of the Bulgaria Jews was never 
declared as the ultimate aim of the BCP, Bulgarisation was the only acceptable way of 
Jewish survival under communism. 
Additionally the history of the Jewish communities under the Ottoman empire is central 
for the understanding of the popular perception of the Jews in the Balkans in general and 
in Bulgaria in particular. Jewish anxieties at the eve of the Bulgarian national liberation at 
the end of the 19`h century put them in a confused position in relation to the modern 
Bulgarian statehood. ' The relationship between Jewish ethnicity and Bulgarian cultural 
nationalism under communism was illustrated in the case of Bulgaria. Bulgarian 
communism tried to accommodate the events of Jewish history in Bulgaria to the 
Bulgarian national mythology. The myth about the civilising mission of the Bulgarian 
' See Gabriel Arie, A Sephardi Life in Southeastern Europe: The Autobiography and 
Journal of Gabriel Arie. 1863-1939, Aron Rodriguc and Esther Benbassa (eds. ), 
(Washington: University of Washington Press, 1998). Also See Stanford J. Shaw, The 
Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, (Houndmills, Basingstokc, 
333 
people and the myth about the Bulgarian tolerance became central to promoting cultural 
nationalism in communist Bulgaria by using Bulgarian Jewish identity. At the same time, 
the association of the Jews with communist movement encouraged the popular Bulgarian 
view that Jews were collaborators of the communist regime. This perception acted in 
accord with older ideas of Jews as collaborators with the Ottoman despotism. Thus Jews 
were largely stereotyped as a hostile party to the Bulgarian national interests in general. 
However under communism Jews were not seen as a big threat to the ethnic Bulgarian 
nation in the way the Turkish identity was. This was so on the first place because the 
Jewish community was much smaller in numbers. But also very importantly, although 
Christians were the historical enemy of the Jews, for the Balkan Christians, Islam was far 
bigger menace. 
Hampshire and London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991), p. 228. 
334 
II. Historical Background 
The history of the Bulgarian Jewry is an inseparable part of the Ottoman past of Bulgaria 
and the Balkans in general. Jews occupied a specific position in Ottoman society. For 
most of the time they enjoyed special protections provided by the Ottoman authorities. 
Under the Ottoman empire Jcws interacted in a somewhat special way both with the 
Christians and the Muslims. The most important consequence of this was that Jewish 
integration into the Bulgarian nation-state after the Ottomans withdrew was particularly 
difficult. This in its own turn affected the Bulgarian perception of the Jews in the new 
independent Bulgaria. The period during which Jews lived alongside the Christians under 
the Ottoman rule in Bulgaria (1393-1878) is of major importance for the understanding 
of the framework of the inter-communal relations established in the Bulgarian lands. 
Essentially the Ottomans regulated the relations between the Christian and the Jewish 
communities for almost five hundred years and the empire's model continued to have an 
impact on the majority/minorities relations when the new nation-states were established 
in the Balkans. 
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III. Jewish Arrival in the Old Bulgarian Lands 
Although there is evidence of Jews living in the Balkans from very early times, it is largely 
accepted that they re-settled there after the Christians. According to Shaw the first Jewish 
communities in Bulgaria were established during the 16`h century in Nikopol and in 
Vidin, both on the river Danube. From there Jews moved to Russe. There were also 
smaller communities to be found in Shoumen and Varna in the north cast of the country. 
Additionally smaller Jewish communities were established in Kustcndil and Samokov in 
the western part of the Bulgarian lands. Rozanes notes that the cities of Vratsa and Lom 
which were on the roads connecting Central Europe with the Balkans, from Belgrade and 
Vienna also attracted Jewish settlers. ' At that time, the town of Sofia, which was later to 
become a centre of Jewish life in Bulgaria, hosted a very small Jewish community. 3Most 
of the Jews who settled in the Balkan lands during the times of the Ottoman empire 
escaped persecution from Portugal and Spain. Escaping from persecution was the most 
important event in Jewish life and it affected the way they viewed their new homeland. 
For them the Ottomans were their hosts, not conquerors, as they were for the Christians. 
Typically, as refugees, Jews to a great extent conformed to society which offered them 
asylum. 
There was another feature of the Jewish character in the Balkans which made them a 
particular ethnic minority. There were many Jews from Spain, who came to the Balkans 
with high-class attitudes and a superior cultural status. This was because the Scphardium 
of Spain did not know the ghetto life of Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. Before the 
2 Sec Shelomo Avraam Rozanes, Istoria na Evreiskata Obshtina v Russe: Po Izvorni 
lateriali. Ot Drevni vremena do 1852, Isaak Moskona (tr. ), (Russe: 1914), vol. I. 
3 See Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 1991. 
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expulsion by and large Spanish Jews lived well, and openly enjoyed their material and 
cultural achievements. Shaw argues that this high social status was the main feature of the 
Balkan Sephardic community, which made them significantly more open to change 
compared to their kin in other parts of Europe: `They never had known the limitations 
and the scorn of the ghettos of Central Europe. They had mixed freely with their social 
equals in Muslim Spain, both Christians and Muslims, so once arrived in the Ottoman 
empire they lacked the servility and even shyness toward superiors which characterised 
the other Jewish groups, in consequence looking down on the latter as ignorant and 
backward'. 4 This made Jews quite different subordinate ethnic minority from the 
Christians in relation to the Ottoman authorities. As a community the Balkan Jews did 
not view the Ottomans as people who prevented them from achievement and success, 
but rather they thought of them as the masters who helped their survival in times of 
disaster. The Ottomans used the commercial skills as well as the cultural heritage Jews 
brought with them. This of course gave them a somewhat privileged position within the 
Ottoman society. Jews responded with loyalty to those in power. Such was the special 
position of the Jews during the Jewish Golden Age in the Balkans, which lasted roughly 
between 16th and 18`" century. Jewish life of this period was concentrated in 
Constantinople (Istanbul), the capital of the Ottoman empire. The largest Jewish city in 
South Eastern Europe at this time was Thessaloniki. There were also concentrated 
Jewish populations in the Macedonian settlements of Monastir and Skopje. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
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IV. Balkan Jews Under the Ottomans 
Generally speaking Jews were held in a higher status then the Christians under Ottoman 
rule. Technically Jews were classified as `unbelievers' as the Christians were. But very 
importantly they enjoyed various economic and tax concessions. Jews had a higher and 
privileged position in trade till the late 17'" century. They could witness in Ottoman 
Muslim courts and because of their multilingual skills, often acted as interpreters at the 
court. In general they were preferred in the conversion to the Christians and after 
conversion they were allowed to keep their own and father's names. Later Jews paid their 
taxes to the leaders of their own millet and not directly to the tax collectors as usually was 
the case with the Christians. This meant that Jews rarely came into negative contact with 
the representatives of Ottoman power. At the same time, the privileges Jews had under 
the Ottomans should not be exaggerated. Peneva argues that their privileges were not 
simply as a result of the appreciation the Ottomans had for the Jews. She notes that 
Ottomans used Jewish professional skills for the `expansionist ambitions of the Sultans' 
as the Jews were quite well connected to the world. ' 
Despite the concessions made to them, Jews remained subjects to the Sultan and like the 
Christians were restricted in many ways, particularly by the exemption from military 
service, which made them equally powerless. Also their particular connection to 
Ottoman commerce made them dependent on developments in the Ottoman empire 
over which they had no control. The Ottoman decline during the 17'f' and 18°i century 
badly affected the Balkan Jewish communities. Although they participated in the legal 
5 See Marina Peneva, `Oblel: loto na evreite v balkanskite provintsii na Osmanskata 
impcria', in Godi. rLnik, Obshtestvena Kulturno-Prosvetna Organizatsia na )vreite v 
Narodna Republika Bulgaria: Centralno Rukovodstvo, (1985), vol. 20, pp. 102-103. 
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structures in a more active way, the lack of stable rule of law at this time in the Ottoman 
empire increased corruption and led to all kinds of insecurities, which affected the Jews. 
All mullets were shaken by attacks of irregulars and the previously peaceful inter- 
communal life was seriously disturbed. Ethnic tension in the Ottoman empire grew and 
the cultural isolation increased. Despite their relative openness to change, Jews were 
fearful and looked suspiciously to the Ottoman reforms in 19th century. With the 
advancement of the national liberation movement of the Balkan Christians, they felt 
increasingly insecure. The Ottoman empire with all its deficiencies seemed safer to them 
than the prospect of new states ruled by their old foe, the Christians. 
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V. Jews and Christians: Shared Traditions 
The interaction between the Christian and the Jewish traditions followed quite a similar 
pattern to the Christian-Muslim communication on the level of religion. Research on the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria suggests that despite the very obvious differences in the 
Christian and Muslim outlook, there have been certain similarities between the two faiths 
based on the unorthodox Muslim and Christian traditions in the Balkans. The various 
Islamic sects were more open to influences and more compatible with Christian practices 
than usually thought. The two religious worlds were bridged at certain points, though 
traditionally they have been seen as antithetical. It is clear that in theory Christianity and 
Judaism were also very different. The lack of personified God in Judaism is the most 
obvious differential. Yet again, unorthodox Judaism was not in total disagreement with 
the Christian faith of its neighbours. The most notable meeting point was the messianic 
attitudes which Balkan Jews adhered to. Jewish exiles from Spain and Portugal brought 
obscurantist attitudes and mysticism to the Balkans. Originally Jewish mystic tradition 
developed to a great extent as a result of the experience of the Inquisition in Spain. 
Jewish education adopted a distinct mode of mysticism attempting to comprehend the 
huge disaster. The suffering seemed so undeserved and so sudden that the only way to 
explain it was through irrational attitudes. Later Messianic expectations deepened during 
the 17th century with the spread of the Sabatcanism, which was essentially a movement of 
the followers of Sabbetai Zevi, who was believed to be a messiah and a convert to Islam. 
Shaw thinks that Sephardic messianism was born in response to the general economic 
decline of the Ottoman empire during the 17`h century, which led to poor education, 
puritanism and extreme religious obedience. ' Messianism offered the promise of radical 
improvement in an unbearable life. It was rooted in folk culture rather than orthodox 
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Judaism. Benbassa writes that `for the barely literate and often illiterate Sephardic masses, 
the appeal of the messiah lay in folk religion, in the system of thought and practice that, 
through an admixture of normative belief, superstition, and magic, tried to make sense of 
an often dismal reality. " This messianistic tradition was not as alien to the Balkan 
Christians, as the scholarly Judaism. Christian peasants also had a strong inclination 
towards messianism. This was also in response to the harshness of life. In this manner 
messianism cut across the divide between Jews and Christians. Although it is not known 
to have amounted to any particular active interaction or exchange of thoughts, 
nevertheless messianism was a trend of belief which the two communities shared. 
This, rather than the natural tolerance of the peasantry, as asserted by the Bulgarian 
historiography, may be seen as the root of the relatively peaceful co-existence between 
the Christians and Jews in the Balkan lands. It appears that the systematic outlook 
towards the Jews was that they were different but not necessarily hostile. In Bulgaria anti- 
Semitism was seldom registered before the late 19 century. " Chary observes that 
Sec Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 1991. 
Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans: The Judeo-Spanish 
Community. 15th to 20th Centuries, (Oxford & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1995), p. 59. 
" See Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, p. 85. Despite 
the rather insignificant position of the Jews in the most of the Bulgarian lands at that 
time, occasional acts of anti-Semitism were registered. The main expression of anti- 
Semitism was embodied in the old Christian belief in ritual murder. According to this 
belief Jews killed Christian children on the major Jewish holiday Pessah (Passover) and 
drunk their blood. Attacks on Jews on such occasions were registered in the Ottoman 
lands in 16th century when the Jewish community in the Ottoman empire grew in 
numbers and enjoyed economic prosperity. According to Shaw they seemed to have been 
committed mainly by Armenians and Greeks in the regions of Anatolia. It also appears 
that there were occasions when Jews were held responsible for their actions as Jews. But 
there is little accurate historic evidence about this. Shaw mentions the case of the 
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Bulgarian anti-Semitism, being primarily rural, was less violent than the urban middle- 
class anti-Semitism observed in the Central European cities. 9Thus Christian Jewish 
interaction in the Bulgarian lands under the Ottomans was not only a result of carefully 
managed relations between them as different ethnic groups by the Ottoman law, but also 
a consequence of shared unorthodox religious tradition. 
breakaway Ottoman feudal lord Osman Pazvantoglu who ruled in the north-west of the 
Bulgarian lands along the river Danube. His Jewish physician was blamed for his death 
after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade and Vidin in 1689. More systematic anti- 
Semitism was apparent in the late 19`h century and particularly while the Ottomans were 
leaving and the after Bulgarian independence. In his account of anti-Semitic acts in the 
Bulgarian lands Chary includes pogroms of the 19`h century, again around rumours for 
ritual Pessah. According to him the most well known were in Pazardjik (1885), in Sofia 
(1884) and in Varna (1890). See also Frederich B. Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the 
Final Solution 1940-1944, (University of Pittsburugh Press, 1972), p. 32. 
" See Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, pp. 32-34. 
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VI. Bulgarian National Independence 
The Bulgarian national independence of 1878 was an enormous change in the life of all 
ethnic communities on the territory. Jewish life in Bulgaria changed forever. The Jews, 
who previously lived dispersed in the Ottoman empire found themselves restricted by 
the new borders of the national states, which emerged after the collapse of the empire. 
From being Balkan Jews, the new Bulgarian borders, decided at the Berlin Congress of 
1878 determined the new location and position of the Jewish communities. Jews were 
now a small and scattered community of around 50,000, consisting predominantly of 
urban populations in small cities, with no particularly strong financial position, culturally 
cut off from the rest of the Jewish communities in the Balkans and Europe. From being 
part of a rather cosmopolitan Ottoman Balkan community, they were now defined as 
Bulgarian Jews only. Similarly to the remaining Turkish people, Jews became passive and 
withdrew to the margins of the new state. The main Jewish cultural centres remained 
outside their new country, independent Bulgaria. The only remaining cultural centre was 
Sofia, where a Jewish press flourished throughout the 19`h century until the Second 
World War. The Bulgarian Jewish community was cut off from its traditional cultural and 
commercial centres: Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Izmir, Edrine. "' According to Benbassa, Jews 
"' During the 15`h and 16"' centuries there were no Jewish schools in the territory which 
was to become independent Bulgaria. Jewish education was located mainly in the 
Macedonian region. During this time there were three main types of Jewish religious 
schools: talmud, torahs and3'eshivas. Thessaloniki (Salonica) had a well-established system 
of Jewish schools and there were also religious Jewish schools of these types in Istanbul, 
Monastir, Demotica, Edrine, Skopje, Kavala and Izmir. In the 19`h century there was an 
overall revival of the Jewish press in the Ottoman lands. Shaw points out that two thirds 
of the total Jewish newspapers in the Ottoman empire during the 19`h century were in 
Salonica, Istanbul, Sofia and Izmir. It appears that Sofia was a rather big publishing 
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did rely on the Ottoman power structures for protection from the periphery: `The Jewish 
communities continued to identify strongly with the central authorities and regarded the 
appearance of new national options in the modern period with mistrust'. " The main 
source of Jewish insecurity, after the collapse of the Ottoman empire, was the uncertainty 
over the new regulations in the new nation-states, including Bulgaria. In difference to the 
Christian majority at this point, they had no state on their own to look to for protection, 
and had to rely entirely on international agreements for protection of the minorities. This 
connected Jews in a particular way to international politics, which the new states did not 
consider a necessarily positive development. Bulgaria did not view the intervention of the 
Great Powers as favourable to her at all, and any ideas about how Jewish matters should 
be conducted were seen along these lines. Thus Jews were not only associated with the 
former imperial power in Bulgaria but also with the new regulations imposed on the 
young state from the outside. One way or another Bulgaria Jews seemed not solely a 
`Bulgarian' problem. 
At the Congress of Berlin there was pressure from Jewish organisations in Europe, on 
both the British and Ottoman governments, to guarantee the protection of the Jewish 
minorities in the Balkans. The partition of Bulgarian territory was perceived as a great 
trauma for the Bulgarian state. The Great Powers, who the Bulgarians blamed, were also 
campaigning for the protection of minorities under the new government. In any case, 
Article 5, the clause of the Treaty of Berlin concerning minorities in Bulgaria and Eastern 
Rumelia was incorporated into the Turnovo Constitution in April 1879, the foundation 
legal document of the new Bulgarian state, the Jewish community was ruled by 
centre. For more details see Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Re ublic, p. 181. 
" Benbassa and Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans, p. 2. 
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democratically elected local council, placed under the authority of the Chief Rabbi paid 
by the state. As Benbassa observes : `The clergy was thus placed under the authority of 
its own spiritual leaders but supervised by the state. 712 The new independent Bulgaria 
acknowledged that Jews were a minority, which was to be represented in the new society 
and state structures. 
'Z Ibid., p. 93. 
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VII. The Interwar Period 
Between the two wars, Bulgarian Jews were seen as a harmless, politically passive and 
socially marginal community. They had little say in the political developments of the 
Bulgarian state and very limited commercial power. This latter characteristic is quite 
significant because the economic wealth of the Jewish communities was a very strong 
argument against them in Eastern and Central Europe and most notably in Germany. 
Bulgarian Jews were never identified as commercially prosperous community in the same 
manner, though they were associated strongly with urban culture. During the interwar 
period Jewish affairs were not considered as any kind a problem in Bulgaria. As a matter 
of fact the Bulgarian state did not see the status of the Jewish community as a matter for 
debate. For most of the time Bulgaria was torn apart by the Macedonian problem, the 
most serious national question in the country. Seton-\Vatson argues that Jews in Bulgaria 
did not represent a significant problem during the interwar years because they were too 
small in numbers. 13 This certainly is a convincing argument. Jewish life was quite visible 
in the big city centres and particularly in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna and Russe. At the same 
time there was no doubt that the ethnic Bulgarian culture was the country's dominant 
culture. 
The lack of Jewish participation in Bulgarian politics in any significant manner said 
something about the actual position of the Jews in the society. Benbassa believes that the 
lack of Jewish representation in high positions of the Bulgarian army or administrative 
structures revealed undeclared anti-Semitism: `The Jews of Bulgaria did not particularly 
distinguish themselves in the political and cultural life of the country. The prevailing anti- 
" See Hugh Seton-\Vatson, The `Sick Heart' of Modern Europe: The Problem of the 
Danubian Lands, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 33. 
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Semitism was not unconnected with this state of affairs. '" But he does not give any 
factual evidence for the existence of anti-Semitism in interwar Bulgaria. In a similar 
manner Shaw concludes that although Bulgaria had the best record of treatment of Jews 
after the establishment of the independent state, there was hidden anti-Semitism in the 
`invisible and unofficial' governmental arrangements. 15 The difficulty with the question of 
whether there was anti-Semitism in Bulgaria before the Second World War is that there is 
no precise way of measuring the level of anti-Semitism until actual persecution takes 
place. It is also extremely difficult to collect enough information about anti-Semitic 
actions or feelings in order to give a straight answer to the question of whether there 
were any roots of anti-Semitism in Bulgaria before the spread of Nazi ideas. The best 
account of the insecurities experienced by the Jews around this time is to be found in the 
diary of Gabriel Arie. In this rare memoir Arie describes the turmoil which the collapse 
of the Ottoman empire and the consequent establishment of independent Bulgaria 
actually caused in the life of the Jewish community. He mentions that there were 
occasional worries about expressions of anti-Semitism in the Bulgarian press. But 
according to his account the main concern of the community was the disconnection 
from the other Jewish communities in the Balkans and particularly the one in Istanbul. 
16 On balance it seems that during the interwar period the Bulgarian Jewish community 
was not subject to any special policy which may be labelled as anti-Semitic. 
But the formation of an independent Bulgarian state had a substantial impact on Jewish 
life. The process of Jewish integration began. Jews started learning Bulgarian language 
seriously. The linguistic acculturation of the Bulgarian Jews became the most important 
'a Benbassa and Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans, p. 94. 
15 See Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire. p. 191. 
'ý See Arie, A Sephardi Life in Southeastern Europe, p. 96 and p. 107. 
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characteristic of their new life. Benbassa defines the whole period as lacking excesses of 
anti-Semitic actions but nevertheless unfavourable to the Jews. He believes that 
integration of the Jews in the new nation-states in the Balkans was far more problematic 
than often thought. According to him Bulgaria was not an exception in this respect: `the 
process of change did not bring a significant integration into the surrounding society. 
The Jews remained apart, anxious to keep a low profile. "Although Jewish integration 
strengthened during the interwar period it was very far from an accomplished process. 
Apart from language Bulgarian Jews continued to live more or less in the same style they 
had before. Similarly to the Bulgarian Turks, Jews thought of this period as a transitional 
one and waited in the margins of the society for better times to come. 
" Benbassa and Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans, p. 104. 
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VIII. Zionism in Bulgaria 
Bulgarian communism argued that most of the Jews living in the country had a strong 
socialist orientation from very early. 'µ The main idea behind this claim was to represent 
the Bulgarian communist movement as united and engaged in `pure' socialist ideology, 
untainted by questions of ethnicity, which the Jewish involvement inevitably involved. 
According to the theory all people who took part in the communist movement were 
motivated by the ideas of the class struggle. In general Jewish involvement with 
communist ideas during the Second World War has been quite controversial from the 
point of view of the communist movement because of the complexities of Jewish 
persecution, which was essentially ethnic by nature. In the Bulgarian case the communist 
idea was to show that Bulgarian communists fought together with all oppressed people, 
because they were oppressed. The communist party history explained Jewish 
participation on the basis of their class identity - Bulgarian Jews were declared socialists 
from the time before the arrival of Nazi ideas in Bulgaria. The aim was to show that Jews 
became communists not as a result of ethnic persecution but as a natural step in the 
maturing of their class consciousness. 
This idea had very little to do with the truth about the political convictions of the 
Bulgarian Jews. It is well established that during the interwar years Bulgarian Jews 
identified strongly with Zionist ideas and less with socialism of any kind. This is not to 
say that Zionism was the only movement of the Bulgarian Jews. Jewish life in Bulgaria 
before the Second World War was quite diverse. But on balance, Jewish nationalism 
claiming that Jews should strive towards the establishment of their own nation-state 
18 Kiril Vasilev (ed. ), Istoria na Antifashistkata Borba v Bulgaria 1939/1944: Scl2tcmvri 
1939 - fevruari 1943, (Sofia: Partizdat, 1976), vol. I. 
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based on Jewish ethnicity and culture, as opposed to communism based on political 
statehood, was the most popular political idea among the Bulgarian Jews. After Bulgarian 
independence both Zionism and socialism tried to develop a systematic concept about 
the Jewish identity. The central issue was what Jews should choose: integration in the 
new Bulgarian society or departure for Palestine. 
At the beginning of the 20`h century, Zionism was uniquely popular among the Bulgarian 
Jews: `In difference to the rest of the Balkan countries, Zionism in Bulgaria blended very 
well with the community life and became its centre. It became the political creed of the 
Bulgarian Jewry. 21 Zionism overshadowed the activities of the Alliance Israelite Universal 
(AIU), which was an organisation created to alter obscurantist Jewish thought after the 
model of the enlightened western Jewish communities. ' In Bulgaria the attempts of the 
AIU to substitute the original language Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) of the Bulgarian Jews 
with French as the common language among all Jews were less successful than in any 
other Balkan country. Chary argues that this was one of the main features of the 
Bulgarian Jews, which set them apart from the rest of the Balkan Jewish communities. 
He states that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman empire a `new generation 
'`' Zionism was the Jewish nationalist movement that has had as its goal the creation and 
support of a Jewish national state in Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews 
(Hebrew: Eretz Yisra'el, `the Land of Israel'). Though Zionism originated in Eastern and 
Central Europe in the latter part of the 19`h century, it is in many ways a continuation of 
the ancient nationalist attachment of the Jews. 
2" See Benbassa and Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans, p. 152. 
Z' AIU was founded in Paris in 1860 and its first schools in the Balkans were opened 
shortly afterwards: in Edrine in 1867 and in Shumla (todays Shumen, Bulgaria) in 1970. 
The Aliance also opened branches in Istanbul, Izmir and Thessaloniki (Salonica) in 1870. 
It taught in the spirit of upward social mobility and supported mass education in one 
language. See Benbassa and Rodriguc, The Jews of the Balkans, 1995. 
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of post-Ottoman Francophile Jews emerged in the Balkans, but not in Bulgaria'. '-'One of 
the reasons Zionism seemed preferable to the Bulgarian Jews was that it offered 
identification both with democratic equality and Jewish unity. Most importantly Zionism 
corresponded with the nationalist upsurge in the entire Balkan region. The unity of the 
nation was the main goal of all Balkan people. This made many of the members of the 
minorities very aware that national identity was to be the heart of the new societies. As a 
result they had to find a way to fit into this concept of the nation-state. The so-called 
`third Jewish generation' responded to Bulgarian nationalism with Zionism" For the 
Jews the starting point was to clarify their own national feelings. Was there a Jewish 
nationality and which nation did Jews belong? Zionism's strength gave clear answers to 
such questions. At the eve of the Second World War there were 30 Zionist societies. The 
Bulgarian Zionist Federation, which served as an umbrella organisation for all Zionist 
activities was established around 1898 and sustained until 1942.2; Bulgarian Jews saw 
Zionism as the most modern theory of Jewish identity and certainly hoped that it would 
give clarity to the rather confused life after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. This led 
to an exceptional Zionsit vitality in Bulgaria. 25 Jewish periodicals and the press in Bulgaria 
illustrates the prevailing Zionist orientation in the country. Between 1897 and 1948 there 
were 228 papers published, the majority of them were Zionist. The organ of the Zionist 
Federation was Hasofar (Trumpet), which was published in Plovdiv in Ladino and/or 
Bulgarian with interruptions between 1901-41 and between 1944-48 transformed into 
u See Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution 1940-1944, p. 30. 
23 Ibid., p. 30. Chary also observes that there were three generations of Jews in the pre- 
war Bulgaria: the old Sephardium who had grown up in Ottoman obscurantism, the 
westernised AJU educated second generation and the Zionist Jewish nationalist, who 
were the third generation. 
24 Benbassa and Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans, p. 151. 
25 Ibid., pp. 151-153. 
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Zionistka Tribuua (Zionist Tribune). Among these who lasted longer were El Dia (The 
Day) 1898-1910 published in Plovdiv, Jevreiski Glas: NeZavishv Zionisticheski Vestnik 
(Jewish Voice: Independent Zionist Newspaper), Sofia, 1924-26, Jevreiska Tribuua (Jewish 
Tribune) in Russe, 1926-29, El Judio (The Jew, 1925-29 in Sofia and Varna, Hafikvah 
(The Hope) in Sofia, 1928-31.2GBenbassa goes as far as to call Bulgaria `the motherland of 
institutionalised Zionism'. 27 Zionism, he says was wining the competition among 
Zionsits, socialists and communists . 
2' For Zionism promised one language, equal 
opportunities and above all united national unity - all the features associated with the new 
times in the Balkans. 
In addition to the fact that no single developed international commercial or cultural 
Jewish centre such as Thessaloniki remained in the new Bulgarian territories must have 
prompted a desire to find a new focus for the community's life. The question what 
language Bulgarian Jews should speak was also subject to debate. Language was seen as 
the main criteria for the Jewish adaptation after the Ottoman nrilletwas dismantled. 
Language difference complicated the public life of the Balkan Sephardium in the 
independent nation-states, where linguistic affiliation was becoming one of the specific 
26 Data gathered at the National Library `Cyril and hlethodius' (NBKM), Sofia, Bulgaria, 
1997. 
"See Bcnbassa and Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans, p. 153. 
28 Ibid., pp. 90-93. According to his data the socialist organisation Poalci Zion, founded 
in Plovdiv in 1910 with its paper Probuda, was the largest organisation in the years 
between 1944-48 with around 7,000 members. In 1924 the revisionist Zionism and youth 
was organised into the Democratic Zionist Activist Group with leader Benjamin Arditi. 
In the 1930s the revisionists and Poalci Zion left the Zionist Federation. There was also a 
religious Zionist movement, `Mizrahi' which was founded in 1935 but it did not live very 
long. 
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characteristics of Balkan nationalism. 29 Jews were speaking many languages, but were not 
really prepared for life in monolingual national cultures. During the 1920s Zionists 
introduced Hebrew as the second language equal to Bulgarian. In effect this meant that 
Jews accepted that Bulgarian was to be their language of public communication and 
Hebrew their national language. This is why the educational reform of 1934, which was 
discussed in relation to the Turkish minority in chapter 4 of this thesis, was the most 
significant factor introduced by the Bulgarian state. The introduction of Bulgarian 
language as the main language of education in all schools greatly encouraged the usage of 
Bulgarian language in all spheres of life. The political changes in 1934 were critical to the 
level of the Jewish participation in socialist life in Bulgaria. The then Bulgarian 
government's anti-democratic policies seriously damaged the democratic process in the 
country and socialist oriented Zionism withdrew from public life. "" Those Jews who 
adhered to socialist ideas of any type were very vulnerable and many opted to stay on the 
safe side by being simply Zionists rather than socialist minded Zionists. 
Z' Ibid., p. 89. 
"' The reform was carried by the government of the colonels Damian Velchev and 
Kimon Georgiev, which came into power in Bulgaria after a coup d `etat on 19 May 1934. 
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IX. Bulgarian Jewish Socialist Tradition in Bulgaria 
Before the Second World War many Bulgarian Jews supported socialism in a broad 
sense. But it was far from being the only political movement associated with Jews. Most 
developed their ideas within the Zionist movement and argued for revising Zionism to 
incorporate socialism rather than rejecting it. They tended to support the Bulgarian Social 
Democratic Party (the so called `broad socialists' as opposed to the `narrow, socialists', which 
later became the core of the Bulgarian communist party). Socialist-oriented Zionists 
favoured the introduction of Bulgarian language for general purposes and for the 
restriction of Hebrew to religious practices. While mainstream Zionists spoke about the 
exclusivity of the Jewish nation, socialists saw integration into Bulgarian mainstream 
society as a way to protect Jewish culture. There were Jewish sections in the Bulgarian 
socialist party at the beginning of the century, consisting mainly of typographers and 
intellectuals in the cities. There were also socialist newspapers: Evreiski rabotnik ('The 
Jewish Worker'), Sofia, 1910-32 with an interruption between 1924 -31, El Ptrevo ('The 
People'), Sofia, 1902-03, Evreiska misul ('Jewish Thought'), Sofia, April 1936-August 
1936. " 
The dynamics between the left and the right in the Jewish community were quite 
complex. The Jewish left was primarily oriented towards the ideas of social-democracy 
rather than Marxism. Moreover Zionism was not simply a right-wing individualist 
ideology but was strongly associated with ideas of equality and Jewish community unity . 
To an extent settling in Palestine was seen as a step towards building socialism, 
understood broadly as Jewish community-orientated life. Some of Jewish left 
" Data gathered at the National Bulgarian Library `Cyril and Methodius' (NBKA4), Sofia, 
Bulgaria, 1997. 
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publications supported Zionist ideas (Evreiski Rabotnic and Probtida) and did not feel that 
they necessarily contradicted socialist movement in Bulgaria. In another words, Jewish 
socialism was not a rejection of ethnic Jewish nationalism striving towards Jewish 
independence in Palestine. 
The main question in the interaction between the Bulgarian and Jewish socialism was 
whether the Jewish and the Bulgarian left movements should be kept separately or fuse. 
Parousheva claims that Jews did not take part in the original Bulgarian socialist 
movement and in the communist party. She asserts: `The question was whether there 
should be Jews in the Bulgarian socialist party or simply Jewish socialists in the Zionist 
movement. '32 It was as important for Jews to decide whether in the name of socialist 
ideals they should merge with their Bulgarian fellows, as it was for the Bulgarians to 
know whether they could sympathise with Jews' Zionist ideals. At a time when Bulgarian 
communists were outlawed, Jews did not participate in significant numbers although very 
" few held important positions in the Bulgarian communist party ranks. 
'Z Dobrina Parousheva, `Social Democracy and the Jewish Working Class in Bulgaria (late 
19th and early 20th century)'in Annual, `Shalom', vol. XXVII, (1993/94), p. 71. 
33 Chary estimates that Jews made up 4 per cent or 400 members of a total of 10,000 
partisans in Bulgaria, and that there were 70 Jews killed in the underground movement. 
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X. `Who Saved the Bulgarian Jews? ' 
Bulgaria has been very proud that during the Second World War no Jews from Bulgaria 
proper were sent to the death camps. The question about why this was so has dominated 
Jewish politics in Bulgaria ever since. This research looks at the controversies 
surrounding the debate and focuses on the answer which was given during communism. 
The Bulgarian communist regime claimed that the saving of the Bulgarian Jews was a 
unique act, comparable only to the saving of the Jews in Denmark. Most importantly it 
asserted that the BCP, with the help of the Red Army, averted the deportations to the 
death camps, planned by the Germans and supported by the Bulgarian government. This 
claim aimed to glorify the Bulgarian communist movement during the Second World 
War. Bulgarian communism also postulated that it was primarily class conflict, not ethnic 
persecution, which motivated the Bulgarian Jews to join the resistance. It was also 
underlined that Jewish persecution during the war was not harsher than the persecution 
suffered by the communists. " This communist version of events of the history of 
Bulgarian Jewry aimed to strengthen the legitimacy of communism as a morally just 
system. Things were clear - capitalists persecuted the Jews and communists rescued 
them. But this simple statement gave a very insufficient answer to the very complicated 
question of how the Bulgarian Jewish community survived. 
First, a major clarification has to be made about the very definition of who actually were 
the Bulgarian Jews in the communist version of history. The communist theory about the 
saving of the Bulgarian Jews was based on the definition of the Bulgarian Jews as the 
Jews living in Bulgaria proper. The Jews living in the territories occupied by Bulgaria in 
Macedonia and Thrace were excluded from this definition. The Jews from these so called 
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`occupied territories' were sent to the concentration camps. Bulgarian communists 
claimed that this was not a `Bulgarian' matter - because these lands were not `Bulgaria 
proper'. In 1943, about 12,000 Jews were deported from the occupied territories of 
Macedonia and Thrace to Poland. 35During the war, communists argued, Bulgaria was 
occupied by the Germans and was under their control. Accordingly Bulgaria had to 
comply with the German demands for the extermination of the Jews because they had 
very little say when it came to the `occupied territories'. The question about the Jews 
living in Bulgaria proper was treated from a different perspective. The communist 
opinion was that there the communist movement supported by the Bulgarian people and 
by part of the Bulgarian elite saved the Jews. The communist teaching was that the BCP 
led the anti-fascist resistance, which saved the Jews. Internally, the driving force was the 
peasant-workers alliance, guided by the BCP. The main outside factor was the co- 
ordinated international communist movement and the consequent intervention of the 
Red Army. Jewish participation in the resistance was reduced to a minimum in this 
communist theory. But also very importantly, if acknowledged at all, it was said that Jews 
took part in the communist movement, not because of the ethnic persecution they 
suffered, but because of their class identity and class-minded thinking. The communist 
formula was that the anti-fascist resistance equalled the struggle against capitalism and 
imperialism and the persecution of the Jews simply part of it. Todor Zhivkov himself 
stated that he personally organised the Sofia demonstration in protest to the plan to 
deport the Jews in May 1943: ' It is true that many Bulgarian Jews perished during those 
terrible years. But none of them perished only because of being Jews. Bulgarians and 
"See Vasilcv, Istoria na Antifashistkata Borba v Bulgaria, 1976. 
35 See Parousheva, `Social Democracy and the Jewish Working Class in Bulgaria, p. 71. 
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Bulgarian citizens of Jewish and other origins struggled together against fascism and 
sacrificed their life for the liberty of their mother-country, for socialist Bulgaria. 
36 
However the question about the Jews of the `occupied territories' was central to the 
confusions in the communist claim. This problem, like everything relating to Macedonia, 
was connected to the ideas of Bulgarian nationalism December 1941 Bulgaria joined the 
Pact (Italy, Germany, Japan) and declared war on the Western Allies. Soon afterwards 
Bulgaria occupied Macedonia and Thrace. Although the boundaries of the new territories 
and the ownership of the new lands were not fully established, Bulgarians were excited 
over the gains. The communist ideology and historiography in general ascribed the 
occupation to the nationalist ambitions of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie. But why Bulgarian 
communists did not fight for saving the Jews in the occupied territories if according to 
their own theory they supported the international anti-Hitlerist struggle? In this case it 
seemed only too convenient to state that neither the Bulgarian communists nor the 
Bulgarian public had any say over the Jewish faith in the `occupied territories'. 
Communism did not deny the deportations from the occupied territories in Macedonia 
and Thrace. But in general, the topic was avoided as much as possible. Later, in its efforts 
to describe the Second World War as an imperialist war, communism ignored the 
Holocaust and spoke only about the `anti-fascist fighters' (`bort! i antifasbisti) who died in 
the camps. It was also argued that because Jews in the `occupied territories' were either 
Yugoslav or Greek citizens the Bulgarian authorities could give up on them much more 
easily. At the same time it was underlined that the Bulgarian administration in Macedonia 
and Thrace succumbed to Hitler's pressure. In short, communism saved the Jews in 
'6 Todor Zhivkov. Foreword. By Albert Cohen and And Assa, Saving the Jews in 
Bulgaria 1941-1944, (Sofia: State Publishing House 'Septcmvri', 1977). 
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Bulgaria and the pro-Nazi Bulgarian bourgeoisie alone bore responsibility for the 
extermination of the Jews from Macedonia and Thrace. 
The communist interpretation added that along with the leading role of the communist 
party in the resistance, Bulgarian Jews were also saved by the traditional lack of anti- 
Semitic feeling in Bulgaria. This was not an unfounded claim. The relationship between 
the Bulgarian nation and the Jewish ethnic minority during the Second World War may 
be described as non-mobilised in an anti-Semitic fashion and non-active on a mass level. 
The observation of the lack of intensive anti-Semitism among the Bulgarian population 
during the Nazi time was quite accurate. Almog compares Bulgaria with Italy and 
concludes that in a similar fashion Bulgarian public opinion was not won by the Nazis. 
He believes that the main reason for this was that both Bulgaria and Italy had relatively 
small Jewish populations, which were not particularly distinctive in social or economic 
terms. Almog thinks that Jews were considered a legitimate part of the Bulgarian nation 
and therefore anti-Semitism did not resonate so much with ordinary people in everyday 
life. "Yet Holocaust history questions whether outspoken anti-Semitism was a necessary 
condition for the extermination of the Jews. 38 Communism emphasised the individual 
psychology and the almost mystical qualities of the Bulgarian cultural national character, 
which saved the Jews during the Second World War. There was very little analysis of the 
actual events and the complicated play of political factors behind the scenes. Grinberg 
gives a very detailed account of the logistics of the Jewish internment in Bulgaria proper 
as well as the logistics of the Jewish deportations from Macedonia and Thrace and the 
" See Shmucl Almog, Nationalism and Antisemitism in Modern Europe 1815-1945, (Thc 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Pergamon Press, 1990), p. 127. 
3R See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, (Great Britain: Polity Press, 
1989), p. 31. 
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involvement of the Bulgarian administration in it. His book was published in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. But it was never reprinted or referred to as a source of 
information in communist historiography. '`' Grinberg claimed that the lack of mobilised 
anti-Semitism on a mass scale was not a sufficient factor on its own to prevent the 
deportations of the Jews from the territories occupied by Bulgaria. He also describes how 
the Jews from Macedonia and Thrace were deported by trains which received the official 
permission to pass through Bulgaria proper. Grinberg however does not deny that the 
saving of the Jews from Bulgaria proper was a great achievement of Bulgaria. 
Communism saw the Jewish question in Bulgaria as part of the myth of Bulgarian 
tolerance, rooted in the myth of the long years of suffering under the Turkish rule, and 
the lack of reactionary native aristocracy. The formula of Marxism-Leninism was also 
used to justify this attitude. Benvenisti summarised that in the spirit of 'Marxism- 
Leninism, in Bulgaria, people posses an `international psyche' and there are no social 
differences between the ethnic groups. To be precise he meant that Bulgarian people did 
not discriminate ethnic minorities in general because they all belonged to the same class. 
Benvenisti stated that the great national revolutionary Bulgarian tradition as well as the 
weak religious feelings of the Bulgarians contributed to the success of the resistance. " 
Interestingly many communist books acknowledged the role of the Bulgarian church in 
saving the Bulgarian Jews. Although religious institutions were not supposed to have 
played a positive role in the Bulgarian society, according to the communist ideology, it 
Sec Natan Grinberg, Documenti, (Sofia: The Central Consistory of the Bulgarian Jews, 
1945). 
" David Bcnvcnisti, `Niakoi problemi otnosno prichinite za spasiavancto na bulgariskite 
evrci of lagerite na smurta: Kum 25-godishninata of socialisticheskata revolutsia v 
Bulgaria' in Godis/mik, Ohshtestvena Kulturno-Prosvetna Organizatsia na Evrcitc v 
Narodna Republika Bulgaria: Centralno Rukovodstvo, 1969, vol. IV. 
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was said that the Bulgarian church was a significant factor in the resistance to 
deportations. " 
The BCP was declared the rescuer of the Jews, just as it was the saviour of Bulgaria as a 
whole. The communist myth also tried to de-ethnicity the Jewish persecution in Bulgaria 
by stating that Jews were in danger because they were poor and socialists, not because of 
their ethnicity. This was the communist answer to the question `who saved the Bulgarian 
Jews'. Although there were some disagreements on this interpretation among the Jewish 
community in Bulgaria, in general it was not challenged until 1989. At the same time the 
real strength of the BCP during the Second World War has been a subject of debate. 
BCP was outlawed after the 1923 uprising in Bulgaria and since then acting as an 
underground opposition. Chary believes that it was quite powerful, strongly connected 
with the Soviets but consisting primarily of Bulgarian nationals: The Russian connection 
with Bolshevism was an aid rather than a drawback to the party in Bulgaria and, there 
being no really serious minority problem in the country, the party was distinguished in 
Eastern Europe because its membership included a high percentage of Bulgarian 
nationals rather than disgruntled members of minorities. 'az However Chary also thinks 
that the two main factors which prevented the Jewish deportations were the protests of 
the Bulgarian community and the increased victories of the Allies. The combination of 
the two sustained the government decision not to hand the Jews over to the Nazis. " To 
the contrary Oren thinks that there was a relatively high number of Jews in the Bulgarian 
partisan movement.; Similarly to him Krispin asserts that the participation of the Jews in 
41 See Cohen and Assa, Savings Jews, chapter 5. 
42 Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, p. 6. 
43 Ibid., p. 155. 
44 See Nissan Oren, The Bulgarian Communist Party 1934-1944, (Ncw York: Columbia 
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the Bulgarian resistance was considerable: 260 guerrillas, 460 political prisoners and 1,000 
detained in concentration camps as politically suspicious persons as well as many others 
who were involved in the underground activities but not recruited by partisan's groups. " 
The debate about the level of active Jewish participation in the communist movement 
was not so important for the BCP. What really mattered from the communist point of 
view was their motivation. The communist myth was not about Jewish performance in 
the communist movement but more about the national uniqueness of the Bulgarian 
people, who saved their lives. Benvenisti argues that Bulgarians and Jews were brothers 
in the BCP, a tolerant party of international character due to its leaders' education in the 
Soviet Union and because `Bulgarians are made out of a special substance', which does 
not discriminate. 4C Dimitrov underlined the role the entire Bulgarian society played, led 
by the BCP, suggesting that the `deeply rooted humanism' of the Bulgarian people saved 
the Jews. 47 
Communist mythology had to compete with another strong myth about the saving of the 
Bulgarian Jews. This was the myth about the Bulgarian monarch, Boris III, who was 
believed to have saved the Bulgarian Jews by outmanoeuvring the German authorities. 
University Press, 1960), p. 274. 
" Sec Alfred Krispin, `A Closely Kept Secret' in Hunan Rrghts 117ithout Froutierr. European 
Magazine of Human Rights, Special Issue: Judaism. A Moral Code or Sense of 
Belonging, (droits de l'Homme sans Frontiers, 1997), p. 18. 
46 Benvenisti, `Niakoi problemi otnosno prichinite za spasiavaneto na bulgariskite evrei of 
lagcrite na smurta', p. 86. 
47 See Supplement of the Archives: Round table `The saving of the Bulgarian Jews 1941- 
1944' in Godishnik, 1989, vol. XXIV. 
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The communist myth opposed the role of the Bulgarian king in the events. Boris died in 
August 1943 and there were speculations, never proven , that 
he paid with his life for the 
refusal to deport the Jews from Bulgaria. This was impossible to verify and Boris was 
mythologised as the defender of the nation and a saviour of the Bulgarian Jews. 
Communist historiography however condemned the role of the king as pro-German. as 
Communism offered an alternative personality to the monarch - Todor Zhivkov, at the 
time a young communist activist in Sofia. The head of the BCP and the Bulgarian 
communist state Zhivkov was held as the main hero in the saving of the Bulgarian Jews. 
Zhivkov claimed personal responsibility for the Sofia demonstration on 24 May 1943, 
which was the high-point in the communist resistance. 49 The Bulgarian king was labelled 
a reactionary monarch, while Zhivkov, proclaimed as the protector of the Jews. The same 
year, when the Jews from Macedonia and Thrace were deported, Bulgarian authorities 
attempted to prepare the deportation of the Jews living within Bulgaria proper and 
25,000 Jews from Sofia were resettled in the provinces as a part of this preparation. This 
fact was kept silent under communism because of the controversial intricacies of the 
events which evolved after the communists took power in 1944. 
48 See Cohen and Assa, Saving the Jews in Bulgaria, chapter 8. 
49See Zhivkov. Foreword. By Cohen and Assa, Saving the Jews in Bulgaria, 1977. 
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XI. The Exodus of the Bulgarian Jews (1947-49) 
Between 1947-49 most of the Bulgarian Jews emigrated to Israel. The departure of about 
43,000-46,000 Jews, of a total population of around 50,000, was authorised by the 
Bulgarian communist government. The Jewish emigration was a result of the complex 
interaction of internal and external political and economical factors after the end of the 
Second World War. In 1944 communism came to power in Bulgaria and found that the 
Jewish community preserved though it was dispersed and shattered by the events of the 
war. The two major results of the war, which affected the Jewish communities 
everywhere in Europe, was the Holocaust and the call for the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. The majority of Bulgarian Jews with their traditional Zionist orientation felt 
that it was both their duty and also their chance to begin a new life in Israel. But there 
was also another factor, which encouraged their departure. This was the course of Jewish 
restitution in Bulgaria. The law governing the return of property owned by the state was 
passed in November 1946. Bulgaria was devastated, there was chaos, poverty and 
disorientation among the population, which the authorities could not cope with. Many of 
the Sofia Jews who returned from the provinces and the labour camps found new 
occupiers in their houses. According to the law Jewish refugees who left Bulgaria could 
not claim back anything after March 1946. This regulation was applied regardless of their 
ideological orientation. Basically Jews had very little to loose. Above all the horrifying 
revelations about the Holocaust gave the sense that it was better for the Jews to protect 
themselves by building a state of their own. 
Apart from this, three specific factors facilitated the Jewish emigration. Their analysis 
aims to define the communist policy to the Jewish question after the war: 1) the role of 
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the Soviet Union, 2) the position of BCP, and 3) the general opinion of the Bulgarian 
society towards the Jewish question. 
After the war the USSR's policy was dictated by the rivalry over who was to control the 
Palestinian issue. At that time the Soviets supported Jewish emigration to Palestine. In 
accord with Marxist-Leninist thought, the idea was that the Jewish problem may be 
solved only by world-wide democratisation. The creation of a communist-orientated state 
in the Middle East would be a major contribution to this process. At the same time 
official Soviet ideology claimed that anti-Semitism and the consequent destruction of the 
Jewish communities in Europe was a feature of world imperialism. The new communist 
order would therefore offer the perfect place for the new Jewish life. Emigration from 
the new people's democracies was thus not officially encouraged but unofficially 
favoured. '" The Bulgarian communist leadership being particularly close to the Soviets, 
did not deviate from this essentially contradictory line. On the one hand Jews were 
supposed to be happiest in the new Bulgarian communist state because it was free from 
prejudice. On the other, Jews should actually go and build the new Jewish state 
somewhere else. The main concern of the new Bulgarian communist government was 
how to escape international monitoring while dealing with Jewish matters. At the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1946, supported by the Central Consistory, it made an agreement 
with the World Jewish Congress not to provide special provisions for the defence of the 
Jews in Bulgaria because there was no real need as everything was going wells' In fact the 
lack of outside monitors was the perfect condition for the Bulgarians to feel free to do 
50 See Iurii Strizhov, `The Soviet Position on the establishment of the State of Israel' in 
Yaacov Ro'I (ed. ), Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union, (Great Britain: 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1995), pp. 313 -314. 
51 See Christo Boyadjieff, Saving the Bulgarian Jews in World \Var II, (Ottawa: Free 
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whatever they wished. Jewish organisations also had nowhere to direct their complaints. 
Meyer observes that even while the discussion went about a potential outside monitoring 
body in Bulgaria responsible for Jewish matters, the Jewish schools in Bulgaria were 
beginning to be closed down and the Jewish organisations, already dominated by the 
communists, could not complain about the Bulgarian laws on restitution, which were 
highly unfavourable to them. 52 Zionist organisations in Bulgaria were maintained until 
1948 with some degree of independence, but after the bulk of the resettlement was 
completed they were closed, soon after 1949. Chary argues that apart from the Soviet 
policy, which dictated relations to Israel in the communist bloc, the BCP gave permission 
to the Bulgarian Jews to leave for two reasons: the government did not have to return 
Jewish property which was confiscated during the war, and Jewish emigration facilitated 
the communist programme for the establishment of a `homogenous Bulgarian 
citizenry'. 53 Jews seemed an additional burden for post-war Bulgaria. 
5; Their mass 
resettlement relived the Bulgarian government from the responsibility to provide for 
them. 
Bulgarian Center, 1989), p. 133. 
52 See Peter Meyer, Bernard D. \Veinrub, Eugene Dushinsky and Nicolas Sylvan, The 
Jews in the Soviet Satelites, (The Americal Jewish Committee: Syracuse University Press, 
1953). 
S3 Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, p. 182. 
5' As early as 1944 David Ben Gurion visited Bulgaria for negotiations over the Jewish 
resettlement to Palestine. Also Israel arranged and helped in the transport expenses for 
the Jewish emigration from Bulgaria. There is little doubt that the decision taken by 
Dimitrov to allow the Jews to leave en mass was approved by the Soviets. The fact that 
there were not many Jewish activists in the communist party and particularly in the high 
ranks must have also helped the Zionist cause. The combination of these factors speeded 
up the emigration matters significantly. 
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Also the lack of international monitoring made it possible for the Bulgarian courts to 
proceed with Jewish affairs as they liked. The anti-Semitic legislators and policy-makers 
in Bulgaria were tried together with all governmental officials, ministers, king's advisors, 
intellectuals and professionals, in 1946, at the so-called People's Court. Also tried were 
anti-Semitic writers and liquidators of Jewish property. Several officials were sentenced in 
absentia. 55 But in general, the court found irrelevant defence of the Jews, if presented as 
an evidence in court. " The communist idea was to destroy any possible opponents to 
power, not to investigate political anti-Semitism. 
In general the Bulgarian public had no opinion on Jewish emigration. It was thought to 
be a Jewish problem, which had very little to do with the future of the Bulgarian country. 
Although there is little doubt that Bulgarian public opinion was against the deportation 
of the Jews, after the war Jewish faith was not a subject of a serious debate among the 
Bulgarians. The restitution laws made it easier for those Bulgarians who took over the 
Jewish flats and houses to stay where they were. Before leaving Jews sold their property 
at low prices because of the various restrictions which were imposed on them and 
because of the pressure of time. The new inhabitants of the Jewish properties were 
Bulgarians. This was particularly felt in the capital, Sofia, where entire blocks of flats were 
emptied and sold out within a couple of years. Jewish life disappeared from central Sofia 
ss See Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, p. 179. His list includes the 
names of Alexander Belev, Boris Tashev, Spas Stoianchcvski, Marko i%lehdcmov. 
Executed for war crimes were 26 ministers and king's advisors, 66 members of the 
Parliament and many intellectuals and professionals. 
s6 See Chary, The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, p. 180. Dimitur Peshev escaped 
death although his defence of the Jews was made irrelevant during the trial. However his 
solicitor, Josef Iasharof, who succeeded in saving his life was Jewish. 
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where before the exodus it had been was one of its distinct features, including the largest 
synagogue in the Balkans. 
The emigration issue divided and confused the Bulgarian Jewish community. Those who 
were leaving were labelled traitors by those who decided to stay. The problems in 
emigrating were blamed on the Zionist organisations, which encouraged emigration but 
could not always secure safe departure and travel. 
57 At the same time the Jewish press 
with socialist orientation expressed gratitude to the first Bulgarian communist leader, 
Dimitrov, who gave the final and official permission for the emigration after 
consultations with Moscow. After the emigration to Palestine, the Jewish presence in the 
country was minimal. It remained concentrated in the big cities and amounted to 5,000- 
7,000 at most. As a result of the exodus the very character of the Bulgarian Jewish 
community changed from dedicated Zionist to strongly pro-communist. The 
overwhelming majority of those who stayed had a strong socialist orientation and 
believed that communism was going to solve the Jewish question once and forever. 
There was one additional consequence of the Jewish emigration from Bulgaria. By 
permitting and in fact encouraging the exodus, communism relieved the Bulgarian nation 
from the responsibility of reflecting on the past and the future of one of their minorities. 
Once the people were not there it was much easier to forget or ignore what happened. 
The Jewish culture and history became central theme of the post-war reconstruction of 
western Europe whereas in Bulgaria they were largely non-existent. 
5' The Jewish press at the time reported that to a great extent emigration to Israel was an 
expression of Zionism and an adventure. Jewish tradesmen were called `parasites', 
`unhealthy, anti-Fatherland front's element'. On the international front the subject of 
anti-Semitism in America was introduced by the new communist press. It was declared 
that in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, there can be no anti-Semitism. 
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XII. The New Definition of Jewish Identity Under Communism 
The central question concerning Jewish life under communism was what constituted 
Jewish identity in socialist Bulgaria. The BCP decided the limits of Jewishness, while at 
the same time Bulgarian Jews sought to maintain their own definition of their own 
cultural identity. Communists' main demand was that Bulgarian Jews had to differentiate 
from the rest of the Jews in the world as ethnically different from them , and particularly 
from the Israeli Jews. The emphasis on the differentiation from Israel's Jews was firmly 
established after the Israeli-Arab war in 1967.5" According to this definition Bulgarian 
Jews were disconnected ethnically from other Jews although their relationships with 
relatives in Israel were accepted but strictly controlled. The main aim of this perception 
was the assimilation of the Jews into the ethnic Bulgarian nation. Once declared a group 
with no ethnic ties to anybody else it was much easier to promote policies based on this 
idea. Also the Bulgarian communist policy towards the Jews continued to depend on 
Soviet politics in the Middle East. During the years of the cold war, the initial support of 
the Soviet Union for Jewish settlement in Palestine shifted towards open hostility to 
Israel and friendliness to the Arab countries. Relations between Israel and the countries 
in the Soviet bloc, including Bulgaria, were severed after the Israeli-Arab war in 1967. 
This had a major impact on the position of Jews in Bulgarian society. 
ss See Meyer, The Jews in the Soviet Satelites, 1953. He reported that in January 1948 at a 
meeting of the Central Jewish Committee of the Fatherland Front it was announced that 
the Bulgarian Jewry was independent of all international Jewish or Zionist organisations. 
It was underlined that Bulgarians of Jewish origin have nothing to do with Jews in 
Palestine or the USA. 
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XIII. Jewish Education 
The Bulgarian communist policy on Jewish assimilation aimed to make Jews as invisible 
as possible in the society. The actual process of assimilation developed in several stages. 
First Jewish educational and community institutions were gradually closed. Second 
Jewish culture, language and history were to be incorporated into the Bulgarian cultural 
national tradition through a new type of cultural Jewish studies. The aim was to prove 
that Bulgaria was culturally and ethnically a homogenous country and there was no 
Jewish culture as a separate entity based on Jewish ethnicity. In order to do this, Jewish 
culture was declared irrelevant to the Bulgarian Jews themselves. The main 
recommendation was to forget it altogether. Jewish schools were abolished in 1943 and 
restored in 1944, after the end of the war. Some new ones were even opened at this time. 
But by 1949 most of them were closed. " Bulgarian authorities claimed that the Jewish 
community itself supported the closures because of the insufficient numbers of pupils. 
This was far from the actual desires of many members of the Bulgarian Jewish 
community. Jews did not want their educational institutions closed, but they could not 
meet the communist requirements according to which they had to be transformed. The 
main content of the teaching was supposed to be about Marxism-Leninism in relation to 
communist propaganda about Israel. This required declaring disapproval of everything 
connected to Israel and acceptance of everything Bulgarian As a result, many Jews, 
particularly the younger generation, wanted to join mainstream Bulgarian life, since as 
Jews they were constantly asked to declare exclusive loyalty to the regime. 
Jewish institutions were also assimilated into the mainstream organs of Bulgarian 
socialism. The Jewish Polyclinic was turned into a general one. The Jewish Club and the 
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Jewish Choir in Sofia were accused of being Zionists and kept under constant pressure. 
The Jewish Drama Circle was faced with similar allegations and was ordered to `clean the 
repertoire from any Israel style content'. `' The Sofia synagogue, which was closed during 
1943-44 and had its Judaica library destroyed during the bombing in 1944, was kept 
closed for most of the time under the communist regime with the pretext of being under 
renovation. " In fact the communist government planned to turn it into a concert hall 
but the Jewish community was opposed and managed to prevent it. 62 The faith of other 
synagogues in the country was similar. Synagogues were never destroyed as brutally as 
some of the mosques in Bulgaria, but in effect, during the entire period of communism 
there were no active places of Jewish worship in the country. As a result Jewish religion 
became a marginal subject of very obscure interest. Jewish holidays were increasingly 
kept as family tradition and denied public space. The Consistory, the religious body of 
the community, was under the total control of the BCP and actually helped the 
authorities observe the life of the Jewish community. The regime tried to substitute the 
old religious and cultural institutions with new communist style organisations. This idea 
was to be implemented by the leading Jewish communists themselves. In 1957 the Jewish 
Cultural Association was founded. Joseph Astrukov formulated the main tasks: to fight 
Zionism and to be `active agitators and propagandists for socialism in our country'. " 
According to Astrukov, who delivered a speech at the opening, new socialist and 
Bulgarian concept of Jewish identity was formulated: `One cannot speak of a Jewish 
nation in general. Jews live a common economic, political and cultural life in the midst of 
'`'Sec Minority Groups in Bulgaria in a Human Rights Context, (Sofia, 1994), p. 54. 
60 RFE, 2896/June 1958. 
" The Central Synagogue of Sofia was officially opened on 9 September 1909. 
"Z Stephen Mark Mallinger, A Brief Introduction to the Jewish Community 
of Bulgaria, (Sofia: RIVA Books, 1996), p. 34. 
63 RFE Report, 2478/June 1959. 
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other nations. For this reason the Jews draw close to these nations and adopt their 
culture... The question relating to the Jewish population in Israel is quite different. There 
a Jewish nation is now in the process of formation. The Jews in other countries do not 
belong to this nation... Do the Jews in Bulgaria have their own language, their own 
dances, literature, art, etc. which express an independent national Jewish culture in 
Bulgaria? Such a thing does not exist. Therefore none say seriously that Jews in Bulgaria 
have their own national culture... Incorporation must not be interpreted as assimilation, the 
obliteration of national derences, the suppression or disregard of the national peculiarities of their way of 
life and customs, etc. The part v has not set itself such a task and can not set it. ' (emphasis added) " 
This statement illustrates two things: that Jewish identity in Bulgaria was understood in 
Stalinist terms and that the BCP was not going to state publicly the promotion of Jewish 
cultural assimilation in Bulgaria. 
Ibid. pp. 3-4, (emphasis added). 
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XIV. The Fate of the Jewish Research Institute 
The most telling story about the marginalisation of Jewish culture was in communist 
Bulgaria was the closure of the Jewish Research Institute URI). It shows how the 
communist policy of Jewish assimilation operated without ever been made official. `S The 
idea for this institution dated back to 1947, when it was still debatable whether the 
community would stay or emigrate. The key figures were Eli Ashkenazi, a lawyer, and 
Rabbi Dr. Asher Hananel. The aims of the JRI were to collect various sources and books 
on Jewish history, to publish an annual periodical, to collect Bulgarian Jewish folklore 
and to establish a Jewish museum in Bulgaria. After a debate within the Jewish 
community whether there was need for such an institute, and whether it was an 
appropriate use of money, Ashkenazi and Hananel requested to have the JRI as an 
attachment to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAN). This was refused on the 
grounds that priority had to be given to Bulgarian studies. The official respond of the 
BAN was as follows: `Is it really so urgent to examine the history of the Jewish 
community in Bulgaria and establish a special section for this purpose alongside with the 
sections for Medieval and Modern Bulgarian History? ' " Eventually the JRI was set up as 
a part of the Department of Bulgarian Byzantine and Oriental Studies. The institute 
function as a research centre, but its objectives were defined as researching the Jewish 
civilisation in connection to the Bulgarian national culture after the independence of 1878. 
Jewish scholars were considered `neither experts nor methodologically qualified. ' They 
65 See David B. Cohen, `The Jewish Research Institute' in Godisbilik, (Sofia: 1995), vol. 
XXVIII. His account of the factual history of the JRI is very detailed. This research 
considers the article to be the main written source of information about JRI, though the 
full reconstruction of the events was supplemented with information gathered by 
personal conversations in Sofia, 1997. 
" Ibid., p. 173. 
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were criticised for being too immersed into the past and not sufficiently Marxist. " In 
1964 Ashkenazi retired and Hananel, after being tried for mishandling of state property, 
died. The department survived until 1974 when it was closed. "The end of the JRI was 
practically also the end of Jewish scholarship in communist Bulgaria. The gradual 
marginalisation and discouragement which the institution and its members experienced 
illustrated the communist policy not only in the sphere of scholarly interest but also in 
Jewish matters in general. 
After the construction of impossible conditions for sustaining the activities of JRI the 
very sense of its purpose was questioned. Since it was declared that Jews had no separate 
or different in any way history, it was also postulated that there was no need to enquire 
further into the matter. 
Ibid., p. 176. 
`' Two major projects were not realised: the proposal for Modern History of the Jewish 
Community in Bulgaria and the publication of Judeo-Spanish-Bulgarian Dictionary and 
`Jewish Proverbs and Sayings', both scripted by Isaak Moskona. In 1979 the Jewish 
collection was handed over to the Central State Archives. 
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XV. The Party and the Jews 
Most of the Bulgarian Jews who chose to stay in Bulgaria rather that leave for Israel 
hoped that communist internationalism was the solution to the Jewish question in 
general. In the case of Bulgaria they believed that it could be possible to be loyal to the 
Bulgarian political state, but also maintain relations with Jews in Israel or any other 
country where Jews lived, provided that all believed in the world wide class struggle. 
Many of them also believed that Jewish cultural identity would be possible to maintain 
within the framework of the Bulgarian communist identity. The pressure to assimilate 
into Bulgarian national culture was met with certain resistance, as the story of the JRI 
shows, but it never amounted to organised movement. Certainly some Bulgarian Jews 
would have preferred to be enabled to build up a hyphenated identity, to be both Jewish 
and Bulgarian. But this was hard to square with BCP's requirement for cultural 
homogeneity in Bulgaria. The Jewish performance in the BCP was quite different from 
other minorities' participation in the communist movement. The ethnic persecution they 
experienced during the Second World War and their particular involvement in the 
resistance left a significant mark on the way they perceived Bulgarian communism. As a 
result Jews were more active in the communist establishment than any other minority. 
Despite the pressure on them to comply with the Bulgarian policy of ethnic 
homogenisation, they never saw communism as an alien ideology, in the way most 
Turkish people did. But Jewish expectations were about being included in the communist 
structure, rather than simply protected by it. 
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Yet their influence over the development of communism in Bulgaria was quite limited. ' 
It would be wrong to suggest that the communist party leadership had a consistent policy 
of discrimination against the Jews. But there was an attitude that they were not to be 
trusted as they were connected to the outside world, which was feared by the communist 
leadership. There were Jewish purges all over communist Eastern Europe during the 
1950s, which became known particularly with Slansky's trial in Czechoslovakia (1952) 
and the `Doctors' Plot' in the Soviet Union (1953). "' In Bulgaria things were different. 
There was no systematic policy to remove Jews from public life in the same manner. 
However communist Bulgaria was not untouched by anti-Jewish measures. In his 
memoirs, lahiel gives an account of the events in the high structures of communist 
power. He claims that the anti-Jewish campaign in the communist bloc did resonate in 
the headquarters of the BCP and reservations towards the Jewish membership increased. 
He also claims that the security services planed investigated the alleged Jewish espionage 
network. 71 The main source of communist anxiety continued to be Jewish connections 
`9 RFE, S\VB EE 5761,11 Mar 1978. According to the data in this report there were 
three Jews members of the National Assembly and three Jewish members of the BCP 
Central Committee. However the actual Jewish membership is hard to estimate because 
some Jews had Bulgarian names. 
"' The `Doctors' Plot' was the fabricated case against nine doctors in the Soviet Union, 
six of them Jews, who were publicly accused of having poisoned and planned further 
attempts on their Kremlin patients. They were accused of acting on behalf of the British 
and American security services and the international Jewish bourgeoisie. Rudolf Slansky 
was Secretary general of the Czechoslovak Communist Party who was accused of being 
at the centre of `Trotskyte-Titoist-Zionist' plot. For more details sec Paul Lendvai, 
Antisemitism in Eastern Europe. (Great Britain: Macdonald & Co., 1971). 
71 See Niko Iahiel, Todor Zhivkov i lichnata vlast: Spomeni. Documenti. Analizi, (Sofia: 
M-8-M, 1997), p. 45. According to him the security services exerted pressure on the 
member of the member of the Central Consistory (CC) named Alajem who as a result 
committed suicide. Iahiel also recollects that in 1950 Mendel Zimerman was expelled 
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with Israel or any western country. The only specifically Jewish trial in Bulgaria was in 
1961, when Rabbi Dr. Asher Hananel was accused of `transfer of foreign currency 
abroad'. The Bulgarian authorities announced that the Sofia city court dealt with his case 
and sentenced him because of speculation with valuables. In the reasoning it was clarified 
that while serving as Chief Rabbi, he made use of his contacts with foreigners, deposited 
money in a Swiss bank and mishandled the synagogue's valuables. It was also announced 
that Hananel confessed to maintaining contacts with Israelis and others. He was 
imprisoned and died shortly afterwards. 72 There were occasional removals of Jews from 
high positions in the party. During the 1960s, Ruben Levi Avramov, president of the 
Committee of Science and Culture was criticised and ousted. There is no information 
suggesting that it was because he was Jewish. But previously Chervenkov, the BCP 
leader, had intentionally misquoted his name - from Ruben (a typically Jewish name) to 
Rumen (typically Bulgarian), while delivering a speech. Such open remarks were seen by 
Jews, as an offence to cultural Jewish identity. " 
In general Jews shared an anxiety about being visible, about appearing ethnically different 
through their names. During the re-naming campaign carried out against the Turks, they 
were asked to declare that they could choose their names freely and that there were no 
restrictions on their freedom to practice their religion. The Jewish cultural society had to 
issue a declaration about this matter, which the authorities used in their defence of the 
from the party, Moriz Assa, an instructor at the CC, was purged and one of the 
secretaries of Todor Zhivkov, Dora Dermendjieva, was also sacked. 
72 See RFE, December 22/ 3721,1961. These facts were confirmed by lohanan Lahav. 
Personal telephone conversation, 1997. 
73 See RFE, December 29,3758,1961. This was confirmed by Alfred Krispin in a 
telephone conversation, Sofia, 1997. 
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anti-Turkish campaign. 7' The Jewish community leadership also publicised a statement 
opposing any interference into Bulgarian sovereignty, in response to Turkey's protests. 
The official Jewish position was that accusation in forcible Bulgarisation was a `slander'. 
75 In private, many Jews feared that the regime may initiate a re-naming campaign against 
them. 
74 Sec RFE, SWB EE 8189,21 February 1986. 
75RFE, SWB 8556,1 May 1987. 
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XVI. Conclusion 
After the Israeli-Arab war in 1967 any Jewish activity was heavily politicised. Jews 
constantly had to declare that they renounced Israeli policy. Also by the 1970s, when 
Bulgarian communism was determined to be reaffirmed on the grounds of ethnic 
nationalism , the pressure on the 
Jews to identify as ethnic Bulgarians increased and was 
felt on every level of life. " If Jewish communists were to remain in the movement, they 
had to accept that the goal of Bulgarian communism was to create a united cultural 
nation based on common ethnicity Many Jews were disillusioned with communism, 
which they expected would treat them as members of the communist political 
community, rather than ask them to merge into the ethnic Bulgarian nation. This was the 
main reason for their renewed interest in emigration to Israel. During the 1980s 
communist Bulgaria became more relaxed about connections with Israel, although there 
were no diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 1988, the wife of the Israeli 
prime minister, Yizhak Shamir, visited Bulgaria to attend the celebrations of 45 years 
since the saving of the Jews. There were speculations about this visit being an attempt on 
behalf of Israel to establish diplomatic relations, but nothing significant emerged. Also 
during the same year, Todor Zhivkov received Serge Zweingenbaum, Secretary General 
of the World Jewish Congress. " At that point, the Jewish disillusionment with 
communism was very high and the main topic was whether there were any possibilities 
76 See RFE, S\VB, 4302,23 May 1973. The occasion on which Todor Zhivkov attended 
the meeting at the Jewish Cultural Centre in Sofia was the 30th anniversary of the 
communist campaign to save the Jews. At the meeting the head of the Cultural 
Association of Jews in Bulgaria, Astrukov, asserted the leading and sole role of the 
communist party in the saving of the Jews, who since have been living as equal socialist 
citizens of Bulgaria. 
77 See RFE, 20 December 1988. 
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for an agreement to renew immigration to Israel. At the same time many Bulgarians saw 
Jewish support for the Bulgarian communist regime as a betrayal of Bulgarian 
nationalism. Because of the strong affiliation of the Jewish institutions with communism 
and the specific way Jewish politics worked, being Jewish in Bulgaria was often taken to 
mean automatically being a communist. Thus Jews acquired the image of being pro- 
communist `by nature' and anti-Bulgarian in the eyes of those nationalist minded 
Bulgarians who saw communism as a threat to nationalism. This was the main reason 
why after 1989, Bulgarian dissatisfaction with communism had also an anti-Semitic 
colouring. Some of the heroes of the nationalist anti-communist opposition were pre-war 
politicians with anti-Semitic record. Such was the case with Ivan Dochev, the leader of 
the former pro-fascist organisation of Bulgarian Legionaries, whose visit in Bulgaria after 
the changes worried the Jewish community in Bulgaria and fascinated some new 
Bulgarian democrats. 
Under communism Bulgarian Jews had the peculiar position of being both patronised by 
the regime and also very vulnerable. The discrimination some Jews experienced in the 
BCP was always quite subtle and hard to articulate. "Jews in communist Bulgaria were 
privileged compared to the Turks because they lived mainly in the big urban centres and 
unlike many Turks never became an underclass. On the other hand Jewish issues were 
never considered as significant as Turkish affairs, nor could then rival the importance of 
the Macedonian question in Bulgaria. Jews were perceived either as hosted by or saved by 
the Bulgarians. They did not question the legitimacy of the Bulgarian nation and had no 
claims over Bulgarian lands. What Jews had a claim over was Bulgarian communism 
itself. Jews who stayed after 1949 in the country saw communist Bulgaria as their rightful 
homeland, which was to guarantee much better conditions of Jewish life than the pre-war 
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Bulgarian state. Yet their hope that communism would bring justice for all citizens of 
Bulgaria and thus solve the problems of Jewish identity remained a fantasy. Bulgarian 
communism offered them assimilation into the ethnic Bulgarian national state instead. In 
Bulgaria Jewish linguistic and cultural assimilation was greatly encouraged by the high 
rate of mixed marriages. Despite this the majority of the Jews felt that they were never 
fully trusted by their fellow Bulgarians. After the anti-Turkish campaign nobody could 
say where were the limits of assimilation be according to the Bulgarian communist 
leadership towards ethnic minorities. 
'R Sec lahiel, Todor Zhivkov i lichnata vlast, 1997. 
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Chapter 7: Post-communism - 
The Legacy of Communism and the Politics of Ethnicity (1989-96) 
I. Introduction 
On 9 November 1989 the news broke that Todor Zhivkov, the leader of the BCP and 
the long-standing head of the Bulgarian state has been ousted from power. Political 
change was sweeping across Eastern Europe and that change had come to Bulgaria. 
Communism, which ruled the country for 45 years, had lost its legitimacy. The big 
question: after the end of communism what was to follow? This chapter examines two 
major questions of the country's post-communist development: How was communism in 
Bulgaria brought down? And what was the legacy of communism in Bulgarian politics in 
relation to ethnic issues and nationalism? It argues that much of the transformation of 
Bulgaria, begun in 1989, was determined by the politicisation of ethnic issues under 
communism. The analysis is based on the premise that the legacy of communist policies 
on the national questions was to define the country in ethnic terms and set the basis of 
the inter-ethnic dynamics after 1989. The formation of new political parties representing 
ethnic minorities (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF, and United Macedonian 
Organisations-Ilinden, UMO-Ilinden), or parties concerned directly with national 
questions, such as the renewed Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Union 
of Macedonian Societies (IMRO-UMS or VMRO-SMD1), appeared on the political stage 
and introduced the most important development in Bulgarian nationalism after the fall of 
communism. The politics of ethnic nationalism in post-communism Bulgaria were 
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heavily burdened by the communist past. And although communism was officially 
declared dead, its legacy dominated Bulgarian political life for many more years. 
The BCP entered a period of long and cumbersome transformation and its position in 
relation to the national questions continued to be a major factor during the period of 
post-communism in Bulgaria. The communist policy on issues of nationalism was 
blamed for all the misfortunes of Bulgarian national development. In contrast to the 
communist period, when the BCP was the only legitimate political party, after 1989 it had 
to compete with other political parties. This was a major change for the party, which had 
no tradition in democratic competition and was not used to being held accountable for 
anything to its electorate. During the previous 45 years of its rule the BCP had to balance 
as much as possible three main factors in relation to nationalism: the ; Marxist-Leninist 
approach to nationalism and internationalism, the Soviet line and Bulgarian national 
sensitivities. After the changes of 1989, the communists had to accept that other theories 
of society may have a say in the world of politics. Bulgarian society was reawakening to 
the new life of political pluralism and democratic choice. As a result of all these changes, 
the BCP was compelled to reorganise itself in some manner in order to be able to meet 
the new demands. The party declared itself to be the defender of Bulgarian national 
interests and called for `national reconciliation' (natsiona/no pomirenie). The supremacy of 
the Soviets was no longer in demand and Bulgarian communists chose to reinvent 
themselves openly as Bulgarians first. 
This chapter is concerned with the period between the years of 1989-96. It has been 
known mainly as the period of `transition' or `post-communism' in Bulgarian politics. 
1 VMRO-SMD is the acronym in Bulgarian language (Vutreshna Makedonska 
Revolutsiona Organizatsia-Suyuz na Makedonskite Druzhestva). 
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These terms were applied to all former communist countries in Eastern Europe. In this 
research both terms are used interchangeably, though Bulgarian development is most 
accurately described as `post-communist'. Bulgarian communism was particularly 
unprepared for change. In fact it was pushed to change by the transformation of the 
USSR, which developed rapidly and unexpectedly towards the full collapse of the 
socialist bloc. Bulgaria had hardly any tradition of reform under communism and the 
changes both surprised and frightened the country. Shortly after the initial excitement of 
the fall of the communist regime it was felt that the transition to something new may be 
long, and ineffective and the future uncertain. During this period the BCP maintained its 
strong position. It is this continued strength which makes `post-communism' an accurate 
description for the Bulgarian transition. In this analysis, the legacy of communism 
determined the political and social life in the country until 1997. Until then reactions 
against the BCP mingled with nostalgia towards communism and with a search for a new 
formula of the Bulgarian nation-state. The long years of isolation and the lack of 
experience in political pluralism, as well as the unfavourable position of the country 
during the Balkan crisis surrounding the collapse of Yugoslavia made Bulgaria very 
vulnerable and susceptible to the rhetoric of nationalism. Nationalism seemed to be the 
most likely political, cultural and moral category which could provide order to the 
fragmented and strained life of post-communist Bulgaria. 
During post-communism, Bulgaria continued to perceive Macedonia as a national loss. 
The communist policy was declared wrong and the pre-war nationalist position deemed 
inadequate. Emotionally post-communist Bulgaria could not accept the existence of the 
Macedonian nation, but practically it made a break-through in Bulgarian-Macedonian 
relations being the first country to recognise the independent Macedonian state, in 1991. 
The internal aspect of the Macedonian question was reactivated by the resurrection of 
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Bulgarian Macedonian organisations, which gradually became accepted as part of the 
main stream politics of the country. The most painful issue continued to be the claim 
that there may be a separate Macedonian identity within Bulgaria itself. As a result Pirin 
Macedonia was subjected to particularly intense political propaganda from all sides in the 
continuing debate over the Macedonian question in Bulgaria. 
The question of the communist legacy became particularly painful in the context of 
interethnic relations between Bulgarians and Turks during post-communism. The 
consequences of the re-naming campaign of 1984-85, and the consequent forcible 
resettlement of the Bulgarian Turks in 1989, raised issues which the BCP had to respond 
to, and Bulgarians by and large would have preferred to be forgotten. The communist 
attempt to erase Turkish ethnic identity failed. The claim that all Turkish people in the 
country were of Slav-Bulgarian origin who converted to Islam under the pressure of the 
Ottoman colonisers was rejected as false by most of the BCP members themselves. On 
the other hand the vast wound opened by the anti-Turkish campaign was not yet been 
healed. The emigration to Turkey continued - although in smaller numbers than during 
the major exodus, many families after 1989 had to endure the experience of division. But 
the former communists continued to use the Turkish issue to boost the Bulgarian 
national confidence and stabilise its position. After communism, being Turkish retained 
the meaning of being part of the oppressive past, backward, reactionary and 
incompatible with the strivings of Bulgarian nationhood. In short, during post- 
communism being Turkish continued to signify disloyalty to everything Bulgarian. 
However there was a big change in the Bulgarian-Turkish interaction during post- 
communism. This was represented by a political party for the Bulgarian Turks, the 
Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) in 1990. The IMF became a major player in 
post-communist Bulgarian politics. The new political position of the Bulgarian Turks 
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moved the community quite far from its marginal position before and during 
communism. The Turkish voice became a very active political factor in post-communist 
Bulgaria. Substantial changes were also made in the interpretation of Bulgaria's Ottoman 
past. There were new and old opinions, which started competing with each other in a 
much more constructive manner. The serious debate was launched over both negative 
and positive aspects of how `bad' or how `good' was Ottoman rule. This was a 
breakthrough not only in the scholarly world but also in the popular mind. 
As far as the Jewish presence in Bulgaria is concerned, after 1989 Jewish life also changed 
noticeably. Some of the old Jewish institutions were restored, new ones were founded 
and others waited to be re-established. Jewish life was revived in Bulgaria and became 
much more visible. International Jewish organisations opened offices in Sofia and some 
of the other big cities in the country. Bulgaria re-established diplomatic relations with 
Israel and the Bulgarian Jews were re-connected with Israel. This development had 
another important result. Since 1989 Jews have been leaving the country in small but 
steady numbers. Consequently Bulgarian Jewish culture has been becoming increasingly a 
social memory rather than living reality. The major question `who saved the Bulgarian 
Jews' was opened to debate and the truthfulness of the communist claim, that they were 
rescued by the communist movement has been seriously questioned. Bulgarian Israelis 
could speak from their personal memories and many of them praised the diplomacy of 
the Bulgarian king Boris III during the Second World War for his role in saving the Jews. 
Finally the debate on minorities' rights opened in the context of human rights movement 
and international institutions. Post-communist Bulgaria's attitude towards its minorities 
was quite complex. On one hand, there was the history and the memory of the 
unfavourable Ottoman times in Bulgaria when Bulgarians were a discriminated minority. 
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On the other hand Bulgarians were coming to terms with the new international 
understanding of minorities rights, forcefully introduced by the burning issues of the 
Yugoslav crisis. In contrast to communist times when most basic information about 
human rights' international aspects was lacking, after 1989 the topic was constantly 
debated. Post-communist Bulgaria aspired to European values, but this also meant that it 
had to review its own identity accordingly. This was a hard thing to do in the general 
atmosphere of insecurity surrounding the Balkans in the 1990s. The highly politicised 
history of Bulgaria studied under communism, as well as the very weak tradition of civil 
society, deepened the anxiety of the Bulgarian people. The feeling of national uniqueness 
mingled with the notion of being victimised by history itself, divided by the Great 
powers' geopolitical interests, forgotten by Europe. 
The change of government in January 1997 marked the beginning of a new era in 
Bulgarian politics. The government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, formerly BCP) 
was forced to resign under the pressure of mass demonstrations in the capital, 
demanding new elections. The new government of the United Democratic Forces (a 
block of the main opposition parties) could no longer legitimise itself as a transitional 
political power only. It had to develop a new language of political, social and economic 
advancement, rather than being a corrector of the communist past. Most importantly, the 
understanding of the future of the Bulgarian nation-state was decisively directed towards 
West European standards of citizenship above ethnicity. The communist period was over 
and Bulgaria had taken a decisive step beyond the politics of ethnicity. 
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II. The Fall of the Bulgarian Communist Regime 
By 1989 the majority of the citizens of communist Eastern Europe believed that they 
lived in a seriously dysfunctional political system. Yet at the same time the overwhelming 
feeling was that the communist elites were far too strong to be removed from power. 
The central position of the Soviets was still in place and although Poland and Hungary 
were already on the road to serious political changes, the socialist bloc was still holding 
together. Schöpflin argues that six main factors which determined the fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe: 1) economic decay, 2) the loss of support of the intellectuals, which 
went hand in hand with the change of the language of public political discourse, 3) the 
popular awareness that the system was vulnerable in 1989, (particularly in Romania and 
Bulgaria, 4) the growing division in the communist leadership, 5) the role of the crowd in 
the events of 1989 and 6) the international dimension, including the importance of the 
lack of Soviet support for the old regimes. --The degree of the importance of these factors 
differed in each of the communist countries in Eastern Europe. 
In Bulgaria the changes were brought about by combination of four of the main factors 
listed above. First and most important, Bulgaria lost the active support of the Soviets. 
The political balance was seriously disturbed by this factor, which had played such an 
important role in the politics of communist Bulgaria. The main question was, Could 
Bulgaria continue to be a communist country without the support of the Soviet Union? 
Bulgaria was totally unprepared for the major shift in Soviet politics, introduced by 
Gorbachev in the 1980s. The stability of the Soviet Union itself was accepted as the most 
powerful protection for Bulgarian communism. It was perceived both as granted by 
history and earned by long years of loyalty to Soviet communism. The changes in the 
2 See Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, pp. 226,233. 
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Soviet system were felt strongly in a country used to following the Soviet line with no 
reservations. But this time the changes required a much more complicated policy than 
obedience to the Soviet power. Communist Bulgaria, as a most loyal satellite, thought 
that control from Moscow provided the Soviets with dominance in the region, but also 
guaranteed that Bulgarian communism would remain in power. This attitude supported 
by the Bulgarian lack of experience in reforms, created a situation of no options. Until 
1989, no stratum of Bulgarian society had a clear vision of an alternative to communism. 
Second, during the 1980s the vision of the future of Bulgarian communism was lost. The 
increasing information about the cultural and economical successes of the democracies in 
western Europe and the United States of America (USA) made it very difficult to believe 
that communism was winning the cold var. The decline of the Bulgarian economy 
sharpened the social divisions and by the 1980s the class divisions within communist 
society were very visible. The party establishment formed its own class, enjoying material 
benefits which were inaccessible to the rest of the population. This was the time of the 
special shops called `Korecom', selling goods in western currency. The sons and the 
daughters of high party members started driving western cars in central Sofia. There was 
little doubt that the `new class' was aspiring to western standards of life, which seemed at 
best a very remote opportunity to the ordinary people. 
Third, the Bulgarian intellectuals slowly and hesitantly began to reject communist dogma 
and question the legitimacy of the regime. There were various informal circles of young 
scholars, mostly at the University of Sofia, who were trying to promote new ideas in the 
fields of philosophy, history or literature. They focussed on some kind of a local post- 
Marxism inspired by the works of the Frankfurt School and Wittgenstein. Although the 
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activities of these circles did not amount to anything more than talking at coffee shops, 
the feeling was that people were rethinking their roles in the society. } 
Last but not the least, on the eve of the changes of 1989, Bulgarian society was shaken by 
the ethnic conflict inflicted by the communist regime during the anti-Turkish campaign 
in 1984-85. In the spring of 1989 the Turkish issue became urgent and could no longer 
be put on hold or silenced. Whereas the intellectual disquiet was centred in the capital, 
the Turkish problem involved many parts of the countryside where ethnic Turks lived. 
The combination of these factors created the strong feeling that the communist system 
in Bulgaria was very vulnerable. The feeling was that change was needed in the Bulgarian 
society, though nobody new exactly what kind of change was to come. 
3 Sec Stephen Ashley, Bulgarian Intellectuals Circulate an Appeal for Democracy, RFE, 
Report, 9 May 1989. 
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III. The Formation of Bulgarian Dissent 
Gorbachev's reform in the USSR during the second half of 1980s, the so-called 
`perestroika ig/asnost', was felt strongly in Bulgaria. By and large the Bulgarian intelligentsia 
was greatly interested in the new ideas coming from Moscow. All of sudden the Soviet 
press and the regular Friday television broadcast from Moscow became the most popular 
media in the cities. People started exchanging Soviet magazines and discussing the latest 
news from Moscow with a new energy. The upsurge in the interest in Soviet things was 
noticeable. But for the communist leadership the changes in the Soviet intellectual life 
were an unexpected challenge. `Perestroika ig/asnosf seemed to have presented the BCP 
with a very difficult dilemma. On one hand, following the Soviet line was a must, if 
Bulgaria was to maintain its position in the communist bloc. But on the other, 
Gorbachev's reform required real engagement in the process of change and much greater 
flexibility on the side of the party elite. Although at this point the Soviet idea was still 
about how reforms would maintain communism, rather than dismantle it, it was strongly 
felt that the Bulgarian political elite was taken by surprise by the new policy. Not only did 
the Bulgarian communists fail to develop a reformist tradition on their own. Until this 
time, the BCP felt quite comfortable and secure in its position as a Soviet satellite. In 
reality, it was becoming apparent that Bulgaria's loyalty to Moscow eroded its own ability 
to develop thinking about reform and change. Gorbachcv's `perestroika' presented the 
communist regime in Bulgaria with an impossible task - to fit a new Soviet framework of 
political thinking, with virtually no preparation period. This seemed very risky to the 
Bulgarian communists. The pace of the Gorbachev reform picked up and unlocked 
enormous energy in Soviet society, but very soon the Soviet authorities understood that 
they could not control the limits of the reform, nor define its direction. The Bulgarian 
comrades did not receive clear instructions about what exactly to do and how to do it. 
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This created the biggest confusion in the communist elite. The Soviet policy, not the 
capitalist West, became to symbolise the biggest danger to Bulgarian communism. 
Meanwhile Bulgarian dissent started to seek legitimacy in Soviet `perestroika iglasnost `. At 
that time three main groups were formed represented the new times: reform-minded 
party members, human rights activists and environmental groups. They were 
complemented by other individuals, scientists, technocrats or writers who shared the 
rather vague belief that change may be possible to. There was no sharp division between 
these groups and often they merged into each other. To some extent they supported each 
other, although more often in a theoretical, rather than practical way. In general, the 
communist reformers concentrated on the Soviet `perestroika; whereas the human rights 
activists, were concerned with the issue of the violation of the rights of the ethnic Turks 
in Bulgaria. The biggest group of Bulgarian intellectuals which focused on the Soviet 
`perstroika' created the Independent Club for the Support of Perestroika and Glasnost in 
1988. It was also referred to as The Discussion Club and in 1989 changed its name to the 
Club for Glasnost and Democracy. It consisted of more than 100 intellectuals, including 
the prominent writer Blaga Dimitrova and the philosopher Zhclu Zhclcv, who was 
known at the time mainly as the author of the book Fascism, which was banned by the 
authorities. This group stated clearly that Bulgaria needed Soviet-style `perestroika'. These 
intellectual instinct brought together communist ideologists aspiring to reform of the 
party and writers and artists demanding space for change. This was the first stage of the 
formation of the Bulgarian dissent. 
In general terms the new thinking sought a revision of the Marxist-Leninist theoretical 
framework as the basis of the communist regime. It aimed to uncover the true socialism, 
buried in the ill practices of communism. The underlying idea was to re-read Marxism 
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and to find the human touch in its theory. Yet this idea remained vague and was used in 
support of the argument that one should not give up the communist ideals because of 
the wrongs of the BCP. No serious attempt was made to work out a new communist 
theory and it was too late to do so. The events of change in communist Eastern Europe 
developed faster than the thinking behind them. To a great extend the Bulgarian dissent 
restricted itself to issues of freedom of speech, religious and artistic expressions. 
The second stage in the development of the Bulgarian intellectual dissent was the 
organised dissatisfaction, which was activated by the anti-Turkish campaign in 1984-85. 
The communist regime inflicted a violent ethnic conflict on Bulgarian society, which in 
its own turn evoked feelings of general disappointment with the communist state and 
particularly in relation to the communist policy towards the national minorities. This was 
the background of the human rights movement in communist Bulgaria. During the early 
stage of its development human rights activists acted in secret, gathering information for 
western human rights organisations, most notably Amnesty International. Their main 
idea was to draw public attention to the injustices in communist Bulgaria. For the first 
time human rights activists were organised in the Plovdiv-based Independent Association 
for the Defence of Human Rights in Bulgaria, founded in January 1988. The third stage 
of the intellectual dissent culminated in open support for the Soviet `perestroika' and the 
sweeping changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe during 1989, which forced the BCP to 
undertake action. 
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IV. The Role of Economic Decline in the Changes 
The other significant factor in the collapse of communism in Bulgaria was the economic 
position of the country. The main aspect of the economic life which contributed to the 
fall of the communist system was the complete failure of the Bulgarian economic 
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. Bulgaria lacked both ideas and practice in the economic 
sphere. The Bulgarian economic reforms, as much as they were implemented, were 
sporadic and gave the Bulgarian communist regime the reputation of being highly 
incompetent. 
The 1960s saw a series of attempts at economic reform. But by the late 1970s, it was 
clear that despite some achievements the economy was not working satisfactorily. The 
reforms in the agricultural sector initiated during this period aimed to integrate the 
agricultural production with the industrial sector. The political implication of this was to 
merge completely the peasant labour force with the working class according to the 
communist program. According to Brown, 1968 was the end of the decentralised 
economic experiments which were promoted in Bulgaria since December 1965. The 
Bulgarian party strengthened its ideological control over all policies, including over the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. The lack of advanced technical intelligentsia and lobby 
in the government, the establishment of total control over the trade unions and the lack 
of interest groups in the country left Bulgaria without serious reformist thinking. 4 
In the eve of the changes of 1989, it was clear that loyalty to the party remained the 
foremost principle of appointment to decision-making posts. This made it impossible to 
a See J. F. Brown, `The Interaction Between Party and society in Hungary and Bulgaria', 
in Andrew C. Janos (ed. ), Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe : Uniformity and 
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advance through competition. At the beginning of the 1980s the so-called New 
Economic Model (Nov Ikonomicheski Mebanism) was introduced to help the country update 
its technologies. 5 But it was based on the traditional communist idea of central planning 
and self-sufficient socialist economy and was a cosmetic change rather than real reform. 
As a result both the working class and the peasantry in Bulgaria became increasingly 
sceptical towards any economic reforms. According to their experience, change in the 
economic sphere brought new hardships and further mismanagement of resources. At 
the same time the regime's propaganda about the prosperity of the proletariat droned, 
but it was much harder to maintain this communist myth. Working people became 
particularly resentful of the negative effects of the changes on their living standards and 
tended to see everything through the prism of material benefit or lack of there of. In 
general the Bulgarian working class was very cautious about any changes and regarded 
them as a game invented at the top of the power structures. And because it was a semi- 
urban class, it combined the mistrust of the countryside towards the more complex 
attitudes of the city life with sense of loss of their natural environment. Yet (luring the 
late 1980s the working class also engaged in the movement for change in Bulgaria. The 
main motivation behind the working class independent activities was to become a visible 
political and social force. The trade unions under communism were under the total 
control of the communist party and had no independent political role. With the general 
movement towards reform in the 1980s, the first independent trade union, Podkrepa, was 
founded in Bulgaria. Although undoubtedly the ideas behind its foundation were inspired 
by Solidarity in Poland, Podkrepa never acquired the same degree of political 
Diversity in One-Party States, (Berekeley: Institute of International Studies, University of 
California, 1976), pp. 113-115. 
5 Sec Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, pp. 192-205. 
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consciousness. The leader of Podkrepa was Konstantin Trenchev, a medical doctor by 
profession. Although he had no working class background, Trenchev had personal 
charisma and expressed firm anti-communist views. He was an inspiration for many 
people to join the independent trade union Podkrepa during the last years of communism. 
Yet the lack of experience in independent trade union life in Bulgaria made the working 
class a very volatile mass during the collapse of the communist system. Podkrepa became 
a symbol of its leader's power rather than a changing force representing working class 
demands. Nevertheless its foundation in February 1989 was one of the most important 
events in Bulgaria towards the end of the communist rule. 
Yet at a time when change was the slogan of the communist world, Bulgaria had 
accumulated no productive reformist experience. The communist leadership has not 
even tested the limits of any reforms. This put the country in a very difficult and 
vulnerable position. Bulgaria remained isolated from the rest of the developments in the 
Soviet bloc, though it was no longer possible to ignore them. The movement for Soviet- 
type reforms combined with the ethnic unrest in the country, pushed by the fall of the 
communist regimes elsewhere, marked the formal end of communism in Bulgaria, before 
the society had the time even to think about it. The fall of the old regime was formalised 
in Bulgaria by the change of the political elite in 1989. But the thinking lagged quite 
behind. Bulgaria's changes were carried out within the communist framework with the 
hope that things would remain calm. The communist regime, which was a symbol of 
radical and revolutionary change, demanded gradual and non-revolutionary reform. The 
question was how to reform communism when it no longer existed? Ho-, v to legitimise 
essentially reformist communist thinking when it was declared dead? Under these 
circumstances the call for Bulgarian national unity was seen as the only way to maintain a 
structured society. 
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V. The Ethnic Factor 
While the changes in the Soviet politics prepared the broad background for the fall of 
communism in Bulgaria, the ethic conflict inside the country was the most important 
factor for the actual changes in 1989. The ethnic unrest in the country during that year, 
which was in response to the anti-Turkish campaign of 1984-85, undermined the regime 
to such an extent that it finally collapsed. The two main reasons for this development 
were that the ethnic unrest focused the human rights movement and at the same time 
internationalised the crisis of Bulgarian communism by making it known abroad. The 
communist policy towards the Turkish minority, the biggest national minority in the 
country, speeded up the fall of one of the most stable communist countries in Eastern 
Europe. Practically, the Turkish issue created a public space for debate about the 
legitimacy of the communist state. Thus the very right of the ruling communist elite to 
remain in power came under question. Finally the Turkish problem urged the dissident 
movement to take a position on questions about ethnic diversity in Bulgaria. By doing 
this the emerging Bulgarian opposition had to articulate its own aims and objectives in 
relation to the nation. 
The other outcome of the Turkish crisis was that the BCP was forced to revise its policy 
on national minorities in Bulgaria and to state its position publicly: \Vhat was at the core 
of the of the Bulgarian state according to the BCP : ethnicity or citizenship? There had 
never been a more difficult and more complicated context for any possible answer to this 
question in the 45 years of Bulgarian communism in power. The entire political context 
suggested that the old rhetoric would not be able to satisfy the public any longer without 
potentially dangerous consequences. The questions of ethnicity and citizenship were 
firmly ingrained in the very core of the Bulgarian changes. Most of the intellectuals who 
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were involved in opposition activities associated themselves with the defence of the 
rights of the ethnic Turks. Yet this proved to be a rather circumstantial commitment on 
the side of many Bulgarians who declared themselves supporters of minorities' rights. 
Essentially minority rights related issues served as a channel for putting pressure on the 
regime. On the surface human rights appeared a priority for the entire Bulgarian society 
because at the time the biggest concern was the position of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria. But in reality leading Bulgarian intellectuals used the Turkish issue to push the 
changes forward without predicting how much more complicated the future 
development of the politics of ethnicity might be. 
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VI. The Role of Bulgarian Intellectuals 
The loss of support of a substantial part of the pro-regime intellectuals was a very 
significant factor in the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1989. As pointed 
out earlier in this work, Bulgarian intellectual life lacked any serious notion of dissent 
until the 1980s. This is not to say that no Bulgarian intellectual ever thought critically of 
the regime, but rather that such criticism did not find an appropriate expression. In fact 
the BCP considered its control over the intelligentsia a significant success. Todor 
Zhivkov himself seemed very proud of the fact that he personally never trusted them but 
managed to retain their subservience during his rule. 6 Indeed most of the Bulgarian 
intellectuals enjoyed safety and security in their positions near to the political power 
structures. Schöpflin describes this condition of intellectual life under communism as 
`para-opposition'. This concept was developed in the context of the Hungarian 
intellectuals under communism, but it seems to describe the Bulgarian intellectuals in the 
1980s quite precisely.? Although Bulgarian intellectuals had official contacts with their 
colleagues in the other countries of the Soviet bloc, they had minimal interaction with 
the dissident movements there. This is clearly illustrated by comparing the state of mind 
of Bulgarian intellectual dissent with the notions of dissent which developed in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Yugoslavia. There was no `Budapest school' or `Praxis' in 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian variation which seems closest to these formations before the 
time of 'perestroika' were the works of the Bulgarian philosopher Zhclu Zhelcv, himself a 
former party member until his expulsion, who had supporters among the similarly 
thinking intellectuals. 
6 See Georgi Markov, Zadochni reportazhi za Bulgaria, (Sofia: Profizdat, 1990). 
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At the same time by the 1980s Bulgarian intellectuals were disappointed with the regime. 
The vision of its future was lost. Significant divisions within the country's intellectual 
elite also appeared. The groupings included the communist hard-liners, the traditionalists 
and the modernisers. The hard-liners were almost strictly party-members and employed 
by the communist party directly. Typically, they would claim an anti-fascist past and insist 
that communism was the only available reality, which was not to be debated. They were 
also pro-Soviet in general and anti-Western. A typical representative of this group was 
Petur Mladenov, the Moscow educated foreign minister of Bulgaria since 1971. The 
traditionalists' group consisted of party and non-party members which believed that even 
if the present communist system was far from perfect, any reforms should be about 
readjusting it rather than changing the regime. The transformation they imagined was to 
be carried out within the limits of communist ideology. They were mostly occupied in 
the humanitarian and technical sector. The regime relied heavily on their support and in 
fact did not loose it until almost the end. In contrast, most of the modernisers shared the 
view that changes were imminent. They were a smaller group, in general terms open- 
minded towards the Western democracies and with strong national feelings. Modernisers 
were both party and non-party members. The hard-liners and the traditionalists both 
viewed that the Soviets should be always seen as a guarantee for stability in Bulgaria. In 
contrast modernisers understood that the Soviet Union itself was undergoing change 
which might reflect in a more complicated manner on Bulgarian politics. A typical 
representative of modernisers among the party members was Alexnader Lilov who 
7 See George Schöpflin, `Hungary: An Uneasy Strategy' in Archie Brown and Jack Gray, 
Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, (New York: Holmes & Meier 
Publishers, 1979), pp. 148-149. 
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emerged in the 1980s as the most prominent ideologue and moderniser of the BCP. " 
8 Alexander Lilov was Moscow educated top rank member of BCP. However he was not 
re-elected as member of Politburo after 1983 and became director of Institute for 
Contemporary Social Theories in 1985. 
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VII. Ethnic Politics During Post-Communism and the MRF 
The most radical change in Bulgaria's ethnic politics was the founding of the main 
political organisation of the Bulgarian Turks, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF), which was formally registered at the beginning of 1990.9About a month earlier 
the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, had been toppled, and the Union of 
the Democratic Forces (UDF), the main Bulgarian opposition party was formed. The 
MRF acquired a huge membership of 100,000 immediately after it was created. It used 
the previously existing structures of the Turkish organisations as a foundation. Since then 
the MRF had been a major political factor in post-communist Bulgaria. For the first time 
in the Bulgarian history, there was a mainstream political force which sprung directly 
from ethnic oppression exercised by the government. As the law stated clearly that 
political parties cannot be founded on ethnic lines, MRF carefully avoided defining itself 
as a political party. Officially it declared that it was not based on Turkish ethnicity and 
had 4-5 % ethnic Bulgarian membership. But behind the fulfilment of the formalities, 
MRF clearly represented the voice of the Bulgarian Turks. The MRF platform openly 
concentrated on the protection and further development of the Turkish minority rights 
understood mainly as collective rights. Immediate demands were made about the means 
to restore the cultural and religious rights of the Turkish people. The emphasis was on 
the establishment of educational rights, including a revision of the school textbooks in 
order to change the image of the Turks as enemies of the Bulgarian people. In February 
1990 a new newspaper `Rights and Freedom' started to be published in Bulgarian and 
Turkish languages. Later, the movement insisted that the perpetrators of the crimes 
committed in relation to the assimilation campaign had to be brought to trial. 
9 See RFE SWB EE/0671 B/3,25 January 1990. 
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Bulgarians warned that the movement was a stepping stone towards territorial division 
and eventual union with Turkey. Due to such accusations the 1-IRF explicitly excluded 
from its platform all forms of nationalism, terrorism, chauvinism, revanshism, Islamic 
fundamentalism, and claims for autonomy. 10 Initially the MRF was close both to the 
opposition coalition, UDF, and the Independent Association for Democratic Human 
Rights led by the old guard dissidents Ilia Mincv and Eduard Genov. But soon 
disagreements with the UDF developed. These were mainly about whether the Turkish 
issue should be taken further or dropped from the immediate political agenda of the new 
Bulgarian democrats. As a result of the endless squabbling between the UDF and the 
MRF, many supporters of the Bulgarian opposition began to see the \IRF as a divisive 
force within the Bulgarian opposition. Initially the MRF voted for the opposition. But 
after registering for elections separately in June 1990 it won 23 seats in the parliament 
and became the third major political force in the country, alongside the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP, former communists) and the UDF. The MRF found itself in the 
position of holding the parliamentary balance, which many Bulgarians viewed as highly 
undesirable. Later, the MRF was accused of causing the fall of the first opposition 
government led by Filip Dimitrov in a vote of confidence in 1992. This confirmed the 
Bulgarian opinion that the Turkish question fractured the opposition and played into the 
hands of the former communists. Consequently it lost some of the support it had 
enjoyed by the new Bulgarian democrats. 
However it would be wrong to suggest that Bulgarian support for Turkish participation 
in politics was based entirely on the grounds of political manoeuvres. Intellectuals like 
Blaga Dimirtrova, Elka Konstantinova, Rumen Vodenicharov and other former 
members of the Club in Support of Perestroika and Glasnost dropped out of Turkish 
10 See Kjell Engelbrekt, The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, RFE, May 31,1991. 
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politics not because they no longer supported Turkish rights but because they could no 
longer see what role could they have in the movement and its issues under the new 
circumstances. This opinion was partly justified, because after the consolidation of 
Turkish political elite, the ; VIRF started to promote its own players in the field. But at the 
same time there was something revealing about the fact that Bulgarian democrats were 
engaged in Turkish issues when they were high on the agenda of the big political 
changes. But once the major shift of the political power was realised, Turkish problems 
did not resonate very strongly with the members of the new Bulgarian democratic elite. 
In fact the Bulgarian transition echoed anti-Turkish feelings and soon after the changes 
of 1989 Bulgarian-Turkish interethnic relations were strained once again. 
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VIII. The Bulgarian Nationalist Backlash 
In December 1989 the Bulgarian government announced that Turkish names could be 
taken back. Accordingly a new law governing names of Bulgarian citizens passed in 
parliament on 5 March 1990. The MRF opposed the law because it postulated that there 
should be a bureaucratic court procedure for changing back the Turkish names. It also 
opposed the law because officially the government did not recognise that the Turkish 
minority was a national minority in Bulgaria. The Turkish question became again a big 
political question in the country. Sixty Bulgarian historians of the Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences, Sofia University, and the National Library publicly expressed their support for 
the MRF's demands and stated that the BCP forced them to back the anti-Turkish 
campaign. But not all sections of the population welcomed the decision to allow 
Bulgarian Turks to get their names back. On the local level many Bulgarian officials and 
ordinary people who were strongly against it. Tension rose high in some of the Turkish 
regions. The immediate reasons were that the local nomenclature bought or sold cheaply 
the houses of those who left, and they feared accountability. In the region of Kurdjali in 
the south-cast, where the agitation was the strongest, most of the Bulgarians are 
descendants of refugees from Turkey or Greek Thrace from the time of the Balkan wars 
and tend to be quite sensitive on national questions. Also the new Bulgarian nationalists, 
who emerged after 1989, claimed that the mass exodus in the summer of 1989 was an 
expression of the Turkish people's lack of patriotism. Members of the communist party 
also felt uneasy about the reversal of the anti-Turkish policy. 
In January 1990, Bulgarians demonstrated in front of the parliament against the 
restoration of Turkish names. They were followed by a Turkish counter-demonstration 
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in Kurdjali. Afterwards unrest spread to other towns, including Plovdiv and Shumen. t" 
There were speculations that the local authorities supported the Bulgarian nationalists 
and helped them with transport to the capital and supplies of food. The suspicion was 
that the anti-Turkish demonstrations were again organised by the Bulgarian communists. 
During the Sofia demonstrations the UDF felt that it would be better to distance itself 
from the Turkish issue. Talks were held and a special forum at the parliament was 
established, The Public Council on the Various Aspects of the Ethnic Issue, to discuss 
the matter. Eventually compromise was found. To appease the nationalists the Council 
issued recommendations for a ban on separatist and autonomist organisations, as well as 
displaying the Turkish flag. The Council also recommended confirmation that Bulgaria 
had only one official language, the Bulgarian language, and an amnesty for those 
imprisoned in connection with the name-changing campaign. 
During this period the new Bulgarian nationalists were getting organised and registering 
officially. The most influential Bulgarian nationalist organisations, which had strong 
opinions on the Turkish question, were the Committee for the Defence of National 
Interests (OKZNI) and the Fatherland's Party of Labour (OPT). 12 Their main target was 
the MRF itself. Their slogans called for the `territorial integrity' of Bulgaria and `ethnic 
space' for Bulgarians. They saw themselves as new democrats and anti-communists and 
looked for support to legitimise their claims in the interwar history of Bulgaria. Mincho 
Minchev, a parliamentary deputy and a leading figure in the OKZNI, stated that `the 
question of the Turkish names of places has been decided as early as 1934' referring to 
the national reforms of the Damian Velchcv/Kimon Georgiev government which were 
11 Sec Stephen Ashley, Ethnic Unrest During January, RFE, 9 February, 1990. 
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about homogenising Bulgarian society. 13 The nationalists argued that the government 
had acted in a totalitarian manner because it took the decision to restore the Turkish 
names without consulting the Bulgarian people themselves. They claimed that once 
manipulated by the previous regime they did not want to be manipulated again. But the 
reality was that those who actively supported or observed in silence the anti-Turkish 
campaign feared revenge. Three months after Zhivkov was overthrown, he was arrested. 
One of the charges brought against him related to his personal participation in the anti- 
Turkish campaign. Liilko Balev, former Politburo member was also charged with him. 
The indictment stated that before 1984-85 the Politburo approved a report suggesting a 
peaceful assimilation and excluding the forced assimilation or deportation to Turkey. The 
prosecution stated that Zhivkov himself gave orders for the renaming campaign. Balev 
responded with evidence that other senior party members such as Georgi Atanasov, 
Dimitar Stoianov, Pencho Cubadinski, Petar MVIladenov, Stoian Mihailov, Chudomir 
Alexandrov and Jordan Iotov also participated in the campaign and that secret decisions 
were taken by the Politburo. 14 Zhivkov himself denied sole responsibility but said that he 
felt no guilt for the campaign because Bulgaria had been threatened by Turkish terrorist 
groups and demands for autonomy. He said that he had been preventing a possible 
Cyprus scenario in his homeland. The trial was adjourned, delayed, and since the BSP 
(the former BCP) resumed power in 1992, the legal process was discouraged on different 
12 Sec Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationaliri' 
Policies, Organizations. and Parties, (Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharp, 1995), 
pp. 244-248. 
13 Mincho Minchev. Interview for the BBC World Service, Bulgarian Section, 29 January 
1990. 
14 See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, (London: Minority 
Rights Publications, 1993), pp. 119-121. 
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grounds such as Zhivkov's deteriorating health. Ultimately the case against the former 
leader was dropped. 
There was little doubt that many former communist activists were involved in the anti- 
Turkish campaign and had no interest in further investigation. Moreover it was 
repeatedly suggested that the Turkish leaders were not exerting enough pressure on the 
issue because some of them were also former communists and supporters of the 
campaign. Still, for the first time, ethnic violence was discussed publicly within the 
country as the policy of the communist party. Attempts were made to analyse the link 
between nationalism and communism in the framework of violence as a basic ingredient 
of the communist power and a natural extension of exclusive nationalistic claims. The 
most obvious questions were whether the BSP/BCP could continue to live as an 
organisation with the guilt and the fear and could it call itself a communist/socialist party 
while the evidence of the ethnic persecution it carried out was revealed. 15 The question 
of guilt was a major issue throughout Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the 
fall of communism. In Bulgaria the opening of the files from the communist period was 
delayed because it was claimed that lustration may renew the ethnic conflict in the 
country. As the Bulgarian public gradually accepted that the MRF would remain a major 
political factor, most people wanted Turkish politics to be accorded to the Turks, and 
Bulgarian politics to the Bulgarians. The leader of the `IRF, Ahmed Dogan, suggested 
that Bulgaria's road to the West may very well have to be via Turkey and the East. Such 
arguments were met with extreme hostility. Although mostly based on economic factors, 
the idea hinted at the age-old undesired association of Bulgaria with the East as opposed 
to the West, which was now its main destination. 
15 Zlatko Angelov, Vek 21,24 October, 1990. 
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On the other hand the Turkish question was a human rights issue and international 
organisations firmly demanded an improvement of the Bulgarian record in this area. In 
this context the westernisation of the country, as seen in the West, depended on the state 
of interethnic relations. But the Bulgarian nationalists saw this concept as inviting foreign 
powers to interfere into the internal affairs of the country. After the elections in 1991 
Bulgaria had its first opposition government and the MRF became the third political 
power in the country, with about one-fifth of the parliamentary seats. The UDF 
preferred to talk about the electoral support they received form the INIRF to form a 
government, but not about an alliance, because they did not want to alienate the 
nationalist minded people among the Bulgarian public and some of the opposition 
parties, which also disliked MIRF's power. Although officially the i\1RF was not an ethnic 
party, there was wide-spread resentment about the fact that the political balance in the 
new Bulgaria was in Turkish hands. Several UDF leaders raised concern that, even if 
Bulgarians are not anti-Turkish, they felt that the country's fate should not be decided by 
a small ethnic minority. 
The Turkish issue in Bulgaria after 1989 was related to the mother country of the 
Bulgarian Turks, Turkey. Immediately after the fall of Bulgarian communism there was a 
significant effort to improve the relations with Turkey. In the context of the Yugoslav 
crisis her role as the major NATO power in the region, seemed even more important to 
Bulgaria. Bulgaria had reasons to pay special attention to Turkey for economic reasons, 
too. In 1990 the improvement of bilateral military relations was significant with many 
exchange visits. The Bulgarian General Staff went to Turkey and became the first such 
senior military visitor since communism came to Bulgaria. In 1991 Turkish officers 
visited troops and military compounds in Bulgaria (Harmanli) and some agreements were 
signed in regard to border control. In 1992 the UDF government officially declared that 
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the two countries are friends. 16 Bulgarian relations with Turkey were further complicated 
by Greece, the other important regional power bordering Bulgaria. The relations between 
Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey were indirectly complicated by the ethnic issues in each 
country. Greece was very aware that for Turkey good relations with Bulgaria would be a 
counterbalance to the Greek threat. Also the new situation in the Balkans, the strength of 
the pro-Islamic forces in Turkey, the volatility of the Middle East and Central Asia was 
likely to complicate even further the future of the Bulgarian Turks and the Balkan 
Muslims in general. Similarly to the Albanian position to the Albanian questions in 
Macedonia and Kosovo, Turkey showed the Bulgarian Turks that they would be better 
off if they found their own way of life within Bulgaria. 
The first census conducted after the collapse of the communist system in December 
1992 caused considerable controversy due to Bulgarian nationalists objections. The 
Bulgarian Turks demanded that the census include questions on ethnicity, native 
language and religion. The census's polemics reflected how important this issue was for 
everyone in Bulgaria. This was also a reaction against the communist years when 
registering nationality was solely a decision for the BCP. Bulgaria's post-communist 
debate about a national census should include in its questionnaire showed the fear that 
registering ethnicity may undermine the Bulgarianness of the country. On the other side 
the Turks as well as other minorities felt that they must be visible in Bulgarian society 
through their ethnic identities. 
16 See Andrei Georgiev and Emil Tsenkov, Bulgaria and the Recognition of Macedonia 
(1991-1992), (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy (Ethnic Conflicts in Eastern 
Europe: Security and Human Rights Implications, 1993). 
410 
The arrangement of the Turkish presence in post-communist Bulgaria was a record of 
the minority's effort to achieve political visibility in order to defend its culture and 
participate in the society. The difficulties of its acceptance by the Bulgarian side reflected 
mainly the fear that multi-ethnicity may be legitimised in the country and that this in its 
turn may lead to demands for Turkish cultural autonomy. This would require a major 
change in the Bulgarian political and cultural frame of mind, which seemed totally 
unacceptable. In the transitional period after the end of communism the leadership of 
the Bulgarian Turkish community developed political sophistication and an expertise on 
the international human rights conventions. Like their Bulgarian fellow-countrymen the 
Turks realised that the society will be undergoing fundamental changes and they engaged 
in the political struggle for control of the direction of this fundamental change. )? 
17 Sec Ibrahim Taturlu, `Ramkovata Konventsia za Pravata na Dlaltsinstvata i Bulgarskiyat 
Model', Demokraticheski Pregled, Vol. 1,1996. 
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IX. Macedonian Organisations in Post-communist Bulgaria 
After the changes in Bulgaria a number of Macedonian organisations were established. In 
the fall of 1989 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Union of 
Macedonian Societies (VMRO-SMD) was registered. It claimed to be reviving the 
VMRO that was leading the movement for the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish 
rule and its unification with Bulgaria. VMRO supporters believed that Yugoslav 
Macedonia was a pure creation of the Comintern supported by the Bulgarian 
communists and was aimed against the national interests of the Bulgarian people. The 
organisation published a number of pamphlets denying the legitimacy of the Macedonian 
nation. Its role in the Bulgarian political life was somewhat underestimated at the 
beginning. But in December 1994 VMRO-SMD candidates ran for the general elections 
together with the UDF and won two seats in Parliament. VMRO-SMD by then accepted 
the new realities of the region: it claimed that Bulgarian foreign policy had no interest in 
being involved in a Balkan conflict, meaning territorial claims over Macedonia, and must 
support the sovereignty and the integrity of the new state. On the other hand when in 
February 1995 in Macedonia there were clashes between the police and the Albanians at 
the opening of the outlawed Albanian-language University in Tetovo, one of the 
Bulgarian VMRO-SMD MP's publicly used the term `reintegration of Macedonia'- 
meaning with Bulgaria. Such suggestions implied that if Macedonia was destabilised it 
would have to seek help from Bulgaria which may lead to unification. 
VMRO-SMD and all Bulgarian governments after 1989 have been very hostile towards 
one Macedonian organisation in Bulgaria, the United Macedonian Organisations - 
Ilinden (UMO-Ilinden). UMO-Ilinden was founded in April 1990. It had been based in 
Pirin Macedonia and superseded another organisation called Ilinden that had been based 
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in Sofia. It was refused registration and defined as an unlawful organisation on the basis 
that it endangered the territorial integrity of Bulgaria. UMO-Ilinden stresses the existence 
of a distinct Macedonian identity in Bulgaria. They want Macedonians to be recognised 
as a national group living within the country. On the question of autonomy they are not 
united. Some say that autonomy is not their immediate goal but others say that it could 
be a long-term aim. Opinions also differ on the language question. Some say there is not 
a Macedonian language; others say it has been mixed with Bulgarian and Serbian; and in 
more secluded areas people say they speak Macedonian. On the question of borders 
supporters of UMO-Ilinden express some anarchistic ideas. Because many ordinary 
people from the Pirin region think that the authorities in Skopje and Sofia are equally far 
away from their problems and are not sincere representatives of their interests, they tend 
to imagine a united Macedonia but without borders. Despite the lack of clarity of their 
platform it could be said that during the post-communist period of Bulgarian politics the 
organisation demanded some kind of unification of all Macedonians living in Bulgaria on 
these basis of cultural and ethnic differentiation. The Bulgarian authorities clearly saw 
UMIO-Ilinden as a threat to national integrity. Despite the government's declaration of 
the 29 December 1989 stating that everyone in Bulgaria would be able to choose his/her 
name, religion and language, there was fear that if such freedoms were practised freely, 
Macedonian identity in Bulgaria could be revived or created. Thus state policy on UMO- 
Ilinden and Macedonian question in Bulgaria, supported by strong mass feeling, was 
hostile. This was an expression of a collective feeling of fear that Bulgarian nationhood 
was going to be first polluted, then dissolved and finally transformed into something else 
and less worthy if mixed with non-Bulgarian elements. The repetitive lamentation of the 
past was projected into the present and the future: we Bulgarians not only were under the 
Turks for ages and consequently lost territories and people but also were subjected to the 
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Soviet rule that was aiming to liquidate us a nation. Such arguments could be heard in the 
Bulgaria of the early 1990s both from the right and the left of the political spectrum. 
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X. The Bulgarian Recognition of Macedonia (1991) 
After the fall of communism in 1989 the main aspect of the Macedonian question in 
Bulgaria remained unsolved. This was the denial of a separate Macedonian ethnic 
identity, culture and history. Yet during post-communism the unification of Macedonia 
and Bulgaria as well as irredentism in Pirin Macedonia were not active factors in 
Bulgarian politics. Disputes over the origins of the Macedonian language continued. But 
the development of a standardised Macedonian language became increasingly accepted 
by the political parties and the Bulgarian public. The fundamental problem remained the 
general understanding of a possible change of national identities. As Schöpflin explains, 
the concept of peaceful changes through civil society's structures has been traditionally 
weaker in Eastern Europe compared to the West. 18 The concept of change in the 
Balkans has been associated with revolutionary connotations, meaning radical, sudden 
and violent. It has been deeply ingrained in the mind that people do not change 
nationality except by force or manipulation. The history of the region has given them 
more than enough evidence for this belief. From there derived the popular perception 
that Macedonians have been misled to believe that they have a separate identity: by 
communist ideology or/and Tito's policy on the national question in Yugoslavia. The 
anti-Bulgarian aspects of accepting a separate Macedonian nationhood was seen as a 
denial of historical Bulgarian ethnicity and tradition in Macedonia, undesired strong 
Serbian influence in Macedonia and denationalisation of this part of the Macedonian 
population, which identifies as Bulgarian. 
The Macedonian question was resurrected. It was reopened for debate but this time 
within the framework of the new and frail Bulgarian democracy that was eager to 
18 See Schöpflin, Politics in Tastern Europe, p. 13. 
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distinguish itself from the communist past. Those who thought of themselves as new 
pluralists quickly revived the idea about Bulgarian Macedonia. They claimed that 
Macedonia was created by the Soviets as a part of their programme to dominate in the 
Balkans and therefore could be a legitimate child of the Comintern only. Nov, the line 
continued, the time had come to stand up, free and unburdened in defence of the 
genuine national cause, which is that `Macedonia is ours'. The collapse of Tito's 
Yugoslavia encouraged the Bulgarian nationalists' belief that similarly to the Yugoslav 
identity, the Macedonian nation may also prove not viable. 
But in 1991 an independent Republic of Macedonia was pronounced and Bulgaria was 
the first country to recognise it. The decision was taken by the government of the 
Bulgarian opposition, Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF) which won in the general 
elections for the first time in November 1991. Several factors helped in taking the 
decision. First, the government's policy was to dissociate itself clearly from whatever was 
known as the legacy of Tito's regime in Yugoslavia and to encourage Macedonian self- 
determination. This decision was also in accordance with the pro-European orientation 
the UDF government was promoting. By that time Macedonia was the third former 
republic of Yugoslavia to succeed successfully after Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and the 
international community was in favour of it, except Greece. Second, and even more 
significant the UDF's position on the Macedonian question was a result of its own 
history. The Bulgarian opposition was very much consolidated as such around the 
protests against the anti-Turkish assimilation campaign and the consequent politicisation 
of ethnic relations in the 1980s. Therefore the initial UDF programme on the national 
question was definitely in support of minorities rights and in coalition with the political 
party representing the demands of the Turkish people, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedom. The president Zhelu Zhelev was unquestionably for the recognition of 
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independent Macedonia. So was the Bulgarian foreign minister, Stoian Gancv, who 
stated after a visit to Skopje: `The government of the UDF will not be assuming the role 
of a historiographer or an ethnographer, but will expect everyone to exert their right to 
self-determination and be free to feel as they choose. '"9 
However it was a recognition of the state but not of the nation: a `yes' and `no' 
definition, which supported mainly the independence of Macedonia in its break from 
Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian post-communist authorities did not sec the political unit, the 
state, and the national unit, the people, as congruent. Theoretically this understanding 
may be classified correctly as non-nationalist, if we understand nationalism as `primarily a 
political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent'. 20 On the other hand it rejected the legitimacy of the self-definition of the 
Macedonian state, which saw itself predominantly as a state made up of people of 
Macedonian nationality (and others). Therefore the Bulgarian post-communist definition 
of the Macedonian state served traditional Bulgarian national aspirations for Macedonia 
being independent rather than in one state with Serbia. 
On the other side of the political spectrum was the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, 
formerly BCP) and since it was busy with reforming itself on all fronts, the ex- 
communists argued that the policy towards Macedonia had to be revised much more 
carefully. Essentially the BSP argued that accepting the existence of a separate 
Macedonian national and political structure was a mistake made by the old Stalinist 
communist guard in Bulgaria and must not be repeated. The new Bulgarian socialists 
wanted to distinguish themselves from the BCP tradition associated with Dimitrov's 
19 Georgiev and Tsenkov, Bulgaria and the Recognition of Macedonia, p. 20. 
20 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 1. 
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position on the Macedonian question in support of independent Macedonia, though in a 
federation with Bulgaria. To some extent it was also an illustration for their pro-Greek 
orientation on the Balkan policy because at the time the Greek socialists were the only 
one who had any international weight since the collapse of the Russian communist party. 
he Greeks severely objected to the recognition of Macedonia under this name, arguing 
that it implied territorial pretensions. ) 
Thus although the nationalist card fall in the hands of the communists first, the 
opposition arrived only to a formally different position on the Macedonian question. 
Moreover even this pragmatic solution started to be revised very soon. As the UDF lost 
power in 1992, after nine months in government, it gradually started shifting to more 
explicit nationalistic stand on Macedonia in order to win more support. VMRO-SMD 
also exerted pressure on the UDF in this direction. And since relations between the UDF 
and the 1\4RF started deteriorating after 1992, the Bulgarian opposition became very 
careful not to loose more of its supporters. As far as public opinion was concerned, at 
the beginning of the post-communist period after 1989, it was not unanimously regarded 
that the Macedonian question was a priority of the new Bulgarian politics. Those who 
were interested in the issue were mainly people from Pirin Macedonia and the western 
parts of Bulgaria, as well as in Varna on the Black Sea coast, where there is a more 
compact Macedonian community. Nevertheless the Macedonian question remained hotly 
debated throughout Bulgarian post-communism. It was both about the past and the 
present. At the same time the collapse of Yugoslavia encouraged all kinds of speculations 
about the future of Macedonian, which continued to concern Bulgaria. 
Until 1996 the Bulgarian definition of who are the Macedonians was based purely on 
`blood and soil' and excluded the non-Slavs of Macedonia: Albanians, Turks and others. 
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This became also a potentially problematic attitude because according to the Bulgarian 
citizenship law every Slavo-Macedonian could automatically `restore' Bulgarian 
citizenship. In effect the Bulgarian law defined who were the Macedonians according to 
their ethnic identity. This showed clearly the Bulgarian post-communist concept of 
citizenship was based on ethnicity. 
Post-communist understanding of Macedonian-Bulgarian relations deviated between 
three main variations. Firstly, that Bulgaria should recognise Macedonia fully, which 
would acknowledge the complete establishment of two states and two nations. Second, 
drawing the two countries closer to each other as to become one nation in two states. 
This theory assumed that Macedonians could no longer withstand the pressure of the 
Yugoslav crisis and not being fully recognised by the European Union as well as bearing 
the economic consequences and therefore, so went the hypothesis, Macedonians could 
consider assuming Bulgarian citizenship and even travel on Bulgarian passports. This 
would have meant that Macedonians were Bulgarian citizens living outside Bulgaria, 
which would have inflamed the Macedonian question again. There was also a third 
theory, which argued that because Bulgarians could speak to the Macedonians without a 
dictionary and there were more similarities than differences in mentality, customs, etc., 
relations should be left to develop naturally and somehow inevitably the two nations may 
unite. The implications of such concept would be that Macedonia could be one way or 
another attracted to Bulgarisation. The reality however was that the professional classes, 
economic bureaucracy, the workers, and the agrarian population of the Republic of 
Macedonia were quite disinterested in such prospects as they did not offer particular 
economic or any other advantages. Also a Bulgarian government would have been much 
more centralised than the ex-Yugoslav federative rule in Macedonia which would have 
not appealed to the new Macedonians. Finally there was also the idea of Greater 
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Bulgaria, which proposed all Bulgarians living in one state and belonging to one nation, 
meaning effectively an assimilation of the Macedonians into Bulgarian identity. This 
scenario was widely thought to be against the interests of Bulgaria itself, however, 
because it would have interlocked with enormous new difficulties: economic, 
demographic, ethnic, international. It was entertained in the minds of the extreme 
Bulgarian nationalists only. 
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XI. Jewish Life: A Fragmented Memory 
After 1989 the Bulgarian Jewish community became much more visible in social life. But 
in difference to both the Turkish and Macedonian questions, the revisions of Jewish 
identity in post-communist Bulgaria were solely an issue of ethnic culture and memory. 
Although many Jewish institutions were restored and new organisations founded, 
Bulgarian Jews expressed no political ambitions as an ethnic minority. Jewish presence in 
the Bulgarian political debate during post-communism was mostly in relation to the past. 
The same old question about who saved the Bulgarian Jews during the Second World 
War became the central theme of discussion. It divided not only Bulgarian public 
opinion but most importantly the Jewish community itself. The majority of Bulgarian 
people and politicians saw the whole issue about the Bulgarian Jews surviving the Second 
World War primarily as a matter of pride for the Bulgarian nation and its international 
prestige. Those who believed that communists played the major role in the saving of the 
Bulgarian Jews seemed to undermine, or even ignore, the contribution of the then- 
Bulgarian government, which acted under the German occupation, as well as the role of 
the Bulgarian king, Boris III. In general most of the former communists and many of the 
Jewish members of the former communist party supported this view. 
On the contrary, those who believed that the Bulgarian Jews were saved by the skilful 
personal diplomacy of Boris III, and the support he received from certain circles in the 
Bulgarian government, denied that communists had any role in the actual events. They 
were mainly Bulgarian and Jewish supporters of UDF and many of them expressed 
monarchist sentiments. Accordingly the Jewish organisations were divided along the 
same political lines. The biggest Jewish organisation in Bulgaria, Shalom, was established 
in 1990. It took over the activities of the previous Jewish cultural organisations and 
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established centres in most of the big cities were there were concentrated Jewish 
populations. It was strongly felt by Jews themselves that Shalom was a continuation of 
the communist style Jewish organisation promoting communist ideas among the Jewish 
community. Another alternative to Shalom was Zion, which was founded in 1991 in 
Sofia. It tried to unite those members of the Jewish community who wanted to distance 
themselves from the former communists and supported the ideas of Jewish nationalism. 
Zion did not attract sufficient support to overshadow Shalom and remained on the 
margins of Jewish He during post-communist in Bulgaria. There was also a third opinion, 
which tried to bridge the two opposite sides in the politics of the Jewish community in 
Bulgaria, supported by Jews who tried to present a balanced approach towards the 
history of the saving of the Bulgarian Jews. They were not organised formally but rather 
formed a group of independent minded intellectuals. According to them both the 
Bulgarian government during the Second World war and the Bulgarian king himself as 
well as the communist resistance have the right to claim contribution to the saving of the 
Bulgarian Jews. 21 
After 1989 the intelligentsia was eager to re-invent the pre-communist past as a glorious 
history. They saw the `good' Bulgarian nation as the main actor of this history. 
Those who believed in it were declared democrats and those who opposed this view 
were labelled hard-line communists. 22 Bulgaria developed a new relationship with Israel. 
In May 1990 the Foreign Minister of Israel, Moshe Arens, visited Bulgaria and paid a 
special tribute to the Sofia synagogue, then under restoration. An agreement re- 
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel was signed by him and the then-Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister, Boiko Dimitrov. This was not simply a state protocol but also a symbol 
21 Emy Barouch. Personal Conversation. Sofia: 10 July 1996. 
22 Atanas Todorov, `In response to Benjamin Hanne', Den/okralsia, 13 July 1998. 
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of the future relationship the Bulgarian Jews were to have with the state of Israel. Travel 
and immigration to Israel became the most significant feature of the post-communist 
period of the Jewish life in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Jews reconnected with their relatives in 
Israel as well as with the whole idea of having a second mother-country. 
The other main aspect of the Jewish debate during post-communism, which was also a 
part of the debate about `who saved the Bulgarian Jews', concerned Bulgarian 
responsibility for the deportation of 12,000 Jews from the occupied territories. In 
February 1993 for the first time the Bulgarian National Assembly held a commemorative 
session in memory of the Jews deported from Macedonia and Thrace, who perished in 
the concentration camps. The event was politicised by the remark of one BSP member 
of the Bulgarian parliament, who stated that it was the Bulgarian king Boris III, who 
signed the deportation order himself. The response came from the UDF member of the 
parliament, who asserted that although there were controversies around the king's role, 
nobody should deny that he helped save the Bulgaria Jews. ''-; Similar disagreements 
appeared regularly in the Bulgarian post-communist press. Nobody really accepted the 
idea that Bulgaria had anything to do with the Jewish deportations from Macedonia and 
Thrace. During the post-communist years the only criticism of Bulgaria's role in the faith 
of the Jews from the Bulgarian `occupied territories' came from the Jewish community in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 24 
23 RFE, EE/1624, quoting BTA, 24 Feb 1993. 
24 See Zhamila Kolohomos and Vera Veskobuk-Vangcli, Evrcite vo Makedonia vo 
Vtorata Svetovna Voina (1941-1945): Sbornik na Dokumenti, (Skopje: Fond `11 Mart 
1943', 1986). Also see Marin Trenevski, `Bugari revnosniji od nematza', Holokaust 
Makcdonskih Jevrejah, [Skopje](4) and `Spaseni' Bugarski Jevreji', Holokaust 
Makedonskih Jcvrejah, [Skopje] (6). 
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XII. The BSP and the Bulgarian National Questions 
In 1989 Bulgarian communism collapsed but the ruling communist party remained the 
main political force in the country for the next six years. Yet the BCP could no longer 
legitimate itself as a ruling party inspired by the ideas of communism because communist 
ideology was discredited everywhere in Eastern Europe. The BCP, which for 45 years 
found a way to avoid reform, had to change. First of all, the BCP decided to change itself 
by replacing its long standing leader, Todor Zhivkov. It seemed a dramatic change, given 
that he had stayed in power for 35 years. The aim of his replacement was to mark the 
end of the old-style communist regime in Bulgaria and to save the ruling position of the 
party. There were two immediate problems with this move. The fall of Zhivkov seemed 
the wish of the majority of people in the country. But at the same time, the lack of 
suitable leader to replace him led to the widespread feeling that he was a victim of the 
party, not the other way around. Petur Mladenov, the former Bulgarian foreign minister, 
took over the leadership after Zhivkov was removed on 10 November 1989. But he was 
an old style party aparatchik and a well-known hard-liner. He could neither give new 
image to the communist party in Bulgaria, nor lead dialogue with the new opposition. 
But in those chaotic days, the replacement won time for the BCP to decide what to do 
next. 
The most important organisational change in the party came in April 1990 with the 
change of its name: the BCP became the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). This was the 
most important transformation, which signified that the party was determined to stay in 
power and therefore prepared to change. SAbove all the change of the name of the party 
25 See Wolfgang Hopken (ed. ), Revolution auf Raten: Bulgariens Weg zur Democratic. 
(Munchen: Oldenbourg, 1996), p. 93. 
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became a symbol of the communist transformation, which denied communist ideology 
and claimed association with socialism understood in its broad sense and as a part of the 
social democratic traditions of Europe rather than the Soviet Union alone. The 1411, 
(extraordinary) congress of the BCP, which was held in 1990, ended with the 
endorsement of a reformist manifesto. The new creed of the party affirmed that although 
the BCP would remain essentially a Marxist party, as opposed to Marxist-Leninist. 
Thus the BCP decided not to follow the social democratic path other former ruling East 
European communist parties chose, while preparing for free elections. The newly 
restructured leadership of the BCP elected Alexander Lilov as its leader. Lilov was once 
the right hand of Zhivkov's daughter, but since her death, he had been out of favour 
with Zhivkov. Nov, after the changes in 1989, he was rehabilitated to the top ranks of 
the party. He was the brain of the new ideology of the Bulgarian communists, who 
rejected Zhivkov's policies as `neo-Stalinist' and declared that the BSP was going to be a 
`new type of modern left party'. 26 Lilov's view was that despite of the revision of the 
past the party should remain united. However it was not clear what exactly the ideology 
of its new unity was going to be apart from rejecting Stalinism and Zhivkovism. It also 
remained quite unclear what was going to be the BSP's understanding of Marxism after 
the `de-Leninisation' or the `de-Communisation' of Bulgarian communism. No serious 
discussion on the theory of communism followed the collapse of the communist system 
in 1989. Most scholars of the younger generation of Marxist philosophers reoriented 
themselves towards studies of political pluralism and classical liberalism. The ideological 
revision of the communist party in terms of rejecting the dogmatic past and asserting 
socialist principles allowed it to claim that it was the protector of socialism in general 
and of all social policy issues in terms of policy making. This was an important tactical 
26 See Vcselin Tsachevski, Bulgarskyat Comunizum, (Sofia: IKK `Slavika', 1993), pp. 442- 
450. 
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claim because concern about economic difficulties, law and safety were increasing rapidly 
after 1989. However there was no clarity about which way should the Bulgarian economy 
go during the transition. The state economy was pronounced dead both by the BSP and 
the opposition. The Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov, a prominent reformer in the BSP, 
stated in his Cabinet declaration of September 1990 that state economy was `economy of 
the absurd' and that the new market economy would be dictated by `every man for 
himself . 27 This position was opposed by hard-liners within the BSP who insisted that 
material wealth should be distributed by the state. In order to preserve its own unity as 
well as to respond to the popular demand for security and safety the BSP worked out a 
platform which aimed to underline the importance of the state during post-communism: 
`We stand for a mixed economy based on state, private and cooperative property'. The 
BSP declared that the privatisation it stands for was `social privatisation'. 211 With this 
essentially populist platform combining demands for the rejection of planned state 
economy with privatisation, but under the umbrella of social security, the BSP won the 
absolute majority in the elections of 1994. 
In relation to issues of nationalism the BSP was reforming under slogans of rights and 
freedoms of all individuals and ethnic groups as declared in the Agreement between all 
political forces signed in December 1990. But in terms of policy the BSP retreated from 
civic definitions of nationhood and promoted Bulgarian ethno-centred education . 
Ethnic minorities' non-profit organisations were attacked as being agents of foreign 
powers aiming to undermine the Bulgarian state and by 1995 most governmental bodies 
withdrew from joint projects with non-governmental organisations. Also a substantial 
grant of the World Bank for education reforms was rejected on the grounds that such 
27 See The Insider, Pilot issue, Summer 1990, p. 22. 
28 The Insider, 12/94, B&CA Supplement, p. 8. 
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reforms would stimulate multiculturalism at the expense of Bulgarian national 
awarcness. 29 
Another equally significant change which the BSP had to undergo was to learn to use 
new political language in public debate. The very idea that political power was to be 
contested reflected first of all on the way the party was to express its views. Before, the 
communist party could speak only the political language which confirmed the party line 
and avoided controversies. Now party statements were scrutinised by the public, the new 
political opponents, the local and the foreign media. Everything stated by the part), in 
words or gestures was interpreted and discussed in political life. This was a totally new 
phenomenon, which pushed the BSP to clarify its platform. The new socialists, who were 
discredited as former communists, could offer very little beside the call for Bulgarian 
national unity. Political pluralism, represented by the emergence of the opposition 
political parties, was declared as the road to divide the Bulgarian nation. At the same time 
the Bulgarian socialists had to deal with their past, which was also provoking a heated 
public debate. The BCP policies towards Bulgarian national questions under communism 
became the central theme of this discussion. Bulgarian post-communism produced 
massive reproaches towards the communist party for not acting as a defender of the 
national interest of the country. The main claim was that communist Bulgaria did not 
have the correct policy on the national issues during the last 45 years: Macedonia was 
betrayed and the Turkish issue was not solved. The Bulgarian communists, it was 
declared, did not rule in the name of the Bulgarian nation. The opposition, the 
nationalistic parties, and a great deal of the public opinion claimed that the Bulgarian 
communist past was insufficiently nationalist or nihilist in its attitude towards the 
29 See Evgeni Dainov, `Transition Agenda Abondened' in Bulgaria in Transition: Thrcc 
Viewpoints, (Sofia: Centre for Social Practices, 1996), pp. 30-47. 
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national questions. Another aspect of the same attitude was the accusation that Bulgarian 
communists were blamed for not having an independent and proper Balkan policy 
during communism. The argument that this was dictated by the Soviets was largely 
dismissed as exaggerated. 30 Post-communist Bulgarian popular opinion demanded 
national policy, understood as a moral responsibility, not political calculations and 
manoeuvrings. 
The new opposition parties, including the main coalition, the UDF, had to present 
themselves as much more passionate bearers of the Bulgarian national interests. The 
opposition was expected to correct the mistakes of the communist past, punish the 
Bulgarian communists for them and construct a new reality ruled by national justice. In 
this way the nation became the mental space where the post-communist political debate 
was taking place in Bulgaria. But nationalism on its own could not give satisfactory 
answers to the problems facing post-communist Bulgaria. It could neither solve the 
pressing problems of the declining Bulgarian economy nor could it offer a constructive 
model of democratic society after the communist experience. 3' During the period of 
Bulgarian post-communism questions of national and ethnic identities became to be seen 
as primary inspiration of mass politics. This was only too natural after the years of 
communist rule when they were considered a privilege of the communist party. 
The BSP approach to its past was not to condemn it, but rather to maintain that the 
wrongs were committed by individual members. The communist party itself was to be 
kept untainted as much as possible. From 1990 regularly statements were published in 
30 See Hopken, Revolution auf Raten, p. 304. 
31 Krasen Stanchev, Can Economic Reforms Overcome Ethnic Tensions; The Role of 
Institutions in Bulgaria's Economic Reform. Unpublished paper presented at the 1994 
Bucharest SFOS Conference `Political and Economic Change in the Balkan States', 20 
August 1994. 
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the newspaper Duma (previously Rabotnichesko De/o) discussing the `guilt' to the past. This 
critique had the function of preventing further crisis in the communist party. It stressed 
that a small number of people at the top of the party structure bore responsibility for 
whatever went wrong with Bulgarian communism. The new Bulgarian socialists were 
trying to distance themselves from Soviet communism and to vin legitimacy in the West. 
This was a radical turn in its internationalist policy which until 1989 maintained the 
supremacy of the Soviets. The BSP claimed that there was no disagreement on the issue 
of rejoining Europe being the ultimate aim of the Bulgarian foreign policy. The question 
was rather `when' and `how'. The discussion among the young generation of party 
members was about modernising the BSP as a social-democratic European type modern 
left party. But until 1997 they were unable neither to clarify their views nor to split from 
the BSP. 32 The new approach had an important function in the post-communist period. 
It was clear for the leaders of the BSP that they could continue to claim legitimacy as a 
party capable to rule only if they managed to preserve and to some extent reconstruct 
some kind of workable past for the communist movement in Bulgaria, but its aims had 
to be transformed radically. The aim was to reconstruct Bulgaria as a western European 
type democracy. The former communists could only claim to be more experienced in 
government than the newly born opposition if their previous experience was not totally 
rejected. This was particularly important in order to underline the contrast between the 
communists and the opposition, which was said to have been lacking any political 
experience. BSP had no choice but to build upon its history as a revolutionary party. 
Moreover blaming individual members of the party rather than the entire communist 
regime corresponded with the message coming from the west at the end of the cold war. 
It was clear that there would be no total international condemnation neither of the ideas 
nor of the deeds of communism. The movement for human rights stood firmly behind 
32 See `Putyat na Evrolevitsata', Enin/eti/sa, No. 1, February, 1997. 
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the idea that guilt could he only individual, not collective. 33 There were many fears about 
possible acts of revenge in the former communist countries and maintaining a peaceful 
and lawful transition to democracy was the slogan of the day. Communism was not to be 
condemned but rather to be forgotten. This international policy had the unintended 
result of actually encouraging the former communists in Bulgaria to struggle to remain in 
power because they were seen as the future leaders of democratic reforms. The electoral 
successes of BSP until 1997 to a great extend rested on the perception that some former 
communist may have done wrongs, but the communist ideas were not altogether so bad 
as far as they provided the theory behind social security policy. Also because the ordinary 
middle and low rank members of the former communist party were not dishonoured on 
the basis of having served a wrong ideology, they remained loyal supporters of BSP. 
Thus the way to the `re-colouring' (`preboiadinane') of the former communists in Bulgaria 
was paved and the blurring between communist and non-communist beliefs began. From 
now on the question was not who was wrong in the past, but who would prove right in 
the future. According to the long-standing tradition of communism envisioning a bright 
future, the BSP promised to deliver the best for Bulgaria during post-communism were 
more than generous. The Bulgarian communists, who so much divided the country in the 
name of the nation, once again were pledging national unity. 
33 For example when in 1992 Andrei Lukanov (prime-minister of Bulgaria in 1990) was 
imprisoned for alleged financial misdemeanours, he appealed to the European Court in 
Strasbourg. Many people in Bulgaria viewed that no European institutions should act in 
defence of political activists who belonged to the communist party. 
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XIII. Zhelev and the Bulgarian Opposition 
Zhelu Zhelev emerged as the most influential intellectual and opposition leader in 
Bulgaria during the years of post-communism. He became the leader of the UDF in 1989 
shortly after the fall of Zhivkov and the first democratically elected president of Bulgaria 
in 1990.34Zhelu Zhelev was a very important political figure in Bulgaria during the post- 
communist period because his personality represented a particular type of Bulgarian 
leadership, which originated under communism but came to light after its fall. Zhelev's 
political career illustrated much of the difficulties of the Bulgarian opposition, which 
aimed to represent both the people and the Bulgarian nation on one side and the new 
political pluralism on the other. 
During the 1980s Zhelev was known as a Marxist philosopher and a moderniser, who 
viewed that communism must change. He thought that (luring communism Bulgaria was 
in a particularly disadvantaged position because it did not have experience in reforms and 
virtually no tradition of intellectual dissent. Zhelev thought that communist Bulgaria 
lagged behind Hungary and Poland but that in 1989 she was more ready for change than 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia. -15 Zhelev believed that the 
Bulgarian intelligentsia together with the Bulgarian masses were the driving forces of the 
change in 1989. He viewed that the intellectual elite of the country was better prepared 
for the transition to democracy than the ordinary people, who lagged behind in their 
political thinking. 
3; Duncan ivI. Perry, Dissident Becomes New President, RFE, 17 August 1990, pp. 3-4. 
35 Zhelu Zhelev, Afterword. By Zhelcv, Fashizmut (totalitarnata durzhava), (Sofia: 
Izdatclstvo na BZNS, 1990), p. 2. 
431 
7_helev became first known in Bulgaria with the publication of his book Fascism 
(Fashi. Znnit totalitarnata durZhaca) in 1982, which was largely interpreted as an allusion to 
the communist state. The book was withdrawn from sale and effectively banned. But 
6,000 copies out of total of 10,000 were sold before the ban came into effect. The book 
became the bible of the Bulgarian dissent. During the 1980s Zhclev became more active 
in public life and was among the original members of the Russe Committee and the Club 
for Glasnost and Democracy. 
Zhelev firmly believed in the politics of compromise. This was a controversial stand in 
post-communist Bulgaria, which had no experience in negotiating political power and 
most of the supporters of the opposition expected rapid changes, which would improve 
their life as fast as possible. After the changes in 1989 Zhelcv, as a leader of the UDF, 
engaged in an active dialogue with the former communists. There was a wide-spread 
opinion that right from the start he chose to co-operate with the former communists 
rather than to fight and defeat them. On 14 December 1989, the biggest demonstration 
took place in Sofia. The crowd wanted the removal of article I of the Bulgarian 
communist constitution of 1971, which stated that BCP had the leading role in the state 
and society. The authorities feared that the tension was so high that the situation may get 
out of control and lead to violence. Zhelev appeared on the balcony of the presidency 
and called for the crowd to go home peacefully. He pleaded for understanding and 
promised understanding on behalf of the rulers. The demonstration ended peacefully. 
Later was discovered that Petur Vlladenov, the then head of the Bulgarian government, 
was calling for tanks to be used to disperse the crowd. 36 Zhelev's cautious approach thus 
may have been well justified in human terms: no lives were lost. But in political terms, 
this day marked the end of the euphoria of the Bulgaria `revolution' and the beginning of 
36 Petur Mladenov resigned shortly afterwards in July1990. 
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the long and painful post-communist transition. Zhclcv was seen as the person who 
decided that Bulgarian communism was to be followed by peaceful and negotiated 
transition to democracy. He obviously did not realise how difficult, long and 
counterproductive this process would be. Most importantly the BSP had the chance to 
postpone the Bulgarian reforms. The former communists understood the peaceful path 
to transition as giving them time to rethink their policy, reshuffle their leadership and 
most importantly to remain in control of the privatisation. 
Thus during his presidency (1990-96), Zhelev became known as moderate and popular 
leader but ineffective political mediator. Post-communist Bulgaria suffered a great 
setback in economical and political terms during those years when except for nine 
months in 1992, the BSP ruled the country. It was declared one of the most backward 
post-communist states, alongside Romania and Albania. Zhelev's style of political 
compromise was felt in the debate about the Bulgarian national questions. In relation to 
the Turkish issue, Zhelev supported both the human rights movement but also the 
former communists' call for `national reconciliation'. Zhelcv also insisted that Bulgaria 
was a protector of the Jews, he believed in the natural tolerance of the Bulgarian 
people. 37Although he did not recognise the existence of the Macedonian minority in 
Bulgaria, he approved of the translation of his own book into Macedonian language, 
which at the time provoked a heated debate in Bulgaria because it was interpreted as a 
recognition of the Macedonian language. Under his presidency Bulgaria recognised 
Macedonian independence in 1991, but Zhelev maintained that there was no 
Macedonian nation. 
37 See `Zhelev and Yordanov Address Parliament on Anniversary of Saving Jcws', RFE, 
SWB, EE/1624 b/2,27 February 1993. 
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Zhelev started his political career as a reformer in the Gorbachev style but did not 
develop beyond it. He had no other vision but the very general idea that communism 
had to be dismantled and democracy had to be build peacefully in Bulgaria. Zhelev was a 
charismatic leader in the \Veberian sense. His peasant background and sincere belief in 
the virtues of the ordinary Bulgarian people helped him to maintain successfully the 
image of being a `commoner'. In this sense his popularity rested on the same premises as 
his predecessor's, the former Bulgarian communist leader Zhivkov. To be loved by the 
ordinary Bulgarian people was the emotional priority of both the long-standing 
communist leader and the first freely elected post-communist president of Bulgaria. He 
drew his strength from, and therefore in many ways was beholden to, the Bulgarian 
nation. 
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XIV. Conclusion 
It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that Bulgaria was very disorientated and 
confused after the collapse of the communist system. The country had to redefine its 
entire identity. Communism collapsed but democracy seemed still a remote reality. It was 
no longer clear where Bulgaria belonged. During the years of post-communism the role 
of the Soviet factor in Bulgarian politics changed dramatically. From being a Soviet 
satellite, used to hold a safely predetermined position, after 1989 Bulgaria was left to 
decide its own future independently. Although the old Bulgarian-Soviet tics remained 
very important in the economic sphere, the entire relationship with Russia needed total 
reconstruction. Despite the many uncertainties about future Bulgarian-Russian relations, 
one thing was very clear - they could no longer be based on the principles of communist 
internationalism. Thus the old cultural bonds came to replace the Bulgarian-Soviet 
communist alliance. This meant that Bulgaria was to think in a new way about its 
international position. 
Bulgaria's relations with the rest of the countries from the former Eastern European 
socialist bloc were very weakened. Although Bulgaria was always in the very periphery of 
what is now defined as Central and Eastern Europe, co-operation with the former 
socialist countries was considered an integral part of Bulgarian life. Indeed this co- 
operation was based on the political rather than geopolitical or historical orientation of 
the countries, which belonged to the former Soviet bloc. The new definitions of post- 
communist Eastern Europe increasingly excluded Bulgaria and the rest of the Balkan 
countries. The main organisations of the communist co-operation, the Warsaw Pact and 
the Comecon, were dissolved and effectively, Bulgaria had no political community of 
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which to be member. 38 Despite the common experience under communism, very soon 
after the changes, it became quite clear that Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia would be 
differentiated from Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. The collapse of Yugoslavia was the 
most unfortunate event that could have happened during this period of total 
restructuring. The states emerging from the collapse also followed a different path of 
development. 
Such were the circumstances under which post-communist Bulgaria was redirected to the 
Balkans - the traditional, historical and geographical region she belonged to. Bulgaria was 
more often defined as a former communist Balkan country, rather than as East 
European. 
3s The Warsaw Pact (formally Warsaw Treaty Organisation) establishing a mutual- 
defence organisation was formed in 1955. It ceased to exist in 1991. Comecon (Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance), established in 1949 to facilitate and coordinate the 
economic development of the eastern European countries belonging to the Soviet bloc, 
was dissolved during the same year. Originally the members of the two organisations 
were the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania. 
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Conclusion 
Nationalism Under Communism, and After 
Communism, as based on Marxist-Leninist theory, relied on the political state alone to 
solve the problems of nationalism. The Bulgarian Communist Party was the sole holder 
of political power, which was supposed to direct the development of communist society 
in all aspects of life, including the area of nationalism and national identities. 
Communism came to power in Bulgaria as a Soviet-type political model, which claimed 
to be internationalist in content. The overarching loyalty to a non-national communist 
citizenship was among the founding principles of Bulgarian communism. This was the 
theory, which had to be applied in practice. However, communism steadily lost its 
political credibility because it was not a consensual system of rule. It increasingly relied 
on fear and terror for extracting support. At the same time the main source of 
communist legitimacy became Bulgarian cultural nationalism. Thus the main conclusion 
of this thesis concerning the general dynamics of communism and nationalism could be 
defined as follows: 
Bulgarian communism subordinated political nationalism to cultural nationalism, irbith became the 
driving force of communist politics of nationalism after the official de-. S'talinisatioii of the BCP in 1956. 
The interaction of communism with nationalism was facilitated by the long-standing 
tradition of cultural nationalism based on ethnicity as a political force in the history of 
Bulgaria. Imperial rule and the movements for national liberation played a central role in 
the formation of the ideas of nation and nationalism in the whole of Eastern Europe and 
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the Balkans. Bulgaria serves as a perfect example of this pattern of political development. 
The striving to unite the nation against a foreign enemy is central for understanding 
nationalism in the region. In the case of Bulgaria the domination of the Ottoman empire 
for nearly five centuries has been seen as the main obstacle to the success of nationalism. 
However communism had to find a balance between domestic national ambitions and 
the demands of the Soviet power in relation to national questions. For most of the time 
the Soviet leadership determined the limits of communist policies on issues of 
nationalism. The Soviet communist party presented one major condition in this respect - 
the unquestionable supremacy of the Soviets in Eastern Europe. But Bulgarian 
communism was particularly advantaged in its relation to the Soviet communism from 
the point of view of nationalism. As this research illustrates, in the case of Bulgarian 
communism, loyalty to Soviet power did not necessarily mean the suppression of 
Bulgarian nationalism. On the contrary, Bulgaria's satellite position actually satisfied 
many of the old Bulgarian national aspirations. The old Bulgarian-Russian friendship 
based on common religion and linguistic similarity was successfully promoted under the 
banner of Bulgarian-Soviet internationalism. The main Soviet concern in relation to 
Bulgarian communism was Bulgaria's relations with its neighbours, which had to 
guarantee USSR's control in the region. Thus, the Macedonian question in Bulgaria was 
of very little importance to the Soviets so long as it did not permit closer alliance 
between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as Yugoslav refused to be subdued by Moscow. 
Similarly, the Soviets did not object to the BCP policy towards the Bulgarian Turks until 
the mid-1980s. Turkey was a traditional enemy of Russia and the USSR, and friendship 
with Bulgaria was not encouraged. Also, Jewish emigration from Bulgaria immediately 
after the Second World War was strongly encouraged by the Soviet line at the time, 
which supported the creation of Israel. After that, the fate of the Bulgarian Jews tinder 
communism was of no particular interest to Moscow. 
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This study argues that Bulgarian communism proved very weak in maintaining political 
nationalism as the main motivation of its policies towards national questions. The BCP 
saw ethnic diversity as a major threat to its power as a leader of the Bulgarian political 
state. Therefore, soon after assuming power, Bulgarian communism started to promote 
the idea of Bulgaria being an ethnically homogenous nation-state. At the same time, 
Bulgarian communism aimed to gain the support of the ethnic Bulgarian majority by 
eliminating ethnic difference. 
Under communism two mass resettlements took place in Bulgaria: between 1947-49, 
over 45,000 Jews left for Israel, and in the summer of 1989 over 300,000 Turks left to 
't'urkey. At other times there were additional waves of controlled emigration on a smaller 
scale. As a result, on the eve of the collapse of communism, Bulgaria had a smaller 
number of ethnically different people than ever before in its modern history. 
As I have argued consistently in this study, the policies of Bulgarian communism in 
Bulgaria in relation to national questions could not be understood separately from its 
understanding of nations and nationalism. The analysis of the politics of nationalism 
under Bulgarian communism required a careful consideration of communist party 
policies on questions of political and cultural nationalism, national identity, national 
mythology, ethnicity and citizenship. This research illustrates that nationalism was a 
central feature of the communist experience in Bulgaria. Thus the second main 
conclusion of this study could be formulated as follows: 
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The major impact of communism on Bulgarian nationalism is not to be sought in the gray communism 
disconnected from the bourgeoisie nationalism of the past, but rather in the manner in which communism 
reconnected to cultural nationalism based on Bulgarian ethnicity as an instnunent ofpolitical power. 
On a more general note, the thesis illustrates the constraints of communism as a theory 
of modernity. The communist theory of modernity rested on the premise that the 
communist state embodied the ideas of political progress. Communism as the rule of the 
one-party state was supposed to direct every aspect of life. Communism saw the society 
as a unit, which needed to be told what to think and how to act in all circumstances, 
including in the realm of national identities. This perception of the role of political power 
in society strengthened the `etatist'tradition in Eastern Europe. Communist modernity in 
general was concerned primarily with class identity. The failure of communism to 
recognise ethnic difference as an essential element of modern society turned it into a dry 
theoretical construct having very little to do with real life, which was much more 
complicated and required a more subtle approach towards culture. This research shows 
that Bulgarian communism offered simple answers to the very difficult question of the 
resilience of national identities not only of ethnic groups but also of the communist 
leaders themselves. Communism promised that national questions would be solved 
naturally during the course of the maturing of the political communist identity. But the 
lack of inclusive political thinking in relation to national identities was central to the 
failure of communism as a legitimate political system. 
The third major conclusion of this study concerns the way dynamics between 
communism and nationalism affected the perceptions of history in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans in particular. Here the role of myth is most central. Communism endowed 
history with strong moralistic meaning. History was viewed as an experience of the past, 
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on which communism had the task of passing judgement. The judgement of history was 
centred around the idea that history was right when it led to the fulfilment of the aims of 
communism, and wrong when it did not. Therefore communism was interested in 
selective history only. Communist accounts of Bulgarian history had two main goals: a) 
to present a version of history which supports the idea that the communists' coming to 
power was inevitable and a natural result of the maturing of the class-consciousness of 
the Bulgarians, and b) to connect communism with cultural nationalism in order to 
maintain continuity. Myth became the mental and intellectual construct which was 
supposed to provide cohesiveness to these otherwise incoherent aims of communist 
history. The mythical aspects of Bulgarian communist historiography gave it a strong 
symbolic meaning. The history of Bulgaria was designed to symbolise the glory of the 
Bulgarian communist nation. Therefore the third main conclusion of this study highlights 
communism's effort to construct a highly selective history held together by myths, and 
can be formulated as follows: 
Communism used history as a narrative designed according to communist ideas about the Bulgarian 
nation. In communist historiograply events were accounted for by a conceptualised model which n-as 
designed by the communist leadership in order to justify its own political aims. 
This predetermined and moralising way of writing history profoundly affected the 
perception of history. In Bulgaria history is expected to serve one or another cause 
depending on the political circumstances of the day. 
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The National Questions 
This study illustrates that national questions were central to communist politics in 
Bulgaria. There are several implications from this. Communism intensified feelings of 
fearful defensiveness and insecurity, which were deeply ingrained in the traditions of 
Bulgarian nationhood. This applies to both the Bulgarian majority and to the ethnic 
minorities in the country. Although through its policies Bulgarian communism promoted 
exclusive cultural Bulgarian nationalism, for most of its rule this was denied officially. 
Whenever the communist leadership showed its own dedication to Bulgarian cultural 
nationalism, Bulgarian society tended to interpret it as communist manoeuvres to 
maintain political control rather than genuine conviction. Paradoxically, communism, 
which struggled so hard to promote the supremacy of the ethnic Bulgarian nation, was 
blamed for having failed it. From here derived two general perceptions of great 
importance for the understanding of Bulgarian nationalism under post-communism. 
First, it was largely thought that communism undermined Bulgarian nationalism and 
Bulgarian national identity, which were never abandoned by the Bulgarian people. 
Second, ethnic nationalism came to be seen as an alternative to communism, which 
became particularly apparent at the fall of communism and during the post-communist 
period. 
Communism had serious implications for the Macedonian question in Bulgaria. The fact 
that Bulgarian communism obeyed Soviet demands over this major national question 
encouraged the belief that communism betrayed the unity of Bulgarian nationhood. The 
way the BCP toyed with the establishment of the Macedonian nation according to 
Moscow's instructions gave rise to the strong belief in Bulgaria that communism was the 
sole reason for the success of Macedonian nationhood. But once communism was gone, 
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such understanding of the Macedonian question proved deeply insufficient and post- 
communist Bulgaria had to grapple with the long-term implications of communist policy. 
At the same time, communism radically changed the position of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria. All Turks in Bulgaria suffered substantially because of communist policy, and it 
is likely that more than 200,000 left the country permanently. But as this study argues, it 
is very doubtful that the Bulgarian Turks would have become a major political force in 
the country without their experience under communism. The way the anti-Turkish 
campaign of 1984-85 backfired, as well as the role Turkish politics played in the fall of 
Bulgarian communism, gave the Turkish identity in Bulgaria new meaning. Unintended 
as it was, communist policy towards the largest ethnic minority of Bulgaria facilitated the 
political assertion of its ethnic identity. Moreover, this development led to demands for 
revising the entire perception of the Turkish presence in Bulgarian history and culture. 
The politics of the Jewish identity in Bulgaria under communism also had significant 
implications. As a result of emigration to Israel and the largely successful cultural 
assimilation of those who remained in communist Bulgaria, the Jewish community lost a 
significant part of its cultural sense. Once having actively connected Bulgarian culture to 
the rest of the world, Jewish life in Bulgaria during communism was reduced to the local 
politicised question of Bulgaria's role in the Second World War. The majority of the 
Bulgarian Jews who chose to stay in communist Bulgaria sincerely hoped that 
communism would solve the problems of Jewish identity by promoting citizens' equality. 
Instead, Bulgarian communism put strict limitations on Jewishness and therefore greatly 
disappointed the majority of the members of the Jewish community, which had 
previously been very faithful to Bulgaria. 
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Future Work 
A number of themes for future work emerge from this research. The results of this study 
show that a further enquiry into the dynamics between communism and nationalism may 
reach new dimensions if analysed as co-existing theories of collective identity. The way 
communism used nationalism may have further implications for understanding what 
impact global theories, such as communism, have on understanding issues of nations and 
nationalism, particularly in the context of the globalisation of the modern world. At the 
same time, the particular pattern of communism becoming compatible with cultural 
nationalism in order to maintain power confirms that under some circumstances political 
ideologies develop survival strategies which rest on their opposites. Was communism the 
only ideology in the post-war history of Europe which resorted to exclusive nationalism 
in its pursuit to power? 
On a more regional level, the results of this study show that the interaction between 
communism and nationalism gave Bulgaria and the rest of the former communist 
Eastern Europe a particular experience, which is now a distinct part of their political and 
cultural heritage. The main question which arises from this peculiarity concerns the 
future of the integration of Eastern Europe and the Balkans into the Nest in general and 
the EU in particular. With their experience of communism and nationalism, what kind of 
political culture may the former communist countries bring into Europe? And how may 
it change Europe? These are questions reaching beyond the politics of the political left in 
western Europe, which until 1989 was the obvious political and intellectual clement 
affected by the developments of Eastern Europe under communism. Rather, I am 
thinking about the ability of European history and culture to accept the Eastern 
European experience of nationalism and communism as a legitimate part of its tradition 
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instead of rejecting it as a disability of the `other' less European Europe - as Eastern 
Europe has been most often defined. The difficulties endured by Bulgaria are glaring, but 
its experience is deeply European, and as it and its neighbouring states and others in 
Eastern Europe develop, they may offer lessons to the Continent as a whole. 
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